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Summary of thesis
This thesis is about the operation of the youth justice bail process, between 
initial arrest and sentence (or other final case outcome), in a particular area of 
England and Wales (known here as Baytown). Following a review of the literature on 
youth justice bail services, and a critical discussion of the methodology used, the 
study examines the outcomes of the bail process in Baytown over a three-year study 
period. It analyses the usage of the different options available for the granting, 
restriction and denial of young persons’ right to bail, by comparing court bail 
decisions with key case characteristics. In undertaking this analysis, the study not 
only explains how systematic bail decisions were during the study period, but also 
shows the impact of these decisions on later stages in the youth justice process, 
such as sentencing.
However, the study also moves beyond quantitative discussion and analysis of 
the Baytown youth justice process. It does so by explaining the operation of the 
process in terms of the attitudes towards it of those who have a say in bail decision- 
making in Baytown. A mixture of quantitative and qualitative techniques, including 
surveys, semi-structured interviewing and participant observation, is therefore used 
to explain how local Youth Offending Team staff, local youth court magistrates, and 
young people on bail perceive the process which their own decisions help to shape. 
The study concludes by arguing that, despite recent Government rhetoric and policy, 
widespread discretion continues to exist at local and individual level within the youth 
justice bail process. Future Government policy in this area must therefore 
acknowledge the role of discretion in youth justice, rather than simply ignoring or 
attempting to eradicate it, if bail services for young people are to become more 
systematic and effective.
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Preface
Youth justice in England and Wales is a constantly-changing field for 
discussion and analysis, both in the academic and the wider public domain. Even in 
this keenly-contested arena of process, policy and practice, however, the quantity 
and quality of research on some issues remains limited. Bail decisions made in 
respect of young people, and the influences upon those decisions, is one example of 
a neglected issue which is of fundamental importance for youth justice.
Research on bail which examines the impact of bail decisions upon what 
happens at later stages in the criminal justice process (and what happens after that 
process is complete), as well as how those bail decisions are made, has in itself 
been relatively rare in England and Wales in recent times. One notable exception 
has been the work of Anthea Hucklesby on the use of bail in adult magistrates’ courts 
(1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Hucklesby and Marshall 2000) and in the police station 
(Hucklesby 2001). Nonetheless, work of this kind specific to the youth justice context 
remains limited. This is so despite the recent (belated) attention paid by the current 
Government to bail services for young people, via the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
and its requirement that bail support be available for all young people aged between 
10 and 17 in England and Wales.
This study shows ways in which insights from research into bail decision­
making for adults can also inform similar research in the youth justice context. By 
focusing upon decision-making in a particular local context, research can take a 
holistic approach to bail decisions, how they are made, and their impact on criminal 
justice generally. In this way, the importance of bail processes can be truly 
acknowledged.
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Chapter One
Introduction
This thesis is about the way in which young people are treated at the bail 
stage of the youth justice process. The bail process covers the stage between a 
young person’s initial arrest by police, and the final outcome of a young person’s 
case. The final outcome can occur at a number of stages within the bail process, 
from the police deciding to take no further action against a young person following a 
period spent on police bail, to sentence at court following conviction. Between these 
two points in the criminal justice process, a series of decisions must be made about 
each individual case involving a young person.
Decisions during the bail stage of the youth justice process can loosely be 
broken down into two categories. The first category comprises decisions on whether 
a case can move on to the next stage of the process. An example would be the 
police decision regarding whether or not to charge a young person with an offence, 
and thereby to allow the case to progress to the court stage of the youth justice 
process. The second category comprises decisions on how to deal with an 
adjourned case until consideration of the case can be resumed. It is this second 
category in which decisions are made to grant, restrict or deny bail to young people. 
Such decisions are prima facie taken by either the police or the courts.
However, bail decisions are not made in a social vacuum. Decision-makers 
apply not just the applicable law when making judgments in individual cases, but also 
their own attitudes, cultures and norms. This is the case due to the discretion which 
is inherent in decision-making in the bail process (Hucklesby 1996, 1997a, 1997b). 
Also, other individuals and agencies have varying amounts of influence over
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decision-makers and their actions. Young people themselves are among these 
influences, as well as those working for (or in association with) the youth justice 
process. Nor is influence over bail decisions restricted to those at the ground, or 
‘micro’ level of decision-making. Those at the intermediate, managerial or ‘mezzo’ 
level of youth justice make policy decisions which affect decision-making at the micro 
level, but also implement legislative and policy directives from the Government, 
national or ‘macro’ level of youth justice. Those at the macro level, therefore, also 
have an influence over how decisions are made at the micro level.
It is clear, then, that any comprehensive study into the treatment of young 
people at the bail stage of the youth justice process cannot limit itself to scrutiny of 
the outcomes of bail decisions themselves, nor even to scrutiny of the effects which 
these decisions have at later stages of the youth justice process. Attention must also 
be drawn to who has an influence over these decisions, and how much influence 
particular individuals or agencies have in practice. Macro and mezzo-level policies 
and decision-making must be understood as forming a part of the field within which 
micro-level decisions are made (Hawkins 2003). This thesis incorporates the above 
concerns into a holistic study of the youth justice bail process in one area -  ‘Baytown’.
Before the structure and framework of this study is defined, however, it is 
necessary to consider briefly recent developments in youth justice in England and 
Wales. These developments form the context for the shaping of the youth justice bail 
process, at the macro, mezzo and micro levels, which is the subject matter of this 
study.
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The present youth justice climate in England and Wales -  politicisation, 
evidence on youth crime, and the New Labour approach
In the last 30 years, the youth justice process in England and Wales has 
become increasingly politicised (Pitts 1988). The stances taken by the major political 
parties on so-called ‘law and order’ issues have frequently been of vital importance in 
performances at general elections since the 1960s (Downes and Morgan 1994, 1997, 
2002), and this phenomenon is especially noticeable with respect to issues regarding 
young people and youth justice. In this regard, both major political parties have 
abandoned traditional penological ideology and begun to compete against each other 
to issue youth justice policies saying what they believe the public and the mass 
media wish to hear (Pitts 2001). Interpretations of the impact of politicisation, 
however, differ greatly, and can be split into ‘orthodox’ and ‘radical’ accounts of youth 
crime in England and Wales.
The orthodox approach to youth crime, as reflected in current Government 
policy in this field, is influenced by so-called ‘administrative’ criminology (Garland 
2002), and the focus on empirical crime figures rather than on theoretical approaches 
to their analysis. Another key influence is left realism (e.g. Young 1997), which 
advocates taking crime and crime victimisation seriously on its own terms, using the 
gathering of empirical evidence. A third influence on the orthodox approach to youth 
crime is centred around concerns of managerialism -  economy of money and time, 
as well as the management of the risk posed by different categories of offender, in 
the response to crime (Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994). However, theoretical 
concerns are seen as subordinate to empirical evidence on the nature and frequency 
of youth crime.
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This ‘evidence-based practice’-led approach allows a pluralist range of 
theoretical bases for policy to be used, in response to different kinds of evidence on 
youth crime. Alongside the established punitivist response to public victimisation and 
fear of crime, the influence of criminal careers research (e.g. Farrington 1997) has 
encouraged a policy of early intervention in young persons’ lives, in both welfarist 
and punitivist guises. In addition, the influence of restorative justice and reparation 
(e.g. Wright 1996) has recently been added to the range of responses to youth crime. 
Finally, the managerialism discussed above has provided the impetus for an 
increased rate of bureaucracy, monitoring and data collection of local-level youth 
justice practice by central Government (e.g. Thomas and Hucklesby 2002), and such 
data collection drives (or claims to drive) the evolving policy response to youth crime, 
tailoring different approaches to different categories of offender.
The radical account of youth crime and justice takes a very different approach 
to the politicisation of youth justice, and the evidence on youth crime. For 
proponents of the radical account, the ‘populist punitivism’ approach (Bottoms 1995) 
carries with it serious and well-documented dangers for young people. In British 
society, young people are the persistent focus of the Establishment’s ‘respectable 
fears’ (Pearson 1983), which portray the latest generation of youth as reaching new 
depths of delinquency, making each new generation of young people far more of a 
threat than previous generations (and masking the fact that the same complaints 
have been made about British youth for centuries). Youth is characterised in a 
number of different ways in the British media, but these different portrayals share the 
common factor of ‘the assumption of the different or deviant nature of ail young 
people’ (Muncie 1999: 10, emphasis in original). This image of deviancy is 
periodically aggravated by sensationalist media reports of youth crime (Cohen 1973). 
Thus youth justice policy is the victim of the increasing interaction between
unjustifiable ‘moral panics’ in the media and a Government which is pragmatic to the 
point of cynicism:
‘Youth justice has evolved into a complex object in which a patchwork of 
processes and disposals, drawing upon justice, retribution, 
rehabilitation, treatment, punishment, prevention and diversion, has a 
constantly shifting presence as political priorities, central directives and 
local initiatives veer from one position to another.’ (Muncie 1999: 275)
Given the insidious impact of media sensationalism and political pragmatism
on images of youth crime and justice, it was no surprise that when the Labour Party
won the 1997 general election, one of its first major pieces of legislation aimed to
radically re-organise the youth justice system in England and Wales. It was also no
surprise that this legislation, the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, was a mixture of
diverse youth justice ideologies (Fionda 1999). Partly because of Labour’s
participation, at least on the level of political rhetoric, in the ‘Great Moving Right
Show’ (Hall 1988), when it returned to government in 1997 after 18 years in
opposition, it was anxious to apply its new reputation, as the party that would be
‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ (Blair 1993), to youth justice. At
the same time, statements of youth justice policy had also included ideas drawn from
less punitive philosophies, such as restorative justice and the idea of social inclusion
(Home Office 1997). This mixture of apparently contradictory policies has been
described as ‘post-ideological’ (Pitts 2000: 3), and produced widespread confusion
when it was applied to youth justice in the aftermath of the 1998 Crime and Disorder
Act. The New Labour approach to bail policy for young people is an excellent
example of this contradiction, as the following extract illustrates:
‘The move to re-invigorate pre-trial services is a development which has 
every prospect of making a difference to the number of people who are 
unnecessarily held in the squalid conditions of remand. . . The problem 
remains, however . . .o f  pursuing reform without becoming vulnerable to 
a new outbreak of popular punitiveness. As a result, Labour’s struggle 
is to find a way of reducing the prison population, without appearing to 
do so -  or of doing good by stealth. This is in itself complicated by other
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policy trends within the same administration which are likely to add to 
prison numbers.’ (Drakeford and Vanstone 2000: 377)
Therefore, the provision in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (section 38(4)(c))
that all youth offending teams in England and Wales must offer a bail support service
for young people aged between 10 and 17 leaves many questions unanswered. On
the most basic level, the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act offers no definition of the
concept of ‘bail support’. To understand what is meant by this term, a definition must
be found within the literature published on this subject.
Bail support, the law on bail, and the youth justice context
Bail support is the name given to activities designed to address the criteria for
denying bail at key pre-conviction decision-making points in the youth justice
process, and therefore to intervene in cases where young people are at risk of being
denied bail. It has been noted in this context that:
The problem of how to deal with serious and persistent offenders 
awaiting trial or sentence has been a long-standing one. Policy has 
sought to meet two aims: of keeping the numbers of those remanded to 
institutions, particularly penal and secure institutions, to a minimum; and 
of protecting the public from the risk of serious harm caused by 
offending on bail.’ (NACRO 1998: 1)
The question of juvenile (or indeed any) bail is therefore one of a balance of 
rights, namely those of the person on bail and those of the public. This balance is 
primarily enshrined in the 1976 Bail Act, which must be the starting point for the 
discussion of bail. The 1976 Bail Act (in section 4) states that a presumption in 
favour of bail operates with regard to any person charged with, but not yet convicted 
of, a criminal offence. This presumption also applies to any person convicted of an 
offence, but not yet sentenced to allow for the preparation of reports or further 
inquiries. As a result, everyone has a right to bail unless a court decides that there
20
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are ‘substantial grounds’ for believing that one or more specified grounds for denying 
bail exist. These exceptions are set out in Schedule 1 of the 1976 Bail Act and 
comprise the following: the likelihood that the defendant would fail to surrender to the 
court; the likelihood that the defendant would commit offences while on bail; the 
likelihood that the defendant would interfere with witnesses, or pervert the course of 
justice; that custody is necessary for the defendant’s own protection (or welfare if the 
defendant is a juvenile); or that the defendant is currently serving a custodial 
sentence or has been remanded to custody by another court.
In addition, the 1976 Bail Act provides for the use of conditions to bail, which 
are designed to overcome the exceptions to the right of bail outlined above. These 
conditions must specifically address the circumstances of denial of bail, and section 
3(6) of the 1976 Act authorises the use of such conditions as appear to the court to 
be necessary to ensure that the defendant surrenders to custody, does not commit 
an offence while on bail, does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise pervert the 
course of justice, and is available for the purposes of inquiries or the making of a 
court report.
Various factors which may influence a sentencer’s decision to remand a young 
person in custody, or impose conditions on his or her bail, include: the nature and 
gravity of the offence, and probable sentence if the young person is found guilty; the 
character, antecedents, peer associations, and community ties (or lack of) possessed 
by the accused; a record of any previous bail conditions; probable co-operation (or 
lack of) for the purposes of obtaining reports; and behaviour towards, or proximity to, 
prosecution witnesses (NACRO 1993a: 1-2). However, these are not the only key 
factors in the youth justice bail process. Another is the apparent inconsistency with 
which 17-year-olds are treated, before and after conviction:
'A further concern in relation to new custodial remand arrangements for 
children relates specifically to the issue of 17-year-olds. The most 
recent youth justice ‘reforms’ have failed to recognise this group as 
being children for the purposes of remand arrangements despite the 
unequivocal definitions of the child being a person under the age of 18 
years as contained in the Children Act 1989 and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Thus, the court will deal with 
remand decisions for such children under adult legislation.’ (Monaghan 
2000: 149)
Reasons for studying the youth justice bail process
It has been shown (Smith 2003) that the youth justice bail process is both
complex and susceptible to fluctuating policy implementation as youth justice in
England and Wales becomes increasingly politicised:
‘The policy of successive governments has been to end prison remands 
for (those aged less than 17) but the provisions in the Criminal Justice 
Act 1991 to replace them with court ordered remands to secure 
accommodation have not been implemented. ’ (NACRO 1998: 1)
In fact, following a decrease of over 50% during the 1980s, the rate of juvenile 
remand to custody (particularly for boys) escalated rapidly year-on-year after the 
implementation of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act (e.g. NACRO 1993a, 1995, 1996; 
ACOP/NACRO 1993). Overall, this data shows that the number of young people 
denied bail while awaiting trial has risen sharply during the 1990s. As issues of law 
and order have increasingly been a matter for public debate, there has been 
‘considerable public disquiet about the consequences of detaining young people, 
particularly those aged 15 and 16, in prison establishments’ (NACRO 1993b: 1). In 
this situation, a need for credible community-based remand alternatives for young 
people (especially those charged with more serious offences) has become apparent. 
It is in this context that the concept of bail support has developed. The continuing 
problem of young people who are remanded in custody while awaiting trial makes 
bail support, and its effectiveness in achieving the stated aim of preventing time
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spent in custody, a relevant topic for research. As the definitions of bail support 
given above state, either implicitly or explicitly, bail support has been primarily 
developed with the aim of reducing the number of young people remanded to 
custody in mind.
Recent legislative developments in the sphere of youth justice provide a 
further reason for studying bail support. Under section 38(4)(d) of the 1998 Crime 
and Disorder Act, all Youth Offending Teams (hereafter YOTs) in England and Wales 
must offer bail support services to young people aged between 10 and 17 in their 
area. To this end, the National Youth Justice Board for England and Wales invited 
bids from YOTs for three-year funding packages to allow development and extension 
of bail support services in line with the new requirements. Government funding has 
therefore been invested in bail support. In addition, bail support is capable of 
seriously infringing the liberty of young people awaiting trial. Bail support often 
involves additional supervision and control over them as well as more ‘positive’ 
elements, such as help with accommodation and employment training (Haines and 
Drakeford 1998: 115-6). This kind of intensive scheme must be shown to be 
effective in order to justify its impact on young people’s lives, as well as the level of 
government investment in it. It is therefore argued that studies of bail support’s 
effectiveness are not merely desirable, but an essential part of research into how the 
juvenile bail process works.
This study therefore undertakes an analysis of the bail services for young 
people in the Baytown area. Its aims are twofold: to quantitatively examine the 
operation of the youth justice bail process in Baytown, in terms of offender and 
offence characteristics and court decision-making outcomes; and to qualitatively 
examine the influences on this decision-making process, drawing upon the views of 
those connected with bail policy and practice in the Baytown youth justice process -
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magistrates, court clerks, defence solicitors, YOT workers, and the young people 
themselves. This second aim is equally as important as the first, as the extent to 
which bail support is used, regardless of government enthusiasm for it, depends 
ultimately upon those involved with the youth justice process and their attitudes 
towards bail support (and other, related bail services). Similarly, bail services rely on 
the co-operation of the young people placed upon them for success in terms of 
reducing the number of remands to custody.
The layout of the study
The thesis will be organised in the following way. Chapter Two reviews the 
literature on the history of bail support and the use of bail support schemes in 
England and Wales to date, including previous evaluative work done on bail support 
schemes. Chapter Three draws on the previous literature to construct and apply the 
methodology used in the study, and sets out the hypotheses to be tested in the 
research. Chapter Four reports on quantitative data detailing the operation of the 
Baytown youth justice bail process, in terms of decision-making, during the 
research’s three-year study period. Chapter Five discusses and analyses the data 
reported in Chapter Four. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight report and analyse the 
qualitative data collected as part of the research, which offer insights from different 
individuals and agencies into their decision-making processes. Chapter Six presents 
and analyses the ethnographic, participant observation data collected from the 
Baytown Youth Offending Team staff responsible for bail services over the three-year 
study period. Chapter Seven presents and analyses the results of interviews 
conducted with magistrates sitting in the Baytown Youth Court, highlighting their 
views on the local youth justice bail process. Chapter Eight presents and analyses
data from semi-structured interviews with young people who were involved in the 
local bail process during the study period. Chapter Nine concludes the study by 
setting the empirical findings and analysis in the context of the wider youth justice 
process in England and Wales. Discussing academic perspectives on discretion in 
criminal justice decision-making, the final chapter examines the theoretical 
implications of the study, and offers suggestions for future research, policy and 
practice in the field of the youth justice bail process.
Two brief notes on the terminology used in the study are necessary here. 
Firstly, it is recognised that, in the research and literature on the subject, the terms 
‘bail’ and ‘remand’ are used interchangeably to describe what happens in criminal 
justice between initial arrest and final case outcome. In this study, the term ‘bail’ is 
used to refer to the above part of the process, rather than ‘bail or remand’, as a 
means of saving space. Secondly, as will already be apparent, the term ‘process’ is 
used in preference to ‘system’ when discussing the ambit and operation of youth 
justice, except where the specific ‘systems management’ analytical approach is being 
discussed, or where others have used the term in a direct quotation.
Chapter Two 
A review of the youth justice systems management and bail 
services literature in England and Wales
Introduction
This chapter will examine the available literature on bail support and other 
‘remand management’ work in the youth justice process in England and Wales. It will 
locate bail support and ‘remand management’ work within its historical origins, which 
lie within the development and use of systems management analysis to understand 
and reform youth justice.
The purpose of the chapter is, firstly, to provide a definition of systems 
management analysis, and then to review the literature on its use in the youth justice 
process in England and Wales, as well as literature which criticises and offers 
alternatives in terms of analysis of the process. The results of this review will 
determine whether systems management analysis can be justifiably used in 
constructing the methodology for this study. The second purpose of this chapter is 
the discussion and analysis of what is known about the effectiveness of youth justice 
bail support work in England and Wales. Discussion will therefore centre around 
whether it is viable to place analysis of bail support work’s effectiveness within the 
wider context of bail services generally, using systems management analysis as the 
means of doing this.
It should be noted at this point that the bail process for adults, and the agency 
work done within it, is outside the ambit of this study. Therefore the body of literature 
on adult pre-trial services will not be discussed in this chapter. However, a small
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amount of evaluative work on bail information schemes (designed to provide court 
decision-makers with all of the relevant information on defendants’ circumstances 
when making bail decisions) for adult defendants has been published (e.g. Stone, 
1988; Godson and Mitchell, 1991; Lloyd, 1992). Similarly, detailed evaluation of 
general pre-trial services available for adults in England and Wales can be found in 
Paterson (1996), Haines and Octigan (1999) and Drakeford et al. (2001). Also, while 
it is recognised that there is an extensive body of literature on partnerships and multi­
agency work within criminal justice generally, this literature will not be reviewed here, 
due both to lack of space and to the need to maintain specific focus on the context of 
bail within the youth justice process.
A review of the systems management literature
Introduction: definitions of ‘systems management’
‘Systems management’ is the generic name given to a collection of analytical 
techniques first used to address issues relating to the youth justice system in the 
early 1980s. The starting point for all of these techniques, however, was the idea of 
systems analysis. The concept of systems analysis as applied to the youth justice 
system in England and Wales was developed by a group of academics linked to the 
Lancaster University Centre for Youth, Crime and Community, often collectively 
known as the ‘Lancaster School’ (Cavadino and Dignan 1997: 254). They were 
influenced in turn by earlier attempts to link social work practice together in a 
theoretically coherent model, which attempted to change social systems rather than 
individuals, in an attempt to promote clients’ needs in the context of hostile systems.
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The basic concept of systems management analysis, and the Lancaster School
contribution to it, has been defined in the following way:
‘This (i.e. systems analysis) means ... looking at the ways in which all 
the different agencies interact and interconnect to form the entire 
system . . . however, the Lancaster approach stresses the need to 
apply systems analysis to the youth justice system in a particular 
local area. Accurate systems analysis facilitates effective systems 
intervention: the system can be modified in ways which the analysis 
suggests will achieve specific desired results, such as a decrease in 
the numbers of juveniles ending up in custody.’ (Cavadino and Dignan 
1997: 255, emphasis in original)
The systems management literature: a review of its theoretical basis and impact 
upon the youth justice process in England and Wales
Arguably the most influential ‘Lancaster School’ publication, Out of Care 
(Thorpe et al. 1980), took as its starting point the effects of the 1969 Children and 
Young Persons Act on the custody rate for young people in England and Wales. 
Noting that the numbers of young people sentenced to custody in England and 
Wales had risen throughout the 1970s, while the numbers sentenced to supervision 
orders, probation orders and care orders had decreased, Thorpe et al. saw this as an 
unintended consequence of the partial implementation of the 1969 Act1. However, 
the particularly damaging results of the 1969 Act’s implementation, which were 
highlighted by Thorpe et al.’s empirical research, were primarily caused by the 
expansion of the youth justice process. This was in turn caused by the co-existence 
of two processes in the 1970s juvenile court -  the old ‘custodial’ one, and the new 
‘welfare-based’ one, which the 1969 Act had partially brought into effect via such 
developments as intermediate treatment. Therefore:
1 Following the defeat of the Labour Party (who had drawn up the legislation) by the Conservative 
Party in the 1970 general election. Conservative youth justice policy was more punishment-orientated 
than that of Labour, which was based upon welfare/interventionist principles (Gelsthorpe and Morris 
1994).
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The two systems have, in effect, become vertically integrated, and an 
additional population of customer-clients has been identified in order to 
ensure that they both have plenty of work to do.’ (Thorpe et al. 1980:
22-3)
Thorpe et al. (1980) offered a critique of the juvenile justice process and of the 
individuals in it, accusing all concerned of making the wrong decisions about the 
wrong young people at the wrong time (ibid.: 3). They were able to explain why the 
juvenile justice process was not working, and how it could be made to work better, by 
their reliance upon a research-based account of what happened to young people in 
the process. This allowed them to put forward a series of evidence-based arguments 
to counteract various myths about the nature of juvenile crime2.
The importance of Out of Care and other Lancaster School literature lies in the 
fact that its arguments were based on empirical evidence illustrating what happened 
to young people in the criminal justice system in practice. These works represented 
a move away from the mainly ideological, or ‘general social theory’ (Bottoms 2000: 
36-7) approach to youth crime and justice, characterised by welfarist (or positivist) 
and justice-based (or retributivist) theories. Between them, these theoretical models 
informed much of the political and social response to youth crime between 1945 and 
1970 (Pitts 1988). They formed the basis of youth justice legislation during that time, 
but avoided discussion of what was actually happening to young people in the youth 
justice process (Thorpe et al. 1980: 25). In contrast, the Lancaster systems 
management theory, and indeed any such similar analysis, was derived from day-to- 
day youth justice practice, and was of itself value-free:
2 These arguments included the fact that most juvenile crime was of a trivial nature; the idea that most 
young people offend at some point during their teenage years but then grow out of crime as they 
progress into adulthood (Rutherford 2002); the effect of ‘up-tariffing’, whereby young people, once 
brought into the criminal justice system, are often rapidly moved upwards through the sentencing tariff 
for minor offences; and the concept of ‘net-widening’ (Cohen 1985), based on the idea that welfare- 
based systems tend to bring more and more young people into the criminal justice system on the 
grounds of their failure to comply with welfare measures not related to the causes of their offending 
behaviour (Haines and Drakeford 1998: 48).
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‘Systems management of itself is a value free management tool that 
says nothing about the aims of intervention. But it is the linking of 
systems management with the critique of welfarism and the over-use of 
custody which creates such a powerful mixture/(Bell and Haines 1991:
121, quoted in Haines and Drakeford 1998: 50)
The most powerful justification for the use of systems management analysis of 
the youth justice system in England and Wales, therefore, is that it recognises the 
characteristics of the youth justice process in practice. The most important of these 
is that much of the real power in terms of making and influencing decisions about 
what happens to young people in the criminal justice process lies in the hands of 
youth justice workers. This fact was emphasised by Thorpe et al. (1980) in their 
arguments that youth justice sentencing trends were made up of many individual 
decisions at local level, and that the operation of the youth justice process comprises 
a whole series of such decisions. Therefore, each decision has implications for 
future actions and future decisions to be taken with regard to young people (Thorpe 
et al. 1980: 25; Haines and Drakeford 1998: 49).
However, it was not inevitable that the systems management approach per se 
would lead to the subsequent youth justice ‘successes’ of the 1980s3. It was the 
gradual development of an anti-custodial, pro-diversionary orthodoxy among youth 
justice workers, and the combination of this orthodoxy with systems management 
approaches, that helped to facilitate changed outcomes for young people involved in 
the youth justice system in the 1980s, i.e. notably, an increase in diversion and 
decrease in custodial sentencing (Haines and Drakeford 1998).
The origins of the pro-diversionary element in youth justice practice are more 
difficult to ascertain in the youth justice literature of the 1980s. The anti-custody 
movement shared the determination of the justice movement to move away from 
unfettered welfare approaches, which research has shown had widened the net of
3 These will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
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the youth justice process by sentencing on the basis of welfare needs (Thorpe et al. 
1980). However, it was also distinct from the arguments of the proponents of the 
justice model in several important ways. On the most fundamental level, the concept 
of proportionality of punishments to the gravity of offences is of central importance to 
supporters of the justice movement (e.g. von Hirsch 1976, 1993), but this concept is 
not necessarily compatible with diversion as it came to be viewed by youth justice 
practitioners in England and Wales in the 1980s.
Diversion, as it was employed in conjunction with systems management 
techniques at the local level of the youth justice process in the 1980s, signified a 
strategy of pushing young people out of the criminal justice process wherever 
possible, mainly through the increased use of cautioning (Haines and Drakeford 
1998: 58-9). Closer examination of important justice model-based texts published in 
the early 1980s reveals that diversion was accordingly welcomed very cautiously 
therein. Sarri (1983), for example, having reviewed literature on the effects of youth 
justice diversion schemes both in the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom at the time, concludes that diversion of young people has some major 
drawbacks. These include the coercive potential of diversion, and the problems of 
diverting young people out of the criminal justice process and into other processes 
(for example the care system, which could and did involve sometimes long-term 
removal from home). The latter phenomenon, it was claimed, had resulted in 
‘minimisation of penetration’ rather than ‘true diversion’ (Sarri 1983: 70), and this in 
turn led to the risk of ‘net-widening’ (Cohen 1985). It was the occurrence of ‘net- 
widening’ which had formed one of the cornerstones of Thorpe et al’s (1980) critique 
of the juvenile justice process in the 1970s.
Similarly, Giller and Covington (1983: 143) suggest that only tightly-defined 
criteria for diversion can guard against the apparent tendency of diversion
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programmes to widen the criminal justice net (Morris et al. 1980) -  although it should
be said at this point that Thorpe et al., whose work is by no means exclusively
justice-based, make the same claim (1980: 128). Again, however, Thorpe et al.
emphasise that successful diversion means different things to different youth justice
practitioners in different areas:
We must emphasise that there is no one ‘solution’, no ‘right’ way of 
going about diversion. This is because there is no one juvenile criminal 
justice system, only an aggregate of local systems, local practices and 
local procedures -  and, as an earlier chapter has already made clear, 
local situations differ widely. Hence, diversionary intervention also calls 
for research skills on the part of the practitioner. Local data must be 
collected and analysed, and appropriately local strategies suggested 
and discussed. ’ (Thorpe et al. 1980: 128)
Juvenile justice practitioners made use of justice-based requirements within 
the youth justice process (such as those in the 1982 Criminal Justice Act) and 
incorporated them in local level strategies. But there was far more to systems 
management-based approaches than justice-based work. More central was a firm 
belief that time spent in the criminal justice process did the majority of young people 
more harm than good. This belief came from such theoretical standpoints as 
labelling theory (e.g. Becker 1963), but was reinforced by empirical research which 
came to the same conclusion, which was again provided by the Lancaster School 
among others (e.g. Thorpe et al. 1980: Chapter Four).
In conclusion to this section, then, the key to systems management analysis 
as it was developed for use in the youth justice process in England and Wales in the 
early 1980s was its pragmatic, evidence-based, ‘bottom up’ view of what actually 
happened to young people in that process. In a movement away from the unfettered 
welfarist approach of youth justice workers in the 1960s, but also from the strict tariff- 
based theories of the justice movement, systems management eschewed grand
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ideology4. In place of macro-level theory, it empowered individual youth justice 
workers, using evidence to show them where they had been going wrong previously 
in their work with young people in trouble, while emphasising the power that they 
retained over what happened to young people in the criminal justice process. It 
allowed practitioners to reflect each local area’s unique combination of causal factors 
for youth crime and multi-agency, multi-decision interaction in the youth justice 
process in the development of a strategy that, it was claimed, would reduce youth 
crime rates.
The effectiveness of systems management in the English and Welsh youth justice 
process in practice
The previous section shows that systems management analysis has the ability 
to reflect the reality of youth justice practice and effects at a local level -  indeed, it 
could be argued that this was the whole point of its development. However, another 
crucial test of systems management’s suitability for use in this study is its success 
rate when applied to the youth justice process in England and Wales in the 1980s. 
The question addressed in this section is quite simply: did the systems management 
approach actually work in terms of its stated aims, namely reducing custody and 
increasing diversion for young people (Haines 1996)?
The assumption that, after initial conflict and resistance at local level, systems 
management approaches to youth work became ‘the new orthodoxy’ (Jones 1984) in 
England and Wales is supported by contemporary literature on youth justice (e.g. 
Pitts 1988; Bottoms et al. 1990; Cavadino and Dignan 1997; Haines and Drakeford
j
I 4 The closest Thorpe et al’s (1980) work moved towards ‘grand theory’ was the idea that the 
decarceration of the majority of young people from custodial institutions was necessary, and should 
form the basis of local strategy. Even this idea was the result of extensive empirical research on their 
part.
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1998). If this assumption is correct, the results which systems management
achieved are impressive, especially in the climate of tough, punitivist Government
rhetoric prevalent at that time (Downes and Morgan 1997). This account explains the
significance of the decreased rate of young people being sent to custody which
accompanied the increased rate of young people being cautioned during the rise of
the systems management approach to youth justice:
‘Sentencing trends clearly demonstrate a proportionate decline in the 
use of custody over the decade of the 1980s to around 8% ... Two 
further factors put this decline in an even sharper focus. Firstly, 
research showed that the growth in community supervision was at the 
expense of custody . . . Secondly . . .account has to be taken of the 
impact of trends in cautioning over this same penod5. But juvenile 
justice practitioners were not just successful in reducing the custody 
rate, they were even more successful in reducing this rate for a 
relatively older and more serious cohort of offenders.’ (Haines and 
Drakeford 1998: 59-60)
Allen (1991) offers a multi-causal explanation of the sharp decline in youth 
custody in England and Wales during the 1980s. He highlights the importance of 
micro-level youth justice workers and welfare professionals in promoting the anti­
custody, pro-diversion strategy derived from systems management. However, Allen 
also points to a range of other factors which help to explain the decline in custody 
rates. Some of these factors could not be influenced by systems management, such 
as the decline in the numbers of young people in the general population.
Other factors were indirectly beneficial to the systems management approach, 
such as the implementation of the 1982 Criminal Justice Act. Although the Act 
resulted in longer sentences for those young people who were sent to custody, 
because of magistrates’ preference for semi-determinate youth custody sentences 
over ‘short sharp shock’ detention centre sentences (Burney 1985), it also introduced 
just deserts principles to youth justice. These included the criterion that custody
5 Cavadino and Dignan (1997: 258) support this argument by noting that ‘in 1992, 82% of known 
indictable offenders under 17 were cautioned compared with 49% in 1980’.
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could only be imposed where no other sentence could be justified, and the provision 
of an opportunity for youth justice workers to articulate alternative, non-custodial 
options in the form of a social inquiry report (Allen 1991: 36-42). These legislative 
changes were undoubtedly beneficial to the systems management approach and the 
principles associated with it at the time. Practical effects included more widespread 
legal representation for young people in court, and more (and better-targeted) 
interventions designed to divert young people from custody. However, while systems 
management work certainly took advantage of the new legislative climate, it would be 
wrong to say that micro-level initiatives were entirely responsible for the success in 
decreasing custody and increasing diversion for young people during the 1980s.
Care must also be taken, when reviewing the literature, to problematise the 
idea of diversion from the youth justice process. Systems management work 
considered increasing levels of diversion to be a measure of its effectiveness. Yet 
the effectiveness of diversion from custody itself (in the form of community 
sentences) was questioned in research. Bottoms et al. (1990), for example, in their 
survey of intermediate treatment (hereafter ‘IT’) for young people in England and 
Wales, illustrated the beneficial impact of systems management on IT, in terms of 
achieving the stated aims of systems management as well as improving the 
effectiveness of multi-agency work. Yet the survey also illustrated widespread 
confusion in practice about the exact meaning of the term ‘alternatives to custody’, 
questioned the specificity of systems management-related aims and objectives at a 
local level, and showed that IT itself covered a wide variety of activities, not limited to 
work aimed exclusively at those who were at risk of either care or custody. 
Therefore, the research argued that the impact and effectiveness of the systems 
management approach to analysis, despite organisational improvements, depended 
significantly upon local youth justice cultures, norms and circumstances.
Research also questioned the usage of diversion in the form of cautioning. 
Gelsthorpe and Morris (1994: 976-7) use official youth crime statistics to show that it 
was the increase in this form of diversion that reduced custody, rather than increases 
in the usage of community sentences and IT. However, other researchers pointed to 
inter-area inconsistency in police cautioning policy, based on local practices (Evans 
1991), hostility on the part of the police towards cautioning, particularly with regard to 
older children (Evans 1991, 1993), the reduction in transparency and accountability 
for cautioning decisions (Pratt 1986), and the increased scope for discrimination in 
cautioning decisions (Farrington and Bennett 1981). In addition, Davis et al. (1989) 
criticised cautioning policy for insufficient consideration of, and consultation with, the 
victims of youth crime. Overall, therefore, research suggests that although systems 
management, with its anti-custodial and pro-diversionary aims, had a significant 
impact upon the outcomes for many young people involved in the youth justice 
process in England and Wales during the 1980s, there were limitations to its overall 
usefulness as an approach to work done with young people in trouble.
Other weaknesses of the systems management approach can be found in 
literature critiquing the politics of such an approach in the youth justice context. Holt 
(1985) offers an account of the youth justice process in England and Wales in 
practice, and the theoretical and practical factors which guided its operation and 
effectiveness, at the time of systems management’s rise to prominence during the 
1980s. He argues (1985: Chapter Five) that Thorpe et al’s (1980) work marked an 
important shift in perceptions of youth crime, because it offered a radical critique of 
the positivistic, interventionist youth justice process of the time.
Holt argues that there were three main ideas behind this critique. The first 
was the increased accountability of State employees, moving towards democratic 
checks on the decision-making processes of ‘welfare’ institutions involved in juvenile
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justice. The second was the defensive strategy of ‘gatekeeping’ to ensure that young 
people were not dragged ‘up-tariff unnecessarily. The third was the idea of a ‘theory 
of atonement’, based on principles of reparation, and aimed at breaking away from 
dualistic conceptions of juvenile intervention6. As a result, Thorpe et al. disowned 
pathological and positivistic conceptions of criminality.
However, Holt also claims that Out of Care overlooks fundamental political 
questions about social control, because it does not question the positivistic 
framework behind juvenile justice (Holt 1985: 42-3). He argues that Thorpe et al’s 
concept of ‘the correctional curriculum’ represents an unwillingness to acknowledge 
the importance of resisting the dominant ideology and as a result it legitimises (with 
the apparent backing of the IT profession) the continued existence of the problematic 
‘penal continuum’. Because of this, he argues (1985: 19) that Out of Care falls short 
in terms of its political analysis of youth justice work.
Holt claimed, further, that bifurcation would lead to the concepts of ‘treatment’ 
and ‘punishment’ being legitimised in the same continuum of disposals for young 
people, both promoted in the name of prevention of further offending (1985: 25)7. 
Given the recent increasing attempts by successive governments to centralise 
political control over youth justice in England and Wales (Goldson 2000), Holt’s claim 
that lack of analysis at the political and ideological level is a flaw in the systems 
management approach to analysing youth crime and justice may have even more 
relevance now than it did during the 1980s.
Cavadino and Dignan also acknowledge political issues in their discussion of 
systems management. They state that ‘it (i.e. systems management) is necessarily 
anathema to proponents of “law and order” ideology because it seeks to limit
6 I.e. the traditional ‘welfare vs. justice’ dichotomy (e.g. Gelsthorpe and Morris 1994).
7 It is interesting, in the light of this comment, to note that following the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, 
the ‘prevention of youth crime’ is now the sole statutory aim of youth justice in England and Wales.
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punishment rather than intensify it’ (1997: 259-60), and relate this factor to the
Government’s decision to turn against systems management in the early 1990s,
having supported it (albeit tacitly) in the 1980s. This is true, but the move away from
systems management was also related to the increasing power over youth justice
practice at ground level which central government gathered during the 1990s, under
the process known as managerialism (Pratt 1989; Haines and Drakeford 1998).
Managerialism, or corporatism, can be defined generally in the following way:
‘This sociological concept refers to the tendencies to be found in 
advanced welfare societies whereby the capacity for conflict and 
disruption is reduced by means of the centralisation of policy, 
increased government intervention, and the co-operation of various 
professional and interest groups into a collective whole with 
homogenous aims and objectives.’ (Pratt 1989: 245)
Pratt (1989: 246) also notes the influence of economic and industrial policies 
and practices upon the development of managerialism in the public sector. 
Managerialism was characterised firstly by the introduction of National Standards for 
those working in the youth justice process, under the Conservative government. 
Subsequently (and more directly) it came to dominate youth justice practice under 
the Labour government which won the 1997 general election, via the 1998 Crime and 
Disorder Act. The 1998 Act radically re-organised the structure of the youth justice 
process, and introduced more intrusive National Standards, including those for bail 
workers (Youth Justice Board 2000a, 2001). So, during the 1990s, the Government 
decided to impose its punitive rhetoric on youth justice practice at a local level, and 
this rise in managerialism dealt a major body blow to the important (and successful) 
work that had been done in the previous decade, using systems management 
principles combined with an anti-custodial stance. Further, with the implementation 
of the 1998 Act and the introduction of the Youth Justice Board and Youth Offending 
Teams, the government deliberately set about discrediting (often with the assistance
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of the Audit Commission) everything that had gone on before, and set about 
replacing previous good practice with a whole new raft of measures and interventions 
designed to usher in a ‘new youth justice’ (Goldson 2000).
Pitts (1988, 1996, 2001) has offered a more detailed critique of systems 
management, again related to its lack of political analysis. Pitts has described 
systems management analysis of youth justice as the ‘collusion and cock-up’ thesis, 
arguing that it ‘ignores government and the role of the state in elaborating both an 
ideology and an apparatus of social control’ (Pitts 1988: 24). He further feared that 
systems management would inevitably result in the co-option of practitioners into the 
government’s “law and order” strategy. Pitts instead favoured a radical, politicised 
approach to youth offending, focusing on macro-level policy on youth justice and 
other social spheres, and its role in disciplining and excluding young people, both 
inside and outside the youth justice process.
Cavadino and Dignan accept the validity of Pitts’ criticisms to some extent, 
concluding that ‘systems analysis neglects the political and ideological dimensions 
and (so) cannot provide a complete theory of the penal system’ (1997: 261). 
However, they also accept that managerial techniques of analysing youth justice can 
still be useful in limiting punishment where it is ineffective, in the financial sense or 
otherwise. Crucially, however, they favour the managerialist approach only in line 
with just deserts and restorative principles, and criticise the mixture of systems 
management concerns with a more punitive agenda in current Government youth 
justice policy (Cavadino et al. 1999: Chapter Seven). This pluralist approach views 
systems management as a means to an end8, rather than as an end in itself. Such 
an approach takes into account the macro-level concerns central to Pitts’ work, while
8 The end being a less punitive and more inclusive youth justice process, on Cavadino et al.’s 
analysis.
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maintaining the micro-level perspectives key to Thorpe et al.’s (1980) approach to 
youth justice.
Conclusions
This review of both the techniques used in systems management analysis of 
the youth justice process, and of the results which application of this research 
technique achieved in the youth justice system in England and Wales in the 1980s, 
seems to indicate that systems management analysis is well-suited to the context of 
the youth justice process. It is, however, vulnerable to attack (because of its 
inherently value-free paradigm) from ‘law and order’, punitive youth justice policy, 
and more particularly the politicisation of the youth justice process in England and 
Wales where such ‘law and order’ policies are involved (Pitts 1996; Cavadino and 
Dignan 2002).
This literature review’s analysis of systems management theory and practice 
in the context of the youth justice process has two very important implications for this 
study. The first is that it can be used as the basis for the study’s methodology. This 
study is concerned only with the operation and effectiveness of one part of the youth 
justice process (namely the bail process) in one particular area of England and 
Wales. Nonetheless, the bail process is part of the larger youth justice process9. It is 
therefore argued that systems management analysis is equally applicable in this 
smaller, more localised context.
The second implication for this particular study is that bail support must be 
considered and analysed in the context of the wider bail process, as an integral part
9 Or at least a part of one in a series of local youth justice processes, which if considered together 
comprise the youth justice process. This approach would be more consistent with that taken by 
Thorpe et al. themselves.
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of that wider process. It cannot be meaningfully analysed independently, particularly 
in terms of effectiveness in working with young people and success or failure on 
those terms. Other parts of the bail process must be considered alongside bail 
support practice and outcomes, and evaluated in the same way. The preceding 
literature review has shown that the impact of the youth justice process on young 
people cannot be accurately examined without looking at all aspects of a distinct 
section of that process -  in this case, all possible experiences of young people in the 
process between initial arrest and final sentencing outcome.
The second part of this chapter will examine what is known about the 
effectiveness of youth justice bail support schemes in England and Wales, in the light 
of the conclusions drawn above.
A review of the youth justice bail services literature
Introduction: history and definitions of ‘bail support’ and ‘remand management’ in 
youth justice
The literature available on the nature and usage of bail support schemes in 
England and Wales shows that bail support services developed from the ‘bottom up’ 
in individual youth justice teams10. This process of development began in the 1980s 
(NACRO 1993a: 1). At that time, there was no statutory requirement that bail 
information or bail support be provided. As mentioned in the introduction, such a 
requirement was put in place only in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. As a result, 
the early bail support schemes were developed in response to identified need at a
10 As they were known prior to the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. Since the 1998 Act, they have been 
labelled ‘Youth Offending Teams’ -  perhaps indicative of the New Labour shift in focus from ‘doing 
justice’ and promoting due process to ‘tackling offending’.
local level (NACRO 1998). This portrayal of the development of bail support work in 
England and Wales appears to endorse Haines and Drakeford’s view that it was work 
done by youth justice teams at a local level which helped to reduce the number of 
young people remanded and sentenced to custody (Haines and Drakeford 1998: 55- 
61).
Haines and Drakeford also argue that local youth justice teams were able to 
bring about these anti-custodial practices by employing systems management 
techniques to analyse what happened to young people in the criminal justice 
process. It is clear that the development of youth justice bail support work and the 
anti-custodial, pro-diversionary application of systems management principles to 
youth justice were inexorably linked. As such it is appropriate to conclude that the 
earliest recognised bail support schemes were one example of the grass roots, 
systems management-based ‘anti-custody orthodoxy’ in England and Wales in the 
1980s, and developed in a piecemeal way.
Evaluation of the literature highlights the fact that ‘bail support’ and ‘remand 
management’ are inherently flexible and loosely defined terms. Although the exact 
definition of the term ‘bail support’ varies from source to source, the following 
definition focuses on services and information designed to facilitate the granting of 
bail:
The provision of a service or services designed to facilitate the 
granting of bail where bail would otherwise be denied.’ (NACRO 1993b:
2)
This can be contrasted with the following, much longer definition of ‘bail
support’, also set out by NACRO, which focuses on activities undertaken with
defendants after they have been granted bail:
‘Community-based activities in programmes designed to help ensure 
that defendants awaiting trial or sentence successfully complete their 
periods of unconditional or conditional bail by returning to court on the
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due date, without committing offences or interfering with the course of 
justice, and to assist the bailee to observe any conditions of their bail. 
Activities and programmes may be aimed at: improving social and life 
skills, controlling anger and aggression, reducing drug or alcohol 
misuse and tackling difficulties with family relationships, schooling, 
employment or accommodation. Such programmes may be run by the 
bail support project itself or through referral to specialist organisations. ’ 
(NACRO 1995: 4)
The concept of ‘remand management’, similarly, covers a great deal of
ground. On its most basic terms, it is defined in the literature as an extension of the
systems management principles discussed in the first part of this chapter to the bail
process. It has been perceived as including the following aspects of practice:
‘Interagency co-operation, common information bases and gatekeeping 
strategies, sustained and methodical monitoring of remand patterns, 
systematic diversionary strategies, good community-based resources, 
careful writing of PSRs ...’ (Hoare 1992: 13)
More specifically, ‘remand management’ has been seen as starting from the 
point of arrest by police, and including strategies covering young people’s detention 
in police custody under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, bail information for the 
courts, conditional bail, bail support, specialised remand fostering schemes and 
supported lodgings, remands to residential childcare facilities, remands to secure 
accommodation, and bail hostels (Hoare 1992: 12-13). Remand management work 
can cover any, some or all of the decisions made in the youth justice process, 
between arrest and final sentence in court. Of course, the quotes from Hoare above 
presuppose a particular set of principles to be applied in conjunction with the systems 
management approach. The early literature takes it for granted that these principles 
revolve around diversionary strategies, designed to restrict young persons’ 
involvement with the youth justice process to the minimum level necessary or 
achievable. Later literature, however, moves away from this pure diversionary 
approach, as the next subsection shows.
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The features of effective bail services
More evidence of the fact that bail support developed in a piecemeal way lies
in the apparent lack of any national guidelines on bail support policy and practice
until 1994. In that year representatives of probation, social services and voluntary
organisations drew up Principles for Policy and Practice for working with young
offenders (NACRO 1995). These Principles highlighted the potential for ‘net-
widening’ (Cohen 1985) in bail support work, meaning the referral of defendants who
would otherwise have been given unconditional or conditional bail. The Principles
also emphasised the need to relate closely the nature, quality and intensity of support
offered to the reasons given by the court for denying bail. Finally the Principles
seemed to emphasise the need to distinguish bail support from other forms of
supervision. This is true in that they included the importance of respecting the legal
status of unconvicted defendants, inter alia by not describing bail support as
‘supervision’, and the inappropriateness of using bail support as a test of future
potential for supervision (NACRO 1998: 2). Later literature, however, casts doubt
upon the validity of this approach to how bail support should work:
‘While schemes are still concerned to target juveniles at risk of 
custodial or secure remand, more pragmatic approaches to the content 
of bail support have developed as a result of growing concern about 
high levels of offending on bail by the juvenile age range ... In 
particular, bail support programmes will need to be guided by an 
assessment of the risks presented by the juvenile, and strategies for 
managing those risk factors.' (NACRO 1998: ibid.)
The latter quote provides no empirical evidence for the change in appropriate 
focus for bail support work (such as evidence of the effectiveness of various 
approaches to bail support). Instead, it points towards the changing political priorities
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attached to youth justice during the mid-1990s11 and uses them as a guide for bail 
support policy and practice. In a paper whose stated aim is to ‘summarise what is 
known about bail support with a view to assisting agencies ... in their area’ (NACRO 
1998: 1), the complete absence of empirical evidence to support the arguments 
made in favour of changing the focus of bail support work is not an encouraging sign. 
The absence of any acknowledgement of the author of this paper12 also makes it 
very difficult to inquire further into the rationale and supporting evidence underpinning 
these publications.
Earlier literature on bail support takes a similarly narrative approach to bail 
support work. In 1993, NACRO, who were the main source of bail support literature 
at this time, published a series of papers on pre-trial initiatives in the youth justice 
system, which in practice focused upon bail support work. The papers acknowledge 
the need to locate bail support work within a wider pre-trial ‘remand management’ 
strategy (1993a: 3), and emphasise the diversity of bail support schemes in England 
and Wales (ibid: 1). Consequently, they generally focus on the promotion of greater 
consistency in underlying principles, a common approach to the assessment of bail 
support needs, and the incorporation of bail support strategy into the legislative 
framework for bail.
The first paper acts as an introduction to these key themes (NACRO 1993a). 
The second paper in the series (NACRO 1993b) outlines a possible theoretical 
framework for bail support services, based on the twin foundations of the legislative 
framework (of the 1976 Bail Act) and the provision of bail information13. The paper 
then sets out a framework for bail support services, based upon the separation of
11 Particularly ‘actuarial justice’ or risk management (Feeley and Simon 1992), and punitivism.
12 And indeed the other NACRO papers on the subject of bail support discussed below.
13 A pre-trial service which involves the provision of relevant, verified and positive information about 
defendants in respect of whom the CPS is likely to oppose bail in court. There is some uncertainty in 
the literature as to whether bail information is separate from bail support, or simply one particular 
variety of it: see the two definitions on pp.42-43 above.
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assessment of need and provision of services, as well as the provisions of the 1976 
Bail Act, and systems management principles (see earlier). Nonetheless, there is no 
actual evidence to suggest that these measures will improve the effectiveness of bail 
support schemes -  in fact no other sources of information are cited in this paper at 
all.
Later papers in the series go on to develop the themes outlined in the second 
paper, using systems management principles to outline a blueprint for pre-trial review 
(e.g. NACRO 1994: 2). Again, however, there is no evaluation of the effectiveness of 
these policies in terms of reducing remands to custody, and no examples of 
evaluation of bail support schemes which have adopted these measures in practice. 
Regardless of the soundness of these systems management principles when applied 
to bail support services, this paper is again prescriptive but lacking in any 
corroboration.
More recent literature, unlike the NACRO papers described above, has
attempted to place bail support work in the context of what evaluation has previously
been done. A good example is the work of Moore and Smith, who, in their recent
guide to good practice in pre-trial work, devote a whole chapter to bail support work
(2001: Chapter Five). Moore and Smith reaffirm many of the points made in the
earlier bail support literature described above. There is an attempt -  albeit a very
limited one -  to put forward the idea of bail support services as one integral
component of a wider overall bail strategy (2001: 65). Elsewhere the authors state
that the foundation of bail support services should be the 1976 Bail Act, and the
exceptions to the general right to bail which it includes (2001: ibid.). They argue that:
‘Prior to the Youth Justice Board funding stream becoming available ... 
the provision of bail support was patchy and of an inconsistent 
standard. ’ (Moore and Smith 2001: 66)
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They also state that the specific role of bail support programmes is to reassure 
the courts in cases where there are serious doubts about the ability of the young 
person in question to meet the conditions of bail, and where the young person 
presents a risk of serious harm to others (2001: ibid.). In making this argument they 
emphasise that bail support programmes are only appropriate in the above 
circumstances, and advocate the use of conditional bail as an alternative in less 
serious cases. They do also allude to the threat of ‘net-widening’ for young people 
wrongly placed on bail support schemes. However, they cite wasted financial 
resources as the main (managerialist) reason for guarding against this, rather than 
the more traditional concern of young people being unnecessarily pushed ‘up-tariff 
and thereby being exposed to the increased risk of a custodial sentence through 
excessive infringements on their liberty (Thorpe et al. 1980; Cohen 1985).
Finally, Moore and Smith argue that bail support is a specific, short-term 
method of intervention, and put forward a number of criteria by which schemes’ 
success or failure can be judged. These are: compliance with National Standards; 
ability of the scheme to reduce the use of remands to local authority accommodation, 
secure and custodial remands; a high rate of compliance with the scheme; the 
presence of identifiable short-term benefits to young people; and the ability to meet 
the needs and expectations of courts and other agencies (2001: ibid.).
As argued above, many of Moore and Smith’s arguments comply both with the 
earlier bail support literature generated by organisations such as NACRO, and with a 
systems management approach to analysis of bail support effectiveness. However, 
again as with the earlier bail support literature analysed above, they do not cite any 
precedent or literature authority as corroboration for any of their arguments. This 
weakens the power of their work, but this lack of evidence is perhaps more of a
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reflection of the scarcity of suitable bail support literature which can be relied upon
when constructing a guide to effective bail support practice.
Other recent guides to the youth justice process also deal with bail support
work and the hallmarks of its effectiveness. Haines and Drakeford (1998) refer to it
as part of their systems management analysis of the youth justice system in England
and Wales. Like Moore and Smith, they emphasise the need to restrict the level of
supervision of as yet unconvicted young people on bail support schemes to the
minimum necessary (1998: 115). Haines and Drakeford, however, argue far more
explicitly than Moore and Smith that bail support work should comprise constructive
work with young people as well as restrictions on their liberty:
‘Of course bail support has to include elements of supervision and 
control. These formal aspects, however, have to be counter-balanced 
with a genuine interest in the well-being of those made subject to such 
schemes and a genuine desire to see them succeed within it, and in 
which the provision of advice and assistance is a cornerstone of 
effective practice.’ (Haines and Drakeford 1998: 115-6)
Again, this analysis is only supported by one example of a bail support
scheme in practice, that of the Pembrokeshire bail support scheme. Although an
evaluative report of the findings from this project was produced (Raynor 1995), it was
apparently not published, and details on the scope, content and effectiveness of the
scheme are scarce in the report. This seems to reinforce the fact that there is little
practical evaluation of bail support work at a local level to be found.
Due to the lack of evaluative material, what little there is will now be analysed
in more detail, in order to ascertain what is known about effective bail support work.
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Evaluation of youth justice bail schemes in practice
The literature reviewed in this section will be divided into two sections: that which has 
originated from the Home Office and the National Youth Justice Board (hereafter 
YJB) for England and Wales, and that which has originated elsewhere. The latter 
group of literature will be examined first in this section.
/. Non-governmental research
Outside the criteria for effectiveness set out for bail support schemes by the 
YJB (via literature issued by NACRO and the National Standards for Bail Support), 
independent evaluation of bail support schemes has been extremely rare. If such 
evaluation has taken place it is seldom published formally in a way which is 
accessible to the public, or to a professional researcher.
However, some sources of evaluation, usually taking the form of accounts of 
evaluative work cited in more general publications, are available. Most of these are 
works published by the Children’s Society, which give examples of bail support 
schemes in action, with some evidence of evaluation included. Such publications 
remain scarce, however. It is also noticeable that the publications dealing with bail 
support schemes’ work in practice (rather than with bail support at a theoretical level) 
tend to rely on a very small ‘core’ of projects for evidence of bail support work’s 
effectiveness.
In particular there is heavy dependence upon the work of the Greater 
Manchester Bail Support Scheme since 1997 (e.g. Goldson and Peters 2000; Moore 
and Smith 2001). The reason for the concentration on the Greater Manchester 
project is not clear. It possibly relates to the fact that so little rigorous evaluative work
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has been done (or at least published) in relation to bail schemes for young people, 
leading to a heavy dependence upon whatever evaluative work has been done in 
particular areas, regardless of its validity and generalisability to other areas’ bail 
support work. Whatever the reason for this reliance on the Greater Manchester 
project is, further discussion of it is required at this stage.
The crucial issue for present purposes is the nature and extent of evaluation of 
the Greater Manchester Project’s effectiveness in achieving its stated aims. Its aims 
were the reduction of remands to custody, the reduction of non-compliance and re­
offending by young people on bail, and the reduction of custodial sentences for 
young people. These aims, in turn, determined the two stated overall measures of 
success for the Bail Support Project, namely how credible it was perceived to be by 
the courts in the Greater Manchester area, and how successfully the young people 
put on the scheme completed their programmes.
Examining the targeting of the project firstly, all the available evaluation 
(Moore and Smith 2001: 78-85; Foster 1998: 6-14) refers to the audit of the scheme 
done in 1998. In that year 136 referrals were made to the project, of which 102 were 
offered a place on the programme. In turn, of these 102 young people, the court 
accepted 51 referrals (50%). Of the 51 young people not given bail support, the 
majority (39) were remanded in custody. As the evaluation points out, this would 
seem to suggest that the project was targeting its services at those who were at risk 
of receiving a secure or custodial remand (Moore and Smith 2001: 78). This, as 
mentioned above, was one of the project’s stated aims, so to this extent the project 
could be described as effective.
The next issue that must be addressed at this point is the level of compliance 
shown by those who were accepted onto the Greater Manchester programme. Of 
the 37 young people who completed the programme during the evaluation period, 24
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(64%) were successful, 5 (14%) were partially successful14, and 8 (22%) failed, so 
that total or partial success was achieved in 78% of cases (Moore and Smith 2001: 
82).
Moore and Smith also include information on sentencing outcomes for those 
placed on the Greater Manchester bail support scheme. They show that the majority 
of cases (46%) that reached final outcome during 1998 resulted in a community 
sentence (Moore and Smith 2001: 82)15. Moore and Smith do admit (2001: 82) that it 
cannot be said with certainty that the success of the young people who completed 
the bail support scheme without any breach gave courts in the Greater Manchester 
area more confidence in making non-custodial sentences, as there is not enough 
information on how young people not placed on the bail support scheme were 
sentenced. However, the lack of a complete account of effectiveness surely makes 
the need for similar information from other bail support schemes in England and 
Wales even greater. The fact that Moore and Smith do not provide any such 
comparison implies that such information was simply not available to them, even 
when writing a publication as recently as 2001.
It is not until details about the young people placed on bail support schemes 
and their history of offending are taken into account in evaluation, as well as 
comparisons with young people who are not considered suitable for bail support 
work, that a true picture of the effectiveness of bail support work with young people 
can be built up. Such considerations are completely absent from the literature under 
review here. Their presence and importance is disguised by the efforts of literature
14 I.e. where the young person did re-offend, but less seriously, and otherwise complied with the 
programme; or where the young person did not comply, but did not re-offend and has not been 
incarcerated.
15 In the 30 cases where the constructive work done while on the bail support scheme might have 
influenced the sentencing decision of the court, 63% of sentences were either community sentences
i  or absolute or conditional discharges -  a slight decrease compared with the 1997 figure of 66% 
(Foster 1998: 7).
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such as the work by Moore and Smith to promote the Greater Manchester Bail 
Support Scheme as a blueprint for bail support work elsewhere in England and 
Wales, and to claim that whatever successes that scheme may have had can be 
emulated in other areas by using the same methods in practice.
The evaluation also investigated the credibility of the programme in the eyes 
of the courts. The evaluators sought anecdotal evidence from those involved in the 
running of the bail support project, particularly from magistrates, court clerks and 
defence lawyers. Only three of the comments obtained are printed in the Moore and 
Smith evaluation (2001: 81). Extra comments are included in the 1998 evaluation 
published by the Children’s Society (Foster 1998: 16-17). Taken together the 
comments on the scheme are universally favourable. However, there is no account, 
in any of the published work, of how many people were interviewed as part of the 
evaluation, what the response rate was, or of how many (if any) negative comments 
were made about the scheme by those involved with it. No information is given in 
either the original project evaluation report or Moore and Smith’s account about the 
methodology of obtaining this anecdotal evidence -  whether the information was 
obtained using interviews, focus groups, or questionnaires, for example.
This lack of information makes the account of the Greater Manchester 
project’s effectiveness very inconclusive. As regards Moore and Smith’s account, 
they do not acknowledge the fact that although they purport to be offering a general 
guide to good bail support practice, all of their information is derived from the 
evaluation of one bail support project during one particular year, with no further 
comparative work to test the validity of the data obtained.
As a final point about Moore and Smith’s account, it is also argued that the 
positive effects of incorporating bail support services within an integrated overall bail 
strategy are not made sufficiently clear. As stated above, Moore and Smith begin
52
their chapter on bail support by setting it in the context of ‘remand management’ 
strategies. However, nothing is said in discussing the work in Greater Manchester 
about how this way of working relates to an overall remand management strategy in 
practice, or to what extent bail support work is linked into it.
Another Children’s Society publication (Goldson and Peters 2000), although 
published earlier than Moore and Smith’s work, offers slightly more up-to-date 
information about the Greater Manchester bail support project’s success rate, 
alongside a narrative account of the kind of work done on the scheme. According to 
their analysis, in 1999, 95% of young people completed the Greater Manchester 
programme without any breach; 70% of the young people referred to the programme 
completed the programme without re-offending; and 70% of the young people with 
whom the project worked were eventually sentencing by way of community disposals 
-  an improvement on the 1998 rate (Goldson and Peters 2000: 19). However, the 
above caveats about the limitations of evaluation apply again here, as little additional 
information is given.
One other comment should be made about Goldson and Peters’ evidence 
here. If 95% of the young people in 1999 completed the bail support programme 
without breach, but only 70% completed it without re-offending, then this strongly 
implies that some young people re-offended while on the bail support scheme, but
5
I were not breached for it. This raises possible issues about breach policy and the
j  attitude of local courts towards breaches of bail support conditions. However, these
I
! questions are not addressed, or even acknowledged, in Goldson and Peters’
[
! account.
Published evaluation of other schemes suffers from similar difficulties as thei
evaluation of the Greater Manchester Project. An example is Goldson and Peters’ 
(2000) brief discussion of the Dorset Bail Support Scheme, without any analysis of
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effectiveness along the lines of impact on remands to custody, targeting, and local 
youth justice credibility. The scope of the Scheme’s remit is similarly unclear. The 
authors remark that the Scheme ‘provided less formalised support for many more 
young people while they were on bail’ (ibid.: 20). What exactly is meant by this 
comment is not made clear. It raises a number of issues which are not adequately 
resolved in this account. These might include some explanation of why this ‘less 
formalised’ work does not count as bail support work, what sort of work is done in 
both categories, and where the boundary between ‘less formalised’ and ‘official’ bail 
support work is drawn by this particular Scheme. Also, there is no mention of how 
this Scheme fits into a remand management strategy, if it does at all.
Before fieldwork for this study began, attempts were made to expand the 
range of literature reviewed by contacting Youth Offending Teams and asking 
whether any information or evaluation of the sort analysed in this chapter was 
available for the bail support schemes which they were running. However, the Youth 
Offending Teams contacted (a total of 20 in all) were generally only able to provide 
basic information about the services offered under the auspices of their bail support 
scheme. Evaluation of effectiveness was virtually non-existent, or at least if any had 
been done, the YOTs involved were not willing to make it available.
f
! II. Home Office and Youth Justice Board evaluationj
i
| Before the implementation of the YJB under the Crime and Disorder Act
| 1998, Government-sponsored evaluation of youth justice bail services was very
i
j scarce. Even Misspent Youth (Audit Commission 1996), often cited as a key
; influence on New Labour’s youth justice policies, devotes just three pages to remand 
generally (ibid.: 30-33) and only discusses one bail support project. As with the
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evaluation in Part I of this chapter, there is no analysis of this project’s effectiveness, 
only a description of its activities. Discussion of remand is primarily framed in terms 
of the great financial cost of remanding young people to the secure estate, rather 
than other measures of the effectiveness of bail services.
However, the introduction of the YJB, together with the new statutory 
requirement that all Youth Offending Teams (hereafter YOTs) provide bail support 
services for all young people within their area of jurisdiction aged between 10 and 17 
inclusive, signified a change in the YJB’s evaluative approach. The YJB began to 
collect and analyse data on youth justice bail services -  a requirement it placed 
directly on YOTs -  and it indirectly commissioned evaluative research on bail as a 
condition of funding YOT based developments in this area. This data was obtained 
from all YOTs in England and Wales, four times per year, and disseminated to all 
YOTs by the YJB, as well as being made available on the YJB’s website.
An example of the evaluation approach taken to bail services can be found in 
the Second Evaluation Report on Bail Supervision and Support Schemes (Bail 
Support Policy and Dissemination Unit 2001). In contrast with the literature reviewed 
so far in this chapter, these reports have taken a nationwide, comprehensive 
\ approach to evaluation of bail services which have been funded by the YJB.
i
| Statistics were gathered only for projects which were partially or wholly funded by the 
’■ YJB, rather than all projects in existence in England and Wales at the time of the 
j report. Whilst this raises questions about the generalisability of the projects surveyed
i\
j to bail services generally, it does represent a more systematic attempt to evaluate
|
I youth justice bail support services than the research discussed earlier in this chapter.
The Evaluation Report is a review of 102 local reports into bail support and 
supervision schemes across England and Wales. It covers a range of issues, 
including local schemes’ operational status, factors helping and hindering the
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development of schemes, accommodation issues, the bail supervision process itself, 
the content of locally offered programmes, and compliance with YJB-devised 
National Standards for Bail Supervision and Support. The three key performance 
indicators by which the Report judges schemes’ effectiveness are attendance at 
court, reducing offending on bail, and reducing the number of remands to custody.
The Report takes a primarily descriptive approach to evaluation. The bulk of 
information is presented in the form of short, descriptive vignettes on aspects of 
particular schemes’ practice. Analysis of schemes’ progress against national 
standards accounts for only four pages of a 42-page report. The report also 
struggles to put performance in a wider context. For example, court attendance rates 
are given for funded schemes during the time period covered by the report, but no 
attempt is made to compare these rates to what occurred previously. Similarly, when 
discussing the target of reducing offending on bail, the report concedes that this 
target ‘is the less (sic) tangible of the three aims’ (ibid.: 40) and will depend on a 
number of factors beyond the scope of the report. These include individual young 
persons’ circumstances and offending, previous offending and levels of support 
offered by each scheme. Similarly, the report goes on to state that:
j
[ ‘it is difficult to say to what extent bail supervision and support has
I reduced remands to custody ... however, it is likely that it has been a
: contributory factor3 (ibid.: 41)
However, no empirical evidence is offered to support this argument.
j The report therefore offers evaluation of youth justice bail services on only a
ii
j superficial level, and does not analyse the effectiveness of schemes against its
i
j defined criteria. There are also other measures of effectiveness which are 
overlooked, such as effectiveness and credibility of schemes in the view of young 
people and magistrates. Neither does the report show the rate of cases in which a 
bail support application was made by YOTs, but rejected by the courts. Further,
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although some information is given on re-arrest and breach rates, no attempt is made 
to connect these to sentences given, or otherwise to compare sentences given to 
those successfully completing bail support programmes with sentences given to 
those who partially completed or failed programmes, or who were not accepted onto 
a bail support scheme.
The report discussed above is representative of much of the literature on bail 
services regularly published by the YJB since its inception. Thomas and Goldman’s 
(2001) report acts only as a guide to YJB-imposed national standards for ‘bail 
supervision and support’, for example, and does not provide any evaluation of 
effectiveness (however defined). Despite a normative approach, based around an
i
integrated bail strategy, the only references corroborating the report’s arguments are 
the YJB National Standards themselves. There is no reference to particular 
examples of individual YOTs’ practice, or any indications of current level of 
compliance.
Other YJB publications have attempted to meet the deficiencies outlined here. 
One example is Thomas and Hucklesby’s (2002) report, prepared for the YJB. This 
report acts as a guide to effectiveness in youth justice bail services. It has several 
advantages over the ‘regular’ YJB reports. Firstly, it firmly locates bail support as one 
important part of a coherent, systematic bail strategy -  something which the
!
j previously discussed literature failed to make clear. Secondly, it prioritises analysis
I
j of effective practice over description16 (as well as providing an introductory review of
| bail legislation, such as the 1976 Bail Act). Thirdly, applying the systems
? management approach, it addresses and gives guidance for each decision-making
!
; stage within the youth justice bail process, from arrest to sentence. Finally, itj
; provides a theoretical basis for its systems management analysis, by advocating a
16 This was done by drawing upon the unpublished returns, from individual YOTs, of information 
required by the YJB. These returns were not disseminated publicly.
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f,
‘children first’, proactive, rights-based approach to ‘remand management’, which
prioritises the least restrictive bail status necessary for young people (Thomas and
Hucklesby 2002: 5-6).
There are also limitations to the usefulness of this source, however. Perhaps
the main disadvantage is the lack of primary empirical evidence underpinning the
study and complementing the secondary literature review. The authors do claim that:
‘semi-structured interviews were conducted with a sample of YOTs, 
prison service establishments, secure units and significant individuals 
within the field. ’ (ibid.: 4)
They also include excerpts from interviews throughout the report. However,
no information is given on how many interviews were conducted, which role each
interviewee played within the youth justice process, or what questions were asked.
More information is required to assess the reliability and validity of this data, and to
avoid the accusation that this primary evidence has been ‘bolted on’ to the secondary
analysis, rather than being triangulated with it. Further, although feedback on bail
services has been sought, to some extent the approach is meta-analytical. It
therefore overlooks the context of local bail policy and practice, and does not give
| enough information about exactly which strategies are likely to be effective in which
| youth justice context. Indeed, the report admits this problem by stating that:
‘at the time of writing, there is no published research which indicates 
how well strategic partnerships undertake their functions, or their 
contribution in assisting YOTs to develop and deliver services 
(Thomas and Hucklesby 2002: 73)
Nor is there any apparent research in this report into the views of youngI
j people on the effectiveness of bail services. Therefore, the views of young people on 
these services remain hidden as a measure of effectiveness. Other YJB publications 
have sought the views of young people, alongside those of victims and offenders’ 
parents, on youth justice generally (Youth Justice Board 2003), but these data focus
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mainly on the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programmes (hereafter ISSP) 
which can be undertaken by young people on bail, rather than bail services generally. 
This report also does not include the views of youth justice agencies, so that a 
comparison can be made between different standpoints on youth justice, and lacks 
focus on particular local contexts of youth justice. As with previously reviewed 
literature, then, the report offers a partial view of service effectiveness, but lacks a 
holistic and focused case-study approach, and an appreciation of differences 
between local youth justice processes, such as that advocated by Thorpe et al. 
(1980).
A rare recent example of empirical research into bail practice, which does 
include research into the views of decision-makers in the bail process, is the Home 
Office-sponsored study by Morgan and Henderson (1998). This study measures the 
impact of the Bail Process Project, which aimed to provide better information to those 
making bail decisions (i.e. police and magistrates), so that those groups could, in 
turn, make more accurate predictions of defendants’ suitability for bail17. The study’s 
methodology was to undertake case studies in five different areas of England and 
Wales. In each area, data were collected on offenders, offences and bail decisions 
taken, during two separate three-month periods -  the first before the Project had
| been implemented, and the second afterwards. Data were also collected on
i
j recorded re-offending, in terms of charges and convictions, occurring while on bail.
j In addition, focus groups, comprising the criminal justice agencies involved in bail
| A Q
I decisions in each area , were conducted for two purposes. Firstly, focus groups
i
| were asked to conduct a systems management analysis of the bail process in their 
area, identify problems in the operation of that process, and devise possible solutions 
to those problems. Secondly, focus groups were held to discuss the information
17 And therefore reduce unnecessary denials of bail.
18 Magistrates, police officers, CPS staff and probation officers were included in the study.
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which agencies wanted to possess when making decisions, and how important 
different kinds of information were to them in making decisions, based on the criteria 
for denying bail contained in the 1976 Bail Act. The results obtained were complex: 
however, rates of offending on bail decreased following the Project’s implementation, 
across the five selected areas overall19.
A clear advantage of this research is its sophisticated, triangulated 
methodology, and its involvement of the various agencies who have an impact on 
bail decisions, as well as the magistrates who make such decisions. It also identifies 
! factors which were more likely to be associated with offending on bail20 and 
; compares these to factors which decision-makers thought to be important when 
! remanding defendants to custody21. Also, the study examines variations between the 
| decision-making contexts in different areas.
| However, there are several limitations in the particular context of this research.
I
! The most prominent is that the study does not specifically focus upon the youth
i
| justice process, where some age groups have different criteria for denial of bail than
j
| criteria applicable to adults. Also, although the study focuses on factors important in 
| offending on bail, it does not specifically focus on the services offered to those on 
I bail, the different ways of measuring their effectiveness, and the impact which these 
services might have on court decisions. Finally, the study does not attempt to 
‘connect’ offending on bail, and interventions on bail, with later sentencing decisions.
; Therefore, although it is more advanced than other recent literature in thei
| methodological sense, the Morgan and Henderson study leaves several key
I
; questions about youth justice bail processes unanswered.
19 Although there were differences in the scheme’s impact between the areas.
20 E.g. homelessness, the current offence and previous offending history.
21 Mostly the factor groups were similar, with some exceptions -  e.g. age affected the rate of 
offending, but did not affect the remand to custody rate consistently.
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Conclusions
The literature reviewed in this chapter highlights the historic importance of 
systems management analysis in both theoretical and empirical evaluation of youth 
justice bail processes. However, it also highlights the vulnerability of a value free 
method of analysis, like systems management, to political development of youth 
justice policy. Traditionally combined, with some success, to a strategy of diversion 
and minimum necessary intervention in the field of youth justice bail practice, 
systems management analysis has been affected by recent moves to make youth 
justice policy more centralised and punitive (Downes and Morgan 1997; Home Office 
1997).
The second part of the review examined research into bail services for young 
people under New Labour, and found that, despite the great increase in the quantity 
of evaluation since the introduction of the YJB and other Crime and Disorder Act 
measures, there has not been a corresponding match in the quality of evaluation. 
Early systems management research, such as Thorpe et al.’s (1980), emphasised 
the need to understand the youth justice process in terms of a network of local youth 
justice processes. Recent research has reflected the centralising macro-level 
policies of the YJB -  an exercise in systems management in itself, but one which 
does not obviate the need for detailed research into the key influences on the youth 
justice bail process in particular areas, and the different ways in which the 
effectiveness of local processes can be measured.
The lack of research which assesses the role of all of the key decision-makers 
in the youth justice bail processes, but which also takes into account the 
effectiveness of such processes in the view of those involved (including young 
people), was noted by Thomas and Hucklesby (2002) in their own research. These
gaps in research knowledge formed the foundation for the current research study, 
and, in particular, provided valuable guidance on an appropriate methodology for the 
study. The following chapter sets out the methodology used, as well as providing 
justifications for the decisions taken in constructing the methodology, and discussing 
problems faced in its practical implementation.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
Introduction
The main conclusion drawn in Chapter Two was that little or no systematic 
evaluation of bail services for young people in England and Wales had previously 
been produced. Bail support and intervention projects have existed for some time in 
England and Wales (since the mid 1980s), but there has been little organised 
evaluation of effectiveness. Moreover, much of what has been done was very limited 
in its scope, not just in terms of looking at particular local projects (which this project 
also does), but also in terms of methodology (e.g. little combination of quantitative 
and qualitative research methods in the same study) and theoretical development 
(e.g. locating findings in a wider context). The literature review therefore showed the 
need for new research in this area -  but it also pointed towards appropriate directions 
for epistemology, research design and the methodology itself.
The aim of this chapter is therefore to explain the methodology used in the 
study. This will involve detailed explanation of the role of theory in the chosen 
methodology, the approach taken here towards research design, and the exact 
methods used in the study. However, description of the research process is not all 
that is required in the chapter. Critical evaluation of the decision-making process at 
each stage of the research is also a key concern. This will reveal not only how 
decisions at each stage of the research process were taken, but also the strengths
and weaknesses of the chosen approach at each stage. Finally, the impact of 
practical issues on the chosen approach to research will also be discussed and 
analysed throughout the chapter.
Epistemological issues
Introduction
The first step taken here was to consider possible research epistemologies in
terms of criminal justice research. There are several of these.
Bottoms points out (2000: 35) that all of these epistemological approaches
have their own strengths and weaknesses. In particular, he points to the tradition in
criminological research to take one of two polarising epistemological approaches to
the research process. On one side, there is the research tradition known as
positivism. Robson (2002: 20) identifies the key features of this epistemological
approach as the principles that only direct observation can generate factual
knowledge; that science is free of researchers’ values; that science is largely based
on quantitative data; that all scientific propositions are founded on facts; and that
causation is established by demonstrating empirical regularities.
Positivism is the theoretical standpoint most associated with the idea that
theory-neutral facts do exist in social research. In other words, positivism takes the
view that social facts can be (and should be) separated from the values held by
social researchers. Yet many of those writing on social research philosophy and
practice dispute this view:
‘Facts are “theory-impregnated”. What we see as factual is a product 
of our theories and an agreement between them and reality itself ...
(yet) value-freedom of such a “naive” kind continues to be a claim in
the actual practice of social research. British Home Office research on 
crime can be seen as an example of such an approach’. (Williams and 
May 1996: 111-13)
Values (whether acknowledged or not) always play a part in social research 
design and methodology. Even an apparently ‘value-free’, quantitative method of 
research, such as the use of a questionnaire, involves theory and value decisions -  
regarding the wording and order of the questions in the questionnaire, for example. 
Yet, as Williams and May (ibid.: 116) go on to point out, this need not mean that 
objectivity cannot be pursued as an aim of social research:
‘The objects of social science are constituted by values and this 
presupposes an appreciation of the values peculiar to the part of the 
social world being studied. Without this, the researcher cannot 
evaluate the phenomena under investigation and their research is 
without relevance. However, it is appreciated that the investigator will 
be motivated by her own presuppositions that will shape her evaluative 
framework. This is inevitable and even desirable. However, to admit of 
this need not compromise “value” neutrality, for the researcher is able 
to objectively describe the values under investigation. ’
In the context of this research, where a review of relevant literature has 
revealed the amount of discretion enjoyed by individuals and agencies at each stage 
of the process, any research strategy endorsing the existence of theory or value- 
neutral facts appears to be inappropriate. It also militates against research which
! examines feelings and attitudes which are not directly observable (May 2001), and
|
| these would seem to be an essential part of research into a neglected and
! discretionary part of the criminal justice process. It is therefore rejected here. This
j
| should not, however, preclude any particular theoretical research strategy, apart from
i
? the more traditional forms of empirical research which regarded objectivity and value*
freedom as equivalent. The real principle here is that social research must be open 
and reflexive about the theoretical assumptions that underpin the ways in which it is
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carried out. This will therefore be a key feature of the current chapter, particularly 
where the context of the research is discussed in more detail below.
The second traditional epistemological approach, which is often in direct 
opposition to positivism in social research, is known as relativism, or interpretivism. 
This, like positivism, encompasses a range of research principles, but basically 
argues against the objective, value-free approach to research which is characterised 
by positivism:
‘Interpretivism is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required 
that respects the differences between people and the objects of the 
natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the 
subjective meaning of social action.’ (Bryman 2004: 13)
Interpretivism therefore prioritises revealing the meanings attached to the
social world by individuals within it. Far from promoting value-free research, as
positivism does, it takes the view that that the researcher’s values are an integral part
of research. A related approach, constructionism, goes further by stating not only
that social phenomena are produced through social interaction, and are constantly
being revised, but also, in a more recent version of the principle, that researchers can
only produce a subjective view of the social world, rather than an objective, definitive
view (Bryman 2004: 17).
Writers such as Robson (2002: 22) illustrate the difficulties of an interpretivist 
approach to research, especially when it makes claims that there is no external social 
reality other than that which is observed by each individual. Apart from the problems 
of generating theory through carrying out this type of social research, there is the 
I more practical argument that such a view simply does not fit in with the ‘real world’
i
(ibid.). In addition, interpretivism can lead to difficulties for researchers in prioritising 
different accounts of the social world and meanings attached to it (Hammersley 
1993).
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This dilemma is summed up by Bottoms (2000), who highlights five key 
approaches to epistemology in the particular context of criminological research: 
classicism, natural science-based positivism, active-subject socially-oriented 
criminologies, active-subject individually-oriented criminologies, and political-activist 
criminologies. While moving beyond the traditional positivism-interpretivism debate 
in some respects22, these approaches mirror the difficulties faced by researchers in 
choosing an appropriate epistemology, as discussed above. Positivism and 
interpretivism each have their own strengths and weaknesses23. Bottoms’ key 
theoretical approaches, similarly, each have strengths and weaknesses of their own.
Recognition of this leads Bottoms to propose guidelines for the relationship 
between criminological theory and practice, which draw pluralistically on the 
strengths of different epistemological approaches (Bottoms 2000: 44). As Bottoms 
points out, the challenge is to link theory to practice through research design. With 
this in mind, Bottoms advocates an adaptive theory approach similar to that of Layder 
(1998), combining the strengths of different theoretical approaches to social research 
(and of inductive and deductive theoretical approaches in particular) in an attempt to 
combat the weaknesses of each individual approach.
However, another key feature of this study, which had a direct influence on the 
methodology, must be discussed at this point. This feature was the exploratory 
nature of the research being carried out. Chapter Two showed that little detailed
!
evaluative analysis of the bail process for young people in England and Wales had 
previously been carried out. Therefore an epistemological approach which reflected
i the need for theory-building in this context was required. The next subsection
j
i
22 For example, the recognition and promotion of power and its effects in political-activist 
criminoiogies, and the distinction made between social and individual forms of interpretivism.
23 The key strength of positivism, which is not always acknowledged in practice, is the emphasis on a 
scientific and rigorous approach to research, as noted by Robson (2002: 21).
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considers the appropriateness of one such approach to the current study -  the 
approach known as grounded theory.
Evaluating the usefulness of a ‘grounded theory’ epistemology
In line with Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) argument, it is submitted that context is
crucial in selecting the right research design (and subsequently an appropriate
methodology). This subsection, and those that follow, deal with the context of the
topic and the specific research setting, comparing different research designs with this
context to assess their suitability for this particular project. Here the focus is on
‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and its usefulness in addressing the
research issues outlined above.
Briefly, ‘grounded theory’ is the process of research which involves theory
emerging inductively from collected data, in contrast to more traditional, experimental
approaches to research in which data emerges from a theory or hypothesis. In this
way, proponents of grounded theory argue, it is more likely that a theory which is
easily understandable and which fits the data of social research will be produced:
‘The principal method advocated by Glaser and Strauss to further the 
discovery of grounded theory is that of “comparative analysis”, an 
approach that they say places “a high emphasis on theory as process; 
that is, theory as an ever-developing entity, not as a perfected product” 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967: 32).’ (Bottoms 2000: 43, emphasis in
| original)
Bryman (2001: 395-7) outlines some criticisms of grounded theory which have 
been put forward. These include the difficulty (for various reasons) of narrowing
I
j down the field of enquiry and disregarding theory until a late stage of the research 
process24; doubts over whether grounded theory is really capable of generating
24 Bottoms (2000: 43) also identifies this mistaken assumption that theory-neutral facts can exist.
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formal (or broad-range) theory beyond the specific context of the research; concerns
over whether the discrete coding of data (which grounded theory, in its purest form,
often demands, in terms of categorising data in preparation for use as theory)
damages the context of the research; and the vagueness surrounding the precise
nature of the grounded theory approach25.
Clearly there are problems with the specific grounded theory approach of
finding conceptual categories in the data, finding relationships between these
categories, and explaining these relationships by finding core categories (Glaser and
Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). The systematic coding techniques usually
involved in grounded theory may be too specific for a particular study. However, the
key to overcoming this problem, particularly in the context of the present research,
may lie in the following observation:
‘Grounded theory is both a strategy for doing research and a particular 
style of analysing the data arising from that research.’ (Robson 2002:
191, emphasis added)
Arguably the problems highlighted previously are primarily concerned with the 
second meaning of the term ‘grounded theory’ given in the above quotation. The 
difficulties posed by the closely-defined rules on the categorisation of data are
!
surmountable by adopting the first meaning of ‘grounded theory’ above -  the more 
general sense of the term. This returns to the idea of inductive theory, which 
develops from the data collected, without necessarily prescribing the research
! methods themselves.
It is this more general application of grounded theory to research epistemology 
which was therefore adopted for this research study. While the key principles of
i
i
grounded theory remained -  the generation of hypotheses emerging from data,
25 E.g. confusion over the different meanings of constructivism in research.
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which would then be tested by further research -  it was used as a strategy for doing 
exploratory research, rather than as a prescriptive method of gathering and analysing 
data generated by the research.
Returning to Bottoms’ research guidelines set out above, the challenge facing 
the methodology for this study was to incorporate this exploratory, grounded theory 
approach to research, while still avoiding the polar extremes of positivism and 
interpretivism. One advocated solution to this challenge is that of realist research. 
The next subsection therefore defines and assesses the applicability of realist 
research in the context of this research study.
Evaluating the usefulness of realism in research epistemology
As a starting-point to this discussion, it is useful to return to one of Bottoms’ 
key criticisms of both positivistic and ‘pure’ grounded theory methods of doing social 
research. This was that both of these models assume, wrongly, that theory-neutral 
facts exist in the social world. It is submitted that what is needed, in this study at 
least, is an approach to research which accepts that ‘knowledge’ and ‘facts’ are 
never indisputable, and always social and historical products (Robson 2002: 32).
One possible solution to this problem is the social research paradigm known
i
as realism. Proponents of realism have argued that it offers a ‘middle way’ in social 
research between positivism and relativism (e.g. May 2001). They have pointed out 
that the fallibility of researchers’ knowledge about the social world which they are
i
| investigating shows that the world exists independently of what individuals think
i
about it -  a belief that realism shares with positivism (Bryman 2001: 13).
Evidence of this fallibility is easy to find. Examples include the ‘messiness’ in 
research mentioned above -  the mistaken beliefs, wrong turnings and unexpected
I 70
outcomes (good or bad) that characterise social research. This belief in the 
existence of a social world independent of individuals’ world-view avoids the problem 
faced by purely constructionist, relativistic approaches to research -  namely the 
difficulty of reconciling competing social accounts or theories.
On the other hand, realism also clearly rejects the positivist belief that 
research is value-free, and direct observation is the foundation of social research. As 
stated above, realism argues that knowledge can be specific to a particular time, 
culture or social situation (Robson 2002: 34). Theories are developed to explain the 
social world, and then accepted, rejected or amended in the light of research in 
practice. It is therefore argued that realism is an appropriate basis for the 
methodology used in this study.
However, realism is, like any other research paradigm, not without its 
problems. A key issue here is the different labels attached to different strands of 
realism, reflecting its development from empirical, or ‘naive’ realism. This merely 
asserted that reality could be understood by using appropriate research methods. It 
did not, however, acknowledge the underlying social structures which generate 
observable social phenomena and events (Bhaskar 1989: 2). It is so-called ‘critical’ 
realism which takes this extra step. Moreover, critical realism aims to change society 
for the better by evaluating and revealing these underlying social structures. This, it 
is argued, emphasises the reflexive, critical approach to collecting and analysing 
research data which should be a key element of the social research process.
The main principles of realist research explanation are set out by Pawson and 
Tilley (1997). They argue that social phenomena only occur when the conditions are 
right for them to do so. The outcome of a social action follows from mechanisms 
acting in particular contexts. In this study, the outcome can be seen as the patterns 
of bail usage for young people, and their impact on later stages of the youth justice
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process. This arises from actions, which are the decisions made by key individuals 
and agencies regarding young people in the youth justice process. These actions 
follow from hypothesised underlying mechanisms, which, in the context of the 
Baytown youth justice bail process, lead to the outcomes of that process and its 
operation. It was therefore the task of the research methodology, and the research 
itself, to uncover possible underlying mechanisms, and analyse their ability to explain 
outcomes in the given context.
The context in this research study was the structure, social organisation and 
practical outcomes of bail policy and practice in a particular area (Baytown). The 
latter was shaped by the reorganisation of youth justice services in England and 
Wales into Youth Offending Teams following the implementation of the 1998 Crime 
and Disorder Act (see Chapter Two). The outcomes to be measured were the 
outcomes of bail decisions made during the study period. Further, the study aimed to 
explain these outcomes with reference to the attitudes of those having a say in the 
Baytown youth justice bail process. When coupled with the fact that the study aimed 
to gather knowledge specific to a particular geographical context, this brief summary 
indicates the basic suitability of realist research for the research study. In particular, 
critical realism was applied to the research. This was so because the aim of the 
study was not merely to describe how the bail process worked for young people in 
Baytown, but also to evaluate how well the process worked. As Bhaskar (1989) 
notes, it is this evaluative and normative dimension to critical realism which 
distinguishes it from other forms of realist research.
Next, having established a general framework for research design, the 
particular decisions about the priority given to different aspects of the research 
process will be discussed, in the light of the research context. The issues raised
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here follow those highlighted in Bryman’s discussion (2001: 29). The discussion 
begins with analysis of the selection of an appropriate research design for the study.
Decisions involved in constructing the study’s research design
The development of research design is a key (but not always well- 
acknowledged) stage in any research study’s methodology. It is discussed here 
since it is necessarily antecedent to the selection of the research methods 
themselves:
‘(Research) design deals primarily with aims, uses, purposes, 
intentions and plans within the practical constraints of location, time, 
money and availability of staff ... Methods texts are about how to get 
there, once the goal is defined or chosen. ’ (Hakim 1987: 1)
Research design is therefore the structure around which the actual research
methods are built. Detailed examination of it is required because it is the preparatory
stage of social research, allowing for careful consideration of the appropriateness of
different research philosophies and theories, and of ontological and epistemological
issues. As Hakim’s quote above illustrates, though, it also requires consideration of
more practical issues and constraints relating to the research. It is therefore argued
that decisions about suitable research design should be made with just as much
: consideration of the context of the research as the later decisions regarding the
I
| actual research methods themselves. This is done as a key part of constructing the
i
i
| research design in the paragraphs that follow.
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Causal connections between variables
This issue really concerns internal validity, or whether independent variables
identified in the study are really responsible for the variation identified in the
dependent variable. Of course, this issue is always relevant in social research to
some extent. However, this study was cautious about the prominence of internal
validity. Internal validity is often linked with mainly or purely quantitative research
studies (Bryman 1988), but this study was at least partially concerned with the beliefs,
attitudes and social behaviour of individuals at the ‘micro’ or ground level of youth
justice practice. This aim is often linked with qualitative research methods. It should
also be remembered that the research was based in one particular geographical area
(Baytown), managed by one particular Youth Offending Team and Youth Court.
Therefore, returning to Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) arguments above, the
recognition of the significance of context in evaluating the outcomes of social actions
and mechanisms limits the importance of causal connections in this study. This is
not to imply that causative relationships played no part in the research. Rather, the
aim was to move away from the positivistic view of causation, which emphasises the
image of a closed system in which causal relationships are predictable, regular, and
not affected by external influences. A realist approach to research acknowledges
that, in social research, not all of the relevant factors influencing results can be
controlled by the researcher:
‘Because we are dealing with open systems, we have to accept that we 
; are dealing with tendencies and probabilities. Causal processes may
; sometimes, even usually, lead to particular outcomes. But on some
occasions, and in some circumstances, they may not. Our hypothesis 
is that there are one or more mechanisms at work which will trigger 
these outcomes; and that there are other mechanisms which will 
interfere so that the outcome does not occur. ’ (Robson 2002: 40)
Therefore, following the realist approach to research, this study required a 
research design which would allow the investigation of hypothesised mechanisms 
about the operation of the youth justice bail process in Baytown. This, in turn, would 
allow examination of causal configurations, involving mechanisms, which had the 
particular pattern of results achieved. Internal validity played a generative role in the 
study’s research design, rather than the successive role it would have played if a 
positivist approach had been taken.
Generalisation outside the research study
This issue is concerned with external validity, or whether the results generated 
by the research could also apply to other groups outside the specific research 
context. This issue is linked into the importance of selecting the research 
participants so as to ensure a representative sample. However, the particular 
context of the research determined the way in which the issue of generalisability 
would be approached in this study. Following preliminary investigation into the 
possibility of comparative research (i.e. comparing the bail process in Baytown with 
that of other YOT areas), it was decided that such an approach would dilute the 
rigour and analytical power of the study.
This was so for several reasons. Firstly, the systems management exercise 
| described earlier indicated that there were several different key decision-making 
points in the youth justice bail process. A comprehensive investigation of how this 
process works necessitated detailed, long-term fieldwork, including observation of 
the beliefs and attitudes of individuals and agencies who had influence over bail 
decisions. Because of the complexity of the organisation of decision-making power
in the process, fieldwork was time-consuming, and required several different 
research strategies to uncover the different mechanisms leading to the observed bail 
outcomes for young people. Therefore it was decided to concentrate the research on 
one particular area -  Baytown -  rather than dividing research resources between this 
area and others.
Similarly, such in-depth research required access to various organisations and 
individuals who had a say in bail outcomes. Given the often complex process of 
negotiating access in social research, not just at ‘gatekeeper’ level but often also on 
an individual-by-individual basis to ensure fully informed consent (Robson 1993), it 
was felt that negotiating access in more than one local youth justice area would be so 
time-consuming as to limit the impact of the research.
The study originally grew out of independent evaluation of part of the Baytown 
YOT’s bail services, which had been initially funded by the Government, via the 
National Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (hereafter ‘the YJB’). The 
design of this evaluation, which was prescribed by the YJB and disseminated by a 
youth justice organisation which will be referred to in this study as ACORN, was 
limited in several respects, which will be discussed below. However, this initial 
research did entail access to those members of Baytown’s Youth Offending Team 
(hereafter ‘YOT’) staff responsible for bail services. It also involved the provision of 
office space at the YOT. It is submitted that this access was essential in providing a 
thorough understanding of how the bail process worked locally. It would, it is argued, 
have taken a great deal of time to build up a sufficiently close working relationship 
with other YOTs so as to allow such in-depth access to their staff26. This was another
j
reason, then, for not including other YOTs in the research: it would have been hard to
i
build up a sophisticated understanding of the context of micro-level policy and
26 Not to mention other key agencies and individuals, such as court users and young people, in these
I other areas.
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practice at other YOTs outside Baytown, and attempting to do so would have 
diverted time (and money) away from research in Baytown itself.
A third reason for not including other areas in the research was quickly 
revealed by preliminary research enquiries. These included visits to other YOT areas, 
for regional bail meetings and conferences. It soon became apparent, on visiting 
other areas, that each area had a unique context which determined what kind of bail 
services that area operated for young people, and how well these services worked. 
To give one example, in the Steeltown27 YOT area, the YOTs offices were located 
just a few metres away from the Steeltown youth court. This enabled Steeltown 
YOT staff to travel to and from court quickly when a young person they were involved 
with was due to appear. In contrast, Baytown’s YOT were based several miles away 
from the Baytown youth court. This increased the time spent travelling, and may 
have had an effect on service efficiency.
These differences may seem trivial when taken in isolation, but they had an 
impact on the kind of bail service offered in each area. Other factors included the 
amount and nature of youth crime in different areas, the geography and size of 
different YOT areas, and the staffing levels at different YOTs. All of these factors 
varied between Baytown and other nearby areas. Their effects made meaningful 
comparison difficult, and so it was decided to avoid the issue by concentrating the 
research purely on Baytown.
These factors also have implications for external validity. It is argued that, 
given the exploratory nature of the research, external validity would be difficult to 
obtain in any case. It was better, following the realist explanation, to search for 
underlying social structures that help to explain bail outcomes in this study, and leave 
| further testing of these theories to future research. Again, therefore, external validity
i
27 A town located a few miles from Baytown, with its own youth justice agencies and YOT.
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was not a priority in this research study -  but it aimed to contribute to a wider 
understanding of the mechanisms operating to produce particular outcomes in the 
bail process, while recognising the importance of the research context (the Baytown 
youth justice process).
Understanding social behaviour and its meaning
A realist approach to the study of crime and criminal justice recognises the 
importance of social structures, which shape individual action -  but it also recognises 
the importance of human agency within the limits of these social structures (e.g. 
Young and Matthews 1992; Young 1999, 2004). Therefore, investigating the 
meanings attached by individuals to the structures within which they work was a 
priority of the research design here.
There are various ‘power sites’ in the youth justice bail process. Given that 
this was so, there seemed to be a great deal of discretion in this part of the criminal 
justice process, as there undoubtedly is in other pre-sentencing processes (e.g. 
Galligan 1987; Gelsthorpe and Padfield 2003). As a result, the behaviour and 
attitudes of those involved in bail decision-making needed to be understood in its 
context. This suggests a preference for qualitative research (Jupp 1989), although it 
need not lead to a purely qualitative approach. Questionnaires and other research 
instruments which are usually thought of as being quantitative research can also 
ascertain feelings and attitudes, although they usually do this in a more structured, 
inflexible way than qualitative research28. In any case, the meaning of different 
agencies’ and individuals’ decisions and behaviour in the bail process was clearly
28Bryman (1988) has used this point as evidence for his argument that quantitative and qualitative 
methods are in reality not diametrically opposed to each other in practice.
central to the research, and this factor was clearly very important in deciding the 
actual research methods to be used.
Which research design paradigm is best in this context?
Bryman (2001: 28) identifies five prominent research designs: experimental 
and related designs, cross-sectional, longitudinal, comparative, and case study. The 
suitability of each of these will now be discussed in the context of the research.
Experimental designs are closely linked with positivism. The ‘classic’ 
experimental design involves the assignment of cases to two groups: one of these 
receives a predetermined ‘treatment’, the other (control) group does not. In this 
study into an aspect of the social world, as has already been explained, there cannot 
be sufficient control over who receives the treatment to undertake a study of this kind. 
An alternative would be to use a ‘quasi-experimental’ design, where there is no 
random allocation of cases to the treatment and control groups (Bryman 2001: 38-9); 
but even in this situation, it is argued that there is insufficient control over the factors 
governing bail outcomes in this study, and the context of the study, for this kind of 
design to be effective (Pawson and Tilley 1997: 53-4). A related problem is that 
there is no one clear-cut ‘treatment’ at issue here. Perhaps the Government-funded 
part of the Baytown YOT’s bail support scheme could have been regarded as a
i
‘treatment’, but the nature of bail support work itself was not always clear29, and there 
were always other bail options available, some of which did not involve any
i
!
29 As will become evident in Chapter Six below, which deals with YOT staff attitudes to the local bail 
process and bail services.
recognisable ‘treatment’ at all30. Therefore, experimental research designs of any 
kind are rejected here, largely on grounds relating to realism’s critique of positivism.
The next research design to be discussed is the cross-sectional design. 
Bryman (2001: 41) identifies this as the collection of data on more than one case, at 
a single point in time, in order to collect quantitative or quantifiable data on two or 
more variables, in order to examine patterns of association between them. This 
design is closely linked to the use of social surveys (e.g. questionnaires or structured 
interviews) in practice. This was in itself a problem for the current research, because 
it had already been established that a central part of the study would be to ascertain 
the feelings and attitudes of those with a say in bail outcomes for young people in the 
Baytown area (including the young people in the bail process themselves). Although 
it is possible to do this using questionnaires and structured interviews, some way of 
evaluating the behaviour of those involved was also needed in this study.
Also, even though qualitative research methods can be used within a cross- 
sectional study (e.g. Beardsworth and Keil 1992, discussed in Bryman 2001: 45), 
what this kind of design cannot do is to inject any sense of temporal sequence of 
events into the research. As mentioned above, the cross-sectional design is 
designed to carry out research at a single, given point in time. Since the initial, non-
i
doctoral evaluation (i.e. that discussed above, which was carried out for the YJB) had 
to last for three years31, it seemed logical to conduct the doctoral research fieldwork
|
over roughly the same period of time, so as to make the most of the access given to 
the Baytown youth justice process. Therefore, without ruling out the use of any of the 
particular research methods usually associated with it at this stage, the cross-
f
i
| sectional research design was rejected.
30 E.g. unconditional bail, which only imposes two obligations on the young person -  that of not re­
offending while on bail, and that of attending court at the next due date and time.
; 31 The length of time during which part of the Baytown YOTs bail support scheme was being funded
i by the YJB.
The longitudinal research design is the next to be discussed here. This design, 
effectively, is the cross-sectional design with the added dimension of time, since it 
takes the form of a research sample being socially surveyed at two (or more) 
separate points in time. The problems with this design for the purposes of the 
current study are therefore very similar to those outlined above when discussing the 
merits of the cross-sectional design. There are also problems regarding sampling 
strategy. Random sampling was not possible in the context of this research, since it 
was initially planned to include whole groups in the study32. An alternative 
longitudinal design, the cohort study, allows for whole groups sharing a particular 
characteristic to be studied. But as intimated above, there was certainly more than 
one identifiable cohort in this study (young people, staff, magistrates), and the aim 
was not to survey them at two or more identifiable points in time, but rather to collect 
data continuously during the fieldwork period. The aim of this approach was to allow 
for a holistic type of data triangulation, enabling constant comparison of emerging 
data with that which had already been collected and analysed (see pp. 114-17 below 
for more details). Although the dangers of confusion in constant collection and 
analysis of data were recognised, there was awareness of the unpredictability of data 
access and availability for a lone researcher utilising information from a number of 
simultaneous sources. As a result of these factors, therefore, the longitudinal design 
was rejected for the purposes of the present study.
The comparative research design model will not be discussed at any length 
here, since its problems in the context of the present study have already been 
f discussed above. The nature and amount of discretion and power-sharing in the
i
: youth justice bail process, together with the multitude of other factors which impact
on a particular area’s services, made meaningful comparison between Baytown and
' 32 E.g. whole groups of young people who entered the bail process in Baytown; all the magistrates 
; sitting in the Baytown youth court; and all the YOT staff responsible for bail services in Baytown.
other areas too difficult as an aim within the confines of the present study. Again, 
therefore, this design must be rejected here.
Bryman’s fifth research design model is that of the case study. As Bryman 
(2001: 47) points out, ‘the basic case study entails detailed and intensive analysis of 
a single c a s e The ‘case’ can comprise a wide range of social phenomena, from a 
single person or event, through a single location, to a single community or 
organisation. The design is therefore inherently flexible -  useful for exploratory 
research into previously un-researched or under-researched areas or subjects, such 
as the present study. Robson (2002) advocates the use of a case study approach as 
possible in realist research. The current research attempted to address the 
hypotheses from several different angles, which pointed towards the desirability of 
different research methods. The one factor which united all of the different strands of 
the research together, though, was the location of the research -  Baytown. No other 
locations were researched into, so that the study’s focus was purely on one site. 
Therefore the research context, at first glance, seemed amenable to the case study 
design.
Another advantage of this design in the current context is its flexibility as 
regards the traditional criteria for assessing the suitability of research designs -  
namely internal and external validity, reliability and replicability. It has already been 
pointed out that the nature of the youth justice bail process, with its widespread 
discretion and important local variations, means that these criteria are difficult to 
meet without distorting or damaging the faithfulness of the research to what actually 
happened at the research site during the fieldwork period33. This is an important 
issue in any social research, but is even more so, it is argued, in exploratory research 
such as the present study.
33 This factor is sometimes referred to as ecological validity.
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The case study approach offers a way around this problem by arguing that the 
above criteria, while still important issues to be considered, are not necessarily 
crucial in the context of this type of research design (Hakim 1987; Robson 2002). It 
recognises that while important information about social research theory and 
structure can be drawn from specific research studies, the context of such studies 
can and does change constantly. This, of course, is also congruent with the 
approach of critical realism, as argued above (Pawson and Tilley 1997). Given that 
critical realism has been highlighted as a suitable epistemology for the present 
research, the case study paradigm seemed appropriate for this study, on both an 
epistemological and a research design level.
More practical considerations also pointed towards the suitability of the case 
study design. As shown above, the study was to take place in a specific 
geographical location, a research context singled out by Bryman (2004) as being 
particularly suitable for the case study design. The research proposed was 
exploratory in nature, with no particular research methods suggested by previous 
studies. The case study design allows flexibility in chosen research methods 
according to the research context, with no inherent tendency towards quantitative or 
qualitative techniques, and scope for combining both paradigms in the same study. 
The research also aimed to explain outcomes, and to evaluate critically the 
implementation of youth justice policy and practice at a local level. There was
i
precedent for using the case study design for critically evaluative, empirical work in 
this field (e.g. McConville et al. 1991).
Like any other research design approach, the case study approach has 
weaknesses as well as strengths. These relate to difficulties in generalising research
! results to other contexts, i.e. the external validity issue discussed earlier in this
i
!
I chapter (Bryman 2004: 51). Given the flexibility of the case study design, there is
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also an increased danger that the methodology of collection and analysis of data will 
not be sufficiently rigorous (Jupp 1989). However, it is submitted that the realist 
approach addresses the problem of generalisation. As previously shown, realist 
research emphasises the importance of context in investigating mechanisms which 
lead to particular results in practice. The case study approach was therefore adopted
i
I here.
ii
This, of course, does not remove the need for rigour in social research at the
I
! next level of the methodology -  that of the specific research methods to be used in 
practice. In fact, it is argued, such an approach requires especially detailed 
consideration of appropriate methods, as the case study design does not suggest 
any research method in particular as being more suitable than the rest. As a result, 
the next section of the chapter will discuss the various research methods options 
available, again referring to the context of the research (and the critical realist 
approach) as well as evidence from other sources in assessing suitability.
Assessing the suitability of different research methods
The study’s ‘frameworktracking young people from arrest to final case outcome
Critical realism, as mentioned above, aims to reveal the meanings of social 
behaviour and attitudes within social structures which limit and frame them (Bhaskar 
1989). The task here, then, is to identify the relevant social structure(s) underpinning 
the mechanisms being investigated. A necessary corollary of this process is to 
measure the outcomes generated by social structures in practice. This then
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facilitates the hypothesising and investigation of mechanisms which could explain the 
outcomes of particular social structures.
In this case study, as shown above, the framework of the research is the youth 
justice bail process in Baytown, within the geographical area under the jurisdiction of 
the Baytown YOT. Before the process can be activated, however, a young person 
must be arrested. It should be noted here that arrest is the ‘trigger point’, not charge. 
This must be true, since a young person can be released on bail by the police (with 
or without conditions) without being charged with an offence. Arrest was therefore 
the starting point of the research framework. Moreover, the effects of the bail 
process, as the systems management flowchart (see Appendix A) makes clear, 
stretch as far as the final outcome of the case against a young person. This could be 
a sentencing exercise, or the withdrawal of the case at some point prior to sentencing, 
from the police deciding to take no further action in a particular case to withdrawal of 
a charge following a guilty plea at court.
Initially, however, the anticipated focus of this part of the research was on the
Baytown YOT’s court-based bail support scheme in particular. The plan was to
include all young people34 who were placed onto the bail support scheme, and to
track their cases through the process using quantitative analysis, examining what
effects (if any) the bail support scheme had on their offending patterns. Given the
launching of the new bail support project and the Government funding behind part of
it, it was anticipated that there would only be sufficient time and space to examine
those young people on bail support itself. This, however, presupposed the fact that
there would be a large number of young people placed on the bail support scheme in
! Baytown. This in itself is a warning not to take even the most basic aspects of social
research fieldwork for granted. In the event, it quickly became apparent that the
I 34 I.e. those between the ages of 10 and 17 inclusive, who were within the jurisdiction of the youth 
! court.
i
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number of young people placed on the scheme was very small indeed (as will be 
explained below). This trend continued over the three years of fieldwork. Given this 
situation, a change in approach was needed. There was simply not enough material 
to undertake any meaningful quantitative analysis on the basis of bail support 
scheme usage alone.
This change took the form of looking at ‘the bigger picture’ of bail outcomes for 
young people in the Baytown area. Instead of examining bail support in isolation, the 
entire youth justice bail process was examined. Although this clearly represented a 
change to the original research plan, it was, it is argued, a change for the better. 
Looking at the whole process enabled bail support to be placed in the context of 
other bail options and outcomes for young people. As the literature review illustrated 
earlier, this has rarely been done in previous research in this area. This also 
achieved a greater depth of understanding of the effectiveness of the bail process in 
Baytown as a whole, and of the individual bail options within that process. The low 
usage rate for the Baytown YOT’s bail support scheme was unexpected, but it 
arguably led to a more incisive analysis, not just of the scheme itself, but also of the 
other parts of the bail process which seemed to impact upon it, as shown on the 
systems management flowchart (see Appendix A).
For this part of the study, then, the aim was to find a method of research which 
was capable of tracking each case (involving a young person from Baytown) through 
the bail process, from initial arrest to final outcome. This general aim immediately 
suggests some form of quantitative research, since one of the key characteristics of 
this kind of social research is the central part played by numerical data (Bryman 
1988). It was also anticipated that looking at every case involving the Baytown youth 
justice bail process would probably produce a large number of cases. This, it was 
feared, might limit the depth and incisiveness of the analysis which could be carried
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out in the time allowed. As a result of this, it was decided to limit the study sample by 
age, so that only cases involving young people aged 15, 16 or 17 (males and 
females) were included. The reasons for restricting the sample in this way, apart 
from ease of analysis in a limited time-frame, included the ability to compare usage of 
bail with usage of remand to custody for this age group35.
The next step was to decide on an appropriate research method for studying 
this bail framework. It was clear that in undertaking this task, the research was 
relying on information collected by other individuals and agencies, for purposes other 
than the research itself. It was not possible for one researcher working alone to keep 
up-to-date records of every arrest and court appearance and their outcomes, given 
the fairly large scope of the sample and the necessary length of the fieldwork. As a 
result, the only viable research method for this part of the study was secondary data 
analysis of police and court records.
The Baytown YOT offices were the base for the research during the fieldwork 
period, and shortly before the fieldwork began, a computer database was installed on 
the networked computers at the offices. This database claimed to contain complete 
records for every young person from the Baytown area who entered the youth justice 
bail process: every arrest, the alleged offences involved, court appearances and bail 
decisions, and final case outcomes. This was the key to a detailed analysis of how 
bail processes worked for young people in the Baytown area. Unconditional access 
to the database was granted throughout the fieldwork period by YOT staff.
35 In reality, the law here is somewhat more complicated. Following the Crime and Disorder Act 
| 1998’s amendment of section 23 of the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act, young men and 
i women can be remanded to secure accommodation by the youth court from the age of 12 onwards 
! (Monaghan 2000: 147). Therefore the sample did not cover all young people who could have been 
\ remanded to the secure estate. However, it was felt that given the greater likelihood of older children 
! being remanded in this way, and especially the continued treatment of 17-year-olds of both sexes as 
\ adults for bail purposes (Monaghan 2000: 149), if the analysis was going to be limited at all, it should 
I be limited to older children. In hindsight, this ‘instinct’ was proved to be accurate, as no children under 
the age of 14 were remanded to the secure estate during the fieldwork period.
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However, there were some drawbacks with use of the database, as indeed 
there are with any secondary data or documentary analysis. The main difficulty was 
that the database was originally constructed for purposes other than the research. 
Also, it was constructed on the basis of data obtained from external sources -  
namely the police (for arrests) and the courts (for court appearances), so that only 
offences for which someone was actually arrested could be included. Fortunately, in 
the context of the present research, this did not pose a problem, since the focus of 
the study was not merely on the incidence of youth crime in itself, but also on the 
youth justice process’s response to it. Therefore the data obtained from the 
database was still suitable for use here, while acknowledging its limitations.
There are, however, other problems with use of secondary data, including lack 
of familiarity with the data on the researcher’s part, and complexity of the data for the 
purposes of secondary analysis (Bryman 2001: 200). Neither of these caused 
serious difficulties in this case. Provision of office space at the YOT offices allowed 
full immersion in the data, and sufficient time for full familiarisation with the 
organisation of the database at an early stage in the fieldwork.
Also, although the database was not built up for the purposes of facilitating the 
research, it shared the research’s objectives as regards the data collected. This may 
have been due to a stated local commitment to systems management principles in 
deciding on a youth justice strategy, and a belief in the importance of monitoring 
youth justice ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’. Parallels can be drawn here with the systems 
management approach investigated in the context of youth justice bail services in 
| Chapter Two.
The results of the application of systems management analysis to the Baytown 
youth justice bail process can be seen in Appendix A. This exercise related to the 
research methodology rather than the collection and analysis of data later on in the
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research process, since its influence was over the selection of appropriate 
epistemology, research design and research methods in the context of the current 
study. However, it must be emphasised again here that the stance taken towards the 
systems management approach -  and its purported reflection of actual practice in the 
youth justice bail process -  is a critical one. Therefore the methodology did not take 
it for granted that the overall bail process in Baytown was systematic, or that systems 
management was necessarily the best way of analysing that process. Instead, in line 
with a critical realist and grounded theory-based approach, it allowed theory to be 
guided by the emerging data.
This said, it seemed clear from the basic nature of this part of the research 
that only this kind of quantitative research could critically analyse the bail process in 
Baytown. As mentioned above, the process had to be examined in terms of the 
outcomes of bail decisions. The systems management flowchart offered assistance 
in identifying the key stages of the process for young people. By ‘key stage’ 
reference is being made to crucial decision-making points in the process -  points at 
which a young person’s case could be removed from the process, or at which bail 
could be limited or denied by decision-makers. From the systems management 
flowchart it is clear that bail decisions cover the period of time between initial arrest 
and detention by the police and final case outcome. However, final case outcome 
could be situated at a number of points in the bail process, as again shown by the 
flowchart (see Appendix A). These are, in chronological order:
• The police station, when the police decide to take no further action in a 
particular case -  either immediately or after a period of time spent on police 
bail36;
36 It should be noted, however, that time spent on police bail is still time spent on bail, even where a 
case is subsequently dropped by the police, and was treated as such by the research.
• Initial appearance in court following charge, where charges can be 
immediately withdrawn by the Crown Prosecution Service;
• Subsequent appearances in court, again where charges are withdrawn 
following a period of time spent on court bail;
• At initial appearance in court, where a young person either pleads or is found 
guilty, and the court moves directly to a sentencing exercise; or
• At subsequent appearances in court, again where a young person either 
pleads or is found guilty, and the court reaches the sentencing exercise stage. 
Data was able to be collected on outcomes at each of the stages above. The
YOT database used as the source for quantitative data in the study covered 
information on all of the above stages of each case. In addition, the database 
recorded the date of arrest37, the nature and number of offences in respect of which 
each arrest took place, and any re-arrest taking place while young people were 
already inside the bail process in Baytown. The systems management flowchart 
shown in Appendix A was used as a guide to data collection, and information was 
available at each ‘key stage’ identified on the flowchart.
There was, however, another important problem with using the database for 
analysis. To gain access to the information in it, it was necessary to enter a young 
person’s name. However, there was no mechanism in place in the database for 
alerting users to new arrests day-by-day38. Therefore, it was at first glance fortunate 
that the Baytown YOTs ‘remand management’39 team kept a record of daily arrests, 
in what was known as the ‘trawl book’. This was the product of daily phone calls by
37 I.e. the date at which each young person entered the bail process.
38 In terms of who had been arrested by the Baytown police, when, and on what grounds.
39 The 'remand management team’ was the official title given to those members of YOT staff 
responsible for co-ordinating the YOT’s various bail services.
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YOT bail staff40 to police stations in the Baytown area which dealt with young persons 
who had been arrested. These phone calls, which were usually made at around 
7.00am, revealed which young persons had been arrested overnight -  or, more 
accurately, which young persons had been arrested and detained overnight, and who 
were therefore still in police custody at the time of the phone call.
This ‘trawl book’ covered all young persons aged between 10 and 17, and 
therefore was used as a guide to information on the computer database, in the form 
of a record of the names of new arrestees. However, it quickly became apparent that 
the book could be used only as an introduction to data collection, and nothing more. 
When the book’s records of arrest were followed up on the database, it became clear 
that the book was, for whatever reason, failing to record a large number of arrests 
involving young people whose age meant that they were within the ambit of the 
study41.
As a result, a ‘snowballing’ approach was taken to investigating who had 
entered the bail process. When a name was recorded in the ‘trawl book’, that young 
person’s whole record was then checked on the database, to uncover any arrests 
that had been missed. Names of any co-arrestees were also investigated, and their 
records checked in turn. In this way a record of arrests and outcomes for males and 
females aged 15, 16 or 17 was built up. It would be wrong to claim that this 
approach was representative of all young people of these ages who were arrested 
during the fieldwork period. The sample obtained was purely a ‘convenience sample’
40 This only took place on weekdays. At weekends and on public holidays, the Baytown Emergency 
Duty Team (hereafter EDT) were responsible for recording arrests. The EDT was supposed to pass 
details of young persons’ arrests at these times onto the YOT staff -  but the EDT was not based on 
the same site as the YOT, and there was no fixed process for passing the data on. Evidence that the 
data was not always passed on in practice was found in the form of the computer database’s 
recording of arrests taking place at these times which were not recorded in the ‘trawl book’, and also in
, the form of YOT staffs complaints to this effect (see Chapter Six below).
41 The main reason for this, as analysis of the database revealed, was that the ‘missing’ young people 
had been arrested but not detained overnight by police -  because they had been ‘NFAed’ (i.e. police 
decided to take no further action, released on police bail, given an immediate reprimand or final 
warning, or charged and bailed to appear in court at a later date - as opposed to the following day).
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(Bryman 2001: 98). The approach taken to obtaining data was not ‘textbook’, but 
represented the most viable way of getting the data that was required in the 
circumstances. While the methodology was not ideal in this respect, highlighting its 
problems and weaknesses here again illustrates the ‘messiness’ inherent in social 
research of any kind, and the fundamental principle that the researcher can only 
make the best use of the data that is available in attempting to answer the questions 
raised by research.
Over the study period of three years, information on each stage of the bail 
process was gathered for each case. This information was then operationalised to 
produce variables, through which outcomes at each key decision-making point in the 
bail process were measured. Variables were also used to collect information 
contained on the YOT database about the young people involved in the process (in 
particular, their age at time of arrest, and their gender), and the offences which they 
had (allegedly) committed (in terms of offence type and seriousness).
The full list of offence-related variables used can be found in Appendix B, but 
some introductory discussion of them is appropriate here. The offence type variable 
classified offences into eight categories. Categorisation was based around that 
found in the Criminal Statistics for England and Wales, measuring police-recorded 
crime, and published annually by the Home Office (e.g. Dodd et al. 2004). There 
were slight differences between the Home Office categorisation and that used in the 
study, however, to reflect the nature and frequency of offending in Baytown. Certain 
Home Office categories included only small numbers of offences recorded in the 
study, and so adjustments were made to aid practicality. As a result, the Home 
Office ‘burglary’, ‘robbery’ and ‘fraud and forgery’ categories were subsumed into a 
general non-vehicular theft category in the study, and sexual offences were included 
in the ‘violence against the person’ category. Also, because of their frequency in the
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study, public order offences and motoring offences were each given their own 
categories therein, although they do not have their own categories in Home Office 
statistics. Other than these differences, the offence type classification matched that 
of official statistics (see Maguire 2002: 338-9 for discussion and a full list of Home 
Office categories).
The offence seriousness variable in the study classified offences on a scale of 
offence gravity. Each offence was allocated a score of between 1 and 8, with a score 
of 1 denoting the least serious offences, and a score of 8 denoting the most serious. 
Again, a full list of offences and their scores can be found in Appendix B. The score 
for each offence was included in the database discussed above, and was calculated 
according to local police guidelines. It was recognised that this offence gravity scale 
could not be considered authoritative, especially with regard to ‘middle range’ 
offences (e.g. Hough 1996), but it was used here because of its ready availability on 
the database, and its usefulness in analysis of offending patterns.
It was not possible to measure the outcomes at every decision-making point in 
the Baytown youth justice bail process, however, for two reasons. Firstly, time 
restrictions played a part here. The quantitative dimension of the research had to be 
balanced with other aspects of the study, which were of equal importance in 
determining the outcomes, context and mechanisms central to a critical realist 
methodology. More will be said about these other aspects and research methods 
below. Secondly, to return to a point made earlier, the study relied upon the YOT 
database for information. The database contained detailed information on the 
outcomes of the formal police and court process for young people in Baytown, but did 
not contain information on the more informal processes which contributed to each 
key decision point (as the systems management flowchart illustrates). Nor did it 
contain the actual grounds given for restricting or denying bail in court -  and court
records to verify this information were not accessible. Variables were selected and 
operationalised on the basis of these practical considerations.
Subject to these limitations, the aim of selecting and operationalising variables 
was to measure and evaluate the outcomes of the bail structure at each available key 
decision-making point. The aim here was not to undertake sophisticated statistical 
analysis with this material. Rather, the intention was to give an overall picture of the 
extent to which the bail process (including the bail support scheme itself) was used 
during the study period, and how it operated with regard to young people from the 
Baytown area.
In particular, attention was drawn to the number of young people who were 
remanded to custody during the study period. This is so since the high rate of young 
people being remanded to custody, and particularly to young offenders’ institutions 
as opposed to secure units42, was one of the stated rationales behind the statutory 
requirement, contained in section 38 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, that all 
YOTs in England and Wales should provide bail support services for all young people 
between the ages of 10 and 17, so that young people might be removed from the 
'corrupting influence’ of prison service custody (Muncie 1999: 296). This is 
supported by the fact that, from the outset of YJB funding in 1999, the reduction in 
the number of young people being remanded to custody was made one of the 
national aims of YOT-run bail support schemes in England and Wales.
To aid evaluation of the quantitative data, information for each of the variables 
used was processed using version 11 of the SPSS statistical software package. It 
was recognised that in order to evaluate the outcomes of the bail process, the
| relationships between different variables used would need to be cross-tabulated, to
I
i ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
j  42 See discussion in Chapter One above. Although Government policy in the early 1990s was to
l phase out custodial remands for all those young people aged 16 or under, this policy was a casualty of 
the ‘law and order’ backlash regarding 'persistent young offenders’ after 1993, and is no longer part of 
Government discourse on youth justice pre-conviction processes (Moore 2000).
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allow for investigation of the existence of statistically significant relationships between 
different variables. As the variables generated nominal data, contingency tables 
were used to illustrate the relationships between the variables, along with the chi- 
square test for statistical significance, which is recommended by Bryman (2004) for 
measuring relationships in nominal-by-nominal data. The level of probability for each 
chi-square value (the p value) was also measured, to enable assessment of the 
significance of chi-square values for each contingency table. The SPSS package 
used to analyse data was capable of generating chi-square values and p values 
automatically for contingency tables, and it was used to do so in the study.
Finally, the results of this quantitative analysis were reported (see Chapter 
Four). Reporting of the results was organised along the lines of the key decision­
making points in the bail process, which also formed the basis of the selection and 
operationalisation of variables used in the quantitative analysis. Following this, the 
results were discussed and placed in context (see Chapter Five). It was decided to 
separate reporting and analysis of results into different chapters, to ensure the 
accessibility and readability of the study.
The next subsection moves on to discuss the methodology used to investigate 
the meanings attached to the structure of the Baytown youth justice bail process by 
those having an influence over its outcomes. In this way, following the critical realist 
approach to research as supported by Pawson and Tilley (1997) and Robson (2002) 
among others, the context of the research could be established, and possible 
mechanisms leading to the process outcomes (as discussed in Chapters Four and 
Five) could be hypothesised and tested.
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Investigating the meanings and attitudes held by those within the social 
framework of the youth justice bail process
The part of the methodology described above established a framework for
understanding how the youth justice bail process worked in the Baytown area.
However, it was argued above that this process is characterised by discretion in
decision-making. It was also argued that the power to influence decisions taken in
the youth justice bail process, in Baytown and elsewhere in England and Wales, was
shared among various individuals and agencies within the process. Given that this is
so, a research strategy was constructed, in line with the critical realist approach
adopted above, to reflect the above arguments. As May (2001) points out, critical
realism seeks to challenge the two polar opposites of social research: that the world
exists independently of people’s own knowledge, and that there is no reality except
that which can be directly observed. It has been argued that critical realism, as
developed by Bhaskar (1989), attempts to avoid these two poles:
71 attempts to provide explanations of social phenomena whilst at the 
same time pointing to “what real people on the ground are doing"/ 
(Davies 1999, cited in Hill and Wright 2003: 285)
This approach, and the search for the meanings of social behaviour and 
attitudes generally, are usually associated with qualitative research of some kind 
(Bryman 1988). However, there are various options to choose from within the 
paradigm of qualitative research methods. The main options are identified by 
Bryman (2001: 266) as being ethnography and participant observation, qualitative 
interviewing, focus groups, various forms of discourse analysis, and qualitative
| documentary analysis. Again, the suitability of these methods must now be
i
| assessed in the context of the present research.
i
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It seemed clear that, when deciding which individuals and agencies to study in 
this part of the research, the focus of study needed to be on those with power to 
influence outcomes in the Baytown bail process. Again, the systems management 
flowchart discussed above played an important part here. An important distinction 
was made between individuals and agencies who had such power and discretion, 
and those who advised or assisted young people during the process, but did not 
have the power to make decisions about them. Re-examining the flowchart, it was 
clear that court sentencers (magistrates and judges) had the power to decide how to 
deal with young people from the point of view of bail43. Their attitudes towards bail 
services for young people in the Baytown area, and the local bail process generally, 
therefore needed to be measured in some way.
Similarly, the YOTs bail staff appeared to have power over the process, in 
several ways. They were able to make recommendations in court to the magistrates 
as regards appropriate bail outcomes; they wrote pre-sentence reports to aid 
magistrates in sentencing decisions; and they made decisions about whether or not 
to refer a young person onto the bail support programme. These roles also needed 
to be investigated in this part of the research.
Thirdly, the young people involved in the Baytown bail process had the power 
to affect the outcome of that process. Their behaviour, offending or otherwise, during 
the process (in terms of whether they committed further crime while on bail, or 
otherwise breached the conditions of bail44) had a key influence on bail outcomes in
43 Magistrates, in both adult and youth courts, deal with all court cases in England and Wales initially. 
Although some cases are remitted to the crown court, either at the committal stage or the sentencing 
stage, the vast majority (95%-97% of all court cases) are dealt with entirely by magistrates (Cavadino 
and Dignan 2002: 93). A similar proportion of cases were dealt with by magistrates in the youth court 
in this study. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, it can be said that magistrates in the youth 
court were the dominant source of power over bail decisions in court, rather than Crown Court judges.
44 In some circumstances breach of bail does not necessitate the commission of a crime perse. For 
example, where a condition of bail is reporting to a police station at given dates and times, and the 
young person involved fails to do this, the way is open for that young person to be breached and 
returned to court.
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their own case. Their opinions on how (if at all) being on different types of bail 
helped to prevent them re-offending, and what role they felt bail should play in this 
and other respects, needed to be ascertained.
By contrast, it was felt that, despite the vital role they played in the bail 
process for young people, defence solicitors, Crown Prosecution Service staff, and 
appropriate adults would not be studied as part of the research. Although they 
contributed to decision-making in important ways, by providing help and advice to 
those making the decisions in the bail process, it is argued that they did not actually 
make decisions about what happened to young people in the same way as the 
groups mentioned above. Although their roles were acknowledged, and certainly 
discussed with the decision-making groups in the course of the fieldwork, they were 
not approached directly to contribute for this reason.
The next step was to identify appropriate research methods for each of the 
chosen groups above.
Researching YOT bail staff
Fieldwork with the YOT staff was greatly facilitated by being present at
the YOT headquarters (in terms of having office space there) throughout the data
collection period. Several options were available for uncovering their attitudes
towards bail services for young people in the Baytown area. Ethnography was one
such option. Ethnography has a range of meanings in research practice, but it is
taken by Bryman (2001: 291) to include the following features, where the researcher:
7s immersed in a social setting for an extended period of time; 
makes regular observations of the behaviour of members of that setting; 
listens to and engages in conversations;
interviews informants on issues that are not directly amenable to 
observation or that the ethnographer is unclear about (or indeed for 
other possible reasons); 
collects documents about the group;
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develops an understanding of the culture of the group and people’s 
behaviour within the context of that culture; 
and writes up a detailed account of that setting. ’
The research was based at the YOT offices for the duration of the original, 
non-doctoral research mentioned above (i.e. three years), allowing ‘immersion’ to 
take place. Moreover, access to the YOT staff for research purposes was obtained. 
These factors removed some of the main ethical problems associated with 
ethnographic research, such as the use of covert observation (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995), which does not give research subjects the opportunity to give their 
informed consent to being studied.
This should not, however, be taken as implying that access was instant and 
straightforward. It was initially granted by the Baytown YOT manager, who gave 
permission for the use of office space at the YOT, as well as permission to talk to the 
YOT staff. However, as Hughes (2000: 241) points out, there can be a crucial 
difference in research between formal political access to the research setting, and 
informal social access to it. The real focus of the proposed observational work was 
to be the staff on the YOT’s bail team. They were the individuals responsible for 
turning bail policy into ground-level practice, for assessing the circumstances of 
young people in the bail process, and so on. Therefore, it was necessary in practice 
to negotiate access to each one of the micro-level staff in turn. This involved gaining 
the staff members’ trust in doing the research. Various strategies had to be 
deployed to do this. Nonetheless, access was fully granted, although it was certainly 
an ongoing process (ibid.). This issue will be returned to below.
With the obstacle of access to YOT staff essentially overcome, it was felt that 
ethnographic research would offer the best opportunity for ascertaining YOT staffs 
attitudes to bail issues. Nor, as Bryman’s list above intimates, would choosing
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ethnography in this context rule out the use of informal, loosely structured interviews 
-  another available research method option.
Further consideration of the research context cast doubts upon the viability of 
other qualitative research methods for the work to be done with the YOT staff. It was 
known from the outset of the research that the bail team itself was small -  comprising 
only four people who were responsible for bail services at the YOT, at the beginning 
of the study period. This also resolved the issue of sampling, or who to include in 
qualitative research of this kind: the group of YOT staff responsible for bail services 
was so small that all the staff had to be included in the study, but the sample was not 
‘representative’ in any statistical sense.
Since there were only four bail workers at the YOT, there were not enough 
participants to enable focus groups to be organised (Bryman 2004). Moreover, 
although documentary analysis could play a role in the research in the circumstances, 
it was felt to be more important to obtain information on staffs experiences of and 
attitudes towards bail services directly, through observation and informal interviews45. 
Overall, then, it was decided that the research method to be used in work with the 
YOT staff would be ethnography (including participant observation).
This method of research, it should be noted, was only made possible by the 
provision of office space at the YOT throughout the period of fieldwork. Without this 
provision, it would have been very difficult to achieve some measure of ‘blending in’ 
at the YOT, and thereby to gain the staffs trust and obtain useful data. The 
‘gatekeeper’ for the bail staff at the micro level of YOT work was the YOT manager, 
who granted formal access to the bail team (who were responsible for the operation
45 In any case, as the quote from Bryman above makes clear, ethnography does not exclude the 
collection of documents about a particular social group and setting as a source of additional 
information.
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of the YOT’s bail services). However, the staff themselves were co-operative with 
the research, and were all fully aware of the research’s aims and objectives.
Success as regards the co-operation of the YOT staff in the research was 
achieved partly by physical presence at the YOT, but also (as is often the case in 
observatory social science research) by good luck. The building of a rapport with the 
team’s senior practitioner was aided greatly by social characteristics held in common. 
Coming from the same city as this member of staff was especially important in this 
regard. Even more specifically, again with regard to the senior practitioner in 
particular, common interest in and support of the same football team also aided in 
building up trust, simply by giving several good topics of conversation in the office. 
Of course this was simply good luck, and may not have been very important given 
the extended amount of time eventually spent at the YOT, but even so it was 
certainly useful in building up the initial relationship.
The fact that the fieldwork began at the same time as the new YOT staff who 
were in post (at least in theory) to deal specifically with the newly extended bail 
support project was also beneficial to methodological development. It was therefore 
possible to receive introductions to the rest of the YOT staff alongside them, as well 
as settling into YOT life with them generally. This again helped to build up a working 
relationship. As will become evident in Chapter Six below, it quickly became 
apparent that there were different approaches and attitudes to bail services within the 
team. This is, therefore, a good example of the need in more qualitative forms of 
social research to continue past the point of gaining initial access to the research 
subjects, and to continue to ‘renegotiate’ access with individual members of staff at 
ground level where they are the focus of the research (e.g. Robson 1993: 295-7).
^  c »
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Renegotiating access is obviously desirable from the point of view of ethical 
issues in social research46, and in particular the principle of securing the informed 
consent of research participants throughout the fieldwork process (Kent 2000: 81). 
But the ability to renegotiate access was also invaluable in the context of this 
particular research study, simply because the individual team members were so 
different in their perspectives to the topics at issue in the research issues. If the 
focus had remained on the gatekeepers47, in terms of building working relationships, 
then these alternative views might have been at best underdeveloped as research 
data, and at worst overlooked completely.
The bail team expressly accepted the research process as a part of their daily 
working lives, and the researcher as ‘one of them’. They began introducing the 
researcher to others in these terms. This raises a well-documented problem with 
participant observation -  that of ‘going native’, or the development of bias in favour of 
the research’s subjects during fieldwork time spent in close proximity to them (e.g. 
Burgess 1984). There was awareness of this throughout the project, given the 
placement in the YOT offices and the provision of office space there.
Some basic, practical steps were taken against this pitfall. This part of the 
research, in practice, centred around the constant taking and reviewing of field notes 
on a computer in the office. For the first two and a half years of the fieldwork the 
office was not shared with anyone else, and so this practice enabled notes to be 
taken immediately (or almost immediately) after incidents or conversations of interest. 
More importantly it also enabled them to be written up in private, allowing reflection 
on initial responses and checks for any signs of bias. Finally, although the trust of 
the staff was soon gained, some steps were taken to preserve some elements of 
‘outsider’ status, so as not to project the image of being on the staffs side. One
46 Considered in more detail below.
47 The YOT manager initially, and then the YOT bail team’s senior practitioner.
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example of this was not participating actively in the social events which played an 
important part in the lives of the YOT staff: evenings out, parties, and so on. Contact 
with the staff was mainly limited to office hours. Again, this may not seem 
fundamentally important in the context of the research, but it played a symbolic part 
in defining the relationship between researcher and researched.
Following collection of the detailed ethnographic data, decisions needed to be 
made about how the data would be analysed and written up. Robson (2002: 458) 
outlines various approaches to the analysis of qualitative data, characterised by the 
rigidity with which the data is coded. At one end of Robson’s scale, there are quasi- 
statistical approaches, in which word or phrase frequencies are used as a way of 
determining the relative importance of terms and concepts. At the other end of this 
scale, there are immersion approaches, which are unstructured and fluid, relying 
much more upon the researcher’s creativity (ibid.).
However, there are also intermediate approaches to analysis between the 
polar opposites mentioned in the previous paragraph. These are identified by 
Robson (ibid.) as template approaches48 and editing approaches49. In fact, these 
approaches should be seen as points on a continuum rather than completely 
divergent from one another. They all involve a process of initial coding, reflection on 
coding, a more detailed process of coding, testing of coding against emerging data, 
and the gradual build-up of patterns and generalisations, which form the basis of 
theory generation (Miles and Huberman 1994: 9).
In fact, the approach taken to the analysis of the participant observation data 
was closest to the ‘template approaches’ described above. Coding of the data was 
carried out on the basis of research questions and hypotheses formulated prior to
48 In which key codes for analysis are derived from research questions, theory or data, and the codes 
serve as a flexible template for analysis.
49 Which are more flexible than template approaches, less reliant upon codes and more dependent 
upon the researcher’s interpretation.
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data collection -  but these codes were deliberately flexible, and did in fact change as 
the ethnographic research continued. The major change was referred to earlier in 
this chapter. This was the unexpected rarity of bail support referrals by the Baytown 
courts, which led to coding based upon a wider view of the bail process in Baytown, 
rather than simply a study of attitudes towards bail support in itself. Such a wider 
approach required an accompanying change in coding strategy. Codes therefore 
evolved and developed as the fieldwork period continued, and as transcription of 
data built up. Given the volume and richness of ethnographic data collected, codes 
were reviewed monthly, on the basis of their suitability for emerging data. This 
resembles the grounded theory approach to exploratory study, which was discussed 
and evaluated earlier. Gradually, generalisations were built up, which were then 
measured against proposed mechanisms for explaining the outcomes of the 
quantitative analysis in Chapters Four and Five. These were checked with YOT staff 
by way of validation.
It was recognised that this process was inherently flexible, and therefore open 
to criticism on the grounds of lacking methodological rigour. However, such a flexible 
approach was felt to be the most suitable for exploratory research such as this study. 
In attempting to understand the mechanisms which generated the outcomes of the 
youth justice bail process in Baytown, the aim was to produce what Brewer (2000: 
138) has called a ‘realist text ... characterised by thick description’. This, in turn, 
raised issues of validity and reflexivity, the potential lack of which challenge the 
appropriateness of such an approach (e.g. Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: Chapter 
Eight). In defence of the ‘realist’ approach to analysis in this context, it is argued that 
the researcher’s role in constructing the ‘reality’ presented in ethnographic data 
(which, in turn, was used to examine the mechanisms generating bail outcomes in 
the given context) was fully recognised and acknowledged during data collection and
analysis. Even so, the need for an accurate description and representation of staff 
attitudes towards bail policy and practice was essential in this exploratory, critical 
realist research.
Mention should also be made of how the YOT staff were identified in the 
writing-up of the research results. The decision was taken not to refer to staff by their 
real first names, or imaginary ones, to protect anonymity. However, as coding 
developed and the divergence between different staff members’ attitudes and 
opinions became clear, the decision was taken to refer to whether staff belonged to 
the ‘old’ YOT bail team, i.e. those who were part of the team before the fieldwork 
began, or to the ‘new’ team, i.e. those who joined the bail team at the same time as 
or after the fieldwork began. This was done to aid the clarity of results and analysis, 
and to compare and contrast data from the ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff members.
The next subsection considers the approach taken to ascertaining the 
meanings attached to bail structures by magistrates in the Baytown youth court.
Researching the Baytown youth court magistrates
The issues which formed the focus of work done with the Baytown magistrates 
were similar to those which formed the focus of work done with the YOT staff, as 
outlined above. As with the staff, the research aimed to reveal how the magistrates 
themselves saw the bail process locally: how well they thought it was working, what 
they thought the major problems with the process were, and how they thought the 
process could be improved, from the point of view both of themselves and others. 
Again, as with the participant observatory and ethnographic work carried out with the
I
; Baytown YOT staff, the overall aim here was to investigate and analyse attitudes
I
j
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towards and meanings attached to previously established bail process outcomes for 
young people.
Such an aim seemed to be leading the methodology towards qualitative 
research. However, the research population in this part of the study was 
considerably bigger than it had been in the evaluation of the YOT staffs responses. 
The number of magistrates sitting in the Baytown youth court fluctuated over the 
fieldwork period, but was never less than 40 at any time during that period. This 
meant that quantitative research methods, especially in the shape of structured 
interviews or questionnaires, were still a viable option for this part of the study, as 
well as the qualitative methods used with the YOT staff.
As ever, though, the practical context of researching youth court magistrates 
played a crucial part in the methodology used here. White (2002: 12) notes that there 
are currently around 31,000 lay (i.e. unpaid and part-time) magistrates in England 
and Wales, compared to around 100 professional magistrates (DJMCs) and around 
160 lawyers who sit as part-time deputies (Darbyshire 2002: 287). Therefore the 
vast majority of cases, in both adult magistrates’ and youth courts, are heard by lay 
magistrates. This was certainly found to be the case in the present study, restricting 
the sample for this part of the research to magistrates who sat in Baytown Youth 
Court, no DJMCs were found to be sitting at any point during the research.
Interviewing lay magistrates posed its own problems. The first of these is that 
lay magistrates may live some distance from the court in which they sit, making 
contact with them outside the court difficult. In any case, permission to interview 
magistrates in their homes was not given here, for confidentiality reasons. Secondly, 
lay magistrates are by definition part-time. They sit in court, on average, around 41 
times a year (Morgan and Russell 2000, cited in Darbyshire 2002: 288) so their 
attendance is generally irregular, and due to their other commitments (in the Baytown
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area at least) they generally come into court only as and when required by the court 
rota.
These two factors in combination limited the ways in which this part of the 
research could be carried out. If the research was to be done using face-to-face 
contact of some kind, it would have to be done at the court, around the time at which 
individual magistrates were sitting. The original research plan aimed to avoid this 
problem by using questionnaires, to be distributed at the court each working day over 
a period of two months, completed by magistrates and returned to the researcher 
(who would collect them in person from the court on a regular basis). This would, 
therefore, be a self-completion questionnaire, administered by hand rather by post.
In accordance with research evidence on the effectiveness of this type of 
questionnaire, the questions were mainly closed, to make answering easier (Bryman 
2001: 129), and in the form of Likert scales as a test of attitude to youth justice bail 
issues locally. The questionnaire also included some more open-ended questions, 
regarding how the magistrates felt that bail services could improve, for example -  
these were included towards the end of the questionnaire, in order to ‘ease’ the 
magistrates into the process by asking more straightforward questions first.
In developing the Likert scale, the intention was, having gathered a pool of 
items relevant to the issues raised by the research and decided on a response 
categorisation system, to test the scale on a group of respondents (magistrates in 
this case), obtain their scores on the scale, and select items for a final version of the 
scale according to the items’ discriminative power (Robson 1993: 257)50. However,
50 Likert scales were also considered for use with YOT staff during the ethnographic study, to enable 
statistical comparisons of key issues and further examination of power relations relating to bail 
processes. However, it was decided not to use Likert scales with the staff, because of the small 
number of interviewees involved. Statistically analysing the scale results of only four interviewees 
would have run an unacceptably high risk of statistical fallacy. In any case, it was felt that the richness 
of the ethnographic data collected and analysed (see above and Chapter Six) more than compensated 
for the lack of quantitative data.
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due to the extremely slow initial response rate from the magistrates (see below), it 
was not possible to test the scale before including it in the questionnaire. This 
obviously had a potentially negative impact on the scale’s effectiveness. However, it 
was possible to avoid extreme positive and extreme negative statements within the 
scale, as Robson (ibid.) suggests.
In fact, the practical circumstances of the research eventually had a 
fundamental impact on the methods used to carry out this part of the research. 
Access to the magistrates was obtained via the senior legal advisor to the Baytown 
youth court. Self-completion questionnaires were sent out to magistrates during the 
fieldwork period, after access had been sought and obtained. However, of the 50 
questionnaires sent out, only one was returned over the allotted two month period. 
Later attempts to re-negotiate access failed, and ultimately it was decided that, since 
the self-completion questionnaire had produced such a low response rate51, 
interviews should be conducted face-to-face.
Even so, it was very difficult to gain access to the lay magistrates, and the 
fieldwork period had to be extended to enable interviews with magistrates to be 
completed. This was done through the clerk to the justices at Baytown magistrates’ 
court initially, and then through the deputy clerk to the youth court. However, due to 
other work commitments on the part of the researcher and the magistrates, the 
interviews could only be conducted over a particular two-week period, and only in the 
period of an hour before the court began to sit each weekday morning52. This limited 
I the time in which information could be sought.
The problem was addressed by amending the original interview schedule. 
The Likert scale element was retained, but mixed with more open-ended questions
51 And also because of the particular difficulties of interviewing lay magistrates, as discussed above.
52 There were even problems, on a few occasions during the interview period, in gaining access to the 
Youth Court building.
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which sought to elicit a more individualised response to issues surrounding bail 
services available to young people in the Baytown area. In designing this new 
schedule, a priority was the reflection of the fact that, while the ultimate decision on 
whether to grant or deny bail rests with the courts, the lay magistrates used 
information given to them by the other key individuals and agencies in the youth court 
process in reaching this decision. Therefore, the questions sought to reveal opinions 
on YOT policy and practice, and the factors which affected it locally. A balance 
between quantifiable information on magistrates’ attitudes generally, and more 
detailed qualitative information on specific issues was sought (see Appendix D for full 
interview schedule). As a final issue, magistrates (and their gatekeepers) were 
reluctant to have their interviews taped, so the responses to the open-ended 
questions were written down on each magistrate's copy of the interview schedule, 
along with the responses to the Likert scale questions. Although this did not give as 
complete an account of the interview as tape recording and transcription, it was a 
necessary sacrifice to make in order to obtain the required data from the magistrates. 
A total of 25 magistrates were interviewed face-to-face. They were selected as part 
of a convenience sample, based on their availability and presence in court during a 
two-week interview period. At the time of the interviews, there were 56 magistrates 
sitting in the Baytown youth court. Therefore the interviewed magistrates 
represented 44.6% of the Baytown bench.
The combination of quantitative, Likert scale questions and qualitative, semi­
structured interview questions demanded a hybrid approach to analysis of data. 
Answers to the Likert scale questions (see Appendix D for a full list) were ranked on 
a scale of 1 to 5. This enabled what Robson (2002: 394) terms ‘single transfer 
coding’. This approach allowed data to be entered into a computer-based analytical 
software package in its original form. The software package used for this task was
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SPSS Version 11, which was also used for quantitative data analysis in this study. 
For this part of the analysis, however, SPSS was used simply to calculate the 
frequencies of different responses to the Likert scale questions.
The results of this exercise were then triangulated with the magistrates’ 
responses to the open-ended questions also included in the interview. The schedule 
allowed magistrates to expand, clarify or modify their Likert scale answers in a more 
open-ended way. For this part of the analysis, the same inductive coding approach 
as was used for analysing YOT staff data (see earlier) was used. As with the staff 
data, the aim was to provide a detailed, realistic account of magistrates’ attitudes 
towards bail processes and outcomes. The advantages and disadvantages of this 
kind of approach have already been discussed above. The template approach to 
analysis was used, prior to triangulation with the Likert scale data. More will be said 
about the role of triangulation in the research methodology below. When writing up 
the results, magistrates were referred to by the number of their interview53, to ensure 
anonymity.
The next subsection discusses the approaches taken to obtaining data from 
young people in the Baytown bail process.
Researching young people in the Baytown bail process
The third group of people chosen for specific scrutiny in the research were the 
young people involved in the youth justice process themselves. It could be argued 
that youth justice research is sometimes guilty of speaking for young people, without 
giving them the opportunity to express their own views about what happens to them 
in the youth justice process (Wilson 2004). The study sought to remedy this -
153 The interviews were numbered in the order in which they were carried out.
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particularly taking into account the lack of research evidence on young people in the 
bail process, who have not yet been convicted.
Several strategies were available for interviewing young people in the 
Baytown youth justice bail process. One would have been to interview all of those 
going through the bail process during the study period. However, given the large 
number of young people included in the quantitative part of the research (as 
mentioned above), conducting interviews with them all would not have been possible 
in the limited time available. A second option was to select a random sample from 
this group for the purposes of interviewing. However, it was recognised that a key 
area of scrutiny for the research was to ascertain how the policy and practice of the 
Baytown YOT was implemented, and perceived by others. Those young people who 
were given unconditional bail, or conditional bail, were not directly affected by YOT 
intervention. This is not to say that they were unaffected by YOT policy indirectly54.
However, it was young people with experience of bail support or the denial of 
bail who were most directly affected by the Baytown YOT’s bail policy and practice. 
Those on bail support had to complete a programme of intervention prepared and 
managed by the YOT; and those who were denied bail experienced YOT policy on 
frequency of visits to young people in custody, interventions aiming to reduce the rate 
of remand to custody, and so on. It was therefore decided to focus the interviewing 
strategy on this smaller group of young people.
This strategy meant that interviewing could potentially occur in either the 
community or custody, depending on the young person’s circumstances and the 
timing of the interview55. In either case, care had to be taken not to overload the 
| young person with lengthy and complicated questions (see Appendix F for the full
54 For example, in terms of the risk assessment routinely done on each young person when deciding 
whether or not to recommend bail to the youth court.
j 55 Due to the limited time available, and the extra time needed to arrange access to young people for 
interview, interviews sometimes took place after the young person had been sentenced.
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interview schedule used). This was an especially important factor for young people 
in custody, as visiting times were obviously limited, and interviews had to be fitted 
around YOT staffs work with the young people56.
Even for young people in the community, though, a vital consideration was 
that every young person interviewed understood fully what the aims and objectives of 
the research were. Clearance from the Baytown YOT was sought before interviews 
commenced, and YOT bail staff acted as facilitators for interviews, since the young 
people interviewed already knew the staff. In addition, clearance was sought from 
young offenders’ institutions where the young person was being interviewed in 
custody. This was in fact necessary as well as ethically desirable, since young 
offender’s institutions had to be notified in advance that the researcher would be 
attending for the purposes of the interview. Discussions about the aims and 
objectives of research, what would happen to the data young people provided, and 
whether young people gave their informed consent to be interviewed formed a 
compulsory introduction to each interview.
For interviews done in prison, the young people had to remain in the presence 
of the YOT worker throughout the YOT prison visits during which interviews had to 
take place. The possibility of reactivity to YOT workers’ presence affecting young 
persons’ responses, therefore, cannot be ruled out. It should be noted, however, that 
the YOT officers’ presence did much to facilitate the interview, since the interviewees 
were already familiar with the YOT workers, and often stated that they felt more 
comfortable doing the interview in the presence of the YOT worker who had come to 
visit them in custody. It was therefore felt that the YOT officers’ presence during
Ii
|__________________________
56 I.e. welfare checks, visits to comply with National Standards on frequency of visits, and so on.
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interviews was a necessary compromise to secure data from each interview. The 
potential methodological limitations of this approach were recognised, however57.
The possibility of tape-recording the interviews was considered before the 
fieldwork began. However, the first four young people to be interviewed did not wish 
the interview to be tape-recorded. Therefore, to maintain a consistent approach, 
none of the interviews were tape-recorded. Instead, detailed notes were taken 
during the interview, and reviewed and added to after the interview where necessary. 
In addition, some of the young people interviewed had numeracy and literacy 
problems, and had difficulty understanding the structure and content of interview 
schedules58. Therefore young people were given the option, at the start of the 
interview, of filling in the interview schedule themselves, or having it read out (and 
explained where necessary) to them by the researcher. In the event, all but two of 
the young people interviewed opted to have the schedule read out and explained to 
them.
For analysis of the data, the same triangulated approach was taken for the 
young persons’ interviews as was described in the context of magistrates’ interviews 
above. SPSS was again used for analysis of quantitative questions, and advantages 
and disadvantages of this approach can be found in the subsection dealing with the 
magistrates’ interviews. Finally, young people were referred to by their interview 
number in the written results, again as magistrates were. In addition, though, 
excerpts from interviews included in the results also recorded whether the young 
person was in custody or in the community at the time of the interview. This was 
included because it was recognised that prison interviews were all carried out in the
!
presence of YOT workers (and sometimes also YOI staff), whereas community
I
57 See also below for a discussion of how this was acknowledged in the writing-up of results.
58 Especially Likert scale questions, which, like the magistrates’ schedules, formed part of the interview 
schedule, alongside more open-ended, semi-structured questions.
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interviews were not59. Whether the young person was in custody or the community 
was therefore recorded in the written results to enable readers to take into account 
the possibility of reactivity in the data where applicable.
The next section of this chapter considers the issues involved in combining the 
different research methods in this study.
Triangulation of research methods in the study
Triangulation in social research methodology has been defined as the use of
more than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena (Bryman
2004: 275). However Bryman goes on to point out that:
‘The term has been employed somewhat more broadly by Denzln 
(1970: 310) to refer to an approach that uses “multiple observers, 
theoretical perspectives, sources of data, and methodologies", but the 
emphasis has tended to be on methods of investigation and sources of 
data.’ (Bryman 2004: ibid.)
This shows that triangulation does not have one definitive meaning in social 
research. Jick (1979: 602-3) goes further by identifying three different kinds of 
triangulation. The first is the ‘between (or across) methods type’, where different 
methods of research are used to study the same research problem. The second is 
the ‘within-method type’, in which the same research method is used in different 
ways to study the same research problem.
However, as Jick (ibid.) points out, the ‘between methods’ type of triangulation 
risks insufficient integration of the different methods, while the ‘within method’ type 
; risks intensifying the weaknesses of the research method being used in different
i
; ways to address the same issues. Instead, Jick proposes a third type of triangulation, 
providing a holistic and contextual account of the topic under study. This type of
59 See above for discussion of the implications of this for quality of data.
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triangulation, argues Jick (1979: 603-5) has the potential to uncover facets of the 
topic which the combined research methods could not have revealed if used 
separately from one another.
The particular attraction of this type of triangulation in the current study is the 
facility for qualitative methods to produce detailed, contextual data on the topic being 
researched. Sieber (1973), for example, used this approach in his work, by 
employing ethnography to validate quantitative results, interpret significant statistical 
relationships between variables, and clarify unexpected and confusing findings. 
Although Jick and Sieber do not discuss triangulation in terms of a realist approach to 
research, it is submitted that ‘holistic’ triangulation is well suited to the critical realist 
approach to study employed here. Having investigated structural outcomes through 
the method of quantitative research, this study aims to uncover the social 
mechanisms which could explain these outcomes, in the particular context of the 
research. These are tasks for which qualitative research60 was clearly appropriate. 
Further, as Jick (1979: 605) shows, such integrated triangulation can uncover 
previously hidden aspects of the topic being studied, even where the different 
research methods used produce divergent results. As Robson (2002) also argues, 
further investigation in the latter event can also produce clear explanations for 
research results.
However, triangulation brings its own difficulties. Bryman (2004: 464-5) notes 
that the weaknesses of individual research methods still remain when they are 
combined in one study61; that triangulation does not obviate the need for strong 
research design and practice; that triangulation must be appropriate to the research 
question(s) being addressed; and that the methods used must all play a significant
i 60 In the form of ethnographic work with the YOT staff, and semi-structured interviews including Likert 
scale questions for magistrates and young people, as discussed above in this chapter.
61 Although combination can reduce the potency of these weaknesses.
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part in the research (i.e. one should not be allowed to dominate the others in 
research practice). It is submitted that all of these obstacles were recognised and 
guarded against in the design and methodology for this study, as outlined in this 
chapter. Jick (1979: 609) adds that replicability of triangulated research is difficult. 
However, this problem was considered at the research design stage here, when the 
case study approach (which also lends itself to triangulation) was favoured. While 
still important, replicability is not a priority in exploratory work such as this research, 
and therefore this problem should not preclude the use of triangulation here.
Therefore, Jick’s ‘holistic triangulation’ was implemented here, following the 
example of Sieber in using qualitative data to contextualise and clarify previous 
quantitative findings. This sophisticated approach to triangulation also, it is argued, 
fits in well with critical realism’s ‘context + mechanism = outcome’ epistemological 
approach to research (Pawson and Tilley 1997), and the case study approach to 
research design, as well as the use of qualitative methods to explain and clarify 
quantitative data.
Examining the research hypotheses
The central hypotheses to be tested in this study were based on the research 
previously carried out into issues regarding bail in the youth justice process in 
England and Wales (see Chapter Two above). The hypotheses build on the 
perceived limitations of this previous research. In particular they take as a starting 
point the fact that there has been very little work specifically done in this topic area 
uncovering the reality of youth justice policy and practice regarding bail. It also notes 
that what work has been done reveals little in the way of a systematic approach to
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issues and problems in this area of criminal justice. The hypotheses at the outset of 
research are therefore as follows:
a. The youth justice bail process in England and Wales, and the services 
provided within it, operate unsystematically.
b. Despite recent Government attempts to centralise control over these bail 
services, rhetoric or policy at the macro-level of the youth justice process 
does not reflect bail services policy and practice at a local level.
These are fairly complex hypotheses, but ones which, it is submitted, allowed 
a more sophisticated understanding of the key issues underpinning this subject area 
by simultaneous testing of both, as opposed to focusing merely on one of the two to 
the exclusion of the other. It is submitted that the use of these flexible hypotheses, 
as ‘guidelines’ for key issues emerging in the research, was not incompatible with the 
inductive character of the methodology as a whole, despite the traditional association 
of hypotheses with deductive research. In line with Bottoms’ (2000) ‘check list’ above, 
these hypotheses were not concrete. They were tested throughout the empirical 
section of the study, and provision was made for their amendment or outright 
rejection, as data emerged. The hypotheses were used in this way with the aim of 
avoiding the trap of only selecting data which supported them, while still giving 
structure to data collection and analysis. It is notable that Bottoms (ibid.), in his use 
of Layder’s (1998) adaptive theory, advocates this ‘looser’ use of hypotheses in 
inductive research.
Conclusions
This chapter has described and explained the methodology used in this study. 
It has set out the hypotheses arising from the literature review in Chapter Two. In
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addressing these hypotheses, it has applied a critical realist epistemology as a 
means of steering a middle course between purely objectivist positivism and purely 
subjectivist relativism. At the research design stage, it has considered the various 
research design models available before selecting and justifying the case study 
approach. Finally, it has proposed a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods 
to apply to the research problems under study, with the latter being used to 
contextualise and clarify the former, as well as providing a framework for the 
methods’ use in combination with one another.
The following chapters report and analyse the results of the research. 
Following the critical realist approach, the next two chapters (Chapters Four and Five) 
provide the structural outcomes for the research, by reporting and discussing the 
outcomes of the youth justice bail process in Baytown during the study period. Later 
chapters will investigate the context and mechanisms by which these outcomes were 
generated.
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Chapter Four
Defining the ‘structure’: the outcomes of youth justice bail 
processes for young people in Baytown
Introduction
This chapter investigates and traces through the bail process, from initial 
arrest to final sentencing outcome, the cases of all those from the Baytown YOT area 
aged between 15 and 17 years old inclusive who were arrested between 1st 
September 1999 and 31st August 2002. The purpose of this analysis is to illustrate 
the operation of the bail process for young people in the Baytown area during the 
study period, both before and during the court process. In this way, in line with the 
critical realist approach to methodology outlined in Chapter Three, the structure of 
the Baytown youth justice bail ‘world’, which shaped the meanings and actions of 
those involved with it, will be described and analysed.
This analysis will be done not just in terms of which bail options were used by 
local bail decision-makers, and how often, but also in what circumstances the options 
were used. The circumstances of each case are assessed by using four key 
variables. These are the age of the young person at the time of his or her initial 
arrest; whether the young person was male or female; the type of offence triggering 
arrest on each occasion; and the gravity of each offence providing the trigger for an 
arrest. More will be said about the latter two variables, and how they were
;
| operationalised, later in the chapter.
Throughout the analysis which follows, the variables in contingency tables 
were tested for statistically significant relationships between them. One example of
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this was the testing of the relationship between seriousness of offence and bail 
outcome at the young person’s first appearance in court. Another example was the 
testing of the relationship between the age of the young person and frequency of re­
offending while on bail. Testing for statistical relationships was done using the 
Pearson’s chi-square test, which is designed to test strength of relationship between 
two nominal variables (Bryman 2004: 238-9).
It should be noted, however, that the chi-square test was not carried out in 
respect of some of the tables discussed and reported on in this chapter. This 
decision was taken because of the small size of some tables, the similarities between 
percentages for males and females in many of the categories, and therefore the risk 
of statistical fallacy (the spurious inference of statistical significance from raw data). 
Chi-square tests were not carried out for specific sub-categories (e.g. males and 
unconditional bail) in these tables, to maintain consistency with other tables in this 
chapter, and also to conserve space. Chi-square values are included, in the 
following discussion, for all of the tables in respect of which the test for significance 
was carried out.
It should also be noted that the tables containing the data reported on and 
discussed in this chapter (and analysed in Chapter Five below) can be found in 
Appendix C below. All references to individual tables in this and the following 
chapter correspond with the tables listed in Appendix C.
Frequency of arrest by age & gender
The trigger point for inclusion in the study sample, as shown above, was the 
arrest of a young person aged between 15 and 17 inclusive in the Baytown YOT area
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during the study period (1st September 1999 to 31st August 2002). As an introduction 
to more detailed analysis below, this first subsection gives an overview of the size of 
the bail population included in the study sample.
Table 4.1 shows that, taking all recorded arrests into account, far more males 
(84.2% of the total) were arrested during the fieldwork period than females. This was 
true of all age groups covered by the research, but the proportion of arrests involving 
males increased with age. Within the parameters of the study, the peak ‘arrest age’ 
for males was 16, whereas for females it was 1562. Having defined the size of the 
study sample in age and gender terms, the next section moves on to consider how 
many young people were on bail, or in the process of completing court orders, at the 
time of their arrest.
Bail and community order status at point of arrest
This subsection deals with the status of young people at the time of their 
arrest. Specifically, it shows the frequency of arrests taking place while young 
persons were already on bail for another offence, or whether young people were in 
the process of completing a community sentence63 when arrested. This analysis will 
show the extent of offending in breach of previous obligations not to offend, as 
imposed by the criminal justice process. The analysis is included at this point 
because it deals with status at the start of the bail process (i.e. at the point of arrest, 
which forms the trigger for inclusion in the study sample).
The data obtained on the relationship between status at point of arrest and 
age is presented in Table 4.2, which shows that the proportion of young people who
62 Although there was little difference, in real terms, between the number of arrests involving 15-year- 
old girls and the number involving 16-year-old girls.
63 Including, for these purposes, the community element of a detention and training order.
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were arrested while on bail increased with age, to the point where the majority of 17- 
year-olds arrested during the study period (51.8%) were already on bail at the time of 
arrest. A similar pattern can be seen when analysing the proportion of young people 
who were not on bail at the time of arrest, but were still in the process of completing a 
previous community sentence (27.9% of 17-year-olds). The latter group, however, 
formed a smaller proportion of those arrested than those who were on bail, 
regardless of age. The data obtained on the relationship between the young 
person’s bail or community sentence status at the time of initial arrest, and his or her 
gender, are presented below.
Overall, as described previously in this chapter, far more males were arrested 
within the study period than females. However, a greater proportion of young women 
(39.4%) were not under any ‘obligation’ at the time of arrest than young men (29.5%), 
and a slightly greater proportion of young women were arrested while completing a 
community sentence (25.2%) than young men (23.2%). The greatest gender-based 
difference in this part of the analysis was found in the numbers arrested while on bail: 
47.3% of all males who were arrested during the study period were on bail at the time 
of arrest, compared with 35.4% of females. This suggests that gender may be a 
relevant factor in the likelihood of re-offending while on bail. The next section 
examines the types of offences committed in more detail.
Types of offences committed
The classification of offences was constructed using a framework similar (but
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not exactly identical)64 to that used by the Home Office in the Annual Crime Statistics 
for England and Wales. For each arrest, only the most serious suspected offence 
was counted here. There were two, related reasons for this approach. Firstly, police 
crime statistics now reflect the number of victims of each alleged offender, rather 
than the number of criminal acts committed (Maguire 2002: 338). Secondly, as a 
result of this macro-level change in police offence counting rules, the Baytown police 
did not consistently record all of the alleged offences committed in cases where 
multiple allegations were made.
As above, the results in this section were considered in the context of age and 
gender. Table 4.4 presents data comparing age and offence type.
Table 4.4 shows that theft-related offences were the most common cause of 
arrest for all three age groups included in the study. Non-vehicular theft was the 
most common offence category for all of the age groups (28.5% of all offences), and 
vehicular theft was the second most common category, again across all three age 
groups (18.5% of all offences). Drugs offences were the least common category 
across all three groups. Seriousness is a relevant issue in relation to the offences 
listed in the ‘other’ category in Table 4.4. These included breaches of bail, but also 
other offences which were not included in any of the defined categories, to reflect 
their categorisation as such in official criminal statistics65. Again, the seriousness of 
these offences will be discussed and analysed below.
The relationship between age and most serious offence type was statistically 
tested. The chi-square value for Table 4.4 was 73.074 (df = 14). This was a 
statistically significant result at the p < 0.001 level of statistical significance.
64 Home Office statistics refer to ‘peak offending age’ rather than ‘peak arrest age’, which is the 
preferred term here. As the Home Office figures are derived from arrest rates rather than conviction 
rates, it is submitted that ‘peak arrest age’ is a less confusing term, particularly as the Home Office 
terminology appears to assume that all those arrested are guilty of offending, or are convicted as 
offenders. This is clearly not the case -  see e.g. Maguire (2002).
65 Such as, for example, possession of an offensive weapon.
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However, no clear relationship could be found in the data itself between age and 
offence seriousness. It is likely that the statistically significant relationship arose due 
to the 9% decrease in 17-year-olds arrested for non-vehicular theft compared to the 
other two age groups, given there were at least twice as many offences in this 
category as in any of the others.
Table 4.5 displays the relationship between gender and type of recorded 
offence. From Table 4.5 it can be seen that non-vehicular theft was the most 
common cause of arrest for both males (27.9% of the total) and females (31.8% of 
the total). In other respects, however, the relationship between gender and offence 
type varied widely for different offences. With regard to public order offences, for 
example, the proportion of females arrested for this kind of offence (26.6%) was 
around twice the size of the proportion of males (13.8%). Vehicle theft, on the other 
hand, was the ground for just over one fifth of all arrests involving males, but only 
8.1% of arrests involving females. Arrests for violent offences were also more 
common among females than males. Drugs offences were among the least common 
for both genders. Indeed drug-related offences were the least common arrest 
offence for males (1.8%), and only motoring offences were less common among 
females.
Overall, the differences in offence type along gender lines were more 
prominent than those along the lines of age (as shown above). The next section 
considers the seriousness of offending within the study sample.
Most serious offences committed, by gravity
Having established what kind of offences were committed, it is now necessary 
to include some measure of seriousness for the offences included in the study. For
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this part of the analysis, an ‘offence seriousness score’, which was used by both the 
Baytown YOT and local police divisions, was utilised to measure the seriousness of 
offences committed within the scope of the study. Each offence was categorised into 
one of eight groups -  the higher the group number, the more serious the offence was 
considered to be. In using this scale, it is recognised that opinions differ as to the 
relative seriousness of some (particularly middle-range) offences in England and 
Wales (e.g. Hough 1996), and that there is no public consensus on this issue (e.g. 
Roberts and Hough 2002). However, this scale was still used, partly out of 
convenience (as a score was automatically calculated on the YOT’s own database, 
and so was readily available), and partly because it does provide some indication 
(albeit not a definitive one) of offence seriousness. The full gravity score table is set 
out in Appendix B.
Table 4.6 illustrates the relationship between the gravity of recorded offences 
and young persons’ age. Table 4.6 shows that just over half of the total number of 
recorded offences were rated either 3 or 4 on the offence gravity score, 6.6% of 
offences were rated 2, and a further eighth were rated 1, the lowest category of 
seriousness. This indicates that a large proportion of offending, across all three age 
groups, was of low to medium seriousness. In practice, a score of 3 equated to 
offences such as common assault, theft and criminal damage, while a score of 4 
equated to such crimes as non-domestic burglary and offences against the Public 
Order Act 1986 (insulting or threatening behaviour)66.
Arrests for the most serious offences, rated 7 and 8, accounted for 8.4% of all
offences, although 11% of arrests involving 17-year-olds fell into categories 7 and 8,
a higher proportion than was the case for the other age-groups. For the relationship
between age and offence seriousness shown in Table 4.6 above, the chi-square
66 See Appendix B for a full list of all offences recorded during the study period, and the gravity score 
allocated to each type of offence.
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value was 55.194 (df = 14), a larger than expected value for a table of this size. This 
value was significant at the p < 0.001 level. However, patterns of offence 
seriousness were in reality very similar across all three age groups -  there was little 
evidence of offence seriousness increasing or decreasing with age. It seems likely 
that the significance of the relationship arose due to the disproportionately large 
percentage of offences, across all three age groups, in gravity categories 3 and 4, 
compared with percentages in other categories.
Table 4.7 shows the relationship between seriousness of offence and young 
persons’ gender, and supports the trends in offence seriousness found in Table 4.6. 
As in Table 4.6, over half of the arrests for both males and females were for offences 
rated either 3 or 4. However, in other respects, there were differences in offence 
seriousness along gender lines. A greater proportion of offences committed by 
females were rated 3 or 4 compared with males. For females, there was a greater 
gap between proportions of offences rated 3 and 4 and proportions in the other 
offence categories than there was for males. This meant that, in offence categories 
1, 5, 6, 7 and 8, there was a greater proportion of male offenders than females. In 
offence category 5, for example, the proportion of male offenders was 6.1% greater 
than the proportion of female offenders, and in offence category 7, the proportion of 
male offenders was 4.8% greater. The next section examines bail decision-making 
by the police in detail.
Police charge and bail decisions
It has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Hucklesby 2002) that those denied bail by 
the police are more likely to be denied bail in court. The police charge decision
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stage67 is therefore an important part of analysing the efficiency of the Baytown youth 
justice bail process68. The police-controlled charge stage is analysed in Tables 4.8- 
4.11.
Analysing the data by age, it can be seen that the proportion of young people 
charged immediately by police increased with age (to a maximum of 74.9% of cases 
involving 17-year-olds), and correspondingly the proportion given police bail 
decreased with age. Similarly, the proportion of young people given a reprimand or 
final warning (either immediately or following time spent on police bail) also 
decreased with age. Also, although similar proportions of young people in each age 
group had their cases dropped by the police (as shown by the ‘NFA’ or ‘no further 
action’ column in Table 4.8), 17-year-olds were less likely to have their cases 
dropped by police following a period on police bail. There was a statistically 
significant relationship between age and police decision: the chi-square value for 
Table 4.8 is 116.879 (df = 16), showing a significant relationship at the p < 0.001 
level. This result shows that the percentage of cases charged immediately increased 
with age. Conversely, the percentage of cases dealt with using a reprimand or final 
warning, or bailed by police, decreased with increasing age.
Table 4.9 illustrates gender differences at the police charge decision stage. 
From Table 4.9, it is evident that females were less likely to be charged immediately 
than males, but also less likely to be given police bail. Females were instead more 
likely to be ‘NFAed’ (9.4% compared to 8.8% of males), and more likely to be given a 
reprimand or final warning than males (14.8% compared to 7.8% of males).
67 Of course, the police’s discretion to divert young people from the court process has been restricted 
by the legislative limitations on cautioning (see e.g. Newburn 2002) -  but it is argued that this has not 
fundamentally altered the police’s discretion over whether or not to charge in itself, or the processes
| by which they make this decision. Both of these are, it has been argued, inherently geared towards 
case construction, prosecution and production of guilty pleas -  see e.g. McConville, Sanders and 
Leng (1991).
68 The nature of YOT bail interventions will be examined in detail in Chapter Six. Here, it is sufficient 
to state that no bail support services were offered by YOT staff at the police station, except in their 
capacity as appropriate adults.
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Table 4.10 examines the relationship between police charge decisions and the 
type of offence allegedly committed by young people. Table 4.10 shows that for 
most of the offence categories, the proportion of young people charged immediately 
was close to the overall average. Drugs offences were more likely to be dealt with 
using a reprimand or an immediate final warning. The ‘other’ category had a very 
high rate of immediate charge (91.7%), and a low rate of police bail or no further 
action (4.6%). The chi square value for this table was 346.771 (df = 56), showing a 
statistically significant relationship between offence type and police decisions at the p 
< 0.001 level.
Table 4.11 analyses the relationship between seriousness of offence and 
police decisions. There was no linear increase in immediate charge rates as offence 
gravity increased. In fact, the highest rate of immediate charge was to be found in 
the lowest offence seriousness category (1 -  95.3%). Nonetheless, a majority of 
offences in each category except category 2 (46.0%) were dealt with using 
immediate charge. In category 2, although they did not form a majority, the 
proportion of cases where the defendant was charged immediately was still larger 
than the proportions of cases dealt with otherwise. Offences rated 2 were also more 
likely to be ‘NFAed’69 and dealt with using a reprimand or final warning than offences 
in any of the other categories. More serious offences were less likely to be dealt with 
using a reprimand or final warning. However, more serious offences were also more 
likely to be ‘NFAed’ following time spent on police bail than minor offences. The 
greatest proportion of cases dealt with in this way was to be found in the most 
serious offence category, 8 (11.1%). The chi-square value for Table 4.11 was 
348.962 (df = 56), a significant value at the p < 0.001 level.
69 I.e. cases in which the police decided to take no further action against the young person involved.
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Overall, 39.0% of those not on bail at the time of their arrest were charged 
immediately, compared with 78.0% of those who were already on bail, and 77.0% of 
those who were completing a court order. For the relationship between bail status at 
this point and charge, the chi-square value was 654.038 (df = 16), a much larger 
value than expected, and significant at the p < 0.001 level.
The first appearance in court
In this part of the analysis, the outcome of each initial court hearing (in terms 
of a bail decision, move to sentencing or withdrawal of charge) was examined 
according to age and gender. Outcomes were also cross-tabulated with the most 
serious offence charge and the current bail status of the young person at the time of 
his or her arrest. These factors are analysed here to test the theory that they are 
relevant factors in making bail decisions in practice. A strong relationship between 
one or more of these factors and the bail outcome at first appearance could be used 
as evidence that bail decisions were made in a systematic and efficient way in the 
Baytown youth courts.
Table 4.12 begins the analysis by examining the relationship between bail 
decisions at the young persons’ initial appearance in court and defendants’ ages. 
Overall, a majority of young people (64.4%) in the study sample were granted bail at 
first court appearance. This figure comprises young people who were granted 
unconditional bail, conditional bail, or bail support. Of the remainder, 17.5% of young 
people were denied bail at first court appearance. This group comprises those who 
were remanded to custody, remanded to local authority accommodation, or were 
made the subject of an arrest warrant for failure to attend court.
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The largest cohort of young people in each age group were those who 
received conditional bail (41.5% of 15-year-olds, 40.0% of 16-year-olds, and 30.3% 
of 17-year-olds), and the second largest cohort in each age group were those who 
received unconditional bail. Bail support, in contrast, was used far less often by 
judges and magistrates at the first court appearance than unconditional and 
conditional bail, with a rate of less than 1% in each age group. In addition to the 
cases which were granted bail at this stage, there was a consistent rate of cases 
being moved onto the sentencing stage at the first appearance, following conviction. 
18.7% of cases involving 15-year-olds, 14.9% of cases involving 16-year-olds, and 
16.4% of cases involving 17-year-olds were dealt with in this way. In these cases, 
there was no need for any bail decision, as the cases were able to be processed 
immediately. Finally, there was a small minority of cases in each age group in which 
charges were withdrawn or dismissed at the first court appearance.
Turning to the cases where bail was denied, the rate of young people 
remanded to custody increased with age. In particular, the rate for 17-year-olds was 
noticeably greater than for the younger age groups. Lower rates of unconditional and 
conditional bail were found for 17-year-olds (23.7% and 30.3% of cases respectively) 
than for the other age groups70. 17-year-olds also had a higher rate of arrest 
warrants for failure to appear in court (11.2% of cases) than the other age groups71.
The chi-square value for Table 4.12 was 135.556 (df = 18), where p < 0.001. 
There was therefore a significant relationship at this level of probability, indicating 
statistical links between age and decisions at the first court appearance. Table 4.13 
presents the relationship between gender and initial court decisions.
70 For 15-year-olds’ cases, 28.0% of cases were unconditionally bailed, and 41.5% were conditionally 
bailed. For 16-year-olds’ cases, 30.1% were unconditionally bailed, and 40.0% were conditionally 
bailed.
71 6.6% of cases involving 15-year-olds, and 8.0% of cases involving 16-year-olds.
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Table 4.13 shows that while those being granted conditional bail at the first 
court appearance formed the largest cohort among males (37.8%), those who 
received unconditional bail at this stage formed the largest cohort among females. 
For females, the rate of unconditional bail (31.0%) and conditional bail (30.7%) was 
very similar, however. The table also shows that more females (22.0%) had their 
cases moved immediately onto the sentencing stage than males (15.4%), while a 
similarly sized small minority in both groups had their cases withdrawn or dismissed 
at this stage (1.9% of males, 1.0% of females). All of the small number of cases 
being granted bail support at this stage were male (0.4% of the total).
The rate of remands to custody was higher for males (9.0%) than for females 
(2.4%) -  and no females were remanded to local authority accommodation at this 
stage. By contrast, females had a higher rate of arrest warrants for failure to attend 
court at first appearance than males (12.8% compared with 8.1%).
Table 4.14 compares type of offence in each case with the outcome of initial 
court decisions. It shows that the highest rate of unconditional bail was to be found 
for criminal damage-related offences (39.3%), while the lowest rate was for ‘other’ 
offences (15.8%). The overall unconditional bail rate of 27.3% masked a percentage 
rate spread of 23.5% across different categories of offence. For conditional bail, the 
highest percentage rate was for ‘other’ offences (52.5%), while the lowest rate was 
for public order offences (22.3%). As with rates of unconditional bail, the overall 
percentage rate for conditional bail masked a percentage rate spread of 30.2% 
across different offence categories. In terms of cases being moved directly to 
sentence, the percentage of drugs offences dealt with in this way (45.5%) was higher
i
i
than the percentage of other offences. Cases involving violence against the person 
had the lowest rate of cases moved directly to the sentencing stage (7.9%). Motoring
i
offences, meanwhile, had the highest percentage rate of cases being withdrawn or
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dismissed (5.3%), although overall rates were low (1.7% of the total number of 
cases), and several offence types had no cases in this category at all (violence, 
drugs and ‘other’ offences). The only cases granted bail support at this stage were 
those involving theft of some kind (either vehicular or non-vehicular).
For cases which were denied bail, rates of remand to custody were greater for 
violence (14.2%) and vehicle theft cases (13.9%) than for other offence types. 
Vehicle theft cases also had the highest rate of remand to local authority 
accommodation (2.2%), while no motoring, violence, drugs or public order cases 
were dealt with in this way at all. For cases where an arrest warrant was issued at 
this stage, there was a 12.8% difference between the offence category with the 
highest rate (motoring offences), and the offence category with the lowest rate 
(violence).
For Table 4.14, the chi-square value was 292.830 (df = 63), where p < 0.001. 
This was therefore a significant value at the above level of statistical significance. 
Table 4.15 builds upon this analysis by analysing the relationship between offence 
seriousness and bail decisions at the first court appearance. It shows that the 
offences ranked as being the least serious (i.e. those in category 1) had the lowest 
percentage rate of unconditional bail (10.6%), but the highest percentage rate of 
conditional bail (55.3%). The next lowest rate of unconditional bail was for offences 
rated 7 (16.6%), followed by offences rated 8 (17.5%). Similarly, the next highest 
rate of conditional bail was for offences rated 8 (50.0%), followed by offences rated 7 
(49.0%). Rates of unconditional and conditional bail were similar for offences rated 2 
to 6 inclusive, but not for offences rated 1, 7 and 8. The small number of cases being 
granted bail support were divided between the categories of 3, 5 and 6. No offences 
rated 6 or above were withdrawn or dismissed at the first court appearance, and 
offences rated 5 or above had lower rates of move to immediate sentence than
offences rated 4 or below (with offences rated 2 having the highest rate -  38.2% of 
the total -  of move to sentence).
Generally the proportion of remands to custody at first appearance increased 
with offence severity. The exception to this was that offences rated 1 resulted in 
remands to custody more often than offences rated 2, 3 or 4. The rate of arrest 
warrants rose to a peak for offences rated 4 (13.7% of the cases in that category), 
before declining with increasing seriousness, until a slight increase for offences rated 
8. Finally, the rate of remands to local authority accommodation was evenly spread 
across the different offence gravity categories, with a 1.6% spread between the 
highest and lowest percentage rates.
The chi-square value for Table 4.15 was 366.536 (df = 63), a result significant 
at the p < 0.001 level. Therefore, as with the relationship between offence type and 
initial court decision, there was a statistically significant link between offence 
seriousness and initial court decision.
The link between bail status on arrest and bail decision at first appearance in 
court was also investigated. Results are shown in Table 4.16. Table 4.16 shows that 
the greatest proportion of cases where the young person was neither on bail nor on a 
court order at the time of arrest received unconditional bail (38.4%) at their first 
appearance in court. This group of cases also had the greatest proportion of cases 
moved directly onto the sentencing stage (21.7%). Those young people who were 
on bail at the time of their arrest, meanwhile, had the greatest rate of conditional bail 
at initial court appearance (45.8%), as well as the greatest rate of remands to 
custody at this stage (10.6%). Those who were completing a community sentence 
! but were not on bail at the time of arrest, meanwhile, had a greater rate of
j
| unconditional bail (the largest proportion within this group -  34.7%), conditional bail,
j
remands to custody, remands to local authority accommodation, and move onto
133
sentencing than those on bail, but a smaller rate for each of these outcomes than 
those who were neither on bail nor on a court order. The chi-square value for Table 
4.16 was 165.131 (df = 16), showing a statistically significant relationship between 
bail status on arrest and bail outcome at first appearance in court at the p < 0.001 
level.
The next section discusses bail outcomes at subsequent court appearances. 
Subsequent appearances in court
This section deals with bail decisions made at subsequent appearances in 
court. To set the parameters, the first set of tables below explain how many changes 
in bail status actually took place during the court process for the different age and 
gender subgroups. This is analysed on the basis that normally two applications for 
bail are allowed in each case72. Table 4.17 begins this section of the analysis by 
measuring the number of changes in bail status undergone by each case that 
reached the youth courts.
Table 4.17 shows that the majority of cases (68.8%) saw no change in bail
status as they progressed through the court process. Within this basic finding, a
number of points can be made. Considering different age groups, 15-year-olds’
cases were more likely than other age groups’ to complete the court process without
any change in bail status, although there was little difference between 16-year-olds
(65.4%) and 17-year-olds (65.9%) in this respect. The rates of cases undergoing
one bail status change and two bail status changes were also very similar for 16-
year-olds and 17-year-olds, with a slightly greater rate of 16-year-olds undergoing
two status changes (17.9% compared with 16.7% of 17-year-olds), and a slightly
72 More applications for bail are allowed where there has been a ‘change of circumstances’ during the 
young person’s time on bail.
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greater rate of 17-year-olds undergoing one status change (17.7% compared with 
16.4% of 17-year-olds).
Table 4.18 considers the relationship between number of bail status changes 
and the gender of the defendant. In terms of gender, females (70.8%) were slightly 
more likely than males (68.5%) to maintain the same bail status throughout their 
case’s progression through the courts. Males and females were almost equally as 
likely to have one change in status, with males being more likely to change status 
twice (15.8% compared with 13.4% of females). This suggests that males were more 
susceptible to such changes than females, although the differences along gender 
lines were slight overall.
Table 4.19 compares the number of changes in bail status with different types 
of offence. In Table 4.19, it can be seen that offences in the ‘other’ category (which 
included breaches of bail) were most likely not to result in any changes in bail status 
(79.2%). Although vehicular thefts were least likely to have no status changes 
(60.0%), they were most likely to have at least one change in status (40.0%). 
Similarly, non-vehicular thefts were most likely to have two changes in status 
(19.4%), suggesting that medium-range offences were most susceptible to changes 
in bail status. This argument is supported by the fact that criminal damage offences 
was the second most likely category to undergo two changes in status (19.3%).
Table 4.20 considers the number of status changes in the context of 
seriousness of offence. When offence gravity scores are compared with the number
j
! of bail status changes, the general trend was that likelihood of status change
|
increased with the seriousness of offence. However, no clear pattern emerged with 
comparing percentage rates for one and two changes in status. For categories 1, 2, 
4, 5 and 7, the rate of one status change was greater than the rate of two changes, 
while for categories 3 and 6, the rate of two changes was the greater. For category
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8, the rates for one and two changes were the same. The data revealed no overall 
trends in this respect.
This subsection gives a general overview of how many changes in bail status 
occurred, and to whom these changes occurred. They can only make sense of the 
bail process in reality, however, when the results of these changes are examined. 
The next subsection looks at the results of bail status changes in detail.
Examining bail status changes at the first application point
By this stage in the process the size of the sample is obviously reduced, 
because of the cases which were withdrawn, dismissed or moved straight to 
sentencing at the first appearance in court. This subsection refers to those cases 
which reached the stage where a first opportunity to change bail status arose. Table 
4.21 compares the results of the first change in bail status with defendants’ ages.
Table 4.21 shows that the majority of cases did not undergo any change in 
bail status at this stage (as mentioned previously). The number of 16 and 17-year- 
olds who underwent a change in bail status was almost exactly the same in 
percentage terms, and was greater than the number of 15-year-olds whose bail 
status changed. The highest rate of change to conditional bail was found among 16- 
year-olds (12.0%), while rates of change to unconditional bail were lower than rates 
of change to conditional bail across all three age groups. The highest rate of change 
I to bail support status was found among 17-year-olds (1.0%), but the rate of change
i
i
was very low across all age groups (and no 15-year-olds received bail support at this 
stage at all).
More 17-year-olds were remanded in custody (5.1%) than 15 or 16-year-olds 
(1.4% and 2.7% respectively). The increase in 17-year-olds who were remanded to
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custody was counterbalanced by a corresponding decrease in numbers of those 
receiving unconditional and conditional bail in this age group. 16-year-olds had the 
highest rate of arrest warrants (13.4%), although their rate was only marginally 
greater than that for 17-year-olds (13.3%). Finally, the rate of remand to local 
authority accommodation remained low, as it was at the first appearance in court. 
17-year-olds cannot be dealt with in this way under the law73, and less than 1% of 
cases involving 15 and 16-year-olds were dealt with in this way at their first change in 
bail status.
The chi-square value for Table 4.21 was 47.564 (df = 12), where p < 0.001. 
There was therefore a significant statistical relationship between age and first change 
in bail status at this level of probability: the numbers of cases remanded to custody at 
this point increased with age. Table 4.22 compares the results of the first change in 
bail status with the gender of the young person.
Table 4.22 shows that there were several differences in bail outcome along 
gender lines at this stage. The rate of females receiving unconditional bail (5.8%) 
was slightly higher than that of males (4.8%), while the rate of males receiving 
conditional bail (11.2%) was higher than that of females (6.5%). All of the small 
number of cases involving a change to bail support at this stage involved male 
defendants.
Turning to cases which were denied bail at this stage, females had a higher 
rate of arrest warrants for failure to attend court (14.4% compared with 11.2% of 
males), as was the case for the initial appearance in court. Males had a slightly
73 This is not to say, however, that these criteria are justified by the nature, extent and seriousness of 
17-year-olds’ offending in practice. It has already been argued in this chapter that, within the 
boundaries of this study, these offending characteristics are not sufficiently different, when this age 
group’s offending is compared with others’, to warrant the treatment of 17-year-olds as adults while 
they are in the bail process. Further, it is argued that such a policy (developed at macro-level) is 
illogical when, since 1991, 17-year-olds are treated as children elsewhere in the criminal justice 
process. This is the epitome of a non-systematic approach, which also potentially prejudices 17-year- 
olds’ rights later in the court process (see e.g. Hucklesby (2002) on the effects of denial of bail on 
sentencing, and also this chapter below).
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higher rate of remand to custody at this stage (3.4% compared with 2.4% of 
females), although rates for both gender groups were low, and rates of remand to 
local authority accommodation were even lower (with no females being so remanded 
at all at this stage).
Table 4.23 compares the results of the first change in bail status with type of 
offence committed. Table 4.23 shows that there was little variation in rates of status 
change to unconditional bail and conditional bail across different offence categories. 
There was a 3% spread between the highest and lowest rates of change to 
unconditional bail, and a 5.3% spread between the highest and lowest rates of 
change to conditional bail. The small number of bail support cases were spread 
across most of the offence categories available, with the highest rate (for motoring 
offences) being 2.4%, and no drugs or criminal damage offences being granted bail 
support at this stage.
There was also little variation in terms of rate of remand to custody across 
different offences, with a 2.5% spread between the highest and lowest rates, and a 
low rate overall. The small number of cases remanded to local authority 
accommodation were all theft-related. Rates of arrest warrant varied more between 
the different offence types than rates of other bail options. The highest rate here was 
for vehicle theft, which was 3.4% ahead of the second highest rate (for motoring 
offences). The lowest rate here was for ‘other’ offences (8.3%).
There was no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between 
offence type and bail status changes at this stage. The chi-square value for Table 
4.23 was 54.976 (df = 42), where p = 0.086. This was a lower chi-square value than 
expected for a table of this kind, and with this level of probability (which is also a 
lower level of probability than that for all of the previous tables in this chapter, apart 
from Table 4.22, where the chi-square test was not done).
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Table 4.24 compares results of the first change in bail status with offence 
seriousness. It shows that most of the offence seriousness categories had a similar 
rate of change to unconditional bail, although the rate of changes for offences rated 7 
was 2% greater than the next highest rate (for offences rated 6). There was a more 
noticeable spread of rates of change to conditional bail, with a difference of 12.3% 
between the highest rate of change (for offences rated 8) and the lowest (for offences 
rated 2). The cases receiving bail support at this stage mostly involved offences 
rated 6 or above.
For the cases denied bail, offences ranked 5 and 6 had the highest rate of 
change to remand to custody, with no offences ranked 8 remanded in this way. The 
highest rate of change to a remand to local authority was only 1.4% (for offences 
ranked 7), and although the lowest and highest rates of change to arrest warrant 
status were found in the lowest and highest seriousness categories, there was no 
linear increase in rates of failure to appear with increasing levels of offence 
seriousness. The chi-square value for Table 4.24 was 95.821 (df = 42), a statistically 
significant value at the given level of probability (here, p < 0.001). This result shows 
that the likelihood of a change in bail status at this point significantly decreased with 
age. However, there were no such patterns in the relationships between different 
bail status change options and age. It is therefore possible that the high percentage 
of cases in which there was no bail status change may have produced the 
statistically significant value here.
Examining the second change in bail status
This subsection reports on bail outcomes at the point of the second change in 
bail status. Table 4.25 clearly shows that a large majority of the cases reaching court
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(84.4%) did not undergo more than one change in bail status during the court 
process. Of those cases in which the bail status did change twice, the largest 
proportion in all three age groups were granted conditional bail at the second change 
point (6.4% of 15-year-olds, 8.2% of 16-year-olds, and 6.1% of 17-year-olds). For 
17-year-olds, the next largest proportion of cases were remanded to custody (4.9%), 
and the rate of remand to custody at this point was larger for 17-year-olds than for 
the younger age groups. 16-year-olds had the highest rate of arrest warrants at this 
stage (3.7%), while 17-year-olds had the highest rate (0.4%) within the small group of 
bail support referrals (as at previous stages, no 15-year-olds received bail support at 
this point).
The chi-square value for Table 4.25 was 29.758 (df = 12), where p = 0.003. 
Therefore there was no evidence of a statistically significant relationship in the above 
table.
Table 4.26 compares bail outcomes at the second change point with gender. 
Females had a higher rate of no further changes in bail status at this point (86.6% 
compared with 84.1% of males). Males, by contrast, had higher rates of change to 
conditional bail, arrest warrants, remands to custody, remands to local authority 
accommodation and bail support than females. Females did, however, have a 
slightly higher rate of ‘moves’ to unconditional bail than males (2.1% compared with 
2.0% of males).
Table 4.27 analyses the results of the second change in bail status by offence
!
type. It shows that the rate of changes to conditional bail at this point was not only 
the highest rate among the different bail options overall (10.5%), but was also the 
highest rate in most offence categories. The exception to this was the criminal 
damage category, where remands to custody had the highest rate (6.4%). The rate 
of remands to custody in this category was also greater than the rate of remands to
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custody in any of the other offence categories, the next highest rate being found for 
vehicle thefts (5.6%). Non-vehicular theft and drugs offences had the highest rates 
of change to conditional bail (9.1% each), while motoring offences had the highest 
rate of change to arrest warrant status (4.8%). The chi-square value for Table 4.27 
was 70.877 (df = 42), a slightly lower value than that expected at the relevant level of 
significance (p < 0.005).
Table 4.28 concludes this subsection by comparing bail outcomes at this 
stage with offence seriousness. Table 4.28 shows that the highest rate of change to 
unconditional bail at the second status change point (5.3%) was found for offences in 
the highest category of seriousness (8), while offences ranked 6 had the highest rate 
of change to conditional bail (9.6%), as well as the highest rate of change to bail 
support (1.2%). Offences ranked 8 also had the highest rate of remands to custody 
at this point (7.9%), followed by offences ranked 7 (7.1%). However, it was offences 
ranked 3 which had the highest rate of change to arrest warrant status (4.0%). The 
above data suggest no overall pattern in the relationship between offence gravity and 
bail outcome at this stage: however, the chi-square value for Table 4.28 was 73.179 
(df = 42), a value slightly less than that expected at the p = 0.002 level of probability.
The next section looks at the impact of re-offending (i.e. offending while on 
bail) in the Baytown youth justice bail process.
The impact of re-offending on bail outcomes
|
As a measure of persistency of offending, each period of time spent in the bail 
process was monitored for recorded re-arrest during that period. The aim was to
i
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investigate any link between recorded re-offending and restriction or denial of bail74. 
The following tables measure the nature and gravity of recorded re-offending during 
the study period, as well as measuring the effects of re-offending on bail status for 
young people in Baytown. As the group of young people who were re-arrested while 
on bail was considerably smaller than the whole group, the group was analysed as a 
whole, rather than being broken down along age and gender lines as in previous 
sections of this chapter.
Table 4.29 compares recorded re-offending rates with changes in bail status 
during the court process. This table shows that the majority of young people were 
not re-arrested during the bail process. Of those whose cases reached the courts, 
765 (38.9%) were re-arrested, leaving 1204 (61.1%) who were not. There was a 
higher rate of change for each possible bail option among those who had been re­
arrested than among those who had not. Those who were not re-arrested had a 
greater proportion of cases in which no change in bail status occurred (85.4% 
compared with 43.3%).
The nature and gravity of recorded re-offending on bail will now be 
considered, in order to examine further the role played by fresh offences in the 
courts’ bail decisions at defendants’ subsequent court appearances.
Table 4.30 examines recorded re-offending during the study period in more 
detail. It compares changes in status with the nature of recorded re-offending, for all 
of those who were re-arrested while on bail. It shows that 43.4% of cases in which a 
young person was re-arrested did not change bail status following the re-arrest. 
Within this figure, 68.6% of criminal damage offences committed on bail did not result 
in any change in bail status. This was the highest rate of offences not resulting in a
74 A young person only needed to be arrested while on bail to be considered as having re-offended, 
regardless of the outcome of the later offence. This is why the term ‘re-offending’ is used here, rather 
than ‘reconviction’.
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change in status, in any offence category (the lowest rate occurred among ‘other’ 
offences -  32.4%).
After no status change, the next most frequent bail outcome following re­
offending was an arrest warrant for failure to attend court (21.4%). This outcome 
was most frequent in cases of vehicle theft (28.1%), and least frequent in motoring 
offences (6.3%). Remands to custody following re-offending were less frequent 
overall than arrest warrants or changes to conditional bail, but slightly more frequent 
than changes to unconditional bail. The highest rate of remands to custody at this 
stage were found among vehicle thefts (12.9%), with the lowest rate occurring in 
criminal damage cases (2.9%). The chi-square value for Table 4.30 was 52.299 (df = 
42), close to the expected value where p = 0.133. However, the level of probability 
was low here, as the p value demonstrates.
Table 4.31 relates the seriousness of re-offending on bail to changes in bail 
status. Table 4.31 shows that a majority of re-offending ranked 2, 5 or 8 did not 
result in any change in bail status, and an outcome of no status change formed the 
largest proportion of cases in every offence seriousness category. The highest 
proportions of changes to conditional bail followed re-offending at opposite ends of 
the seriousness scale (in categories 1 and 8). For those denied bail following re­
offending, the highest rates of remands to custody were to be found for offending 
ranked 5, 6 and 7, but the highest rates of arrest warrant were to be found for 
offending ranked 1, 3 and 5. The chi-square value for Table 4.31 was 71.039 (df = 
42), a similar value to that expected where p = 0.003.
As was shown earlier in this chapter, a small proportion of cases in the study 
period underwent a second change in bail status. The relationship between re- 
| offending and the second change in status is shown in Table 4.32. Table 4.32 shows 
that those who were recorded as having re-offended while on bail were more likely to
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undergo a second change in bail status than those who did not. In particular, re­
offenders were more likely to have been remanded to custody at this stage, as well 
as more likely to have had their bail status changed to unconditional bail, conditional 
bail, or bail support. A greater proportion of re-offenders were also issued with an 
arrest warrant for failure to attend court. However, the majority of re-offenders did 
not undergo a second change in bail status.
Table 4.33 compares the nature of recorded re-offending with the second 
change in bail status, for all of those cases in which the young person was re­
arrested while on bail. A majority of cases involving re-offending on bail in each 
offence category did not undergo a second change in bail status. The lowest rate of 
this occurrence was found in the ‘other1 offence category (63.5%), and the highest 
rate was for drugs offences (90.9%). The most likely change in bail status at this 
point was a change to conditional bail (13.3%). This occurred most frequently for 
vehicle theft (19.0%) and ‘other’ offences (16.8%), and least frequently in cases of 
criminal damage (5.7%). The greatest rates of change to remand to custody status 
were to be found for criminal damage (8.6%) and violence (8.2%). The greatest 
rates of change to arrest warrant status, on the other hand, were to be found among 
fresh occurrences of ‘other’ offences (13.1%) and motoring offences (10.0%). 
Changes to bail support and remand to local authority status following re-offending 
were very rare. The chi-square value was lower than expected (chi-square = 46.441; 
df = 42), while the level of probability was also low for this table (p = 0.294).
Table 4.34 compares the seriousness of recorded re-offending with second 
changes in bail status for re-offenders. Table 4.34 shows that the majority of re­
offending in each seriousness category resulted in no change in bail status. The 
highest rate of ‘no change’ cases was found for re-offending given a gravity score of 
2, with the second and third highest rates in categories 4 and 7 respectively.
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Elsewhere, the highest rate of change to conditional bail was for re-offending ranked 
5 for seriousness, with the second highest rate for re-offending ranked 1. For cases 
denied bail at this point, the highest rate of remand to custody was for re-offending 
considered to be in the most serious category, followed by the rates for re-offending 
ranked 5 and 6. Re-offending ranked 1, meanwhile, had the highest rate of arrest 
warrants at this stage, with re-offending ranked 4 and 8 the only other seriousness 
categories to have a rate greater than the overall average of 6.4%. The chi-square 
value for Table 4.34 was 72.889 (df = 42), a slightly lower value than expected at the 
given level of probability (p = 0.002).
Having now considered the different stages in the court process at which bail 
status could change, as well as the impact of recorded re-offending upon these 
status changes, the next section examines the impact of cases’ bail history on their 
final outcomes.
Comparing final case outcomes with bail history
This section focuses on how cases completed the bail process, and compares 
final case outcomes in each case with how that case had previously been dealt with 
during the bail process. It will therefore attempt to ‘connect’ final case outcomes with 
preceding bail process factors, which could have an influence on the final outcome.
As an introduction to this section, Table 4.35 compares initial offence type and 
seriousness with final sentencing outcome, for all cases within the study period which 
reached the court process. It should be noted that, throughout this section, 
outcomes are measured only for cases that reached the court stage.
Table 4.35 shows that the highest rate of custodial sentences was found in 
cases of vehicle theft. The second highest rate of custodial sentence was for
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offences in the ‘other’ category. There was a 17.2% difference between the rate of 
custody for vehicle theft and the rate for drugs offences, which had the lowest 
proportion of custodial sentences. The highest rate of community sentences was for 
theft offences, with only ‘other’ offences and motoring offences having a rate of less 
than 60% in terms of community sentence outcome.
Usage of fines and withdrawal of charges have not been discussed so far in 
the chapter, but there were some interesting variations in their use here. For 
example, 18.2% of drugs offences were dealt with using a fine, but only 0.8% of 
vehicle theft and violence cases were dealt with in this way. Similarly, 18.2% of 
criminal damage-related cases were withdrawn or dismissed during the court 
process, as were 17.5% of cases involving violence, but no drugs cases were dealt 
with in this way. The chi-square value for this table (chi-square = 171.638; df = 28) 
indicated a significant relationship between initial offence and final case outcome (p < 
0.001).
Table 4.36 compares the seriousness of offences with final case outcomes. 
Table 4.36 shows that he highest proportion of custodial sentences were for the most 
serious category of offences, 8. However, the second highest proportion were for 
offences rated 1. Altogether, 177 of the 330 cases which resulted in a custodial 
sentence being imposed (53.6%) were for offences given a gravity score of 4 or less. 
There was a sharp increase in the custody rate -  offences rated 1 left aside -  
between offences rated 4 and offences rated 5.
Rates of community sentencing increased with seriousness until reaching a 
peak for offences rated 3. Thereafter, they declined with increasing offence 
seriousness, until a slight increase for offences rated 7, before declining again for 
offences rated 8. Other outcomes produced more varied results. For example, the 
highest rate of dismissal or withdrawal was for offences rated 8 (16.7%), but the
lowest rate was for offences rated 7 (7.1%). The highest rate of fines, meanwhile, 
was for offences rated 2 (13.5%), but no cases rated 6 or 8 were dealt by means of a 
fine. The chi-square value for Table 4.36 was 158.701 (df = 28), indicating a 
statistically significant relationship between the variables at the p < 0.001 level. The 
rate of community sentences reached a peak for offences rated 3, before declining 
with increasing seriousness. The rate of custodial sentences increased significantly 
for offences rated between 5 and 8, although this trend was skewed by a high 
percentage of offences rated 1 which received a custodial sentence. The latter may 
be explicable by the seriousness with which breaches of court orders were taken 
(see above), since such breaches were rated 1 on the offence gravity scale.
Table 4.37 moves on from this analysis to investigate the impact of denial of 
bail on final sentence outcomes in the Baytown youth courts. Table 4.37 shows the 
impact of denial of bail at any point in the bail process (whether at initial court 
appearance or subsequently) on sentencing. Overall, it shows that 1589 of the 1851 
cases reaching court (85.8%) were not denied bail during the court process. It can 
also be seen in Table 4.37 that those who were denied bail at some point in the 
process were less likely to receive a community sentence, and much more likely to 
receive a custodial sentence, than those who were not. This suggests that being 
remanded to custody was a significant factor in sentencing, in that it made a 
custodial sentence at the end of the court process more likely.
However, it should also be noted that those denied bail at some point were in 
fact more likely to receive a community sentence than a custodial sentence, although 
the difference in the two proportions was only 3.8%. There was a significant 
relationship between the seriousness of the initial offence and the final sentence 
outcome (chi-square = 158.701 (df =28); p < 0.001).
147
Table 4.38 examines the relationship between the bail decision made at young 
persons’ first appearances in court and the final sentence outcome, to measure the 
impact of these initial decisions on sentencing. Table 4.38 suggests that the initial 
bail decision made by the courts in Baytown did have an impact on sentencing. For 
example, only 7.6% of cases granted unconditional bail at first appearance were 
eventually sentenced to custody. Similarly, for cases granted conditional bail at initial 
court appearance, just over a fifth (21.9%) were given a custodial sentence, while 
almost two thirds eventually received a community sentence (65.6%). A more 
ambiguous result was found when investigating what happened to young people who 
were initially remanded to custody. A large minority of these cases (43.0%) were 
eventually given a community sentence, compared with 53.0% which received a 
custodial sentence. One side-issue raised again in Table 4.38 is how rarely bail 
support was used at initial court appearance, in just 6 (0.3%) of the 1851 cases 
reaching the initial court appearance stage. Of these six cases, three received a 
community sentence, two received a custodial sentence, and one was eventually 
dismissed. The chi-square value for Table 4.38 was 572.199 (df = 32), significant at 
the p < 0.001 level.
For ease of analysis and its presentation, the whole of the sample group was 
analysed together in Table 4.38, and Tables 4.39 and 4.40, which deal with 
subsequent changes in bail status and their relationship with final case outcome. 
However, the relationship between the initial bail decision, final sentence outcome, 
age and gender was also considered. When the relationships between these 
variables were considered together, it was found that the largest chi-square values -  
for both males and females -  were to be found for 17-year-olds, when degrees of 
freedom were taken into account. Whereas for 15-year-old males, the relationship 
had a chi-square value of 126.987 (df = 28), where p < 0.001, and for 16-year-old
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males the chi-square value was 163.676 (df = 32), where p < 0.001, for 17-year-old 
males the chi-square value was 301.278 (df = 28) where p < 0.001, indicating a 
stronger relationship between initial bail decision and final sentence for this 
subgroup. Similarly, for 15-year-old females, the chi-square value was 23.602 (df = 
16; p  = 0.099), and for 16-year-old females the chi-square value was 17.399 (df = 12; 
p = 0.135), while for 17-year-old females the chi-square value was 61.947 (df = 20; p 
< 0.001).
Table 4.39 compares bail decisions at the first point of change in bail status 
with final sentences. Comparing Table 4.39 with Table 4.38, it can be seen that a 
greater proportion of young people whose bail status changed to unconditional bail at 
the first status change point eventually received a custodial sentence, compared with 
the proportion who received unconditional bail at their first court appearance. The 
same shift in the balance between community and custodial sentences can be seen 
when comparing those who were granted conditional bail at the first change in status, 
and those who received it initially. It can also be seen with those who were 
remanded to custody at their first change in status. Here, though, the shift was such 
that a majority (61%) of those who were remanded at this point actually received a 
community sentence eventually, compared with 30.2% who received a custodial 
sentence. The chi-square value for Table 4.39 was 82.546 (df = 24; p < 0.001), a 
significant value at this level of probability.
As above, the relationship between first change in bail status and final 
sentence was also broken down by age and gender. Whereas the strongest 
statistical links in Table 4.38 above were found for 17-year-olds (male and female), 
here the only chi-square value which was larger than expected was that for 16-year- 
old boys (chi-square value = 67.513; df = 24; p < 0.001).
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Table 4.40 shows links between final case outcomes and the second change 
in bail status. Table 4.40 shows more similarity to Table 4.38 than to Table 4.39 
overall. The percentage of cases remanded to custody at this stage, but eventually 
receiving a community sentence, decreased compared with the first point of change 
in status. In fact, the proportion of cases in this category was exactly the same as 
the proportion which received a remand to custody at this stage, and went on to 
receive a custodial sentence (46.6% in each case). The proportion of cases 
receiving unconditional bail and going on to receive a custodial sentence increased, 
compared with the previous two tables, to over a fifth (22.5%). The percentage of 
cases receiving conditional bail at this stage and going on to receive a community 
sentence (65.4%) rose slightly compared with Table 4.39 (where it was 62.7%), 
returning almost exactly to the level in Table 4.38 (where it was 65.6%) -  although 
the proportion receiving conditional bail and later being sentenced to custody rose 
compared with the proportions in the previous two tables. The chi-square value for 
Table 4.40 was 87.827 (df = 24; p < 0.001), a significant value, and one which was 
slightly higher than that for the relationship between the first change in bail status and 
final sentence, but considerably smaller than that for the relationship between initial 
bail outcome and final sentence.
As before, these data were further broken down by age and gender subgroups 
for statistical testing. However, for the relationship between the second change in 
bail status and final case outcome, there were no statistically significant relationships 
in any of the age or gender subgroups. The highest chi-square values were those for
16-year-old boys (chi-square = 38.627; df = 18; p = 0.003) and 17-year-old boys (chi- 
square = 27.996; df = 20; p = 0.109).
The final section of this chapter examines the amount of time cases took to 
complete the bail process in Baytown.
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Comparing amounts of time spent in the bail process
This section examines the amount of time for cases to reach their final 
outcome at the end of the bail process. In analysing the data, it is recognised that 
the high number of cases in which no period of time was spent on bail (usually 
because the case in question did not reach court) will distort statistical analysis in this 
area. Therefore, three measures will be used here: data for all cases within a 
particular subgroup (i.e. all those cases for which data were available), data for all 
cases within a particular subgroup which reached court, and data for all cases within 
a subgroup where at least one day was spent on bail.
Table 4.41 begins the analysis by comparing times taken to complete the bail 
process for all cases within the sample, breaking results down by age of defendant. 
In Table 4.41, the mean for all cases involving 16-year-olds (39.22 days) was greater 
than that for other age-groups. 16-year-olds’ cases also had the greatest standard 
deviation (50.603), although it was 15-year-olds’ cases which had the greatest range 
of the three age groups in the study (330 days), and the median value was greatest 
for 17-year-olds (23.00 days).
fable 4.42 shows that females’ cases spent considerably less time in the 
process than males’ on average (26.16 days compared with 38.09 days). Similarly, 
the median time spent in the process and the standard deviation were both smaller 
for females than males.
fables 4.43 and 4.44 consider times taken to pass through the bail process for 
all cas3s reaching the court stage. Table 4.43 discusses results for different age 
groups It shows that, for cases which reached the court stage, 16-year-olds took 
longes to progress through the bail process on average (50.98 days). The median 
(28.Q0days) and standard deviation (53.726) values were also greater for this age
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group than for others -  and the gap between this age group’s mean, median and 
standard deviation values and those for other age groups was greater than it was
[
when all cases in the study were considered (see the results from Tables 4.41 and 
4.42 above).
Table 4.44 breaks down the same data by gender. As in Table 4.42 above, 
males whose cases reached the courts had greater mean, median and standard 
deviation values than females. It is noticeable that the differences in these values 
between males and females were smaller than they were for all cases.
Tables 4.45 and 4.46 limit the analysis to cases which involved an identifiable 
bail period (i.e. only those cases in which a young person spent at least one day in 
the bail process are counted). Table 4.45 shows that 16-year-olds had the greatest 
mean and median times taken for cases to complete the bail process, as well as the 
greatest standard deviation value. Removing cases which were dealt with 
immediately at court increased mean values for all three age groups by between 
three and five days, when compared with values for all cases reaching court. 
Similarly, median values increased for all three age groups, as did standard deviation 
values -  although the increases in standard deviation for 16-year-olds and 17-year- 
olds were minimal compared with the values for all cases reaching court.
Table 4.46 breaks down the same data by gender. As with age groups, 
previous patterns for gender groups continued in Table 4.46. Male mean, median 
and standard deviation values continued to be greater than those for females, and 
greater than the values for all cases reaching the court stage. Compared with the 
latter measure, however, increases for males were greater than increases for 
females. As with all five previous tables in this section, however, there was a wide 
range in case values.
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There was evidence that young people in Baytown were more likely to re­
offend the longer they spent on bail. Taking the overall median value for length of 
time spent on bail during the study period (21 days) as a benchmark, of those who 
spent less than 21 days on bail, 11.6% re-offended during the bail period, whereas 
for those who spent 21 days or more on bail, 54.3% re-offended during the bail 
period.
Conclusions
This chapter aimed to define the shape and operation of the Baytown youth 
justice bail process, with regard to children aged 15, 16 and 17. It addressed the 
question of the explicability of the decisions made in the process, with reference to 
key criteria relating to offences and offenders. While it is difficult to summarise the 
amount of data presented above, an overall conclusion is that decisions were mostly 
explicable on the grounds of the key criteria in the early stages of the process. 
Similarly, relationships were found between initial bail outcomes and sentencing. 
However, subsequent bail decisions were less explicable on the grounds of the key 
criteria, and no relationships were found between these subsequent decisions and 
sentencing outcomes.
The issues raised in the course of the analysis will be further discussed and 
analysed in the following chapter, which aims to explain and highlight the findings 
reported above. In this way, following the critical realist methodology adopted in 
Chapter Three, the outcomes of the Baytown youth justice bail ‘world’ can be 
established, and hypotheses for explaining these outcomes can be put forward, to be 
tested in later chapters of this study.
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Chapter Five
j
Loose cannon or well-oiled machinery? Discussion and 
analysis of the outcomes of Baytown’s youth justice bail 
process
Introduction
This chapter discusses and analyses the findings reported in Chapter Four. In 
this way, the outcomes of the youth justice bail process can be highlighted and 
explained, using the data presented in Chapter Four as the basis for the arguments 
in this chapter. To aid the accessibility and clarity of analysis here, the chapter will 
be organised into the same sections as Chapter Four, dealing with the key issues 
relevant to the Baytown bail process, and the young people and offences with which 
it dealt. The chapter will conclude by presenting the key outcomes from the 
quantitative findings, together with hypotheses for explaining these findings. 
Explanations will then be tested and triangulated by means of the data in Chapters 
Six, Seven and Eight. As stated above in Chapter Four, the tables containing the 
data analysed in this chapter (and reported on in Chapter Four above) can be found 
in Appendix C below. All references to individual tables in this chapter correspond 
with the tables listed in Appendix C.
Frequency of arrest by age and gender
The findings in this section of Chapter Four showed how frequently males and 
females of different ages were arrested within the study period, as an introduction to
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the analysis later in the chapter. The picture here was that of an offending profile 
dominated by male offending, with more than three-quarters of arrestees in all three 
age groups covered by the study being male. It was difficult to contextualise the 
findings that the peak arrest age in the study was 16 for males and 15 for females. 
This was so because it was not possible to compare number of arrestees in each age 
group with general population rates for each age group in the Baytown area at the 
time of the study. These findings will be compared with the response of the youth 
justice process to offending by different age groups as the chapter continues.
Bail and community order status at point of arrest
The findings in the third section of the previous chapter related to the numbers 
of young people who were already on bail, or still in the process of completing a court 
order, when they were arrested. The aim here was to provide a preliminary picture of 
the persistency of youth offending in Baytown during the study period.
Findings showed that the rates of being on bail at the time of arrest and being 
on a previous court order at the time of arrest both increased with age, with a 
majority of 17-year-old arrestees being already on bail. The differences between 
different age groups were found to be statistically significant, so that the likelihood of 
offending on bail or while under a community sentence increased with age, while the 
likelihood of not being on bail or under a community sentence correspondingly 
decreased with age. This indicated that the youth justice bail process in Baytown 
had grounds for adopting a different approach to different age groups’ offending -  for 
example, by ‘fast tracking’ 17-year-olds through the process. Again, this finding will 
be contextualised later in this chapter, when responses to the different age groups’ 
offending will be analysed in more detail.
The analysis in this section also relates to the issue of whether bail support 
could (and should) have been offered at the police station stage (in fact it was only 
offered by the Baytown YOT at court). Given that the number of young people 
arrested while on bail increased with age, it might be argued that bail support 
services could have been provided at the police station stage of the youth justice 
process, particularly for the 17-year-old age group. However, these figures must be 
considered in the context of police action following arrest and charge, the number of 
young people who were denied bail at this stage, and the time taken to process 
remanded cases through to the court stage. These issues will be considered in 
more detail below.
This section also considered the relationship between gender and bail status 
on arrest. Although a similar proportion of males and females were on a previously- 
imposed court order at the time of their arrest, a greater proportion of males than 
females were on bail at the time of their arrest (and, correspondingly, a greater 
proportion of females than males were neither on bail nor on a court order). These 
differences were statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level, so that the percentage 
of those not on bail or a community sentence at the time of arrest was significantly 
greater for females. This suggests that, if a case for bail intervention at the police 
station stage was to be made, the suspect’s gender would be an important factor in 
targeting that intervention (with males being more likely to be arrested while on bail). 
Again, though, this analysis must be contextualised by analysis of the operation and 
efficiency of police decisions (such as whether to charge or divert suspects). This 
can be found in the section of this chapter dealing with police charge and bail 
decisions, and the analysis here should be read in context with the analysis in that 
section.
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II
Types of offences committed
The fourth section of Chapter Four broke down the offences recorded by type, 
and compared the different categories of offences with the age and gender of alleged 
offenders. Table 4.4 (illustrating the relationship between offence type and age) 
showed that the majority of offences in each age group were theft-related (covering 
vehicular and non-vehicular theft). This meant that a majority of offences recorded 
were property-related, and did not involve a direct threat to the public. Violence 
against the person, by contrast, accounted for between 5% and 10% of offences in 
each age group. Table 4.4 showed trends in offence type which remained consistent 
across the different age groups included in the study.
However, these trends did not remain constant when offence type was 
compared with gender in Table 4.5. This table showed that there were noticeable 
variances in frequency of different types of offences between males and females, 
beyond the fact that non-vehicular theft formed the greatest proportion of arrest for 
both males and females. A greater proportion of males were arrested for vehicle- 
related offences (either motoring offences or vehicle theft), while a greater proportion 
of females were arrested for violence against the person and public order offences. 
Taken together, the two tables showed contrasting patterns in offence type across 
age and gender divisions. However, the relationships in both tables were statistically 
significant (with the differences in Table 4.5 -  where females were significantly more 
likely to have committed offences of public order and violence than males -  more 
strongly significant than those in Table 4.4). This shows that age and gender were 
significant factors to be taken into account when responding to offending behaviour.
The results in this section must be contextualised by examination of which 
offences were placed in which category for the purposes of this part of the research.
157
A full list of offences and offence categories can be found in Appendix B, but some 
indication of the content of the offence categories is included here. Each category 
covered a range of offences. For example, the theft category here covered ‘ordinary’ 
theft, but also different types of burglary. The vehicle theft category covered 
ordinary’ and aggravated vehicle theft75, as well as the lesser offence of ‘interfering or 
tampering with a vehicle’. Public order offences, which accounted for the third 
greatest proportion of offences in each age group, included minor breaches of the 
peace, but also more serious charges such as insulting or threatening behaviour and 
affray. Again, it was difficult to categorise the more serious public order offences in 
terms of whether or not they were a direct threat to the public.
This issue was even more prominent in discussing the ‘other’ offence 
category. The ‘other’ category mirrored the classification of offences in official
statistics. Here, it included any offences which did not fit into any of the specific 
offence categories. It therefore included offences as diverse as interfering with a 
witness, possession of an offensive weapon, and breaches of bail and court orders. 
It was this masking of individual offences within offence categories which led to the 
discussion and analysis, in the previous and current chapters, which measured the 
seriousness of recorded offences, with the aim of clarifying the exact nature of 
offending.
Most serious offences committed, by gravity
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 used an offence gravity scale (see Appendix B) to compare 
offence seriousness with the age and gender of suspects. These results supported
75 Aggravated vehicle theft can include some element of direct risk to the public caused in the course 
of the theft (the ‘aggravating factor’). This is therefore an example of a ‘hybrid’ offence, officially 
against property but also involving at least the risk of harm to the person, and can be difficult to 
classify as an offence against property or an offence against the person.
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the argument that the offending carried out by the young people in this study was 
mostly low to medium range in nature. A majority of offences across all three age 
groups, and across both genders, were rated 4 or below on the gravity scale. 
However, the proportions of minor offending decreased with increasing age, and 
were greater for females than males. As with previous sections in this chapter, the 
differences between different age and gender groups according to offence 
seriousness were statistically significant (also as previously, the differences were 
more strongly significant for gender than for age). However, as noted above in 
Chapter Four, although 17-year-olds were more likely than others to have been 
arrested for offences rated 7 or 8, there were no clear patterns in the data in Table 
4.6, and the result may be explicable by the concentration of offences rated 3 and 4. 
In Table 4.7, the proportion of more serious offending (rated between 5 and 8) was 
greater for males than for females. The real significance of these findings will lie in 
the response of the bail process to the arrest patterns shown here -  how appropriate 
the use and denial of bail were in the light of these findings -  but the analysis so far 
in this chapter shows the importance of age and (particularly) gender in patterns of 
offending captured in the study. This provides a benchmark for outcomes in the later 
stages of the bail process.
Another relevant issue here is the role of breaches in offending patterns. As 
the only offences rated 1 were breaches of some kind (either of bail or of court 
order), the tables showed that breaches accounted for 12.0% of all arrests within the 
study (320 arrests overall). These arrests represent failure to comply with the 
conditions of bail or sentences, rather than criminal offences per se. Objectively 
speaking, they could therefore be seen as less serious than other offences. They are 
also of interest, however, in that they represent opportunities for intervention, while 
on bail or court order, to attempt to prevent such breaches as failing to observe
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curfews, failing to report to police stations when required to, and failing to attend 
court hearings at the right time. More light will be shed on this issue later in the 
chapter, when the exact nature and extent of YOT intervention to protect young 
persons’ rights to bail is discussed and analysed in detail. Breaches relate directly to 
the conditions of bail, and as such an important issue later in the chapter will be the 
response of the bail process to these ‘offences’ in particular.
The next section marks a dividing point in the discussion of findings, as what 
follows uses the discussion so far in this chapter as a starting point for analysis of the 
structure of the Baytown youth justice bail process, and its outcomes.
Police charge and bail decisions
The sixth section of Chapter Four examined the operation of the police bail 
and charge process in Baytown, using the key variables discussed in the sections 
above. To contextualise and evaluate the results here, it is necessary to refer to the 
legal rules governing police decisions at this stage. Firstly, the police decision 
whether or not to charge is governed, at least in theory, by the ‘reasonable prospect 
of conviction’ threshold (Sanders 1997: 1072). Although the ‘reasonableness’ of the 
police decision to charge could not be evaluated here, the tables in this section 
showed that an overall majority of cases were charged immediately in this study. An 
overall majority was also found across all age groups, both gender groups, all 
offence types except drugs offences, and all offence seriousness categories except 
category 276.
An immediate charge meant that the young person was either released on bail
until his or her first appearance in court, or held in custody pending the next available
76 And in the case of both of the latter exceptions to the rule, cases immediately charged formed a 
larger proportion of the total number of cases than any other police decision outcome.
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youth court hearing. However, the database from which the data were derived did 
not differentiate between cases in which young people were granted bail by the 
police before their first court appearance, and cases in which young people were 
denied bail by the police, and detained until their first court appearance77. Qualitative 
information78 assisted partially in understanding this issue. Unlike some other YOT 
areas, Baytown had a youth court which operated six days per week79. This meant 
that those denied bail during the week were systematically presented for the court at 
the next session. Therefore, the typical detention period was less than 24 hours. 
The obvious exception to this was the detention of young people arrested and 
charged after the Saturday morning court session. If they were denied bail, they 
were detained until the Monday morning court session.
This does not enable a clear distinction to be made between those who were 
denied bail and those who were not, and as such the data are flawed on this point. 
The missing data also precluded investigation of links, for example, between denial 
of bail by police and denial of bail in the court process later, the existence of which 
have been argued for in other research (e.g. Sanders and Young 2000). What can 
be said, however, is that the majority of young people (65.7%) in the study were 
either bailed to appear in court, or denied bail for less than 24 hours. This 
demonstrates ‘time efficiency’ in the police bail process, whereby cases were moved 
onto the court stage quickly. It is also clear from the results in this section that police 
bail was used comparatively rarely (in 16.4% of cases overall, including those dealt 
with by means of reprimand or final warning following a period on bail), and where it
77 Section 38 of PACE states the criteria for denying police bail, at least one of which must be satisfied 
before a young person can be remanded. These are as follows: the young person’s real name or 
address cannot be ascertained; the young person, in the police’s view, is unlikely to appear in court if 
bailed; the young person is likely to interfere with witnesses or further police investigations if bailed; or 
the young person is likely to commit further serious crimes if bailed (Sanders 1997: 1075).
78 Gained through participant observation research on the Baytown YOT staff -  see Chapter Six for 
details.
79 Morning and afternoon sessions from Monday to Friday, and morning sessions on Saturdays.
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was used, a greater proportion of cases led to a charge than to no further action, a 
reprimand or a warning -  this was true overall, and also for all age and gender 
groups, all offence types, and all categories of offence gravity.
Consideration of the relationships between police decisions and each of the 
four key variables used in the research -  age, gender, offence type and offence 
seriousness -  revealed statistically significant relationships between police decision 
outcomes and all of the key variables. The proportion of cases charged immediately 
increased with age, and males were more likely to be charged (either immediately or 
later) than females, for example. This suggests that police decisions were made in a 
systematic way, taking such factors as age, gender, offence type and offence 
seriousness into account. The statistically significant relationships between police 
decisions and the nature and seriousness of offences indicates that the Baytown 
police were taking such factors into account when assessing the prospects of 
conviction. Further evidence of organised thinking can be found in Tables 4.10 and 
4.11, which show that ‘other’ offences with a seriousness rating of 1 (i.e. breaches of 
bail or court order) had a very high rate of immediate charge.
The significant relationships between police decisions and the age and gender 
of suspects are less easily explained by the ‘reasonable prospect of conviction’ rule.
17-year-olds, for example, had a greater proportion of cases immediately charged 
than the younger age groups, and these differences were statistically significant. 
These significant relationships suggest the presence of police ‘working rules’, within 
the formal legal provisions, which help police make decisions, using legally irrelevant 
factors (e.g. McConville, Sanders and Leng 1991). However, another explanation is 
that two or more of the key variables (or other variables which could not be controlled 
for in this study) were interacting to provide systematic (and legally permissible) 
grounds for prosecution. For example, although Table 4.8 showed that 17-year-olds
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were significantly more likely to have their cases immediately charged, Table 4.6 
showed that this age group were also significantly more likely to commit offences with 
a seriousness score of 5 or more than other age groups.
Therefore, apparently irrelevant factors in police decision-making could be 
explained by their coincidence with relevant factors, such as the probability of certain 
age and gender groups committing more serious kinds of offence. The evidence 
here cannot conclusively prove that the Baytown police did not use ‘working rules’, 
such as age and gender, to help them make decisions. But the existence of prima 
facie ‘illegally’ significant factors was shown to mask more complex relationships 
between relevant factors and police decisions. This, combined with the ‘time 
efficiency’ of the police process in Baytown, points to systematic decision-making at 
this stage. The high rate of immediate charge does not indicate a proactive 
approach to bail by YOT staff at the police station, but such a proactive approach 
was not justified on the basis of the statistical evidence.
The next section of analysis deals with bail outcomes at the first court 
appearance.
The first appearance in court
The seventh section in the previous chapter discussed bail outcomes at the 
initial appearance in court, analysing data by age, gender, offence type and offence 
seriousness, as previously. The effectiveness of bail decisions in court must be 
.contextualised by reference to the criteria for denial of bail, as contained in the 1976 
i Bail Act:
j
‘For offences for which imprisonment is a possible punishment,
defendants need not be granted bail if  there are substantial grounds 
| for believing that they will:
I
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• fail to return to court when they should;
• commit an offence while on bail;
• interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of 
justice, whether in relation to themselves or another person.’ 
(Hucklesby 2002: 123, emphasis in original)
The findings must be assessed in the light of these criteria. Of the three 
requirements listed in the Bail Act, one, the likelihood of interfering with witnesses or 
police investigations if released on bail, could not be assessed in the study. The 
nature of the research meant that the reasons given in court for denying or restricting 
bail could not be systematically collated. Doing this would have been the only way in 
which the appropriateness of the Baytown courts’ denial or restriction of bail on this 
ground could have been evaluated.
The remaining two criteria mentioned in Hucklesby’s quote above, however, 
could be assessed using the available data. Focusing on the criterion of likelihood of 
failure to surrender to the courts firstly, this issue is focused upon in Table 4.16. The 
table showed that there was a significant relationship between bail status at the point 
of arrest and bail outcome at the first court appearance, and therefore that those on 
bail when arrested had a significantly greater rate of conditional bail, remands to 
custody and remands to local authority accommodation than those who were not on 
bail when arrested. There is therefore evidence to support the argument that the 
Baytown youth courts made appropriate restrictions and denials of bail on the basis 
of the above criterion.
Less easy to reconcile with the above criterion was the finding that 5.8% of 
offences ranked 1 for seriousness were remanded to custody at the first court 
appearance. These represent breaches of bail and breaches of court orders (i.e. 
failure to comply with bail conditions) -  not criminal offences in themselves, and
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therefore not governed by the criteria for denying bail mentioned above80. Non- 
imprisonable offences have stricter criteria for the denial of bail than imprisonable 
offences, the most important of which is the scenario where, as Jones (2003: 401) 
notes, ‘a defendant has previously “jumped bail” and the court considers that this is 
likely to happen again. ’
The finding therefore illustrates the operation of a reason (i.e. arrest for 
breach) for employing one of the grounds (i.e. likelihood of breaching bail) for 
denying bail which are set out in the Bail Act 1976. As ever in bail decisions, 
however, the law is defined in vague terms here. The courts are asked to make a 
prediction as to what might be likely to happen if bail is granted. Therefore discretion 
played a large part in deciding whether bail was granted or denied, even though 
denial of bail following previous breach of bail was, in theory, within the legal rules. 
The reality of the Baytown courts taking breaches of bail very seriously, and denying 
bail following breach in some cases, could be seen as an indication that more could 
have been done by the Baytown YOT to intervene in cases where the immediate 
cause of the denial of bail was not previous criminal offences, but a breach of bail 
which did not necessarily entail the commission of a crime. An example might be 
providing assistance in transporting young people to court for scheduled court 
hearings, where a defendant had previously failed to attend court, and had been 
denied bail as a result. In fact, bail support was not used at all at first court 
appearance for breaches of bail.
|
| A second criterion for denial of bail (for imprisonable offences) is the likelihood
!
i
|of re-offending if the defendant is released on bail. The seriousness of the charge
!
facing the defendant is a reason for denying bail on this ground, rather than a ground
in itself. Table 4.15 suggested that this was a reason which was relied upon by the
80 However, the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 creates a presumption of custodial 
remand when an offender re-appears in court for breach of a court order.
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courts in bail decisions at the first court appearance. More serious offences had 
higher rates of remands to custody, and there was a statistically significant 
relationship between seriousness of offence and bail outcome at this stage, since the 
rate of remand to custody increased with offence seriousness, as did the rate of 
conditional bail (with the exception of offences rated 1 in the latter instance -  
although this may again be explicable by the fact that breaches of bail and court 
orders were rated 1 for seriousness). It might be argued that the existence of a 
statistically significant relationship here indicates that the Baytown youth courts 
elevated seriousness of offence beyond the status of a reason for relying upon a 
ground for denying bail, so that it was instead used as a ground in itself. Hucklesby 
(2002: 124) has documented the regular occurrence of this misapplication of the bail 
law elsewhere. However, while the evidence of the strong relationship between 
offence seriousness and outcome here suggests this occurred (and therefore that the 
courts were not making decisions in an appropriate or systematic way), it cannot 
conclusively prove that the Baytown courts made this error in practice. Other 
evidence that decisions were appropriately made in line with the law can be found in 
Table 4.16. As previously shown, this table revealed a significant relationship 
between bail status on arrest and bail outcome at the first court appearance, and 
therefore suggests that the courts legitimately took this factor into account when 
deciding whether to grant or deny bail at the initial court appearance.
A separate issue relates to the very low rate of bail support referral at first 
court appearance. The tables in this section show that only 0.3% of cases resulted in 
a young person being placed on bail support at the first court appearance. This 
raises the key issue of why further applications were not made, especially 
considering the analysis above on the rate of remands to custody for (prima facie 
minor) breaches of bail. The discretion inherent in the Bail Act’s criteria for denying
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bail is important here. Where a young person had offended persistently (re-offending 
while on bail, for example), but the offending in question was minor or non-violent, 
the courts could legally find grounds for denying bail, but the denial of bail was not 
inevitable. There was scope for bail intervention to protect against denial of bail for 
minor offending. Table 4.14 showed that 14.2% of remands to custody at the first 
court appearance were for violent offences, while Table 4.15 showed that just over 
16% of remands to custody were for offences ranked 4 or less for seriousness. 
Remands to custody for petty but persistent non-violent offenders were a feature of 
the Baytown bail process at the initial court appearance, and there was scope for 
challenging the grounds for denying bail in these cases. The issue of bail support 
applications will be returned to later in this chapter. A key issue raised by this 
analysis, though, was whether the low rate of bail support referral was more due to 
widespread rejection of YOT applications by the Baytown youth courts, or more due 
to applications not being made by the YOT in the first place, thereby cutting off the 
supply of bail support cases before the court stage.
The following section analyses bail outcomes for subsequent appearances in
court.
Subsequent appearances in court
The first part of the eighth section in the previous chapter introduced the 
parameters of analysis, by showing how many cases had undergone changes in bail 
status, and analysing frequencies by age, gender, offence type and offence 
seriousness. The principle finding revealed here was that an overall majority of 
cases reaching the courts did not undergo changes in bail status. Table 4.17 
showed that 15-year-olds had higher rates of cases which did not change status
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during their time spent in the bail process. Triangulating this with previous data, it 
has already been shown that 15-year-olds were significantly less likely to be on bail 
or a court order at the time of arrest (Table 4.2), significantly less likely to be arrested 
for violent offences (Table 4.4) and significantly less likely to be arrested for offences 
rated 5 or above for seriousness (Table 4.6). The evidence shows that the Baytown 
courts took these factors into account in deciding whether or not to change bail status 
at subsequent court appearances. The age group with the least serious and 
persistent offending patterns was also the age group that was least susceptible to 
subsequent changes in bail status.
A similar pattern can be found by triangulating the findings of Table 4.18 
(females were more likely than males to undergo no changes in bail status) with 
earlier findings. Although females were statistically more likely to be arrested for 
violent offences, they were also significantly less likely than males to be on bail or on 
a court order when arrested, and significantly less likely to be arrested for offences 
rated 5 or more for seriousness. Table 4.20 confirmed these findings by showing 
that the proportion of offences not undergoing any change in bail status decreased 
with increasing offence seriousness. The courts therefore seemed to take offence 
and offender characteristics into account systematically when deciding whether or 
not to make changes to bail status, with less serious and less persistent offending 
being less likely to undergo changes in status. However, the patterns discussed here 
were absent when comparing rates of cases undergoing one and two changes in bail 
status. There were no trends in the differences between these groups of cases, 
using any of the key variables. Once the initial decision to change bail status had 
been made, subsequent changes in status seemed to occur less systematically.
The second part of Chapter Four’s eighth section focused specifically upon 
outcomes at the first point of change in bail status. Table 4.21 revealed a statistically
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significant relationship between age and bail outcome at this stage, so that the rate of 
remands to custody increased with age. The finding that 17-year-olds had a 
significantly higher rate of remands to custody at this point is explicable both on the 
basis of the law on bail and previously analysed data. The bail law shows that the 
criteria for denying bail are less strict for 17-year-olds than for younger children (e.g. 
Ball, McCormac and Stone 2001), because their vulnerability is not taken into 
account for the purposes of bail decisions. Previous analysis in this chapter, 
meanwhile, shows that 17-year-olds were significantly more likely to be persistent 
and serious offenders than younger age groups. These two factors explain how 17- 
year-olds could have had a greater proportion of remands to custody at the first 
status change point within a process of systematic decision-making.
A statistically significant relationship was also found between offence 
seriousness and the first change in bail status, indicating that offence seriousness 
played a significant part in decisions to change bail status at this point. In particular, 
the more serious offences (ranked 5 and above) were most likely to undergo a 
change in status, reinforcing the argument that more serious offences were more 
susceptible to status changes. No significant relationship was found between gender 
and bail outcome at this point, or between offence type and outcome. These are 
departures from findings relating to the initial court appearance, and suggests that 
these variables declined in importance for the courts when making decisions at 
subsequent appearances.
In the previous section of this chapter, it was noted that bail support referrals 
j at first court appearance were very rare. It was also noted that this could not (on the 
basis of documentary evidence) be explained by the courts rejecting YOT bail 
| support applications, since this was also a very rare event. Tables 4.21-4.24 showed 
that this pattern was maintained at the first point of change in bail status. 12 cases
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resulted in a switch to bail support at this stage, compared with six cases which were 
referred onto the bail support scheme initially. This represents an increase from 
0.3% of total number of cases at first appearance to 0.6% of the total number of 
cases at the point of first change in status -  a classic case of figures being doubled, 
but from such a low starting point as to make very little impact. Table 4.24 above 
shows that 10 of the 12 bail support cases had a gravity score of 6 or more. 
Therefore it could be said that the majority of offences for which bail support was 
granted were ‘serious’, and that there was evidence that bail support was being 
targeted systematically at more serious offences. The under-use of the bail support 
scheme, however, was noticeable at the first change in status, just as it was at initial 
court appearances.
Another issue raised in Tables 4.21-4.24 above was failure to attend court. As 
shown here, the proportion of young people made the subject of an arrest warrant 
increased compared with numbers not attending the first appearance in court. This is 
particularly highlighted in Table 4.24, where a small group of young people were 
given either conditional bail or custody for offences with a gravity score of 1 (all of 
which were breaches of either bail or court order in practice). This again shows that 
the Baytown courts took failure to attend court seriously at each stage in the court 
process -  as they were entitled to do under the Bail Act’s provisions regarding 
likelihood of failure to attend court or re-offend if released on bail. Although this does 
indicate systematic and appropriate decision-making by the Baytown courts, more 
could arguably have been done by YOT bail services to tackle this problem, via the 
bail support scheme, so as to attempt to reduce the risk of restrictions on young 
persons’ liberty in the bail process for what were prima facie minor transgressions.
Table 4.24 showed that offences rated 5 and 6 had the highest rate of change 
to both conditional bail to custody status at this point. Additional analysis of these
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data showed that over half of the cases in which status transferred from conditional 
bail to remand to custody or local authority accommodation at this point had an 
offence seriousness score of 4 or less. This presents the image of a fine line 
between restriction and denial of bail for young people, especially for medium range 
offences. The risk to the public of re-offending, when used as a criterion for denying 
bail, is important in this regard. Seriousness of offence, a recognised reason for 
denying bail on the ground of risk of re-offending, did not play a major role in over 
half of the cases in which bail was denied81. The regular use of remands to custody 
in such situations, together with the rarity of active YOT interventions in the form of 
bail support packages82, is a feature of the Baytown bail structure which merits 
further investigation and explanation in the chapters which follow.
Tables 4.25-4.28 examined outcomes at the second point of change in bail 
status. Table 4.25, showing the relationship between age and outcomes at this 
stage, revealed that 16-year-olds had the highest rate of change overall. However, it 
was the 17-year-olds who had the highest rate of denial of bail83, and the highest rate 
of remand to custody in particular. Previously in this chapter, this occurrence was 
explained by the less strict criteria for denial of bail to 17-year-olds, compared with 
younger children. At earlier points in the bail process, statistically significant 
relationships were found between age and bail decisions to support this explanation.
81 Seriousness of offence is not a ground for refusing bail in itself, but still counts as an important 
reason for refusing bail, as evidence for the court’s substantial grounds for believing that the 
defendant would re-offend if released on bail: see Bail Act 1976, Schedule 1, Part 1, paragraph 9, as 
cited in Hucklesby (2002: 124). Also, paragraph 2a of the 1976 Bail Act Schedule 1, as added by 
section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, states that bail need not be granted if 
the offence is indictable or triable either way. This would apply to all of the offences in this study rated 
5 or above.
|82 The question of whether the rarity of bail support referrals was due to the rejection of bail support 
; applications by the courts, or down to YOT staff simply not applying for bail support in the first place, 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six below.
j83 Including, as before in this study, remands to custody, remands to local authority accommodation, 
and arrest warrants.
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There was no such statistical relationship in Table 4.25, however. This suggests that 
age could not explain 17-year-olds’ greater rate of remands to custody at this stage.
Among the remaining key variables, no statistically significant relationships 
could be found between bail outcomes and gender, offence type and offence 
seriousness characteristics84. This is a noticeable departure from earlier stages of 
the bail process, where significant relationships were consistently found between 
decision outcomes and the key variables used. The key findings contained in Tables 
4.25-4.28 -  such as criminal damage and vehicle theft having higher rates of remand 
to custody than other offences (Table 4.27), 17-year-olds’ higher rates of remand to 
custody (Table 4.25, see above), and a similarly low rate of bail support usage to that 
found at earlier stages of the process (all of the tables) -  did not, therefore, show the 
signs of being reached in a systematic way, as earlier decisions had done.
It has already been noted in this chapter that discretion is inherent in the bail 
process, and that the terms of the 1976 Bail Act which govern the restriction and 
denial of bail are loosely defined. However, this is the first point in the Baytown bail 
process at which there was limited evidence that bail decisions were made in a well- 
organised way. This is not to say that there was no evidence at all of guiding 
decision-making principles at this point. Rates of remands to custody, for example, 
increased with increasing offence seriousness, and as 17-year-olds were more 
serious and persistent offenders than younger age groups, their greater rates of 
remands to custody might be explicable on these grounds. Nevertheless, statistical 
evidence did not point to systematic decision-making here, as it did for earlier bail 
decisions.
The detrimental operation of discretion in this part of the bail process may be 
explicable by reference to macro-level legislation and policy:
84 Although the relationships with offence type and offence seriousness produced chi-square values 
only slightly below the expected level.
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'... (S)ection 154 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 inserted a provision 
in the Bail Act stating that, following a refusal of bail in one hearing, “the 
courts need not hear arguments as to fact or law which it has heard 
previously”. In practice, this has generally been interpreted by both 
lawyers and magistrates to mean that the mere passage of time cannot 
amount to a “new argument”. (Jones 2003: 402)
Such policies may lead courts to make decisions which are not based on 
freshly-heard arguments which take into account changes in the circumstances of 
young persons’ cases85. This, in turn, may lead to court decisions at this stage in the 
bail process which are not based on well-organised, legitimate principles. The 
operation of discretion to produce these results is therefore a phenomenon which 
merits further investigation in this study. This is so particularly as previous stages of 
the process seem to have produced systematic decisions, at least on the basis of the 
presence of significant relationships in the data.
Further analysis of the data in Tables 4.25-4.28 suggested that discretion in 
decision-making was particularly evident in cases on the ‘borderline’ between 
restricted and denied bail. Of the group of cases in which bail was denied at the 
second status change point, a majority of cases had previously been granted 
conditional bail. Also, 19.1% of the cases had been denied bail at initial court 
appearance, before being granted bail, and then denied it again at this point. The 
data reinforced the idea that courts had the most discretion over bail outcomes in 
medium-range cases -  just over half of these cases involved theft of some kind. 
These data emphasise the presence of discretion in the bail process, which is 
particularly underlined by the lack of significant relationships between outcomes and 
key variables at this point. Explanations for the changing role of discretion at 
different stages in the bail process were therefore points of departure for further 
investigation later in the study.
85 This may discourage defence solicitors from making new applications for bail -  certainly there were 
fewer cases undergoing two changes in bail status than there were cases undergoing one change.
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The impact of re-offending on bail outcomes
The ninth section of Chapter Four examined the impact of offending while on 
bail on decisions made in the bail process in Baytown. As one of the stated grounds 
for denying bail, in the Bail Act 1976, is the risk that the defendant might re-offend if 
he or she was released on bail, this is an important measure of the efficiency of bail 
decision-making by the Baytown youth court.
This section showed that the majority of young people whose cases reached 
the court stage were not re-arrested while inside the bail process (Table 4.29). 
However, the impact of re-arrest upon bail decisions was considerable. Not only 
were those who were re-arrested more likely to undergo changes in bail status, and 
more likely to be remanded to custody at the first status change point, but there was 
a very strong relationship between changes in bail status and re-offending. These 
findings are certainly congruent with the 1976 Bail Act’s allowance of restriction or 
denial of bail on the ground of likelihood of re-offending.
However, the impact of re-offending on bail outcomes required further 
explanation, in terms of the nature and seriousness of re-offending. It is important to 
note that, of those who were re-arrested, 43.3% of such cases were evidently not 
thought worthy of a change in bail status (Tables 4.29-4.34). There are several 
potential explanations for this finding, which did not seem to fit with the strongly 
significant relationship between re-offending and bail status changes (see above). 
One explanation might be that a large proportion of re-offending was actually minor in 
nature. Other explanations might be inconsistency, in terms of bail decisions, on the 
part of the Baytown courts, or an unwillingness to cause conflict (with other agencies 
or simply other magistrates) by overturning previous decisions.
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Tables 4.30 and 4.31 examined the nature and seriousness of re-offending in 
detail. When considering the nature and seriousness of initial offending earlier in the 
chapter, it was noted that the picture of offending that emerged from the analysis was 
mostly one of relatively minor property offences, rather than serious, violent 
offending. These tables showed that the picture of recording re-offending while on 
bail was broadly similar to this. Whereas 47% of initial offences were theft-related 
(either vehicular or non-vehicular theft), 44.7% of re-offending fell into this category. 
There was a slightly smaller rate of drugs, public order and criminal damage-related 
offending on bail than initially, and a slightly greater proportion of motoring and ‘other’ 
offending on bail than initially, but the overall proportions of different types of 
offending were similar, and ranked in the same order. Just as with initial offending, 
the proportion of violent offending on bail was small (in fact it was exactly the same 
proportion in both cases -  6.4%). Generally speaking, therefore, patterns of types of 
initial offending and types of re-offending while on bail resembled one another closely 
in terms of the nature of offending.
In terms of offence seriousness, the picture was once again very similar. A
total of 245 cases in which there was recorded re-offending involved a new offence
which was given a higher gravity score than the original offence for which the young
person had been arrested (32.0%). This left 193 cases in which the new offences
was equally as serious as the old one (25.2%), and 321 cases in which the new
offence was actually less serious than the original one (42.0%)86. These figures can
be put into context by comparing the seriousness of offending on bail and initial
offending. 71 % of initial offences were given a gravity score of 4 or less (12.0% rated
1, 6.6% rated 2, 29.4% rated 3, 23.0% rated 4), compared with 70.7% of re-offending
(15.5% rated 1, 5.0% rated 2, 25.7% rated 3, 24.5% rated 4). Just 2.0% of both
86 In the remaining six cases in which there was recorded re-offending (0.8%), the gravity of the new 
offence was not known.
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initial offending and re-offending was given the highest gravity score of 8. Overall, 
then, re-offending was characterised mainly by property-related, low or medium 
seriousness offences -  just as initial offending was. Tables 4.30 and 4.31, therefore, 
suggest that re-offending on bail was predominately non-violent and of low to 
medium seriousness.
This is not to suggest that the courts in Baytown were not justified in changing 
bail status more often (and, in particular, using remands to custody more often) for 
cases involving re-offending on bail. The criteria of the 1976 Bail Act make it clear 
that the courts can and should take re-offending into account when deciding bail 
outcomes. However, the role of discretion must again be emphasised here. Re­
offending itself was important in court bail decisions at subsequent court 
appearances, but there was no statistically significant link between either the nature 
or the seriousness of the new offences and the changes in bail outcome (at either the 
first or second status change points) in cases where recorded re-offending occurred. 
The act of re-offending in itself had an impact on subsequent bail decisions, but the 
impact which the re-offending had could not be explained by the nature or gravity of 
the seriousness itself. Referring back to the language of the Bail Act 1976, the 
ground for restricting or denying bail (the risk to the public of re-offending on bail) 
was clearly being used, but the reasons supporting that ground were unclear.
In recent years, both macro and micro-level youth justice policy and practice 
has been clearly influenced by issues relating to managerialism, efficiency, and the 
management of risk in particular (e.g. Audit Commission 1996). In these terms, 
working within the framework of the 1976 Bail Act, there was scope for more than 
one outcome in cases where re-offending was recorded, because the re-offending 
was mostly minor and property-related. Table 4.31, for example, showed that a total 
of 32 cases with a gravity score of 4 or less were denied bail at the first change in
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status. If bail was being denied due to the risk of re-offending while on bail 
(appropriately, in legal terms), there was still scope, using the discourse of risk 
management, for the courts to avoid denying bail to young people without posing a 
major risk to the public. A similar pattern emerged at the second point of change in 
bail status. Just under half of the cases denied bail at this point involved fresh 
offences of theft, while only 8.3% involved violence against the person (Table 4.33). 
64.6% of the cases denied bail at this point involved re-offending given an offence 
gravity score of 4 or less (Table 4.34).
A key issue arising from this section, then, is why courts responded to (minor) 
re-offending in this way, when alternatives were available under the terms of the 
1976 Bail Act. A related issue is the very small number of bail support referrals 
(mentioned previously), and why bail support was not used to divert young people 
away from custody within the framework of the 1976 Bail Act. These are, in other 
words, questions of discretion, and how it was used in the Baytown youth justice bail 
process. These issues will be further investigated later in the study.
Comparing final case outcomes with bail history
The next section of Chapter Four looked at the impact of decisions made in 
the bail process on sentencing outcomes at the end of that process. The section 
began by comparing offence type and offence seriousness with final case outcomes. 
Table 4.35 showed that, overall, the majority of cases reaching court in the study 
period resulted in community sentences, with just under 18% of cases resulting in 
custody, a tenth dismissed or withdrawn, and the remainder fined or dealt with using 
a reprimand or final warning. There was more variation between offences of different 
levels of seriousness than between offences of different types. In particular, the gap
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between the four most serious offence categories and the four least serious offence 
categories in terms of rate of custodial sentences (with the former having a higher 
rate than the latter), and the statistically significant relationship between offence 
seriousness and final outcome, suggest that seriousness of offence played an 
important part in sentencing decisions, separately from what had happened while the 
young person was on bail. This might be expected, as the study was done at a time 
when proportionality was the only permissible sentencing rationale87.
Table 4.37 showed a strongly significant relationship between the denial of 
bail at some point in the court process and the final sentence outcome. However, the 
fact that more young people who had been denied bail received community 
sentences than custodial sentences shows that a denial of bail did not inevitably lead 
to a custodial sentence. This again highlights the discretion given to magistrates and 
judges deciding cases considered to be on the ‘bail or jail’, or ‘community or custody’ 
borderline.
Therefore, although denial of bail did have a statistically significant impact on 
sentencing (with a remand to custody at some point increasing the likelihood of a 
custodial sentence), its social significance on sentencing was less clear. Sentencers 
seemed to be using remands to custody in ways other than as a ‘signpost’ showing 
suitability for a custodial sentence. Indeed, the data suggested the possibility that 
remands to custody were used instead of a later custodial sentence. This issue 
required further exploration later in the study, but recent Youth Justice Board 
guidelines do not rule out the use of custodial remands in this way88. Table 4.38,
87 Since the end of the study period in August 2002, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (still in the process 
of being implemented at the time of writing) has allowed a variety of punishment objectives to be 
, legitimately taken into account by courts when sentencing. See Gibson and Watkins (2004) for more 
details.
88 See, e.g., Home Office (2000), which states that:
‘the court must take time spent on remand in custody into account in deciding what
overall length of DTO term to impose .... Time spent on remand in custody is not 
| (later) offset against the term set by the court (section 74(5)). ’ (ibid., para. 1.10)
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comparing initial bail decisions at court with final case outcomes, reinforced the 
findings of Table 4.37. There was a statistically significant relationship between 
these two variables (probably explained by the use of unconditional or conditional 
bail at first court appearance being most likely to lead to a community sentence being 
imposed), but of those who were remanded to custody at their first appearance, 43% 
eventually received a community sentence. The flexibility of the bail process, the 
lack of inevitable outcomes in most cases, and the discretion inherent in the law 
governing court decisions were all important issues here, which acted as platforms 
for further investigation in later chapters of this study.
Later tables in this section showed the relationships between changed bail 
status and sentencing outcomes, as cases travelled through the bail process. 
Although there were significant relationships between final outcomes and both the 
first and second changes in bail status, these relationships were weaker than the 
relationship between initial bail outcome and final outcome. Significant relationships 
between outcomes at each stage and final outcome for the different age and gender 
subgroups also became progressively rarer as cases progressed.
At the same time, the boundaries between bail and custody, and subsequently 
between community and custodial sentencing, became increasingly blurred. More 
and more young people who were remanded to custody eventually received a 
community sentence as their cases advanced through the different stages of the bail 
process, to the point where the percentage of young people who were remanded to 
custody at the second change in status and went on to receive a community 
sentence was the same as the percentage who were remanded to custody at this 
point and went on to be sentenced to custody. Conversely, the proportion of those 
who were granted conditional bail, but were later sentenced to custody, increased as
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cases moved through the bail process. It seemed, therefore, that the significance of 
bail decisions for the purposes of sentencing declined as cases moved towards the 
end of the process. This may seem surprising, on the grounds that sentencers 
should sentence on the basis of the most up-to-date bail information available at the 
time (e.g. changes in status since the initial court appearance).
A related issue was the continual rarity of referrals onto the Baytown YOT’s 
bail support scheme. As can be seen from all of the tables in this section, a tiny 
minority of cases were accepted onto the scheme. A total of 12 referrals resulted in 
a community sentence, with 9 more resulting in custody (a further two referrals were 
eventually dismissed or withdrawn). These data show the minimal role played by bail 
support throughout the wider bail process. This, as previously mentioned, was a key 
issue for further investigation in the study, especially in the context of cases where 
either bail or custody (and, by extension, community or custodial sentences) were 
realistic outcomes for young defendants, within the context of the legal framework 
and local decision-making.
Comparing amounts of time spent in the bail process
The eleventh section of the previous chapter examined the time taken for 
cases to complete the Baytown youth justice bail process. Moving beyond the 
results presented in that section requires contextualisation within the wider youth 
justice process outside Baytown. Increasing emphasis on managerialism within 
youth justice (e.g. Pitts 2001, Smith 2003), and the consequent collection and 
collation of increasing amounts of data on how the ‘system’ operates, enables these 
figures to be compared with recent data on overall time performance across England
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and Wales89. While the figures cannot be compared directly with the Youth Justice 
Board’s data for the region including Baytown90, national trends can at least give a 
rough estimate of the ‘time efficiency’ of the Baytown courts during the study period.
In fact the Baytown courts performed well against national standards in this 
regard. For the first quarter of 2004, the national average time taken for persistent 
young offenders’91 cases to pass through the bail process in England and Wales was 
66 days92 -  a decrease of four days compared with January 2003, and a decrease of 
78 days compared with January 1997 (Youth Justice Board 2004). Although the 
figures here do not cover the same ground as those from the Youth Justice Board, 
they do compare favourably with the national average, even when only cases 
spending at least one day on in the court bail process are included, and especially 
when all cases in the youth justice process are included. This points to the 
emphasis, nationally and locally, with speeding up the bail process for young people.
However, this section also showed that young people were more likely to re­
offend the longer they spent on bail -  a finding which has been repeated in other 
research (e.g. Morgan and Henderson 1998). Such contextualisation suggests that 
the speeding up of the bail process was justified93. As previous analysis makes 
clear, however, these findings must be critically analysed in the light of the evident 
discretion present in the local bail process. Further investigation was required in this 
respect to ascertain whether time reductions had been achieved at the expense of
89 It is recognised that this is not a direct comparison, since Youth Justice Board figures relate, firstly, 
to persistent young offenders, excluding those who do not meet the PYO criteria, and secondly to all 
young people in the youth justice process (i.e. all of those aged between 10 and 17 years old). 
Nevertheless, this attempt at comparative analysis still gives context to the ‘time efficiency’ of the 
Baytown youth courts during the study period.
90 This would jeopardise the anonymity afforded to participants in the study by running the risk of 
revealing Baytown’s location.
91 The only results used -  or at least the only ones published -  by the Youth Justice Board on this 
subject.
92 This average, however, conceals a less well-publicised range of average times across police forces 
in England and Wales, ranging from 36 to 103 days (Youth Justice Board 2004).
93 Justified, that is, on the macro level (nationally). Information was not available on mean case times 
before the study period -  although anecdotal evidence from the Baytown YOT staff suggested that 
mean times had also been reduced locally.
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systematic, appropriate decision-making which took children’s rights (to bail and as 
children) into account94.
Conclusions
The title of this chapter asked whether the Baytown youth justice bail process 
could be characterised as a ‘loose cannon’ or ‘well-oiled machinery’. The analysis 
and discussion of Chapter Four’s findings points more to the latter conclusion than 
the former. The criteria of the 1976 Bail Act (for court bail) and the 1984 Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act and the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (on police 
bail) on when bail can be legitimately restricted or denied provide the norms against 
which Baytown’s bail practice must be measured. On these terms, there was 
evidence that courts took persistency and seriousness of offending into account, 
legitimately and systematically, in making bail decisions. Similarly, significant 
relationships between decisions and factors such as defendants’ age and gender 
could be rationally explained by reference to local offending patterns among different 
age and gender subgroups.
However, such a conclusion does not tell the whole story of the Baytown 
context. There was also evidence that decisions became less systematic, and less 
explicable by key criteria, after the initial appearance in court. The more bail status 
changes occurred, the less explicable bail decisions became on the basis of the 
evidence. There was also uncertainty about the social significance of remands to 
custody. A significant relationship existed between remands to custody and custodial
94 There is a considerable body of research, dealing with adults on bail, which has found that those 
involved in the court process spend as little time deciding, discussing and contesting bail issues as 
possible. See, for example, Doherty and East (1985), who found that 62% of bail decisions in their 
study were dealt with in less than two minutes by courts; and also Hucklesby (1996). Hucklesby 
(1992), in the context of adult offending on bail, has argued that delays in processing cases may lead 
to more re-offending while on bail, however.
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sentences, suggesting that the former was likely to lead to the latter. However, the 
later remand to custody occurred in the process, the greater the proportion of cases 
was that led to a community sentence. This raises the question of why some cases 
were felt worthy of custodial remand, but not a custodial sentence at the end of the 
bail process.
Another issue worthy of further investigation was the rarity of bail support 
referrals throughout the court process. As previously mentioned, the quantitative 
analysis could not reveal whether this outcome was due to the courts’ rejection of 
YOT applications, or due to a lack of applications from the YOT. This issue and the 
previous one discussed clearly highlight the role of discretion in the court bail 
process. In turn, discussion of discretion draws attention to the fluidity of the Bail Act 
norms mentioned earlier. Cases in which courts had the freedom, within what was 
allowed by the Bail Act, to opt for ‘bail or jail’ (Hucklesby 1996), and later community 
or custodial sentences, were a clear and common feature in the data.
Similarly, courts could (and did) remand minor offences to custody on the 
grounds of ‘likelihood of re-offending on bail’, and do so legitimately within the bail 
law. But, analysing using the discourse of ‘risk management’ or ‘actuarial justice’ 
(Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994) as the current Government frequently has in the 
context of youth justice (e.g. Smith 2003), there was again scope for avoiding 
remands to custody on the grounds that minor offending (such as simple breaches of 
bail) did not pose a major risk to the public, and therefore ‘likelihood of re-offending’ 
was in fact low. Perhaps the most interesting issue to arise from this chapter is why 
bail support was so rarely used to address the reasons for denial of bail.
In line with the critical realist approach to research advocated in Chapter 
Three, it is now necessary to summarise the key outcomes of the analysis in this 
chapter, for which explanatory mechanisms (in the context of Baytown youth justice)
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must be sought in the following chapters of the study. These have been found to be 
as follows:
• The mostly systematic nature of decision-making, within the limits of the 1976 
Bail Act;
• The decreasingly systematic nature of decisions at later stages of the Baytown 
bail process;
• The ambiguous social significance of remand to custody in the context of the 
bail process and sentencing; and
• The rarity of bail support referrals, used to tackle the legal grounds for denying 
bail, throughout the bail process.
Mechanisms for these outcomes will now be sought through the collection and 
analysis of qualitative data gathered from key individuals and agencies playing a part 
in the operation of the Baytown youth justice bail process. Chapter Six begins the 
exploration of mechanisms and context by presenting the results of participant 
observatory work done with the Baytown YOT’s bail staff during the study period.
Chapter Six
Managing Conflict Out of the Process: An Ethnographic 
Study of Bail Services in Practice
Introduction
Having examined the quantitative data arising from the operation of the youth 
justice bail system in Baytown, this chapter looks at the issues relating to youth 
justice bail services from the perspective of one of the key agencies involved -  the 
staff of the Baytown Youth Offending Team (hereafter ‘YOT’). Based on participant 
observation methods of data collection, as detailed in the methodology, what follows 
is a closer examination of the factors which shaped the delivery and management of 
bail services for young people in Baytown. The aim of this chapter is to illuminate 
further the results obtained from quantitative analysis on the outcomes of the 
Baytown youth justice bail process.
The focus will be on not only how ‘systematic’ bail practice was developed at 
the micro (practitioner) level, but also how this related to policy at the mezzo 
(managerial) and macro (Government, Youth Justice Board -  hereafter ‘YJB’ -  and 
national) levels. Following presentation and analysis of results, possible 
explanations for the process outcomes shown earlier in Chapter Five will be put 
forward.
The next section sets the context by introducing the organisation of YOT bail 
services in Baytown.
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The organisation of Baytown’s youth justice bail services
The Baytown YOT comprised three micro-level teams, each responsible for 
dealing with different stages of the youth justice process in Baytown. The court team 
included two court officers, who represented the YOT at court hearings. This team 
also included staff responsible for working with the Baytown police on diversion 
policy for young people locally95. There was a total of between five and seven court 
team staff during the study period. The supervision team dealt with young people 
who had already been convicted and sentenced. This team worked with young 
people completing community sentences96. The supervision team was the largest of 
the three teams, with between eight and 12 staff during the study period. The third 
team was the bail, or ‘remand management’97 team, responsible for all youth justice 
services between initial arrest and conviction. All three teams had a designated 
senior practitioner. In addition, the mezzo level of the YOT consisted of the YOT 
manager, and also (towards the end of the study period) a deputy YOT manager, 
who was also the senior practitioner of the supervision team.
When the period of observation began, the Baytown YOT bail team was 
undergoing a period of transition in terms of staffing. The two members of the ‘old’ 
bail team -  one of which was the senior practitioner -  were already in place, and had 
been for some three years previously. However, two new members of staff joined the 
team at around the same time as the commencement of the fieldwork. In line with 
the requirements of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, these new members were a
95 And, in particular, responsible for working with young people subject to final warnings.
96 The team also worked with (following the implementation of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act) 
young people completing the community element of detention and training orders, whereby each 
voung person was allocated to a member of the team at the beginning of his or her order.
As noted in Chapter Three above, the official title of this team was the ‘remand management team’. 
To aid clarity, however, the team will be referred to as the ‘bail team’ hereafter in this chapter, except 
in direct quotes where staff referred to themselves as ‘remand management workers’ or ‘the remand 
management team’.
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probation officer and a police constable. The stated mezzo-level policy here (in line 
with macro-level policy as mentioned above) was to give a multi-agency input to bail 
services, since the two existing members of the team were social workers, with 
considerable social work and youth justice experience between them.
In fact, this multi-agency policy was not destined to operate as planned at the 
mezzo and macro levels. The two new members of the bail team both left the team 
long before the end of the fieldwork period. They both remained as members of staff 
at Baytown YOT -  but felt unable to carry on as part of the bail team. The main 
reason for this was that their roles were not as they expected. One of the new 
members said:
Tm just bored really -  I want to intervene with the kids, be proactive, 
but there aren’t enough of them. We’re supposed to be doing bail 
support, but bail support isn’t happening. ’
In line with this statement, a ‘team within a team’ developed to some extent.
The new members of staff felt ‘shut out’ of team practice at times. This was in part
due to the preference of the two ‘old’ members of the team for making bail
decisions98 very early in the morning, or informally at other times of the day. A ‘new’
member remarked that:
‘The lads (i.e. the ‘old’ team) are used to making decisions while they’re 
having a fag. ’
This comment matched observations closely. It was significant that the two 
‘old’ members were close friends. They had known one another and worked as 
colleagues for many years in various social work and youth justice capacities. They 
were indeed used to relying on each other to make bail decisions prior to the 
appointment of the new staff. Quite simply, for several years previously, they were 
the team.
98 For example, whether a young person who had been detained overnight by police was in danger of 
being remanded in custody in court, or whether he or she was suitable for bail support intervention.
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After two years of the fieldwork, they were the team once again. The police 
officer became a YOT worker responsible for liaising with the victims of youth crime. 
She was the first to leave, after less than a year on the team. The probation officer 
became part of the YOT’s supervision team, first informally to help out with the 
supervision team’s workload, and then officially.
Although there was no noticeable hostility between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
members on the direction of practice, how and why the ‘new’ team were excluded in 
this way was a key issue in analysing the data (see below). The possible reasons for 
this are explored in the next subsection, which takes a brief historical view of the 
development of youth justice bail services in Baytown.
Historical influences on micro level practice
The senior practitioner (who was, as previously mentioned, a member of the 
‘old’ team) started work on the team some three years before the fieldwork 
commenced. He talked frequently about the nature of bail practice at the time of his 
arrival, comparing his own practice favourably with that of his predecessors in the 
role:
‘Before I started on remand management, there was a bail support 
team. They were sitting there, at the back of the court, and when the 
kid was there (before the magistrates) they’d be standing up and going 
“Oh of course Your Honour, this kid can go on bail support” every time.
Just net-widening, not targeting anything. They were all trying to keep 
their jobs, justify what they did, ‘cos they only did bail support -  if they 
didn’t do that they’d have been out of a job wouldn’t they?’
He further argued that because of this apparently unfocused approach to bail
support services for young people, the rate of remands to custody ‘were through the
roof by the time I started’. The written evidence for this claim was quite limited but
other members of staff who had been on Baytown’s youth justice team (including the
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YOT manager at the mezzo level) agreed that this was so. The senior practitioner
also regularly claimed that:
‘For six months I didn’t do anything (in terms of bail services and 
intervention), just trying to sort the mess out, you know. And while I 
wasn’t doing anything the remand (to custody) rate went down!’
Whether this decline in the number of remands to custody was due to the
change in bail strategy, different patterns in the gravity and frequency of youth
offending locally, or changes in court attitudes was never made clear -  and could not
be tested due to the absence of empirical evidence dating from that period. What
was clear was that the six-month period of total non-intervention was subsequently
very influential indeed on bail practice. When services did re-commence, the aims
were limited:
We (i.e. the senior practitioner and the other member of the ‘old’ team) 
were just bobbing apples, trying not to net-widen, trying to save money 
really. ’
The focus of this policy was mainly trying to reduce remands to custody, which
seems to have been achieved to some extent following the senior practitioner’s
appointment. However, this experience engendered a deep mistrust of specialist bail
support work, as opposed to what was known as ‘remand management’:
‘Bail support just won’t work with most of the scrotes (sic) we get in 
here. We’ve known most of them for years. We know who’s going to 
play ball and who isn’t. Most of them won’t. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
This quote illustrates the ‘old’ team’s extreme caution regarding proactive bail
support work. Further, it shows an instinctive approach to bail support, relying on
previous experiences with potential candidates for bail support, rather than a detailed
analysis of the circumstances in each fresh case.
The next subsection will examine elements of the philosophy (shaped by the
historical experiences described here) which the staff applied to their day-to-day
work.
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The philosophy and politics of bail practice
Two key elements to policy and practice, both of which helped to shape the 
ways in which staff approached their work with young people, were identified during 
the period of observation. Each of these will now be discussed in turn.
‘Bail support’ versus ‘remand management’
It was noticeable from the start of the observation period (as intimated above 
in discussion of historical influences) that the ‘old’ members of the staff always 
referred to themselves as the ‘remand management team’, never the ‘bail support 
team’:
‘This place (i.e. the whole YOT) is like Ford’s. It’s a process, starting 
with the court team, then us, then the supervision team after the kid’s 
been sentenced. But we (the team) are the glue which holds it all 
together. What we do is identify the key points in the system, and try 
and intervene where it’s necessary. It’s not just bail support though.
That’s only one little bit of what we c/o.’ (‘Old’ team member)
In the context of the historical experience it seems likely that the ‘old’ team
were hostile to the idea of ‘bail support’ as some kind of separate, discrete form of
intervention.
The ‘new’ team, on the other hand, took a different view. It should be noted 
here that the majority of the observations of the ‘new’ team came from one member 
of it in particular (the probation officer mentioned previously). This was not only 
because she stayed with the team for some time longer than the other ‘new’ member, 
but also because she was keen to discuss issues in the context of research. Building 
on her probation experience of working with young people, she seemed far more 
receptive to the idea of ‘bail support’ as a separate concept:
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‘Of course it needs to be targeted, and if they won’t comply I’ll breach 
them, but I am here to do work with the kids. Try and give them advice, 
show them how to get help. That’s what bail support is. Some of them 
are chaotic, they really need that. ’
On this issue there was, if not a personal conflict, certainly a professional or
ideological conflict about the role of bail support -  and the remarks made about the
suitability of ‘chaotic’ young people were particularly interesting in this context, since
the ‘old’ team openly used ‘a chaotic lifestyle’ as a formalised ground, or norm, for
not offering a bail support package to the courts. The phrase ‘chaotic lifestyle’ was
used as shorthand to denote a young person’s unsuitability for proactive bail
services, on forms that were filled in when bail support was being considered, and in
practice generally:
We often use that as the main reason for not doing bail support, 
because if they are chaotic, you know, all over the place and not taking 
responsibility, there’s no chance they’ll comply ... The magistrates see 
that on the reports and they know that’s what it means.’ (‘Old’ team 
member)
Whose side are we on?
The Government-projected image and discourse of the relationship between 
the new YOTs and the young people they work with is that of ‘professional’ and 
‘client’, or ‘manager’ and ‘consumer’ (Lacey 1994). The Government implies that 
YOTs work with young people to prevent offending. Commentators have argued, in 
contrast, that the YOT structure, and Government youth justice policy generally, 
works against young people to impose a socially exclusionary discipline (Pitts 2001). 
Although victims are considered in other areas of New Labour youth justice policy, 
such as reparation orders (Dignan 1999) and referral orders (Crawford and Newburn 
2003), they are less commonly a feature of discourse on bail. The ‘old’ team
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members, however, saw their role in bail work as being primarily linked not to young
people or the State, but to potential future victims of crime:
‘We’re here to protect the public, not just help the kids. That’s
something we always have as a priority when we’re thinking about the 
right thing to do with kids on bail. If the risk to the public is too high, we
won’t recommend bail to the court.’ (‘Old’ team member)
This statement, and others like it, were frequently expressed by the ‘old’ team.
It differed somewhat from the stated legislative aim of YOT practice (the prevention of
youth offending), although admittedly the latter is very vague and can be interpreted
in a variety of ways. Such statements were usually accompanied by assertions that
they were experts on their own area of policy and practice, and did not need
assistance from anyone on how to make it more effective. The ‘new’ team moved
away from this risk management rhetoric, to develop a more ‘children first’ (cf. Haines
and Drakeford 1998) approach:
7 do see them as children first and offenders second, yes. They need 
to be given more social help to change their offending patterns, but I 
see it as my role to provide that help if I can. ’ (‘New’ team member)
As previously, there were differences in individuals’ policies and approaches
to bail services -  differences which were resolved, not by conflict and resolution with
help at the mezzo level of the YOT, but by policy inaction, which in turn caused the
‘new’ members to leave the team. The next section looks at the impact of these
philosophies and attitudes on work done by the YOT team in practice.
The importance of the different roles played by the team
Detentions overnight by police
The subsidiary role of bail support was further underlined by the regularity with 
which other work was done by the team, in comparison with the relative rarity with
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which bail support work was actually done with young people. A regular feature of 
the team’s work, for example, was what was known as ‘the trawl’. This involved the 
members of the ‘old’ team " coming into the YOT offices at about 7.00am each 
weekday, phoning all of the police stations in the Baytown YOT area, and checking 
whether any young people had been detained overnight by the police.
While this was undoubtedly a systematic intervention in itself, it was perhaps 
not as systematic as it appeared to be. If a young person was not detained overnight 
(if, for example, he or she was arrested during the day) he or she was not always 
counted in the main written statistical database kept by the team. This practice was 
discovered later in the fieldwork process, when comparing the team’s written 
statistics to the information held on YOIS (Young Offender Information System), the 
YOT’s database containing information on the young people who had entered the 
youth justice process in the Baytown area. There were numerous examples of cases 
not recorded by the team, but which had been entered into the computer 
database100.
When asked why detention overnight in a police station was the basis for bail 
statistics, one of the ‘old’ team said simply:
‘Oh, that’s just the way we (i.e. both members of the ‘old’ team) have
always done it  ’
This was the ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ philosophy which characterised much 
of the ‘old’ team’s practice, and subsequently of course the whole team’s approach. 
The ‘old’ team had used this process since their appointment; for one reason or 
another it had not been questioned; so it was still used.
99 This function was very rarely performed by the ‘new’ members, while they were part of the team.
100 It was not clear why the cases had not been entered: it was suspected that there had been various 
reasons for this, including the young person not being detained overnight by the police, but also 
because the young person had been arrested at the weekend -  a point returned to later in the chapter.
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Appropriate adult work
The trawl’ discussed in the previous subsection was closely linked with 
another key role played by the team -  that of undertaking appropriate adult duties. 
This was also done on an almost daily basis by all members of the team -  even the 
senior practitioner, despite the observation of another experienced member of YOT 
staff that:
7 don’t know of any other YOT where the senior prac (sic -  i.e. 
practitioner) does AA (i.e. appropriate adult work) themselves. Usually 
it’s volunteers that do it. ’
From occasional visits to other YOTs101 it did indeed seem that volunteers
from the community, who had received formal YOT training before starting in the role,
did most of the AA work. However, this was not the case in the Baytown area. The
problem was not a lack of volunteers. There was in fact a team of volunteers
overseen by a local charity, a representative of which acted as liaison officer between
the YOT and the volunteers, and provided duty rotas showing volunteer availability.
The problem here was, in reality, the lack of trust between the ‘old’ team, the liaison
officer, and the volunteers themselves:
‘Bloody volunteers are useless. They’re never around when you need 
them. It’s easier to do it (i.e. act as appropriate adult) yourself.’ (‘Old’ 
team member)
There was felt to be a lack of suitable cover for AA work, and during the 
fieldwork period the volunteer ‘system’ -  if system is the right word -  broke down 
almost completely, so that the bail team was doing the vast majority of appropriate 
adult work when it was required. Although the charity liaison officer often worked at
101 They were visited in order to observe area YOT meetings informally, although this observation was 
not a formal part of the research due to the difficulties in comparing one YOT’s practice with another’s 
-  perhaps in itself a sign of the lack of a systematic national response to youth justice bail issues.
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the YOT at least one morning per week, she (and the charity generally) were also
seen to be partly to blame for the situation:
‘She (the charity worker) is rubbish. She doesn’t change the roster 
often enough, so you’re phoning someone up, expecting them to be 
available ‘cos their name’s on the roster, and they’re not there or they 
answer the phone but can’t make it down to the (police) station ... and 
then they wonder why we don’t use them. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
As a result of this situation, especially coupled with the lack of staff power, less
time was spent on other bail services, such as bail support itself. It was also, it is
suggested, socially significant in this context that one of the ‘new’ members of the
team, who was a police officer, found her ability to play a part in the bail team
hindered by the emphasis on AA work. Under current Police and Criminal Evidence
Act Codes of Practice, police officers are not allowed to play the role of appropriate
adult when a young person is arrested and detained (Home Office 2003: Code C,
para. 1.7(a)(iii)). The police officer’s inability to take part in what was evidently a
fundamental part of the team’s day-to-day work played a part in her departure from
the bail team soon after arrival at the YOT. At a bail team meeting held shortly after
the police officer left, the senior practitioner made this comment:
‘X  has gone because she can’t do the AA work. ’
It would be over-simplistic to suggest that this was the only reason why this
‘new’ member of the team left. However, on the basis of other observations relating
to this issue, this factor played a part:
7 get on well with X, it’s not her fault she can’t do everything we do, it’s 
the Government that makes up these stupid rules, like every YOT has 
to have a copper, but they should know AA work is a really important 
part of remand management. They should change the rules so 
coppers can do the AA work, or give us someone else who can do it, 
but then you get the usual stuff about not having enough money to take 
anyone else on.’ (‘Old’ team member)
Such observations also indicate the key role played by AA work, both in day- 
to-day team practice and in the ‘old’ team’s own perceptions of their own work
195
priorities. It is argued, however, that although the appropriate adult role was fulfilled 
thoroughly by the whole team (with the obvious exception of the police officer), its 
centrality to practice showed a lack of systematic practice in itself. There was a clear 
opportunity to set up a volunteer system which was capable of doing at least a 
sizeable proportion of appropriate adult work -  but due to difficulties in establishing 
effective multi-agency practice102 this opportunity was not taken. This in turn had a 
knock-on effect on other services which the bail team provided on paper, but which 
played only a small part in their work in practice.
When bail support was offered (and why it was not offered)
Chapter Two above showed that bail support can be offered at various stages 
in the youth justice process. In particular, it can be offered either at the police station 
or in court. The Baytown team refused to offer any bail support at the police station 
stage, although there was some evidence that other YOTs were doing so103 -  again 
the main stated reason for not doing so was fear of ‘widening the net’ (Cohen 1985), 
and offering bail support when it was not needed, thus running the risk of pushing 
young people up the sentencing tariff unnecessarily. The main implication of this 
approach in the Baytown context was the exclusion of bail support work from the key 
duties undertaken by bail staff -  liaison with the police following arrest, and 
appropriate adult work. A potential second implication was the unnecessary denial of 
bail to young people at the police stage of the youth justice process. However, as 
the YOT statistics which were the basis of the quantitative reporting and analysis in 
this study (see Chapters Four and Five above) did not differentiate between those
102 Something which New Labour’s macro-level strategy seems to believe is achievable without any 
practical problems.
3 How effective these other projects were is of course outside the scope of this study.
young people who were charged by police and bailed to appear in court, and those 
young people who were charged and detained by police until their appearance in 
court, it was not possible to measure the impact of denial of police bail in individual 
cases.
Even after the policy decision to offer bail support at court had been made,
there were choices to be made regarding the point at which bail support, if suitable,
might be offered. Once again, ‘net-widening’ and the experience of the old bail
support team (mentioned earlier) meant that bail support was not typically offered at
a young person’s first appearance in court:
We need time to assess them, find out if  they’re going to play ball. ’
(‘Old’ team member)
On the rare occasions when bail support packages were put before the court,
then, they were mainly offered at subsequent appearances in court104. However, as
Chapter Four showed, many of the cases in which bail support packages were
offered had already been remanded in custody at their first court appearance:
‘Yeah, we almost always visit them in prison and assess them there. I 
can tell from talking to a kid whether he’s (sic) showing any remorse, 
you know, whether he’s (sic) going to comply if we go for bail. 
Sometimes a bit of time in prison’s good for them -  gives them a 
chance to think. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
An established policy of waiting until a subsequent appearance in court to 
offer bail support packages was unusual in terms of general bail support practice 
nationwide. Recent evaluative research has made it clear that the majority of YOTs 
in England and Wales offer bail support packages at the first court appearance, and 
that YJB guidelines support such an approach (e.g. Thomas and Hucklesby 2002). 
Linked to the reactive policy was the ‘old’ team’s belief that, at least in the Baytown 
area, magistrates and judges often reduced the severity of a sentence where a
104 See the relevant sections of Chapters Four and Five above for more details.
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defendant had been previously remanded in custody, to take the time already spent
in custody into account.
The team further believed that this was one reason (and others will be
discussed below) why many young people in Baytown would not comply with any bail
support package offered to the courts, and were happier to spend time in custody:
They save with the Woolwich -  do the time on remand, so they don’t 
have to do it later. ’
The memorable phrase ‘saving with the Woolwich’ was used to denote a 
young person’s serving time on remand in custody, with the aim of obtaining a 
discount on his or her ultimate sentence. It was considered to be a deliberate policy 
on the part of young people in Baytown, and its existence (and validity) was 
seemingly accepted by the team. Whether it actually existed as part of youth justice 
sentencing policy in Baytown was, however, hard to establish without questioning 
magistrates on their decisions in individual cases105.
There was also a firm belief in the ability of the Baytown youth court to adhere 
to the terms of the 1976 Bail Act when making a bail decision on a young person. 
The ‘old’ team knew local youth court magistrates well and seemed to trust them 
completely:
‘Some places, the magistrates don’t have a clue, they don’t know the 
law. But our magistrates aren’t like that. They stick to the Bail Act. If 
they remand a kid to custody, you know there’s going to be a good 
reason for it. ’
When bail support was offered, and accepted by magistrates, the bail team 
used a set of standard bail conditions which were considered an essential part of any 
bail support package. These included referral to local drug and alcohol treatment
105 Something which, for ethical reasons, could not be done in this research. As noted in Chapter Five, 
however, legislation (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s.74(5)) and Youth Justice Board guidance on this 
matter (Youth Justice Board 2000) both require time spent on remand in custody to be taken into 
account when deciding on the length of a detention and training order. Presumably it could also be 
taken into account in deciding that custody was, in fact, not appropriate.
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agencies where abuse was felt to be a cause of offending behaviour, a requirement
that the young person resided at a given address while on bail, and a curfew to be
adhered to at specified times of the day106. Occasionally, other conditions would be
added to the basic package, such as a requirement on the defendant to avoid
association with co-defendants or witnesses. To monitor compliance with residence
and curfew, the bail team normally telephoned the given address shortly after the
start of the curfew period, to check that the young person was present:
We normally just phone, rather than going round there, because it’s 
evening work, and there’s only a few of us to do everything. The other 
thing is, sometimes it’s dangerous to go to someone’s house on your 
own, so it’d need two of us to go, and that’d mean no-one would be on 
duty if the police phoned to say they’d arrested someone. ’ (‘Old’ team 
member)
Enforcement of the other conditions described above was seen by the team to
be the responsibility of the police (in the case of association requirements) or
external agencies (in the case of assessment and treatment for substance abuse):
‘Because we’re so short-staffed, we rely on the police or whoever it is 
to let us know, if a kid’s breached bail support. We can’t spend a lot of 
time chasing people around to get the info we need.’ (‘Old’ team 
member)
The next section of the chapter looks at the links between the YOT bail team 
and other YOT staff, and the implications of these links for micro-level practice in 
Baytown.
Bail work and other micro-level YOT staff
It might have been expected that there would be effective division of 
workloads at the micro level of the Baytown YOT’s bail strategy, to ensure that bail
106 In practice, curfews were always enforced during the evenings and overnight.
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services could be delivered as efficiently as possible. In fact this did not appear to be 
the case during the study period.
Throughout the fieldwork period it was clear that the senior practitioner on the 
bail team wrote the majority of pre-sentence reports for young people in the Baytown 
area. He accepted this as a key part of his workload, although the YOT’s supervision 
and throughcare team ostensibly held primary responsibility for this role. This 
situation also seemed to conflict with staffing arrangements. At no time during the 
fieldwork period were there less than seven supervision team members (counting full­
time and part-time posts), in contrast with the unstable and far smaller team of bail 
staff.
At times the tension between the bail team and other staff was clearly visible.
The best example of this was the relationship between the bail staff and the
supervision team. Each team had misconceptions about the nature of the other’s
work. The following quote gives an example of the ‘old’ bail team’s attitude towards
the supervision team’s practice:
‘It’s easier for them than for us. They can plan their work in advance, 
work out when they’re going to see the kids, make appointments. We 
can’t do that. They (i.e. the supervision team) come in (i.e. to the YOT 
offices) at 9, 9.30, you never see them before that. We’re in here at 7 
most of the time. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
The ‘new’ members of the bail team were, however, more sympathetic to the 
other teams. During the study period, as previously mentioned, both left the team for 
other sectors of the YOT, and were not replaced. One of the ‘new’ members joined 
the supervision team later, partly because of her frustration at the lack of 
responsibility given to her in the bail team. This, in turn, was related to the scarce 
opportunities for doing any active intervention work with young people on bail, since 
so few young people were placed upon the bail support scheme. This member of 
staff had moved to the YOT from the probation service, and frequently expressed her
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desiire to be ‘stretched’ in her work far more than she was as part of the bail team.
She cited what she saw as the greater structure of supervision team work -  and the
closer relationship between the micro and mezzo levels of the supervision team -  as
beinig the reasons behind her move:
‘I ’ve nothing against (the ‘old’ team) personally; it’s just that I’ve got 
nothing to do, nothing positive with the kids, just reactive stuff like going 
to the prison and seeing if the kids in there are OK. ’
This was, in fact, a perception of the bail team which was shared by members 
of t!he supervision team. The bail team were seen as ‘mavericks’ whose 
maniagement and policy were not always clear, and who appeared not to be working 
hardl during the day (or working hard at all), compared with the caseloads of the 
supervision team.
In fact, this was also a partial misconception. The bail team almost invariably 
did attend work at 7.00am, and sometimes had to leave home even earlier to make 
the llong journey to the YOI where young people from Baytown were remanded to 
custody (see below). The ‘old’ team sometimes did work during the evenings as well, 
doing appropriate adult work107. But this work was mostly reactive in nature, and was 
therefore less visible than proactive bail support work would have been. The 
extensive appropriate adult work done was a good example of this, as was the 
common practice of not making bail support applications until after a young person 
had been initially remanded to custody. A related issue, given the discussion above, 
is whether the balance between reactive and proactive work was correct, since the 
team did little to work proactively with young people on bail.
The next section looks at the links between the bail team’s policy and practice 
and those of external agencies involved in providing bail services for young people in 
Baytown.
107 And the occasional ‘spot check’ when a young person was accepted onto the bail support scheme. 
As shown above, though, personal checks (as opposed to checks made by phone) rarely occurred.
The relationship between the micro level and external youth justice agencies
The bail team and the Baytown police
The senior practitioner’s insistence that he and his team should be responsible
for appropriate adult work at the point of arrest (see above) brought them into contact
with the Baytown police every day. Indeed, for the first two years of the fieldwork
period, young people were most often taken to the police station which was adjacent
to the Baytown YOT offices. The links between the YOT bail team and local police
officers were palpably close, and ‘old’ team members expressed their satisfaction
with the police’s processing of young people at and following arrest:
We know most of the coppers, they make the work as quick as they 
can, and use their common sense when they’re deciding what to do 
with the kids.’ (‘Old’ team member)
‘New’ team members108 did not express such unequivocal support, but at the 
same time did not generally show open dissatisfaction with police practice during the 
arrest, detention and charge process. The only exceptions to this discourse were 
complaints about lack of co-ordination between agencies for the interviewing of 
young suspects, which caused delays in the interrogation process. These, however, 
mainly centred on the availability of, and lack of YOT trust in, volunteers who could 
carry out appropriate adult work. This mistrust, as shown above, was driven by lack 
of communication with the agency responsible for providing volunteers, rather than 
by dissatisfaction with the police themselves.
The team (‘old’ and ‘new’), however, showed less confidence in the Baytown 
police in their (i.e. the police’s) role as monitors of bail conditions. In this sense, the 
police were seen as being quite erratic in undertaking this supervisory function:
108 One of whom, as already stated, was a police officer.
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The cops don’t always check up on the bail conditions, especially the 
curfews. I’m not saying they never do it -  I just mean they do 
sometimes, but not always, and the kids know that. That’s why we do 
the spot checks on bail support.’ (‘Old’ team member)
As noted above, however, the YOT staff mostly checked up on adherence to
curfews by phone, rather than in person. They claimed that this was due to
pressures of work and staff shortages. When asked whether they would consider
officially handing over responsibility for ‘spot checking’ to the police, the ‘old’ team
played down the need to do this:
7 don’t think there’d be any need ... We are busy but that’s the way the 
job is, you know? Anyway I don’t think the police could do it any better, 
they’re under a lot of pressure too. And that way we can use our own 
judgment a bit, you know, assess the situation the kid’s in, if we can 
sort it out without going back to court. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
Therefore, on this issue, the YOT staff were unwilling to discuss any changes
in policy, despite acknowledging difficulties and disagreements in their work with the
police. There was also ‘old’ team criticism of the police decision, late in the fieldwork
period, to transfer all young arrestees to one central police station, further away from
the YOT offices. Given the level of staff involvement in appropriate adult work, this
entailed more travelling time when a young person was arrested and detained. In
turn, in the view of the ‘old’ team, such a move disrupted local organisation of bail
services, because the extra travelling time meant that less time was available for
talking to and working with young people:
7 don’t see the point -  it holds everything up when you have to travel 
into town to get to the police station, especially in rush hour. It holds 
the police up too because they can’t start interviewing until the AA gets 
there. It was much better when you could just walk next door and see 
kids at the police station there. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
203
The bail team and local solicitors
There were numerous firms of solicitors in the Baytown area, all of whom
worked with young people. However, the vast majority of cases involving young
people who had been arrested in the Baytown area were handled by only two of
these firms. The team were clear about how this unusual situation had come about:
‘They get the business because they’re the Martini firms -  they turn up 
anytime, any place, anywhere. The kids know if they call them 
someone will be there, and they’ll have a Mars bar and a packet of fags 
for the kid, you know, make the effort for them. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
It would be wrong to say, though, that a young person’s preference for a
particular firm was the only factor in the selection of a particular firm for call-out.
Recommendations on which solicitors young people should use were made -  by the
admission of the YOT staff themselves -  by appropriate adults. These were
members of the Baytown YOT’s bail team more often than not (see above). The
YOT staff had a significant say in which firm received the ‘business’ each time a
young person was arrested by the police. This was especially true since, as one of
the ‘old’ team remarked, ‘we usually get to the cop shop before the solicitor does’. It
seemed natural for the staff, acting in their capacity as ‘independent’ advisors, to
recommend a solicitor to a young person in trouble. Nor should this be taken to
mean that the chosen solicitors’ firms were incompetent in representing the young
people in the criminal justice process109.
The point which is being made here is that the selection of solicitors’ firms was
another area of YOT staff discretion which was exercised in a far from systematic
way. The staff were open about the fact that the solicitors’ firms which were actually
109 Their effectiveness (or otherwise) in doing so is outside the scope of this study, since solicitors did 
not have the power to actually make decisions affecting the youth justice bail process in the Baytown 
area. Rather, they acted on instructions from their clients (see e.g. Chapter Eight below).
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used were chosen because they knew the solicitors in those firms on a personal 
level:
‘It just makes sense to use people you know -  we’ve known these guys 
(sic) for years, we see them in court all the time, we know they’ll do a 
good job and make the process as quick and easy as possible for 
everyone. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
These firms were part of the status quo in the Baytown youth justice process, and, as
with many other aspects of the YOT’s bail policy and practice, the YOT staff were
very resistant to the idea of change.
The bail team and alcohol and drug treatment agencies
There was one main agency which did drug and alcohol work with young 
people on bail in the Baytown area. The other main drugs and alcohol treatment 
agency dealt only with referrals from probation. Therefore, although YOT probation 
Staff did deal with 17-year-olds, their contact with young people in the Baytown area 
was limited, and the bulk of their work was done with adults instead. The agency 
which did work with most of the YOT’s clients claimed to be working closely with the 
YOT ir terms of policy, and this view was supported at the mezzo level of Baytown 
youth jjstice practice (i.e. the YOT manager). However, micro level practice was far 
more complex than such a policy suggested.
Referrals to the main drug and alcohol agency were regularly made on behalf 
of young people by YOT bail staff. Such referrals were a regular feature, not just of 
bail sipport packages, but also of ‘ordinary’ bail conditions. However, liaison 
between YOT staff and the agency’s staff was irregular and usually made by 
telephone rather than in person. The YOT staff were often the ones who initiated
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contact rather than waiting for the agency to contact them. The ‘old’ team were
I
: dissatisfied with the links between the YOT and the drugs agency:
j
The drugs workers are hard to get hold of a lot of the time -  sometimes 
we don’t know what work they’re doing with the kids, or whether the kid 
has turned up for appointments. We need that information when we’re 
deciding if the kid’s played ball on bail or not -  and so does the court. ’
(‘Old’ team member)
Further problems were caused not only by communication problems between
YOT and agency, but also what was perceived by staff as a formalistic assessment
by agency workers of young persons’ progress while on bail. The YOT team (‘old’
and ‘new’ members) felt that, where treatment for drug or alcohol abuse was a
condition of a young person’s bail package (either conditional bail or bail support),
the agency should be tackling the abuse itself, rather than simply monitoring
attendance at appointments. A particular case serves as a good example of this
difference in approach. One young person, who was on the bail support scheme,
had to undergo treatment for drug abuse as a condition of his bail support package,
since it had allegedly played a part in his current and previous offending behaviour.
However, although the young person was attending appointments at the agency as
required, and also adhering to the curfew which had been placed upon him, the team
strongly believed that he was continuing to abuse drugs at home in the evenings,
when the curfew was in operation:
‘When we ring up the house to make sure he’s there, or go round there 
and do a spot check, he’s always in, but he’s always stoned as well! 
Staggering around, slurring his words. He’s definitely still taking the 
Valium like he was before. Why aren’t they (i.e. the agency) sorting 
that out? They’re supposed to be, aren’t they?’ (‘Old’ team member)
This situation continued for the several months during which the young person
in question was on bail support. He was never breached by the team, despite their
confidence that he was continuing to abuse drugs:
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Technically he’s not in breach, because he’s turning up at the agency 
and sticking to his curfew, but it seems a bit pointless when he’s 
supposed to have stopped taking drugs.’ Old’ team member)
The team (‘old’ and ‘new’ members in this respect) were wary of rocking the
policy boat at mezzo (managerial) level by criticising an apparent contradiction in
policy: ‘we’re supposed to get on with them (i.e. the drugs agency) now, aren’t we?’.
It is argued that problems arising between the YOT team and the drugs
agency were aggravated by differences in policy at the mezzo level of the two
organisations. These differences were not always clearly articulated, but they
centred around different perceptions of what the aims of drug and alcohol work with
young people should be. This issue was highlighted when (perhaps in response to
the concerns discussed above) a member of staff from the drugs agency was
transferred to the YOT offices, presumably to provide the YOT with a ready point of
contact when they felt that agency work was appropriate in a particular case.
However, this staff member felt that the approach taken by other YOT staff to agency
referrals was misguided at times:
‘They overload me with referrals. Sometimes they’re formal ones 
through the agency, sometimes it’s “can you just have a word with him 
on the quiet, he’s smoking a lot of weed at the moment’’. But quite a lot 
of the time the kid doesn’t need proper drugs work -  the drug use isn’t 
really making him (sic) offend, and it’ll probably go away on its own 
eventually.’ (Seconded YOT drugs worker)
The quote above encapsulates the difference in policy between the YOT and 
the agency. The YOT (and particularly the ‘old’ team) believed in the value of 
abstention in drugs and alcohol work with young people and a ‘zero tolerance’ 
approach to abuse while on conditional bail or bail support. The agency, on the other 
hand, seemed to be taking a ‘harm reduction’ approach, so that some drug or alcohol 
abuse might be tolerated provided that the link between abuse and offending was not 
absolutely clear, drug-related offending was not getting any worse while treatment
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was taking place, or there was no clear risk to the young person’s health. There was
a clear conflict in practice here. While the agency’s practice had come from a policy
decision at mezzo (and, indirectly, macro) level, the YOT’s practice had no real
mezzo policy source of its own, and again seemed to derive from the intangible gut
instinct of the ‘old’ team members -  something which formed such a key part of
micro-level YOT practice.
The divergent approaches of the YOT and the drugs agency to substance
misuse seemed to be another policy conflict which led to unsystematic and confused
practice when applied to young people in the bail process. Sometimes the bail team
breached a young person for drug misuse while on bail anyway, despite the
difficulties mentioned above: at other times they did not. At the time when the
observation period ended, this conflict was still ongoing, had not been addressed at
either mezzo or micro level, and was seemingly made worse by the presence of an
agency staff member in the YOT offices. On the most basic level, the drugs worker
was the focus for most of the discontent:
‘Whenever I’m at the YOT, people from the agency are wanting me and 
asking where I am. When I’m at the agency people from the YOT are 
after me. I have to try and play them off against each other sometimes, 
they want different things from me.’ (Seconded YOT drugs worker)
The bail team and education and training agencies working with young people
One of the team’s main concerns when undertaking their duties was the
education of young people who were involved in the youth justice process. As one of
the ‘new’ team remarked:
‘Education is one of the biggest problems for them -  or I should say 
lack of education, because most of the repeat offenders haven’t been 
in mainstream education for years, and the schools won’t have them 
back. ’
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Phone calls attempting, and failing, to persuade schools to ‘re-accept’ children
they had in many cases not seen in the first place were a common feature of day-to-
day ilife at the YOT. The aim of these phone calls was to improve the portrayal of the
young person in question when he or she appeared in court, or was made the subject
of a pre-sentence report110. Throughout the period of observation, though, these
appeals to the mainstream education system in the Baytown area were largely
fruitless. There was no system in place for re-integrating young people in
mainstream education, apart from these informal ad hoc discussions. This situation
continued despite the addition of a dedicated education liaison officer to the YOT
staff during the observation period. In fact, this addition to the YOT made no
noticeable difference to the disorganised situation described above.
The failure to make progress was not due to the education officer or his
practice. The issue was rather that work was mainly directed at less serious
offenders, or young people still in mainstream education, rather than those who had
been outside it for a long period of time. Discretion (to involve certain young people
in education initiatives) was used to target services at young people who had a low
risk of failure, rather than those with the greatest need for intervention.
What alternatives were available, then, for young people who could not be part
of the mainstream education process, or (in the case of the 17-year-olds) had gone
past the minimum school leaving age? In a few cases home tuition was available,
but the bail team were not optimistic about this initiative:
‘Most of the kids we get aren’t interested, even with home tuition. They 
haven’t been anywhere near a school for years, they get money nicking 
things and selling them, selling drugs, all that stuff. They don’t want 
jobs, or education, they don’t need them.’ (‘Old’ team member)
110 Which, as mentioned earlier, were mostly written by the bail team, and by its senior practitioner in 
particular.
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Attitudes were similar about more practical and vocational training schemes
for older children. These were run by various independent local schemes, funded by
Baytown’s local authority. They aimed to offer practical skills to young people to
strengthen their position in the employment market. Skills offered included, for
example, training in mechanics -  which involved classes in repairing and maintaining
vehicles, building on an interest which might previously have revealed itself in
involvement in vehicle theft.
However, these schemes, though proactive in theory, were fragmented in
practice. Communication between the bail team and the agencies was poor, with
each blaming the other for the resulting problems:
This kid we had on bail support a while ago, they (i.e. the education 
agency) told him he’d get a qualification if he finished one of their 
courses. He finished it but then they said he’d got it wrong and there 
was no certificate for the course he’d done. Then they phoned us up 
and blamed us for telling him he’d get the certificate! We never said 
anything like that! it’s not our fault if they can’t organise things 
properly.’ Old’ team member)
Also, misunderstandings about what the schemes’ responsibilities and duties
actually were merely added to the team’s pessimism. No protocols about what would
be done in each case were observed, and a situation developed whereby the bail
team (and the young people they referred onto the external projects) did not fully
understand what happened in terms of training, and what was supposed to happen:
7 don’t really know what they do up there (at the schemes) but 
sometimes it just sounds like they’re teaching them how to get better at 
nicking cars. We used to do more outdoor pursuits with the kids -  take 
them out hiking, that sort of thing. Doesn’t happen much now though, 
but then again the kids are harder to handle now, I suppose.’ (‘Old’ 
team member)
The ‘old’ team were also firmly of the belief that once a young person had 
become entrenched in the ‘hardcore’ of offenders in his or her (almost always his) 
age group, no intervention (from the YOT or anyone else) could break the spell of a
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life of crime. Conversely, minor offenders would ‘drift’ out of crime and into a normal 
life as they got older (the senior practitioner being an open supporter of the ideas of 
Matza (1964, 1969) on the subject of delinquency and drift), and so any serious 
intervention with them would only result in net-widening, and would not have any 
beneficial effect either. These beliefs led to a creeping pessimism about the ability of 
the bail team (and anyone else in the YOT for that matter) to do anything about the 
young people entering the youth justice process. This, in turn, led to a withdrawal of 
any proactive bail services, and a retreat to minimalist reactivity.
Another factor in this approach was a belief, again arising from the ‘old’ team, 
that the team’s real function was to save the youth justice process money, and that 
the team would ultimately be judged on its ability or inability to do this in its bail 
strategy:
‘One of the big problems with getting involved with the outside 
agencies is that you don’t know when the money’s going to run out with 
them -  you can’t commit to it because you don’t know how long it’s 
going to last I’ve always thought that my job as a remand 
management worker is to save the system money, not spend more of 
it. I used to be able to use the stats to prove I was saving the system 
money, you know, by reducing the number of remands to custody and 
all that But I can’t do that now, the remand rate has been going up 
since the Crime and Disorder Act came in, so that puts pressure on us 
to cut down on the budget with other things, especially when they’re not 
very reliable.’ (‘Old’ team member)
This requirement was not fully articulated by the mezzo (management) level of 
the YOT, although it was implied on some occasions in a more general context, and 
certainly fitted in with the post-Misspent Youth (Audit Commission 1996) 
managerialist climate in the New Labour youth justice policy framework. But, again, 
such speculation was used as evidence for the ‘old’ team’s pessimism regarding bail 
services. The missed opportunities in the area of education and training for young 
people in Baytown’s youth justice process were a good example of this.
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The bail team and accommodation agencies working with young people
Accommodation, or the lack of it, for young people on bail was viewed by the 
staff as being one of the biggest problems facing the bail team in Baytown. On the 
basis of (admittedly limited) discussions with and observation of other nearby YOTs, 
this was not a problem which was limited to Baytown itself. The team struggled to 
find a suitable place to live for young people on bail outside the family home. It was 
frequently the case that young people who had been arrested and charged in 
Baytown no longer lived with their families111. In such cases, the risk of remand to 
custody was increased, since one of the reasons behind the grounds for denying bail 
is the absence of a suitable place of residence during the bail period. Young people 
whose accommodation situation was unstable should, it is therefore submitted, have 
been one of the main targets for bail services offered by Baytown YOT.
In reality, though, this priority was turned on its head by the YOTs policy. 
Such was the shortage of locally available, suitable accommodation for young people 
on bail that one of the bail team’s criteria for refusing to consider a young person for 
bail support work was that he or she did not have a suitable bail address. Therefore, 
instead of seeking to tackle the accommodation problem head-on, the team avoided 
even applying for (or recommending) bail when a young person had no secure place 
to live. It is unclear how many young people were remanded to the secure estate 
simply because they had no bail address and could not live at their family home112. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the information that was available, lack of 
accommodation played a part in a young person being remanded to custody in at the 
very least a sizeable minority of cases.
111 See Chapter Eight for young persons’ accounts of their own accommodation problems, and the 
impact of these problems on their offending behaviour.
112 The bail team only began to record the reasons given by the court for denying bail around 18 
months after the start of the fieldwork, and even then records kept were irregular and very informal.
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The team cited lack of funding as the main reason for not being able to 
develop alternative accommodation provision. Once again, however, this statement 
did not tell the whole story. The team did in fact have two accommodation places 
avaihble for young people on bail. Both were in private houses, owned and run by 
remand foster carers, who were paid a regular allowance by Baytown’s local 
authority for accommodating young people. However, the ‘old’ members were 
resistant -  often fiercely resistant -  to allowing these places to be used for young 
people on bail support. The main reason given for this attitude was that the team did 
not vant the places being ‘tied up’ long-term by young people on bail support. 
Instead the places were taken by children in the 10-15 age group who were at risk of 
beinj remanded to local authority accommodation.
It is submitted that this policy, although well-intentioned, was misguided to 
some extent. This is so, firstly, because quantitative analysis revealed that younger 
chilchen were rarely denied bail in the Baytown area. Secondly, younger children 
woult have been given priority by local social services for alternative 
acconmodation, whereas older children found it harder to find specialised 
acconmodation of this kind. Thirdly, and finally, there was no evidence to suggest 
that /ounger children necessarily needed such accommodation for longer periods 
than the older age groups -  the places were often ‘tied up’ for extended periods of 
time in any case. Therefore, older children, who (especially in the case of 17-year- 
olds) were more at risk of being denied bail, did not enjoy the advantage of these 
‘ring:enced’ accommodation places.
Accommodation alternatives for young people on bail were very scarce. 
Seveal accommodation agencies dealt with young people, but -  as with other areas 
of pactice -  the bail team had become frustrated and disillusioned with 
comnunication problems and the severe shortage of available accommodation:
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‘Most of the time I don’t even bother asking. I know what the reply’s 
going to be. It’s Christmas Eve all year round here, there’s never any 
room at the inn. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
In this case, however, their pessimism was not entirely unfounded. When 
local accommodation agencies did deal with young people on bail, the only available 
places for them were bed-and-breakfasts, which simply did not provide a suitable 
environment. Young people sometimes found themselves living next door to drug 
users and dealers, as well as prostitutes (see Chapter Eight). Sometimes the young 
people were even forcibly removed from their rooms by those wishing to do 
‘business’ there. At best, by the very nature of bed-and-breakfasts, young people 
were evicted from their rooms during the day, and were effectively homeless at these 
times. The dangers for young people who often came from unstable family 
backgrounds, and who were mainly (as discussed above) outside mainstream 
education, were obvious. Apart from not providing any stability, and little or no 
activity designed to address problems leading to offending, staying in alternative 
accommodation sometimes put young people’s personal safety at risk. Yet the YOT 
and external accommodation agencies seemed powerless to address these 
important issues for young people on bail.
The negativity which this far from ideal situation fuelled at the Baytown YOT 
meant that the accommodation issue itself was often managed out of the process. 
Even on the rare occasions when a young person was placed on the YOT’s bail 
suppor scheme, this led to a lack of systematic procedures for checking the 
existence and viability of bail accommodation which a young person had nominated. 
On one occasion, a young person given bail support gave the bail team an address 
which vas located some distance away from Baytown, in a rural area113. The team 
were reluctant to do an evening ‘spot check’ in this particular case, because, it was
113 This 'oung person was Interviewee 16 in Chapter Eight below, and he discussed this incident in 
more deail there.
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claimed, of the effort involved in driving to the given residence at night. The young 
person had been on bail for several days before one of the team finally did carry out 
a physical check.
When he reached the given address, he found that the young person’s family 
did not live there. In fact, subsequent enquiries revealed that they had not lived there 
for nearly a year. The young person was in fact at large and of no fixed abode, and 
re-offended during this period. When he was re-arrested, he was remanded in 
custody, and subsequently received a custodial sentence. It is argued that a 
successful period spent on bail support, in accommodation which had been checked 
before the young person was released on bail, might have prevented the subsequent 
denial of bail, and possibly also the custodial sentence in this case.
The bail team and the youth justice secure estate
Given the team’s status as a bail team, part of its duties necessarily involved 
the youth justice secure estate114. This was so because when a bail application was 
denied -  or was not made at all -  the young person in question would be remanded 
to the secure estate. Attitudes towards secure establishments for young people, and 
indeed the nature of the regimes in those establishments, therefore had a key impact 
on the operation of the team’s bail services.
At the start of the fieldwork period, what will be referred to as the ‘old 
framework’ was in effect for the Baytown YOT. This involved young people who were 
remanded to custody being sent to HMP Baytown. This prison, which was a 
dispersal prison for adult males, had a specialist youth wing, and young males were
i
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j 114 Comprising young offenders’ institutions -  hereafter referred to as YOls -  and secure units.
therefore sent to HMP Baytown where possible. The ‘old’ team, and also the ‘new’
team (less openly), were enthusiastic about this arrangement:
‘It’s a good set-up down there (i.e. at HMP Baytown). It only takes 
about 10 minutes to drive down there, so we can see the kids the same 
day they’ve been remanded, or the day after, and do a welfare check 
on them quickly. We know the prison officers down there too, we trust 
them to let us know what’s going on, you know, with who gets 
remanded and when. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
The main disadvantage of this arrangement was obviously the placement of 
young people on remand in an adult prison115. Other disadvantages centred around 
the placement of young people in an overcrowded prison environment, with a lack of 
specialist resources dedicated to young people on remand. The advantages, 
however, were several from the YOT’s point of view: ease of access to young 
people116, more efficient time management (since minimal time was spent travelling 
in most cases), and a good rapport with prison staff (enabling better 
communications).
For girls, and younger children sent to secure units, the old framework was 
less effective on these criteria. There was no secure remand accommodation for 
girls within 100 miles of Baytown, and the nearest YOI was around 140 miles away. 
Also, although there was a secure unit in Steeltown, which was only around 10 miles 
away from Baytown, places at the unit were very limited. As places were also 
available for young people not accused of crimes, young people placed on secure 
remand were often placed further away117. Therefore, for these young people, the 
advantages of the old framework were less apparent.
However, the relationship between the Baytown YOT and the youth justice 
secure estate changed radically during the fieldwork period. During 2000, the team
115 Albeit on a specialist youth wing.
116 This was also true from the point of view of the young people’s families and friends, at least for 
young people from Baytown and the surrounding area -  others from outside the area were also sent to 
HMP Baytown.
117 In one case, involving a girl, the placement was well over 300 miles away from Baytown.
discovered -  via a prison officer at HMP Baytown -  that young people from the 
Baytown area who were remanded to custody would no longer be sent to the local 
prison. Instead, they would be sent, if possible, to the nearest specialist YOI. This 
was YOI Stonewall, over 100 miles away from Baytown. The team were angry about 
this change, not least because they had not been consulted, or informed of it directly 
by the YJB:
‘They’re going to start sending the kids to (Stonewall) next month. The 
YJB are supposed to be in charge and they didn’t even remember to 
tell us! We’re the ones to have to put up with this, not them! We had a 
good system going already and now we have to drive for hours just to 
get to the kids, instead of going 10 minutes down the road. Is that 
supposed to make things better?’ (‘Old’ team member)
The above quote illustrates some of the disadvantages of the switch to
Stonewall. The team faced a 200 mile round trip to get there, in order to check on
young people’s welfare in prison, and update case information. Just as HMP
Baytown was as easy to access for a young person’s family and friends as it was for
the team, so the move to Stonewall stretched the social bonds of the community to
breaking point for young people sent there118. In addition, Stonewall had a large
catchment area, so many different YOTs were competing for visiting time at the YOI.
Visits now had to be booked in advance, and the time spent travelling to and from
Stonewall impacted greatly on the staff’s time management.
These factors should have been apparent before the move to Stonewall was
implemented. Other factors119 caused further problems, both for the team and for the
young people in prison. It quickly became apparent that conditions at Stonewall were
118 This was made worse by the lack of public transport facilities in the area surrounding Stonewall. It 
was, for example, hard to reach by bus, and some 20 miles from the nearest railway station, so that a 
young person’s visitors sometimes had to rely upon the ability of the team to transport them in their 
cars.
119 These may or may not have been foreseeable, given the overcrowded and crisis-ridden nature of 
the prison network in England and Wales (see e.g. Sim 2004).
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very poor. There were severe understaffing and bullying problems, exacerbated by 
very low staff morale120.
The YJB could not have been expected to foresee the nature and extent of 
these problems. What it could reasonably have foreseen, arguably, was the fact that 
a YOI with such a large catchment area would become overcrowded very quickly and 
easily. It arguably could have acted more quickly than it did, moreover, to prevent 
the problems becoming any worse.
The disadvantages to the team were also made worse in practice. Visits to 
young people at Stonewall, even though they had to be booked in advance because 
of the large number of young people being sent there on remand, were sometimes a 
waste of time. The team were often unable to talk to the young person whom they 
had made an appointment to see. The first main reason for this were that the young 
person had been taken to court for a scheduled appearance, and so was not there 
when the team member arrived at Stonewall. This obviously pointed to a lack of 
basic communication between Stonewall and the team, something which was entirely 
avoidable121. Equally obviously, it disrupted the team’s work routines122. The second 
main reason for such wasted journeys was that the young person simply refused to 
see the YOT member123. Overcrowding and understaffing may have contributed to 
this. Whatever the reasons, though, the situation was not ideal for either YOT staff or 
young people, and for a team that was, for various reasons, over-stretched, these 
journeys took up a great deal of time, sometimes to little or no effect.
120 More details on this issue are not given here, to preserve the anonymity of the establishment in this
study.
121 This said, it also pointed to a failure by the team to make the necessary checks on court 
appearances, since the vast majority of appearances were in Baytown’s youth court or Crown Court.
| 1 2 As well as the research, since several fruitless trips were made to interview young people in prison.
123 Remarks made by prison staff such as ‘he’s in bed and he doesn’t want to see you -  there’s 
j  nothing I can do about it’ were common in this regard.
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Towards the end of the fieldwork period, some young people from Baytown
were sent to YOI Greenwood on remand. Greenwood had previously taken only
sentenced young people, in a YOI unit on the same site as (but not in the same
building as) an adult training prison. It was considerably closer to Baytown than
Stonewall. This meant that staff had to spend far less time travelling, making use of
their time far more efficiently. Any empirical comparison of the effectiveness of the
regimes of Stonewall and Greenwood is outside the scope of this study, particularly
as, for example, a comparison of re-offending rates would make little sense in a
study focusing on remand prisoners. From observations of the two establishments,
however, significant differences in the regimes and the way in which YOI staff
responded to young people within them were noticed124. YOT bail staff felt that young
people were encouraged more in Greenwood than in Stonewall:
‘Greenwood’s a smaller place, so there’s fewer kids on remand there.
That’s because it hasn’t got a massive catchment area like 
(Stonewall)125. So the staff can spend more time working with the kids, 
the kids can spend longer out of the cells, and they talk to us more.
The atmosphere’s just better there than in (Stonewall) all round, really.’
(‘Old’ team member)
Therefore, the move away from Stonewall had some beneficial effects, in the 
view of the bail team. It should be re-emphasised, however, that not all young 
people could be sent to Greenwood, and some were sent even further away than 
Stonewall because of overcrowding. In such cases, the problems for both staff and 
young people were magnified still further.
The problematic relationship between Baytown YOTs bail services and the 
secure estate had not one cause, but several, located at the micro and macro levels
124 It is perhaps interesting that both YOls were privately run, so this in itself would not have accounted 
for the differences between the two establishments.
125 Altiough the new framework had not been operational for long when the fieldwork ended, so this 
may ro longer be the case.
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of the process. The attempts to centralise and improve youth justice practice at the 
macro level sometimes undermined already existing problems at the micro level.
The following sections examine the relationship between the different levels of 
the response to young people in the bail process, focusing on the links between the 
micro level (the team) and higher strata of management: the YOT management and 
regional organisations (the mezzo level), and national policy-making organisations 
and agencies (the macro level).
The relationship between the micro and mezzo levels: practitioners, YOT 
management, and bail policy
Some discussion of the relationship between the micro and mezzo levels of 
the Baytown YOT has already been made in the context of the links between the bail 
team and external drugs agencies working with young people. There it was noted 
that communication between the team members and the YOT manager was often 
difficult. This feature of bail services will be discussed in more detail here.
It was common for the team (‘old’ and ‘new’ members) to remark upon the 
absence of the YOT manager from day-to-day working life:
‘Sometimes trying to fix up a meeting with (the YOT manager) is like
trying to get an audience with the Pope. ’
This comment was made half-jokingly by an ‘old’ team member, who knew the 
YOT manager well and respected him -  but it is still illuminating in the sense of 
showing the ‘stretching’ of the mezzo level under the new multi-agency youth justice 
framework. Increasing layers of bureaucracy126, at regional and national level, in the 
youth justice process meant that the YOT manager was rarely able to discuss
126 In the form of meetings and conferences keeping managers out of the office, as well as paperwork.
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matters of micro-level policy with the team. He was often engaged in mezzo-level 
meetings with other local youth justice agency managers, or attending conferences 
and policy meetings regionally or nationally.
As a result of this ‘stretching’, the YOT manager intervened little in the micro 
level bail policies described in this chapter. ‘Communication’ often took place mainly 
in the form of statistics compiled by the bail team, and organised by the YOT 
manager before being passed onto the YJB. However, these statistics did not 
provide a full account of how (and how well) bail services were working locally. The 
team (and the YOT manager) prided themselves on their long-standing use of 
statistics and monitoring of practice, yet even fairly basic quantitative analysis of 
factors affecting the use of bail locally was not employed. Instead, an uncritical count 
of remands to custody and other bail disposals year-by-year was a key feature. 
Opportunities for use of rigorous evaluation of micro level practice to challenge local 
level problems were missed. The manager was taken away from his area of 
expertise by the New Labour macro level agenda. Communication between mezzo 
and micro level was productive when it actually occurred, but due to pressures 
exerted primarily by the macro level, it was necessarily infrequent, as the above 
comment shows.
The communication problems between micro and mezzo levels were implicitly 
acknowledged when, during the fieldwork period, managerial duties at the YOT were 
divided up. A deputy YOT manager127 was appointed to deal with day-to-day micro 
level practice. This managerial re-structuring failed to change the model of a bail 
team whose practice was paralysed by a combination of resistance to the ‘new youth 
justice’ (Goldson 2000) and over-cautious use of discretion over local policy and 
practice.
127 The senior practitioner of the supervision team.
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The change in the YOT hierarchy had no observable practical effect on bail 
team practice. Partly, this was because the deputy YOT manager also had work 
commitments away from the office environment, just as the YOT manager did. Partly 
it was also the result of conflict between the YOT sub-teams, as mentioned above. 
The deputy YOT manager remained a vital part of the supervision team, and was 
seen as such by the bail team.
Occasionally this conflict took a more tangible form. On one occasion, before 
the ‘new’ members of the bail team had left, the senior practitioner of the bail team 
called a team meeting, to be held later on the same day. However, shortly before the 
meeting was due to take place, news arrived that a young person had threatened a 
member of YOT staff during a home visit. The deputy YOT manager then asked the 
police officer who was a ‘new’ member of the bail team to accompany another 
member of staff to the scene of the alleged incident. The bail team’s senior 
practitioner was not informed about this until the meeting was due to start, when he 
discovered that a member of his team would not be able to attend the meeting. A 
heated argument then took place between the deputy manager and the senior 
practitioner. This could have been viewed simply as a misunderstanding, or a minor- 
level communication breakdown, or even a necessary measure in a potentially 
dangerous situation, but the meaning attached to the incident by the ‘old’ team was 
somewhat different. They saw it as an example of the deputy manager ‘pulling rank’ 
on the bail team and deliberately subverting bail team practice (they argued that an 
‘ordinary’ police officer could have been sent out to the incident, rather than the bail 
team member).
In conclusion to this subsection, the links between the micro and mezzo levels 
of the Baytown YOT’s bail strategy were severely strained during the study period. 
These difficulties had two main implications. Firstly, the task of transferring macro­
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level policy into micro-level practice was made far more difficult. Secondly, when 
conflicts arose at the micro-level, it was harder for the mezzo-level to take steps to 
resolve such conflicts, and to take action to prevent them re-occurring.
The next section examines the links between the micro and macro levels of 
youth justice bail policy and practice.
[
I
i .
| The relationship between the micro and macro levels of youth justice: 
imposing the new youth justice orthodoxy in the new millennium
As indicated at the start of this chapter, the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act 
fundamentally changed the relationship between youth justice practice at ground 
level and Government policy. Put simply, it brought the two levels much closer 
together128. The 1998 Act greatly accelerated the process of centralising power over 
the micro level of youth justice at national level. This process could be seen clearly 
in many of the 1998 Act’s provisions -  for example, the introduction of the YJB, which 
is responsible for formulating ‘best practice’ in youth justice work as well as 
disseminating it. However, the centralisation of power also occurred in more subtle, 
insidious ways -  one of which directly affected the way in which Baytown’s youth 
justice bail services were run.
Before the Act’s introduction, bail support services -  as the bail team defined
them -  only covered 10 to 16-year-olds. However, the 1998 Act stipulated that bail
support services must be available for all young people between the ages of 10 and
17 inclusive. The Baytown YOT therefore applied -  successfully -  for YJB funding to
enable the bail support service to be extended in line with the new legislation. In
128 Despite the central responsibility of local authority chief executives for YOTs. This could be seen 
as an example of what Garland (1996) defines as ‘responsibilisation’, under which governments are 
seen to be transferring responsibility for crime control policy to the local level, but are in fact covertly 
centralizing power over policy at the national level.
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return for this funding, though, the YJB expected the funded part of the bail support 
scheme to be evaluated by an independent organisation, in accordance with pre­
determined criteria. As a result, bail support services for 17-year-olds in Baytown 
were under the direct scrutiny of the Home Office129.
However, the process of the macro level monitoring the micro level did not 
stop at centralising legislation, nor even at evaluation in exchange for funding. It 
extended to regular bulletins on ‘best practice’, monitoring visits, and numerous sets 
of guidelines dealing with all youth justice bail services in Baytown (and indeed in 
every other YOT in England and Wales). The YJB did not disseminate guidelines 
and evaluate practice directly. Instead it appointed an ‘independent’ organisation -  
ACORN130 -  to carry out these tasks on its behalf. It was with ACORN which the 
YOT bail team had the most contact. ACORN’s official role was simply to undertake 
a kind of ‘meta-analysis’ of information gained at regulator intervals from the 
researcher in the capacity of independent evaluator (as well as the team themselves 
on service provision generally). However, it became apparent that ‘role creep’ was 
occurring on ACORN’s part. During the fieldwork period it became an uncritical 
mouthpiece for YJB policy development, rather than acting impartially as an 
independent evaluator of the information received from YOTs. In this way the reach 
of macro-level power penetrated even further into ground level practice.
It was partly because of this ‘role creep’ that the team’s hostility to ACORN 
and the YJB quickly took hold. Observations generated by research seemed to 
concur with the team’s (notably, as highlighted in previous sections, the ‘old’ team’s)
129 The White Paper No More Excuses (Home Office 1997) indicates that although the Youth Justice 
Board is independent, it is ‘under the sponsorship’ of the Home Secretary -  seemingly a euphemism 
for its being under the direct control of the Government.
; 130 A pseudonym for an agency involved with various aspects of criminal justice, including youth 
I justice.
224
views on this point. However, the roots of this animosity extended beyond ACORN in
particular, to encompass resistance to macro-level policy in general:
The Government don’t know anything about remand work at the sharp 
end. They don’t know anything about bail support either. I ’ve been 
doing this work for a long time. They should have asked us if they 
wanted to know what guidelines to put in. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
This statement -  which accurately represents the ‘old’ team’s views
throughout the fieldwork period -  links resistance to the macro level’s influence over
day-to-day practice to other issues shaping the team’s attitudes towards youth justice
bail services. In particular it harks back to the history of these services in the
Baytown area, discussed above. The influence of historical factors on the team’s
practice during the fieldwork period has already been noted. The above quote also
shows how the team’s own understanding of what ‘bail support work’ was shaped
their attitudes towards what they saw as interference from ‘outside’. It also raises an
important issue, linked to the arguments made in Chapter Two earlier. This was the
fact that the Government did not appear to consult local youth justice teams (as they
were then called) who had previous experience of bail support work before
implementing it nationwide131. Certainly, as the quote implies, the Baytown team had
i  not been consulted, and this again was seen by the team as a sign of the
j
i
| Government’s arrogance and ineptness.
This new evaluation regime also had an impact on the team’s practice in other
i
I ways. Previously, when assessing a young person’s suitability for bail support work,
I
| the ‘old’ team had used their own form:
i
j ‘It was really straightforward -  two pages, the basic details about the
offence, previous (i.e. offending history), risk to the public -  just the 
important stuff. ’ (‘Old’ team member)
131 The obvious source for the 1998 Act’s provisions was the Audit Commission’s report Misspent 
Youth (1996). However, the discussion of bail support services in that report was very limited (see 
Chapter Two above). Also it is significant that the discussion there focused on how much money 
could be saved using bail support services, rather than any concept of children’s rights, to bail or 
anything else for that matter. See also Jones (2001: 373-4).
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After the 1998 Act had been implemented, however, the YJB introduced its 
own assessment form -  ASSET. This was substantially longer than the old form, 
while covering much the same ground, albeit in far greater detail. In addition to the 
ordinary ASSET form, to be completed for young people generally, there was also a 
special bail ASSET for those in the bail process. From the outset, the bail staff saw 
the resulting paperwork and administration as an unnecessary intrusion into locally 
established practice:
That thing (i.e. the ASSET form) is like War and Peace. Who’s going
to have the time to read all that?’
The introduction of ASSET threatened the foundation of the team’s previous 
practice -  the daily early morning ‘trawl’ in which a team member would telephone all 
the police stations in the Baytown area which were capable of detaining young 
people overnight. The team member would then find out which young people had 
been so detained, assess risk based on knowledge of the young person and his or 
her pattern of offending (as well as the circumstances of the current offence), and 
quickly complete the bail assessment form accordingly, in time for the young person’s 
appearance in court later that day. The length of the new ASSET forms made it 
difficult to pass on information to the YOT’s court officers in this way. Despite this, 
the trawl went on as normal after the introduction of the ASSET. The team knew that 
ASSETs would not always be read in their entirety by other agencies in the youth 
justice process, due to time pressures. They therefore regularly filled in the ASSETs 
| only partially, or did so as rapidly as possible, while doing what was necessary to 
| present an adequate picture of compliance to the YJB.
i
The ‘old’ team were openly hostile to the local representatives of ACORN, who 
seemed to them to be the agents of the Government rather than impartial collectors 
of data. Such was the suspicion of outside interference with their work, however,
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that even ordinary data collection and analysis was seen as an unnecessary chore at
best, and a malicious threat to their ‘good practice’ at worst. The ‘old’ team actively
resented any contact with ACORN and the YJB. On one occasion an argument
broke out during a telephone call by a member of the ‘old’ team to the member of
ACORN staff responsible for the collection of the data. The ACORN staff member
refused to pass on collected information about bail services, locally and nationally, to
the team member, in advance of the publication of a report on the subject. The ‘old’
team member was furious about this:
That idiot wouldn’t let me have the figures. Who does he think he is? I 
told him I’m a government employee, I’ve got a right to see those 
figures. This is the YJB’s idea I suppose, they take over everything 
and they haven’t got a clue about what we do. ’
Another form of direct contact with the macro level came in the form of 
regional meetings and conferences. Regional meetings were held at various venues 
four or five times a year. These were fairly informal gatherings, designed to compare 
and contrast bail outcomes from different YOTs. National policy was often a key 
feature of the meetings’ agendas, but they were rarely attended by ACORN staff. 
Conferences happened more rarely, and covered far more YOTs and a much bigger 
area than the meetings. These were usually organised and run by ACORN staff, and 
were forums where members of ACORN liaised with bail workers from different YOTs 
to pass on information from the YJB, and to disseminate results from the analysis of 
data collected from the YOTs on their bail processes.
Conferences usually produced anger from the ‘old’ team at what they saw as 
the ineffective and unnecessary interfering of the macro level in local bail policy and 
practice. Sometimes they also produced feelings in the team’s senior practitioner 
best described as despair. After attending one conference, some distance away 
from Baytown, this team member was absent from the YOT for some time due to
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illness. He admitted that he had witnessed the more proactive services used by 
some other YOTs attending the conference (including more extensive use of bail 
support work) and had become very anxious. Crucially, though, he still saw the bail 
process for young people in Baytown as something he had little control over, in terms 
of proactive work with young people to prevent time spent in custody.
The next section discusses and contextualises the findings presented 
previously in this chapter, relating them to the quantitative data presented and 
analysed in Chapters Four and Five.
Discussion and analysis of findings
The discussion in this section links back to the outcomes of the Baytown youth 
justice bail process, which were defined on the basis of the reporting and analysis of 
quantitative research (see the conclusion to Chapter Five above). The findings in 
this chapter will be analysed here to reveal whether they can provide mechanisms for 
explaining these outcomes. Each outcome will now be discussed in turn.
Mostly systematic court decision-making under the terms of the Bail Act
This outcome was not directly addressed by the findings in this chapter. 
Magistrates’ decision-making processes will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven 
below.
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Decreasing evidence of systematic decision-making at subsequent court 
appearances
The issue of why bail outcomes at subsequent court appearances were less 
easily explicable by research evidence can be linked to data in this chapter. There 
was considerable research evidence that the ‘old’ team trusted the Baytown 
magistrates completely, and believed in the magistrates’ ability to make decisions in 
line with the Bail Act criteria. Therefore, when court decisions were not made 
systematically, the culture of avoiding conflict and managing it out of the bail process 
made it less likely that the YOT staff would attempt to challenge these decisions (e.g. 
Hucklesby 1997a).
This occurrence was linked to a wider reactivity and negativity in offering bail 
services. ‘Old’ team discourse referred back to a ‘golden age’ of youth justice, when 
young people in the youth justice process were not as troublesome or dangerous as 
they are currently132, and when youth justice practice was more effective. But 
secondly, and simultaneously, it looks forward with increasing pessimism to the 
inability of the youth justice agencies to do anything about youth crime, and the 
problems/needs of the young people involved, except ‘widen the net’ of the youth 
justice process through an increasingly disorganised, complex and ineffective 
response to crime133.
There was potential for effective YOT work with young people on bail. Some 
of this potential was realised by the ISSP scheme, which followed the period of study, 
and was outside its scope (see Appendix H for an overview). This highlighted what 
might have been achieved by the bail team, since the resources available to the
132 A comparison could be made here with the ‘historical amnesia’ thesis put forward in the general 
context of society’s attitudes to youth crime by Pearson (1983, 1994).
133 For the dangers of this negative attitude, see Cohen (1985: Chapter Seven), and McMahon (1990).
229
ISSP team were not significantly different to those available to the bail team. It is 
submitted that, in the field of education and training for young people on bail for 
example, the difference between the responses of the teams was a positive and 
proactive attitude, and less preoccupation with managing conflicts out of the youth 
justice process by remaining largely inactive.
Negativity provides the link between this explanation and the explanation 
discussed next -  namely that regarding the social significance of remands to custody 
locally.
Social significance of remands to custody
Evidence was found of a YOT policy of not offering bail support at first 
appearance in court (although there were exceptions to this norm). The ‘old’ team in 
particular used remand to custody at first appearance to gain extra time for risk 
assessment, and suitability for subsequent bail applications. Their discourse alluded 
to practical experience and instinct about how young people would respond to being 
placed on bail. This did not fit in with the image of systematic, case-by-case, detailed 
analysis projected and promoted by macro-level policy, and is one possible 
explanation for the ambiguous results of remands to custody. In particular, 
comparisons could be drawn here between this model of practice and the evidence 
to suggest that a remand to custody is in itself damaging to a defendant’s case (e.g. 
Sanders and Young 2000). Various writers (e.g. Cavadino and Dignan 2002: 82-9) 
have pointed out that a remand to custody limits a defendant’s access to legal 
representation, therefore hindering his or her ability to construct a defence case. 
Some have also argued (e.g. Davies 1971; Ruthven and Seward 1996; Cavadino 
and Dignan 2002) that sentencers are more inclined, where a defendant has been
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remanded in custody, to consider a custodial sentence. Therefore, this policy does 
not point to efficient decision-making.
Conversely, there was some evidence of the Baytown courts remanding 
young people in custody, and later giving them a community sentence (see Chapters 
Four and Five), and the ‘old’ team believed that the courts operated such a policy in 
Baytown. In the light of this evidence, another possible mechanism for the above 
outcome was the attempts to avoid sentencing to custody later134, but such 
calculations seem to overlook the particularly bad conditions often faced by remand 
prisoners (Morgan and Jones 1992). Both of the mechanisms discussed in this 
subsection, it is argued, had a part to play in the social significance of remands to 
custody -  but both also point to widespread discretion within the bail process, which 
was not always used efficiently.
A third, ‘knock-on’ effect of the YOTs remand to custody policy involved the
movement of young people on remand away from HMP Baytown. This seriously
impeded the effectiveness of the bail strategy used by the YOT. It could also be
argued that this change in the bail process could have triggered a change in practice,
however. A move away from the policy of only offering bail support at second court
appearance or later (and often following an initial remand to custody) could have
been one possible development. However, no such change occurred. The reasons
for this caution and pessimism have been discussed above, particularly with regard
to education and accommodation facilities for young people on bail in the Baytown
area -  but the same comments apply equally to staff policy in this respect as well.
Therefore the combination of a cautious, reactive service and a belief that
magistrates’ decisions to remand young people in custody were invariably right
anyway meant that bail support was severely hindered at the Baytown YOT.
134 And perhaps also the weighing-up of the expense of a shorter period on remand against a longer 
period as a serving prisoner.
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The rarity of bail support referrals
The findings here revealed that the YOT applied for bail support only rarely. 
This focused analysis on explanations for this attitude among staff. Complaints from 
the ‘new’ team highlighted the very small number of young people who were actually 
referred onto the bail support scheme while the fieldwork was going on. The ‘supply’ 
of young people being placed on bail support was -  somehow -  being ‘cut off, so 
that the new, dedicated staff could not work with them. This conflict about bail 
strategy at the micro-level was a conflict which was ‘managed out of the process’ by 
the ‘new’ team’s subsequent ‘sideways’ moves into other roles in the YOT. This was 
possible by means of the wide discretion available to individuals at the micro level of 
practice -  discretion to ‘carry on regardless’ on the part of the old team, and despite 
clearly stated, multi-agency, proactive bail policy at mezzo and macro levels. Of 
course, a contrast could be drawn between this management of conflict and the 
systematic, smoothly-run multi agency YOT featured prominently in macro-level 
rhetoric.
Another mechanism involving managing conflict out of the bail process related
to the ‘old’ team’s definition of bail support itself. It owed much, rhetorically, to the
‘risk management’ model of criminal justice (Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994), under
which ‘high risk’ groups of offenders are isolated and excluded. However, it is
important to note that compliance with the risk management model does not rule out
the use of discretion, or discrimination:
‘In practice there is considerable overlap between the old and new 
penologies. The old assumptions continue to infect the new scientific 
calculations of probability and the new risk-managers do not abandon 
their preconceptions. Indeed, by enumerating the characteristics of 
suspect populations, the new penology lays bare the bases of 
categorical suspicion and makes starkly evident the stereotypes and 
prejudices that inform them ... Actuarial calculation thus becomes its
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own self-fulfilling prophecy as those targeted are more likely to be 
drawn into the criminal justice net.’ (Zedner 2004: 290)
The ‘old’ bail team (the only bail team members who used the discourse of risk
management) were committed neither to national youth justice policy and practice
nor to any concept of rights for young people in the youth justice process. They
seemed to be saying that they were interested primarily in preserving their own
discretion, and this obviously had negative implications for both development of
policy and young people’s rights. This discourse, despite its risk management
rhetoric, arguably provided a contrast with the image of youth justice as a well-
managed ‘system’.
Discretion and managing conflict out of the process
The factor which draws together the competing explanations discussed in this 
section is that of discretion at the micro-level of the Baytown process. Despite the 
centralising, managerialist tendencies of macro-level policy, those who had the 
power to exercise discretion at the micro-level were able to employ and maintain their 
norms of bail practice. These included appropriate adult work which could have been 
delegated to others; a reactive approach to bail services; mistrust of external 
agencies; complete trust of magistrates’ decisions; and a ‘gut instinct’ approach to 
risk assessment of those on bail.
These norms faced challenges from a number of sources during the study 
period. There were challenges from the micro-level (new members of staff who had 
a more proactive approach towards young people in the bail process), from the 
mezzo-level (implemented multi-agency policies and competing demands on staff 
resources) and from the macro-level (increased bureaucracy and monitoring of
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practice). However, the norms were never successfully displaced. The ‘old’ team 
had the power to cut off the supply of cases for the ‘new’ team at the micro level, 
preserving their beliefs (derived from previous experience in a different context). 
They were able to take advantage of the absence of mezzo-level ‘hands-on’ office 
input (itself partly due to the demands of macro-level managerialism) to preserve 
their power and discretion. Finally, they were able to retain discretion in the face of 
attempts at greater control from the macro-level. In reality the ASSET forms were 
completed very reluctantly or done as a ‘last-minute job’, especially by the ‘old’ team 
(and sometimes, especially in the case of the bail ASSET forms, not completed at 
all). The team (correctly) guessed that, in an overcrowded youth justice process, the 
chances of the forms being thoroughly read and analysed by other agencies in each 
case seemed remote.
Key to an understanding of YOT discretion is analysis of how that discretion 
was used. On the basis of research evidence, discretion was primarily used to 
manage conflict out of the local bail process. Examples of this include the ability to 
cut off the supply of cases to ‘new’ YOT staff who wished to be more proactive; the 
‘old’ team’s role in the dominance of several solicitors’ firms (all of whom they knew 
well) locally; and resistance to macro-level bureaucracy by means of compliance 
which was superficial at best, and practice which was not effectively challenged by 
other agencies at the micro and mezzo levels. A lack of communication, both with 
others in the YOT and with external youth justice agencies, was key to the 
preservation of both the ‘old’ staffs discretion, and the reactive, ad hoc way in which 
this discretion was exercised.
An example of this was the attitude of the ‘old’ team towards curfew 
monitoring, shown above. They did not see monitoring as their job, at least in terms 
of regular personal ‘spot-checks’. Yet they did not wish to transfer responsibility for
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this onto the police, or overtly discuss doing so. Doing either of these things would 
have reduced the ‘old’ staffs discretion, and therefore reduced the importance of 
their expertise in making bail decisions135.
Conclusions
The discretion afforded to the courts under the 1976 Bail Act was a key 
feature in the outcomes of the Baytown bail process detailed in Chapters Four and 
Five. There, however, discretion mainly led to explicable and legal decision-making. 
The findings presented in this chapter tell a different story, but one which helps to 
explain outcomes such as rarity of bail support usage and failure to challenge less 
explicable decisions at subsequent court appearances. The data portray a different 
side to discretion in the bail process -  the discretion used by staff to maintain existing 
policy norms, regardless of whether these norms were efficient, in terms of time, 
finance, legal provisions, or normative concerns (such as the protection of children’s 
rights). However, the data explains less about the courts’ role in the outcomes of the 
process. The next chapter aims to address this limitation by presenting and 
analysing research on the court decision-makers themselves -  the magistrates sitting 
in the Baytown youth court.
135 See Chapter Nine below for a discussion of theoretical approaches to discretion in criminal justice 
decision-making.
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Chapter Seven
Youth Court magistrates’ attitudes to youth justice bail 
services in the Baytown area: system response or 
communication breakdown?
Introduction
The previous chapter began the process of discovering mechanisms which 
could explain the outcomes of the Baytown youth justice bail process, by illustrating 
the meanings and attitudes of Baytown YOT staff towards that process. This chapter 
continues the process by exploring the attitudes of magistrates sitting in the Baytown 
youth court towards bail services offered in their area. As shown in the methodology 
chapter above, the data here are the result of semi-structured interviews, comprising 
a mixture of Likert scale-measures statements and open-ended questions, and 
conducted face-to-face with the Baytown youth court magistrates.
The purpose of these interviews was to measure the attitudes of the Baytown 
youth court magistrates towards the youth justice bail process within which they 
made decisions. In identifying this overall purpose for the interviews, the findings 
and analysis of the previous chapters was taken into account. So far, the study has 
shown that it was the magistrates who made the ultimate decision as to whether or 
not each young person’s right to bail would be granted, restricted, or denied. 
Measuring their attitudes was therefore crucial in analysing and explaining the 
quantitative results (i.e. the usage of bail) of the Baytown bail process during the 
study period. But the study has also illustrated the various influences on magistrates’
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bail decisions, by the other individuals and agencies who play a part in the youth 
justice process. It was therefore important to ascertain, not just magistrates’ own 
levels of confidence in the Baytown bail process and the reasons behind these levels 
of confidence, but also magistrates’ attitudes towards the other individuals and 
agencies who shaped the local bail process. This exercise also enabled triangulation 
of magistrates’ opinions on bail services with the opinions of YOT staff, as discussed 
and analysed in Chapter Six above, and in turn a more sophisticated explanation of 
the quantitative data (see Chapters Four and Five above) which illustrated how the 
Baytown youth justice bail process operated.
The basic purpose of the interview was broken down into more detailed 
objectives. The first objective was to evaluate the magistrates’ own knowledge of the 
local bail process: their awareness of trends in the usage of bail, their perception of 
the location of bail support within the framework of Baytown’s bail services for young 
people, and their knowledge of what bail services were available locally. The second 
objective was to evaluate magistrates’ attitudes towards local bail services: the 
effectiveness of those services, and the quality of the information presented to 
magistrates as aids to bail decision-making. The third objective was to assess 
magistrates’ views on obstacles to local bail services, and to measure their opinions 
on how those services might be improved in the future.
This chapter is broken down into two main sections. The first combines the 
quantitative results of the Likert scale questions used during the interviews with the 
results of the semi-structured questions asked during the interviews. In this first 
section, findings will be presented along the lines of the key themes explored during 
the interviews: the nature of bail services for young people in Baytown, and the 
relationship between bail support work and other bail services; the availability and 
presentation of information relevant to magistrates’ decisions regarding bail status;
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obstacles to a better and more efficient service being offered to young people from 
Baytown who were on bail; and possible improvements which could be made to the 
bail services offered in the Baytown area. The second section of the chapter will 
discuss and analyse findings, triangulating data here with those in previous chapters 
to investigate mechanisms capable of generating the outcomes of the Baytown bail 
process.
The full results of the responses to the quantitative Likert scale questions in 
the interview can be found in Appendix E below. All quantitative data reported on in 
this chapter refers to the appropriate figures in Appendix E. The full interview 
schedule used with the magistrates can be found in Appendix D.
Magistrates’ attitudes to local bail services
The nature of bail services and bail support work for young people in Baytown, and 
the relationship between them
Chapter Six described and explained how the Baytown YOT staff defined and 
prioritised different bail services within the local youth justice structure, and, in 
particular, defined and located bail support work as a specialised, narrow area within 
that range of services. As an introduction, the first part of the interview with the 
magistrates asked how they saw the relationship between bail support work and what 
the YOT staff termed ‘remand management’ work generally. Results are shown in 
Figure 7.1 (see Appendix E for this figure and all subsequent figures referred to in 
this chapter).
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Magistrates’ opinions were divided on the issue of whether bail support was a 
fully integrated part of local bail services for young people, with 14 of those 
questioned (46%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing with this statement, and 
another seven expressing a neutral opinion.
Opinions were more ambivalent on the question of whether most young 
people in the Baytown area were not suitable for bail support work, however. Results 
are shown in Figure 7.2. 15 magistrates (60%) expressed a neutral opinion on this 
question, leaving four who agreed with this statement, and six who strongly agreed 
with it. No magistrates, however, disagreed or strongly disagreed with this view.
Figure 7.3 showed that just over half of those interviewed (52%) were neutral 
on the issue of whether the Baytown bail support scheme was effective, in their 
experience, in targeting the criteria for denying bail in the 1976 Bail Act. This 
compared with eight who agreed that bail support was effective in this way, and two 
who strongly agreed that it was. As with the previous two questions, however, 
responses were generally positive, in the sense that only two magistrates disagreed 
with the statement, and none strongly disagreed with it.
In the semi-structured questions, magistrates were asked, firstly, what guiding 
principles they used when making bail decisions. The answers given were 
unanimous, in that they all took the terms of the 1976 Bail Act as the basis for 
decision-making:
‘On a case-by-case basis ... using the evidence we have from those in 
court... and applying the Bail Act criteria. ’ (Interview 10)
‘Each individual is treated in the same way ... in that every case is 
judged against the Bail Act and its criteria. ’ (Interview 20)
A common variant on this view (mentioned by 11 of the 25 interviewees) was
the combination of the Bail Act with consideration of the public interest:
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‘When applying the Bail Act ... we think about the protection of the 
public and whether bail would threaten public safety.’ (Interview 6)
‘The protection of the public ... must take priority when using the law to 
make bail decisions. ’ (Interview 14)
As a preliminary to asking magistrates for their opinions on bail support, they
were asked how they would define ‘bail support’. This was done to gauge the
meanings attached to ‘bail support’ by magistrates, as opposed to the meanings
which they attached to ‘bail services’ in a more general sense. The replies were
varied, but more concerned with control than help:
Things like curfews, reporting to the police, measures to protect the 
public from the risk of re-offending.’ (Interview 15)
‘Anything offered by the YOT to prevent re-offending on bail.’ (Interview 
10)
‘Something to help young people with the problems they have which 
may cause their offending. ’ (Interview 18)
‘It usually involves quite an intensive package of intervention in the 
young person’s life -  perhaps alcohol or drug treatment if it is needed, 
or training with a local agency. ’ (Interview 9)
‘Sometimes it is hard to tell the difference between bail support and 
ordinary conditional bail. The boundary between them isn’t always 
made clear, and of course it is common to impose curfews, residence 
requirements, and things like that as conditions with conditional bail. ’ 
(Interview 20)
These interview extracts show that although magistrates liked the idea of bail 
support, they were unsure about how it was used (and how it should be used) in 
practice. The magistrates’ concept of ‘bail support’, and indeed of the other bail 
services offered for young people locally, was governed by the way in which the 
services were presented by Baytown YOT members in court. Most of those 
interviewed agreed that bail support -  or at least their concept of what ‘bail support’ 
was -  was well integrated with the other bail services provided by Baytown YOT. 
When probed further on this issue, a typical comment was that ‘the same YOT staff
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are responsible for all the bail services, so the whole package seems to be well- 
integrated’ (Interview 5). A related topic, which was included in the interview with the 
aim of separating these two issues from one another, was magistrates’ attitudes on 
the targeting of bail support services specifically. When magistrates were asked 
whether they thought the sen/ice was well targeted, many felt unable to give a 
definite answer, because they had not sat in cases where bail support packages had 
been offered:
‘I ’m not sure how well-targeted the bail support service is, because it’s 
never been put before the court in a case I was sitting on. ’ (Interview 6)
Magistrates displayed a common feeling of not knowing enough about the
aftermath of a bail decision -  particularly a decision to refer a young person onto the
bail support scheme:
‘Of course, we know if the young person has breached the conditions 
when they come back to court. But I personally don’t know enough 
about what happens while the young person is on bail -  what sort of 
work is being done with them, how well they’re responding, that sort of 
thing. We get basic training in what it involves generally, but we never 
get the chance to see what’s happening for ourselves. ’ (Interview 9)
‘We do get training but we don’t get the chance to see what goes on 
once a young person is on bail or remanded. I have sat in on a couple 
of projects run by different people -  that was interesting, I would like to 
know more, but because we’re not in (court) very often, it’s difficult to 
organise. ’ (Interview 1)
All of the magistrates who were interviewed agreed that they had little direct
experience of referring young people onto the bail support scheme, and even less
experience of what actually happened to young people on bail support. The above
quote suggests some regret about the lack of opportunity for magistrates to find out
more about how bail support worked in practice in Baytown. This was supported by
several other magistrates’ comments:
‘Because we’re part-time, and we only sit once every two or three 
weeks normally, we can’t become more involved and actually see what 
the young people do on these schemes. ’ (Interview 7)
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One magistrate who felt unable to answer the majority of the questions asked
put the problem in this way:
7 don’t feel able to answer because I don’t know enough about what 
happens when a young person is bailed or remanded. We get training, 
but outside that we don’t get the opportunity to see what happens 
afterwards (i.e. after the bail decision has been made). It’s always 
made clear to us that we’re not social workers -  we have to be led by 
the experts. Any answers I gave about how well it all works would just 
be guessing.’ (Interview 14)
Another magistrate, being interviewed at the same time as the one above136, 
agreed:
‘These questions should really be addressed at the other agencies in 
the process -  they can give informed answers, whereas we can’t, 
because we don’t know enough. ’ (Interview 15)
These were extreme examples of this effect, in that the magistrates concerned 
felt unable to offer any opinion because of their lack of knowledge regarding bail 
issues in Baytown. Such responses were the exception rather than the rule. 15 of 
the 25 magistrates interviewed mentioned that clerks and other court staff were 
helpful in providing training on bail legislation and what magistrates’ bail decision­
making options were in court. But, as shown by the quotes above, the nature of 
young people’s experiences on bail, and local services available for young people on 
bail, remained a mystery to some magistrates.
There was some awareness of the nature of the magistrates’ role in the youth 
justice process. All the magistrates interviewed were lay magistrates, therefore they 
were part-timers, who to some extent were ‘parachuted’ into the process, because of 
the nature of individual involvement. Few of the magistrates interviewed normally sat
i
i
i in the Baytown Youth Court more than once every two weeks, and they emphasised
136 As magistrates were interviewed in groups (see Chapter Three for methodological discussion) the 
influence of one magistrate’s answers on another’s cannot be discounted, although there were no 
noticeable instances of 'peer pressure’ during the interviews.
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their dependence upon other, ‘expert’ youth justice individuals and agencies when
making bail decisions:
We are led by other agencies when making these decisions ...as well 
as the law, of course.’ (Interview 11)
We rely on professionals in the court for information and guidance in 
applying the Bail Act. ’ (Interview 20)
When asked who in particular should be targeted by bail support work,
magistrates were unsure:
‘It would have to be reserved for a serious or persistent offender -  but 
of course we are guided primarily by recommendations from the CPS 
and defence teams, and of course the YOT, because they are the ones 
who would be working with the young person on bail support.’ 
(Interview 8)
‘When considering any application for bail we have to consider the risk 
to the public’s safety. If the young person is considered to be too much 
of a risk to be granted unconditional bail, or conditional bail, then often 
he or she will be considered too much of a risk to be given bail at all. ’ 
(Interview 1)
Availability and presentation of information relevant to magistrates’ decisions
In this section, magistrates were firstly asked whether, when they first sat on 
the Baytown bench, they had been fully informed about the operation and content of 
bail services (including the bail support scheme). Figure 7.4 shows that opinion was 
divided on this question: 11 magistrates (44%) expressed a neutral view, while seven 
(28%) disagreed (three strongly), and another seven (28%) agreed (again, three 
strongly).
However, Figure 7.5 shows that when magistrates were asked whether they 
had been kept up-to-date on bail services since then (again including bail support), 
13 (52%) were neutral, 10 (40%) disagreed that they had been kept up-to-date (six 
: strongly), and only two (8%) agreed with the statement (one strongly).
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Magistrates were then asked about their views of the quality of bail information
from YOT staff in court (Figure 7.6). 12 (48%) were neutral about the quality of
information supplied to them, while a further eight agreed that YOT presentation of
information in court was helpful, well-prepared and comprehensive (three agreed
strongly with this). A majority of magistrates (14, or 56%) also agreed that they
trusted bail information and recommendations given to them by YOT staff in court
(Figure 7.7), while a further six magistrates strongly agreed with this view -  only two
magistrates did not agree that they trusted YOT information and recommendations.
The semi-structured questions in this section of the interview aimed to
measure the magistrates’ level of satisfaction with the YOT bail services, as they
were presented to them in court. Observations and attitudes were not specifically
limited to experiences in the courtroom by the questions asked, but it was
recognised, given the observations made in the previous sub-section, that most (if
not all) of the magistrates’ experiences of the bail services would be based on the
time they had spent on the Youth Court bench.
The magistrates’ satisfaction levels regarding quality of bail information in
court, as provided by the Baytown YOT bail team, were mostly high:
‘Personally I’m very satisfied with the quality of infonvation we get in 
court when making decisions. The defence teams, the CPS 
representatives and the YOT workers are all professional and reliable. ’ 
(Interview 4)
Several magistrates, on the other hand, commented that:
We could see the YOT workers, from the remand management team, 
a bit more often than we do at the moment. ’ (Interview 1)
Magistrates pointed out that the YOT was represented in court by one of the
two designated court officers, except when neither was available due to holiday time
or illness. YOT bail workers rarely attended court, except as cover when the court
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officers were unavailable, or where they were making a bail support application137. It
was interesting that at least a few magistrates noticed this, and were not entirely
satisfied with the situation. Mostly, however, the above comment from Interview 4
was representative of other magistrates’ attitudes.
Similarly, most of the magistrates interviewed (18 of the 25, or 72%) thought
that the agencies involved in bail decisions locally had good working relationships
with one another, and with the court itself:
‘Personally speaking, I’ve known most of the YOT staff who appear in 
court for some time. In particular, talking about bail decisions in court, I 
know that (the ‘old’ bail team) are helpful and reliable when they 
provide information. They only argue for bail when it is safe, in their 
opinion, to do so, bearing in mind the safety of the public and their 
protection from offending.’ (Interview 12)
Magistrates also mentioned the importance of ’familiarity’ with those from 
whom the court sought information, and the building of ‘trust’ between the different 
agencies.
Key issues in bail services for young people in Baytown: the relevance of bail support 
to youth justice locally, and obstacles to better performance
Magistrates were mostly positive about the role bail support could (in theory) 
play in bail decisions, as shown by Figure 7.8. 21 out of the 25 interviewees either 
agreed (11, or 44%) or strongly agreed (10, or 40%) that bail support could make the 
difference between bail and jail. Views on the reality of bail support in Baytown were, 
however, quite different, as Figure 7.9 shows. Six magistrates agreed that bail 
support was always put before the court and considered as an option where a young 
person was at risk of being denied bail. However, eight of the magistrates disagreed
137 Which, as Chapters Five and Six indicate, happened only rarely.
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with this statement (three disagreed strongly), and eight were neutral. Despite the 
results in Figure 7.9, nine magistrates agreed, and a further eight strongly agreed, 
that bail support was an essential part of the bail services offered by the Baytown 
YOT (Figure 7.10). This compares with two magistrates who disagreed that this was 
true (one disagreed strongly).
The next part of the Likert scale questionnaire asked magistrates about which 
factors they felt were the most significant obstacles to the bail services offered to 
young people in the Baytown area. The factors included in the questionnaire were 
based around those identified through the participant observatory work done with the 
Baytown YOT staff (see Chapter Six), although magistrates also had the opportunity 
to mention other factors which were not included in the questionnaire itself. For each 
factor included, magistrates were asked to evaluate its importance in hindering bail 
services overall, and also bail support services specifically.
Figure 7.11a shows that 18 of the magistrates interviewed (72%) either agreed 
or strongly agreed with the view that financial factors limited the bail services offered 
in Baytown. 11 magistrates strongly agreed, and another seven agreed. Two 
magistrates did not express an opinion on this question. 17 of the magistrates (68%) 
either agreed or strongly agreed that a lack of financial resources limited bail support 
services in particular (Figure 7.11b). For each of these two questions, one 
magistrate disagreed, and no magistrates strongly disagreed.
Figure 7.12a shows that 15 magistrates (60%) either agreed or strongly
i
I agreed that a lack of YOT staffing resources restricted local bail services for young 
people. This figure comprised nine magistrates who agreed with this view, and 
another six who strongly agreed with it. A further seven interviewees expressed a 
neutral view, leaving two magistrates who did not express any opinion, and one who 
disagreed that lack of staff power was a significant factor. Figure 7.12b shows that a
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slightly smaller number of magistrates (12, or 48%) either agreed or strongly agreed 
that lack of YOT staff resources was a significant limiting factor for bail support 
services specifically. Magistrates who were neutral on this question (nine) formed 
the most popular opinion, and two magistrates disagreed with the statement.
Magistrates were next asked for their opinions on the impact of the transfer of 
young people remanded in custody away from HMP Baytown (see Chapter Six 
above for YOT staffs views on this issue). 14 magistrates (56%) either agreed or 
strongly agreed that this policy development was a significant limiting factor upon 
local youth justice bail services generally (Figure 7.13a). Nine interviewees strongly 
agreed with this statement, and a further five agreed, with eight magistrates 
expressing themselves to be neutral on this issue. One magistrate disagreed with 
the statement. 13 magistrates (52%) either agreed or strongly agreed that this issue 
was inhibiting bail support services specifically (Figure 7.13b). On this question, 
seven magistrates agreed, and six strongly agreed. Nine magistrates were neutral 
on this issue, with a further two disagreeing with the given statement.
On the issue of overcrowding in the youth justice secure estate in England and 
Wales, magistrates showed a slightly stronger consensus of opinion than they had 
with previous questions (Figure 7.14a). No magistrates disagreed that overcrowding 
had impacted upon the quality of bail services in Baytown, and while 10 (40%) were 
neutral, 15 (60%) either agreed or strongly agreed that this was the case. Nine of 
these 15 interviewees strongly agreed with the statement. Opinions were broadly 
similar with regard to bail support in particular (Figure 7.14b). 14 magistrates (56%) 
either agreed or strongly agreed that overcrowding had impacted adversely upon 
Baytown YOTs bail support services, although proportions within this group were 
slightly different to those for the previous question. Here, eight magistrates agreed 
with the statement, compared with six who strongly agreed. A further 10 magistrates
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(40%) were neutral on this question, and one disagreed that overcrowding had had 
an impact.
The interviewees were also asked whether the needs of young people on bail 
played a significant part in YOT bail services, in terms of the extent to which these 
needs were taken into account in service delivery. Opinions here were more 
ambivalent than those offered for previous questions in this section. 13 magistrates 
(52%) were neutral when asked to rate the importance of meeting young people’s 
needs in bail services generally (Figure 7.15a). This compared with seven 
magistrates who agreed, three who strongly agreed, one who disagreed, and one 
who expressed no opinion. On bail support specifically (Figure 7.15b), 13 
magistrates (52%) were again neutral, but six agreed that young people’s needs 
played a key role, and four strongly agreed. As before, one magistrate disagreed 
with the statement, and one expressed no opinion.
Magistrates were more certain of their opinions on the role of protecting the 
public in bail services locally. 22 (88%) either agreed or strongly agreed that 
protection of the public played a role in bail services offered by the Baytown YOT (11 
agreed and 11 strongly agreed). Three magistrates were neutral, and none 
disagreed (Figure 7.16a). 21 magistrates (84%) said that protection of the public 
also played a key role in the way in which bail support services were run. 10 
magistrates agreed that this was so, 11 strongly agreed, and four were neutral 
(Figure 7.16b).
Nine magistrates agreed that the needs of victims played an important part in 
bail services offered by the YOT, and a further eight magistrates strongly agreed with 
this statement. A further seven magistrates were neutral, while one strongly 
disagreed that the needs of victims played a role in bail services (Figure 7.17a). 11 
magistrates (44%) agreed that the needs of victims played a role in bail support
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services, and a further eight strongly agreed. In contrast, four interviewees were 
neutral on this issue, one disagreed, and one strongly disagreed (Figure 7.17b).
Opinions on the role played by ‘time efficiency’ in the Baytown youth justice 
bail process were more divided. Eight magistrates strongly agreed that the issue of 
improving time efficiency played a part in local bail services (Figure 7.18a), but a 
further eight were neutral, while another seven agreed with the statement. Two 
magistrates disagreed that time efficiency was an important factor in practice. 
Opinions on bail support specifically were very similar to those on bail services in 
general. Eight magistrates agreed that ‘time efficiency’ and speeding up the 
operation of the process played an important role in bail support services (Figure 
7.18b), and a further eight strongly agreed that this was true. Seven more 
interviewees were neutral, and two disagreed with the given statement.
The final issue dealt with by the Likert scale questionnaire was the nature and 
extent of youth crime in the Baytown area, and the role which these factors played in 
bail services and bail support services offered by the Baytown YOT. These 
questions were designed to assess magistrates’ views of the responsiveness of local 
youth justice services to emerging trends in local youth crime. Results are shown in 
Figures 7.19a and 7.19b.
11 magistrates (44%) agreed that the nature and extent of youth crime locally 
played an important role in bail services, while nine were neutral on this issue, two 
strongly agreed, and two disagreed. One additional magistrate felt unable to express 
an opinion (Figure 7.19a). Magistrates were slightly more cautious about the role of 
local crime trends in bail support work, however. 12 (48%) were neutral on this 
: issue, while nine agreed, two strongly agreed, and one disagreed that crime trends 
played a part in bail support services (Figure 7.19b).
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When asked in semi-structured interviews about the factors which hindered
youth justice bail services locally, the majority of magistrates agreed that lack of
financial resources was a key problem:
‘If I had to name one obstacle to better performance it would be lack of 
money. It is a day-to-day situation which magistrates have to face in 
their decision-making. ” (Interview 20)
‘The costs of secure accommodation is included in local authority social 
services budgets, which can lead to differences between courts and 
local authorities. ’ (Interview 23)
‘Lack of funding is always an issue in the public sector, regardless of 
the agency -  it's not just the justice process. ’ (Interview 17)
‘There aren’t enough schemes available locally, and it seems to me 
that there is insufficient funding to meet the needs of young people. ’ 
(Interview 18)
‘There is a lack of placements and bail hostels places for young people 
in the area.’ (Interview 15)
‘Youth justice has been historically under-funded, especially bail 
services. ’ (Interview 5)
Some magistrates within this group not only commented upon a lack of
funding for bail services locally, but also linked this lack of resources explicitly to
perceived macro-level and micro-level shortcomings:
The Government needs to invest far more heavily in bail services. It is 
not a high-publicity issue for them. ’ (Interview 5)
7 would like to see more structured proposals for conditional bail and 
bail support packages, like mentoring, sport opportunities, and 
education if assessments show up poor literacy. I blame the lack of 
these packages being offered in court on lack of availability, which in 
turn goes back to a lack of funding.’ (Interview 9)
A minority of other magistrates, however, did not share this view:
‘A lack of money is not immediately obvious to me. ’ (Interview 4)
Other magistrates, however, indicated that they felt that they did not know
enough about the local financial situation regarding youth justice to comment:
‘How do we know what finances are available for youth justice in the 
area?’ (Interview 3)
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7 don’t know anything about financial circumstances locally.’ (Interview 
13)
7 find it difficult to answer; because I do not know how resources are 
allocated.’ (Interview 12)
The magistrates were not as consensually emphatic about the lack of staff
power as an obstacle to better performance. Nonetheless, a majority of those
interviewed identified this issue as a problem locally:
7 am not sure what provision is made for continuity of inter-agency 
liaison when staff are off sick or on holiday. ’ (Interview 3)
‘In my experience, there are not always staff available to regularly 
inform magistrates of all new bail proposals and options. ’ (interview 8)
‘There is a lack of staff cover in court at times -  especially on Saturday 
mornings and late in the afternoon.’ (Interview 17)
A total of eight interviewees linked under-funding to under-staffing at the YOT:
‘Under-funding and under-staffing go hand-in-hand.’ (Interview 24)
‘Resources are stretched for bail services, in finance and staff terms, 
and both problems stem from insufficient budgets. ’ (Interview 6)
As before there were other magistrates who were not aware of any problems
in this area -  but again as before, they were in the minority:
7 am not aware of any staffing problems. ’ (Interview 4)
Again as before, a small minority of magistrates did not feel that they knew
enough about YOT staffing levels to comment. All of those who did not comment on
staffing issues were among the magistrates who did not comment on financial issues
(see above).
Magistrates were next questioned about the transfer of young people who had
been remanded to custody away from HMP Baytown, and the effects this transfer
had on bail services locally.
‘This move has put unnecessary strain on resources, when considering 
access to the youths. ’ (Interview 1)
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The closer to home they are remanded, the better. ’ (Interview 24)
‘Children should be kept locally; to allow for parental or guardian visits. 
Maintaining community ties is crucial.’ (Interview 3)
‘In my view it is very important to have local bail hostels and other local 
facilities for young people ... this assists visits by their families, but also 
speeds up court appearances ... it now takes a great deal of time for 
young people to be brought to court. ’ (Interview 5)
‘Support during remand is now more difficult, for families and the YOT. ’ 
(Interview 9)
‘It stretches limited staffing resources even further. ’ (Interview 14)
One magistrate took a different view, stating that young people had to be
taken out of their community to be dealt with successfully:
‘It is unfortunate if  offenders have to be moved away, but it has to be 
accepted in order that the remand is successful. ’ (Interview 20)
Others, however, knew very little about the local situation:
‘It might have an effect ... but I don’t generally know where they are 
sent ...I  know places are very limited here though. ’ (Interview 12)
A related issue on which magistrates were questioned was overcrowding in
the youth justice secure estate generally, and the ways in which this impacted upon
Baytown YOT bail services. Proportions of interviewees who agreed that this had
had a negative impact upon services in practice were similar to those who
commented upon the transfer of young people away from HMP Baytown (see
above), and magistrates often linked these two issues together:
‘Recently we have had to remand a young girl to secure 
accommodation hundreds of miles away from here. It is bad enough 
that there are no remand places available locally, but this is clearly 
unacceptable from the point of view of the young person, families and 
the YOT team. It is not right. ’ (Interview 5)
‘This is a problem which is linked to financial and resource problems 
generally. ’ (Interview 18)
‘It is bound to increase difficulties for the offender, which in turn 
increases difficulties for the YOT and the youth justice process.’ 
(Interview 20)
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'Yes, it is a problem, and it is related to the lack of facilities for 
remanding in custody locally. The nearest place138 is still about 40 
miles away. ’ (Interview 22)
‘Overcrowding is a factor, but it should not affect the bail support 
services when they are available locally.’ (Interview 12)
7 find there is a particular problem with secure placements, although 
there are problems everywhere in the custody process. I wonder 
whether the people making assessments are using the right criteria, 
though?’ (Interview 15)
Magistrates were next asked in more detail about the extent to which they felt
local services met the needs of young people on bail. One magistrate felt that young
persons’ needs were subordinate to the youth justice process’s needs overall:
‘It is the court’s needs which are uppermost in many cases ... such as 
where the time between the date of offence and the date of sentence 
includes a young person’s birthday. ’ (Interview 2)
The largest group of magistrates, however, believed that needs were not
being met by local services, but also related these limitations to other issues:
‘It is difficult to address the needs of young people when they are 
remanded such a long way from their homes. ’ (Interview 4)
‘The needs of young people on remand are complicated by the 
slowness of the justice process.’ (Interview 18)
‘Bail can last such a long time that even though services are meeting 
needs, there is still the risk of re-offending. ’ (Interview 20)
Others felt that needs were important, but also that they were met by local
services:
‘Contact with people they know is very important -  I think the YOT 
helps to provide that. ’ (Interview 3)
The second largest group of interviewees did not feel they had enough 
information of knowledge to comment on the extent to which young people’s needs 
were met, giving reasons such as lack of training and not being present at case 
conferences.
138 The magistrate here was referring to YOI Greenwood. See Chapter Six for more detailed 
discussion of this issue.
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Magistrates were also asked about the importance of protecting the public in
the context of local bail services, practically and normatively. The majority were
emphatic about the importance of this factor, but more in the normative sense than in
terms of what actually occurred in practice:
‘This is a key factor; often overlooked if we concentrate solely on the 
young offender’s “needs”. ’ (Interview 2)
‘The public remains anxious as to their safety when young offenders 
are free to offend again. ’ (Interview 3)
‘Even conditional bail poses a risk to the public, in cases of theft or 
vehicle theft, so it is important to have a structured and restricted bail. ’ 
(Interview 9)
‘It is certainly a factor uppermost in our minds, but given how little bail 
support is used, it is hardly an issue in that context. ’ (Interview 12)
‘When remands to custody are used, there is also the element of the 
young person themselves being protected from harm. ’ (Interview 15)
‘The needs of the general public outweigh the voluntary actions of 
defendants.’ (Interview 17)
On the issue of the needs and wishes of crime victims, most of the
interviewees thought that the issue was important, both in practice and normatively.
A small minority mentioned their approval of reparation to victims, without explicitly
linking this back to bail service specifically. Others mentioned the importance of
keeping victims informed during the bail process:
‘The victims of the offences must be considered, and a priority must be 
to keep them informed about how “their” case is progressing.’ 
(Interview 5)
‘If a young person is on bail having been charged with a serious crime, 
consideration must be given to the victim.’ (Interview 12)
One magistrate attempted to weigh up and balance the needs of victims and
the public generally:
‘Victims’ needs are important, but protection of the public is more 
important. ’ (Interview 19)
254
Opinions were more neutral on the importance of efficiency, in terms of saving
time and money, in the local youth justice bail process139. Just under half of the
interviewees (11, or 44%) made comments in addition to their Likert scale answers.
Those who did were mostly content that local services rightly prioritised efficiency in
policy and practice:
‘Fast track justice for persistent offenders is very necessary, and 
appears to be working. ’ (Interview 3)
‘Efficiency ensures that the youth links the punishment to the offence. ’ 
(Interview 4)
As with the other questions asked, however, there was diversity in the
opinions given. Where critical comments were made, however, they centred around
the failure of services to maintain efficiency in practice, rather than the desirability of
this goal in principle:
‘All agencies should pull together, to get reports, defendants, witnesses 
and so on to court on the right day, and in good time. ’ (Interview 5)
‘Quickerreports are needed -  which means more staff.’ (Interview 9)
‘Inter-agency difficulties are more of a problem than the transporting of 
defendants to and from court. ’ (Interview 12)
‘Outside factors contribute greatly to the speed at which cases are 
dealt with -  such as co-operation between the police and the CPS.’ 
(Interview 15)
There were only two exceptions to this trend, captured in the quotes below:
‘The need to preserve the rights of defendants and the public should 
come before any statistical data which the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department ask for -  but they don’t. ’ (Interview 21)
‘Efficiency and saving time do not always run hand-in-hand.’ (Interview 
18)
Magistrates were given the opportunity to make comments about the impact of 
the nature and seriousness of youth crime in Baytown on bail services. As with the
139 As reflected in the quantitative Likert scale data reported above in this chapter.
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previous question, not all of the magistrates made additional comments on this issue,
aside from their Likert scale responses. Those who did comment felt confident that
the Baytown YOT were flexible in this respect, and took developing trends into
account in their policy and practice:
‘These issues are why the YOTs were put into place ... and they are 
able to take changing trends into account.’ (Interview 10)
‘It is important as a strong consideration in YOT thinking, and also as a 
background factor in court practice. ’ (Interview 12)
‘A relatively small number of persistent young offenders do commit a lot 
of the crime, and drag in new offenders. YOT policy should reflect that, 
and I think it does. ’ (Interview 17)
‘ISSP has been useful in targeting persistent young offenders.’ 
(Interview 25)
Suggestions for improvements to youth justice bail services in Baytown
The final part of the semi-structured interviews went beyond the agenda
covered in the Likert scale questions. It gave magistrates the opportunity to mention
any areas for improvement in the bail services offered by the Baytown YOT. In this
section, magistrates were not guided by any particular questions, but were simply
asked to comment on any areas for improvement which they could think of.
Magistrates touched upon a variety of issues in this part of the interview. The
mostly frequently mentioned was that of efficiency, but suggestions for improvement
in this area related to a number of different issues, as these quotes illustrate:
‘Major problems arise where the police fail to get information to court 
for matters to proceed on time. ’ (Interview 1)
‘Young offenders should be delivered to court on time -  not when 
Confidence140schedules it. ’ (Interview 2)
140 A pseudonym for the private security firm responsible for transporting young people from Baytown 
to and from custody and the courts.
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The most popular view in this area, however, was that efficiency could be
improved by more YOT staff, and more resources for them:
‘Inefficiencies in the process appear to be due to a lack of sufficient 
staff, not individual poor performance -  this includes the CPS as well 
as the YOT/ (Interview 8)
‘More YOT staff are needed if efficiency is to be improved further ... 
this would allow court reports to be produced more quickly, for 
example. ’ (Interview 9)
‘YOT bail staffing is becoming stretched. ’ (Interview 16)
The next most frequently mentioned area for improvement was the needs of
young people remanded to custody. In contrast with the views on efficiency, there
was a strong consensus on what should be done:
‘Local remand centres would improve the situation for young people 
greatly. ’ (Interview 15)
‘Young people are sent too far away on remand -  there should be more 
local facilities. ’ (Interview 7)
‘The introduction of (YOI Greenwood) has improved remand processes 
but it is still quite a long way away from here. ’ (Interview 2)
The quote from Interview 2 above shows some blurring of consideration of
young people’s needs with considerations of efficiency. For example, there was
praise for the introduction of YOI Greenwood (in the latter stages of the fieldwork
period) as a custodial facility for young people from the Baytown area, but only on the
grounds that it was far closer than the previous nearest secure remand facility at
Stonewall141, rather than the quality of the regime offered at Greenwood. Some also
recognised that even Greenwood was some distance away from Baytown, which still
posed problems for YOT services and the young person’s family and friends. Other
magistrates, however, situated their criticisms in the context of young defendants’
welfare, as did Interviewees 7 and 15 above. They expressed dissatisfaction, both
141 Around 80 miles from Baytown.
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from the point of view of stretching what were often already fragile links between the
young person and his or her community, and also from the point of view of the youth
justice process’s response to custodial remands142.
Six of the magistrates felt that young people’s bail needs would be best met by
the availability of local bail accommodation for young people:
‘The lack of alternative bail accommodation for young people who 
cannot live at home is a major issue, and has made the difference 
between bail to custody in the past ’ (Interview 25)
A specialist bail hostel for young people should be made available -  
or, failing that, some other accommodation serving the same purpose. ’ 
(Interview 10)
Other topics were also mentioned in this part of the interview. One such topic
was the issue of victims, and more specifically keeping them informed (mentioned by
four interviewees):
‘Victims are often forgotten at this stage in the process ... until there is 
an outcome they should always be kept in touch about their case.’ 
(Interview 3)
‘Victims and their needs should be a central part of YOT policy.’ 
(Interview 22)
Another three magistrates discussed potential sources of conflict between the 
macro and micro levels of youth justice, and how their removal might improve 
services:
‘I feel that more education on how youth justice really works is needed 
for those who administer the figures ... their criteria are not always 
well-selected, and there is too much paperwork for all those involved 
now.’ (Interview 1)
‘Figures do not always compare regions fairly or equally ... they do not 
take enough of the local context of crime and justice into account. ’ 
(Interview 5)
The final issue to be mentioned was that of improved publicity, both locally 
and nationally, and the need to both disseminate good local practice and educate the
142 I.e. the need for a YOT visit to the young person as soon as possible after the remand to custody.
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public ‘on how the process really works, and what outcomes are like in practice’ 
(Interview 3). This was seen as being the responsibility of government (local and 
national) rather than youth justice agencies themselves.
This concludes the semi-structured interview data, and the reporting of results 
obtained. The next section of the chapter analyses and triangulates the quantitative 
and qualitative data obtained from the magistrates, referring back to the bail process 
outcomes (see Chapters Four and Five) which required explanation.
Discussion and analysis of quantitative and qualitative findings
The discussion in this section relates back to the Baytown bail process 
outcomes highlighted in Chapter Five, and discussed, using data obtained from the 
Baytown YOT staff, in Chapter Six. Therefore, the discussion here is organised 
along the lines of the outcomes, each of which will be discussed in turn.
Mostly systematic court decision-making under the terms of the Bail Act
Magistrates were emphatic about their adherence to the terms of the Bail Act, 
and the criteria determining when bail could legitimately be denied. In these terms, 
as shown in Chapters Four and Five, decisions were primarily systematic. However, 
as mentioned in previous chapters, the criteria of the 1976 Bail Act are loosely 
defined in themselves. They require and maximise magistrates’ discretion over 
interpretation in practice (e.g. King 1981: 130-37). The data in this chapter suggest 
that the magistrates structured this discretion by considering the ‘protection of the 
public’. It was interesting that there was little evidence of magistrates balancing the 
public’s interest against the defendant’s in interviews. The quantitative data showed
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that protection of the public was seen by magistrates as playing a more important 
part in the local bail process than the needs of young people, and the qualitative data 
reinforced this finding by showing that, normatively, magistrates felt that the 
protection of the public should be more important, and was more important to them in 
making bail decisions in practice.
The data in this chapter therefore provides an explanation for the systematic 
nature of decisions, in terms of compliance with the Bail Act, but one which focuses 
on the discretion inherent within the Act. There was scope for different bail outcomes 
within the boundaries of compliance with the Act, and the data emphasises that 
discretion could be used legally, but with consideration of the public’s protection 
taking priority over the rights of un-convicted children. There is also the issue of how 
protection of the public can be accurately defined. Magistrates related the concept 
back to the exceptions to bail in the Bail Act. Protection of the public could be 
considered using any of the three criteria for denying bail on charges of imprisonable 
offences, and so its use as a criterion does not preclude legal and system decision- 
making. But neither does it preclude decisions which are not legal or systematic. A 
comparison might be made between this vague guideline and the use of ‘common 
sense’ or intuition when decision-making by magistrates in Parker et al.’s (1989) 
study.
In legislative terms, the ‘protection of the public’ argument translates into a 
reason for believing that a defendant would re-offend if released on bail, rather than a 
ground for denying bail in itself. Yet magistrates interviewed here seemed to think 
that it was a ground for refusing or restricting bail in its own right. Similarly, some 
magistrates indicated that seriousness of offence was also a ground for refusing bail, 
rather than a reason informing a ground for refusing it. This confusion (despite 
magistrates’ insistence that the Bail Act 1976 was strictly complied with in practice) is
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a finding that has been repeated in other research (e.g. Hucklesby 1994, 1996, 
2002).
Decreasing evidence of systematic decision-making at subsequent court 
appearances
The arguments in the previous subsection also provide a potential explanation 
to the above outcome. Just as the use of ‘protection of the public’ as a decision- 
making guideline can lead to system and legal bail outcomes, so, as mentioned 
previously, it can lead to decisions less explicable by the legal criteria, because of its 
ambiguity.
Other explanations for this outcome were also present in the data. Many of 
the magistrates interviewed trusted the YOT staff almost completely. They praised 
the standard of YOT information presented to them in court, and largely blamed any 
shortcomings in service and recommendations either on other agencies’ failings 
(such as the police) or on factors out of the control of micro-level staff (such as a lack 
of financial resources). However, as shown in Chapter Six, staff recommendations 
and practice were guided by staff norms, based around the maximisation of 
discretion and the management of conflict out of the bail process. Norms were in 
turn shaped by a complex range of factors. These included the history of reactivity 
and the trust placed by staff in magistrates.
Therefore, the magistrates’ trust of the YOT staff and the information provided 
by YOT staff provide an explanation for decline in systematic decision-making. Such 
mutual trust provides a firm basis for the creation of distinctive court cultures at the 
micro-level, based around speed and ease of decision-making (e.g. Hucklesby 
1997a, 1997b). The trust placed by magistrates and YOT staff in one another led to
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a culture of reactivity and unwillingness to challenge earlier decisions. This, in turn, 
threatened to erode the organised decision-making seen at most initial court 
appearances.
Social significance of remands to custody
The arguments advanced above regarding magistrates’ use of the ‘protection 
of the public’ criterion also apply here. This criterion had the potential to lead to 
necessary or unnecessary denial of bail. Elsewhere, magistrates were quick to 
acknowledge the damage which moving young people on remand away from 
Baytown had done to bail services. It was interesting, though, that although 
interviewees often related the resulting problems to a lack of staffing, they did not 
show any awareness of the exclusion of ‘new’ YOT staff members from the bail 
decision-making process (see Chapter Six), or any critical understanding of how bail 
policy might have been changed following the transfer of young people away from 
HMP Baytown.
Again, the high level of trust placed in the staffs reactive policies could also 
explain the inconsistent significance of remands to custody in decision-making. One 
example of this can be found in the excerpt from Interview 12 above. However, this 
quote also provides a slightly different angle on the issue of the trust between 
magistrates and YOT staff. The quote is actually stating that magistrates trust the 
opinions of the YOT staff whom they know. In fact the magistrate mentioned the 
names of the two members of the ‘old’ YOT team in this part of Interview 12. It has 
already been noted in Chapter Six that it was the ‘old’ team who were hostile to the 
idea of bail support. The ‘new’ YOT team members were not mentioned by any of 
the magistrates in the interviews. In fact, as Chapter Six illustrated, this mattered
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little in practice, because the ‘new’ YOT team members were simply not allowed to 
undertake proactive bail interventions.
The magistrate in this interview echoes the preferences of magistrates in 
Brown’s (1991: 68-71) study. There, the magistrates preferred those individuals and 
agencies who were realistic143 and experienced144. Trust here was grounded in the 
knowledge that staff were unlikely to depart from magistrates’ own decision-making 
preferences. Magistrates were playing a part in the isolation of those YOT staff not 
complying with the ‘official’, established norms of reactive, formalised bail practice. In 
this way the ‘time and money’ effectiveness of the bail process was secured and 
enhanced, trust between youth justice agencies was built up, and the effectiveness of 
the Baytown process was jeopardised. Brown (1991: 70) also recognises that youth 
justice workers and magistrates may share common goals, centred around ease of 
young people’s classification as ‘types’ of offenders and consensual decision-making.
The rarity of bail support referrals
Magistrates showed a great deal of confusion about what ‘bail support’ 
actually involved in practice. Perhaps this is not surprising given the rarity of bail 
support applications by Baytown YOT workers in court. However, the data also 
suggests another problem: that bail support in itself was not sufficiently well-defined 
locally, and could blur into what was thought of as conditional bail. Perhaps this, in 
turn, implies that YOT staff were not resistant to the elements of bail support work in 
themselves, but to the ideology of its imposition on their practice by macro-level
143 I.e. those who appreciated, and acquiesced in, magistrates’ own preferred approach to decision­
making.
144 I.e. those who were known to, and trusted by, magistrates.
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youth justice policy145. This provides support for the argument, put forward in the 
preceding two chapters, that YOT staff and magistrates alike wished to ‘manage 
conflict out of the process’ by diluting the nature and usage of bail support, as a tacit 
method of showing resistance to macro-level policy.
The data illustrates the magistrates’ uncertainty about the exact role which bail 
support does and should play in the youth justice process. It gives the image of bail 
support as an ancillary, minor part of this process. It is interesting, in particular, that 
this opinion closely mirrors those of the YOT staff (see Chapter Six), in evaluating the 
role of bail support in their work as well as in elevating the importance of risk 
assessment and protection of the public.
However, the data also illustrate a different problem -  and one which was 
again highlighted by the ethnographic study of YOT bail staff. Young people who 
were not felt to be suitable even for conditional bail were almost automatically 
labelled as so ‘high risk’ that they had to be denied bail altogether. This reflects 
Parker et al.’s finding that ‘magistrates believe there is a hard core of cases for whom 
nothing but custody will do’ (1989: 59-60), and Brown’s (1991) argument that young 
defendants’ cases are stereotyped and compartmentalised by youth justice 
decisions, into ‘soft end’, intermediate and ‘hardcore’ cases. Magistrates and YOT 
bail staff shared a belief in the existence of such a hardcore in Baytown, for whom 
only custody would do. These young people were not thought worthy of any bail 
intervention, but conversely, the majority of more minor offenders were not thought to 
need such intervention. The bifurcatory classification of cases (Bottoms 1977) 
reflected a managerialist approach, but also meant that, in this way, bail support had 
been by-passed in the discourse of both YOT staff and magistrates. It was seen as 
suitable for use only in exceptional cases, rather than as an essential part of the
145 An issue that was discussed earlier, in Chapters Four and Five.
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process, to be considered for use in every case, just as other bail options were. 
Given this situation, and magistrates’ implicit trust of and agreement with the opinions 
of YOT bail staff in court, it is not surprising that bail support played such a marginal 
part in the Baytown youth justice bail process during the study period.
This was in contrast to the observation, from most of the magistrates 
interviewed, that bail support was an integral part of the package of bail services 
offered by the Baytown YOT. They were in favour of the scheme in principle, and 
indeed in practice, but knew little of how (and how well) it was actually working. This 
finding is congruent with both other qualitative research done as part of this study146 
and quantitative research discussed earlier in the study147. It should also be 
remembered that very few cases involved an application for bail support which was 
subsequently rejected by the court (again discussed in Chapter Six above).
The data also showed that some magistrates wished to know more about bail 
services available locally, but felt that they were not given the opportunity to find out 
more in the process of their training. The reasons behind this failing are unclear from 
the data. It could point to a lack of efficiency on the part of the court staff responsible 
for training magistrates, as well as the difficulties of organising such training for part- 
time lay magistrates.
Some magistrates interviewed did not seem to have enough information about 
Baytown’s bail services to make fully informed decisions about how well these 
services were working in practice. These ‘knowledge gaps’, leading as they did in 
some cases to a perceived inability on the part of the magistrates to answer some 
questions put to them, may not be obviously informative as research material. 
Nevertheless, they do open up some interesting issues in themselves. One of the
146 Especially YOT staffs attitudes towards bail support, seeing it as only a small part of the work they 
did.
147 In particular, the finding that only a very small number of young people were actually placed on the 
bail support programme (see Chapters Four and Five).
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most obvious of these issues relates to the extent to which the youth justice bail 
process is ‘systematic’ -  one of the hypotheses generated earlier in the study. Such 
gaps are in part explicable by the nature of lay magistracy, where magistrates mostly 
have a ‘part-time’ role, and sit in courts infrequently. However, it is submitted that 
this does not tell the whole story regarding the perceived inability to answer 
questions on bail issues for young people.
There was also a lack of communication between the magistracy, as an 
agency playing a part in the youth justice remand process, and other agencies who 
also play a part. Of course magistrates interviewed were regularly briefed by court 
clerks on the applicable law in each case and the options available when a decision 
has to be made. Similarly, it is obvious that magistrates heard submissions from the 
Crown Prosecution Service and defence solicitors regarding the facts of the case. 
But what they were not made sufficiently well aware of, on the basis of the evidence 
obtained here, is the gap between the ‘law in the books’ and the ‘law in action’. The 
former, for the purposes of this study, would be the exceptions to the right to bail as 
laid out in the 1976 Bail Act as well as the formal nature of different kinds of bail 
options for young people. The latter would be how (and how well) the different 
options work in practice -  what the exact nature of bail support work was in practice, 
and how well it was working in terms of reconviction rates, for example. It is this 
information that the Baytown magistrates did not seem to have available to them, 
regardless of how well submissions to them were made by other agencies in the 
context of each case.
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Conclusions
An understanding of the discretion inherent in the youth justice bail process 
was central to discussion and analysis of the data in this chapter. Magistrates 
themselves had wide discretion within the terms of the Bail Act, which they structured 
using their own norms. But they were, as they themselves argued, also dependent 
on other agencies, including the YOT, for information not only about the ‘law in the 
books’ but also about the ‘law in action’. The opinions expressed by members of the 
YOT regarding bail issues were therefore a heavy influence on magistrates’ decision­
making. Magistrates were also clear about the fact that they trusted the 
recommendations made by the YOT regarding bail, because they felt that the YOT 
were the ‘experts’ on the appropriate decision to be made in each case.
However, given the diverse influences on YOT bail policy, there was far more 
to the information given to the magistrates than simply a dispassionate 
recommendation which took all the relevant law and facts into account. Just as 
magistrates’ decisions did not take place in a social vacuum, so neither did YOT 
recommendations. The latter were in fact shaped, as Chapter Six shows, by a 
variety of factors, such as apprehension regarding resources, a historic mistrust of 
bail support in its own right which extended to a mistrust of it even within a ‘remand 
management’ context, and conflict within the framework of the YOT (some of which 
was ‘managed out’ as described above).
Therefore the unsystematic nature of bail policy and practice within the 
Baytown YOT had a crucial impact on attitudes among magistrates in Baytown’s 
youth court. Conflict was again being managed out of the process by leaving 
magistrates unsure as to how bail services operated in practice -  thereby helping to
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minimise any conflicting opinions they may have had regarding the way in which the 
bail process was working for young people locally.
Chapter Eight provides explanations for the outcomes of the Baytown youth 
justice bail process from the point of view of the third group of people whose 
decisions had a direct impact upon the operation of the process in practice, alongside 
YOT staff and magistrates. This group comprised young people whose cases moved 
through the bail process in Baytown, during the study period.
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Chapter Eight
Speaking a different language? The attitudes of young 
people towards bail services in Baytown
Introduction
This chapter continues the exploration of possible explanations for the 
outcomes of the youth justice bail process in Baytown (as explained in Chapter Five). 
The purpose of this part of the research was to seek the opinions of young people on 
the decisions affecting them in the bail process. Such a purpose recognises that, 
once a young person has been granted bail, compliance with the requirements of bail 
depends upon his or her action (desistance from breaching the bail requirements), as 
well as upon the reaction to any breach (detection of and action against breach by 
youth justice agencies), and the quality and relevance of the bail support service. A 
full understanding of how the Baytown bail process operates must therefore include 
an account of young people’s own attitudes towards, and levels of confidence in, 
local bail services aimed at them.
As with the magistrates’ interviews (see Chapter Seven), this basic purpose 
was then broken down into more specific objectives. The first objective was to 
evaluate young people’s attitudes to bail services before, during and after their time 
on bail. The second was to understand young people’s needs, and to assess the 
extent to which these needs were met by bail services locally. The third was to 
understand the general meanings of bail and custody for the young people, relating 
these meanings to the reasons behind breach of bail conditions. The fourth and final 
objective was to triangulate the previously presented data, by addressing not only the
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actions of the Baytown youth courts, but also the actions of the Baytown YOT which 
were examined earlier in the study.
18 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 17 young people, all of 
whom were or had been on the Baytown YOT’s bail support scheme. Interviews 
comprised a mixture of Likert scale questions and open-ended questions, as with the 
magistrates’ interviews (see Chapter Eight). The full interview schedule used for 
young persons’ interviews can be found in Appendix F. In addition, figures illustrating 
the full responses to the Likert scale questions can be found in Appendix G, and all 
references to figures in this chapter correspond with and refer to the figures in 
Appendix G. More details about the rationale behind this approach, and the 
difficulties faced in implementing it, can be found in Chapter Three. Quotes from the 
interviews show where each interview was conducted (i.e. in custody or in the 
community). Following reporting of findings, the final section of the chapter 
discusses and analyses these findings, placing them within the context of the 
Baytown youth justice process bail outcomes, and triangulating results with data from 
previois chapters.
Understanding young people’s views of YOT bail interventions prior to and in 
the courtroom
All of the young people interviewed heard about the scheme from either a 
YOT worker or their solicitor at the time they were referred to or placed on the 
scheme. Towards the end of the study period, YOT staff began to distribute leaflets 
in the reception areas of the Baytown youth courts (as shown in Chapter Five above) 
-  but tiis practice had little or no direct impact on young people:
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7 didn’t know there were leaflets until my solicitor told me. ’ (Interview 7, 
in custody)
‘The YOT worker gave me a leaflet but I never read it. ’ (Interview 16, in 
custody)
Only two of the 18 interviewees148 reported having been referred onto the bail
support scheme at their first appearance in court. These two young people (in
Interviews 12 and 15 -  see later discussion) were both placed upon bail support
towards the end of the study period149. Eight of the 16 who had been initially
remanded in custody were ambivalent about being referred onto bail support when
they were told about the scheme:
7 didn’t really care about getting out on bail, but X  (‘old’ YOT team 
member) came to the prison and said I could go for it if I tried to sort my 
head out. So I said OK. ’ (Interview 5, in custody)
Overall, however, such ambivalence was not universal, as Figure 8.1 shows.
There was a roughly even split between those who agreed that they had either
pleaded guilty or showed remorse prior to being referred onto the YOT bail support
scheme (10 interviews, or 55.6%) and those who did not agree with this statement (8
interviews, or 44.4%).
‘I’d already pleaded guilty and they told me I couldn’t stay in the secure 
unit any more150. I was really scared about going to prison, so I was 
happy about getting out on bail.’ (Interview 1a, in the community)
‘My solicitor told me I might get remanded ‘cos I’d done another crime 
when I was already on bail ... that really scared me.’ (Interview 10, in 
the community)
Figure 8.2 shows the responses to the Likert scale question about how young 
people perceived the quality of their bail support application’s presentation in court.
; 148 Percentages here, and throughout this chapter, are proportions of the number of responses in the
; total number of interviews, rather than the total number of interviewees. Therefore percentages are
calculated from the maximum possible number of responses, i.e. 18, since one young person was 
interviewed twice.
149 The young person in Interview 15 was actually referred as part of the Intensive Supervision and 
Surveillance Programme (ISSP), about which see Appendix H for more details.
150 Because this young person’s 17th birthday fell during the secure remand period, and so he would 
have had to be transferred to a young offenders’ institution at this point.
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All of the interviewees were at least neutral about the way in which their bail support
application was presented in court, although only three (16.7%) strongly agreed that
the presentation was helpful to them. More interviewees (10, or 55.6%) mentioned
that their solicitor was helpful than mentioned that their YOT worker was helpful (5, or
27.8%) at this stage, and all of the latter group praised their solicitor and their YOT
worker at the same time:
‘Yeah, in the court the YOT worker said I should get bail ...he did help 
me there. My solicitor was good as well.’ (Interview 3, in the 
community)
It should be noted here that young people were not asked about the YOT
court officer’s role in presentation -  only the role played by the YOT bail team.
The interviewees were ambivalent, in the semi-structured responses, about
the role played by the magistrates in bail support referral. There was a feeling
among those interviewed that the magistrates themselves did not explain fully
enough why the young person had been accepted onto bail support, as well as what
was involved in each package:
‘The judge151 didn’t really say why I’d been accepted -  he just said that 
I had.’ (Interview 7, in custody)
The next subsection moves on to consider young people’s experiences on the 
bail support programme itself.
Understanding young people’s experiences on the bail support programme: 
young people’s needs
All young people interviewed were firstly asked about the social needs which 
they rated as important, in terms of these problems’ relation to bail support services.
i
s
i
S  151 S ic -  the interviewees often used the terms ‘judge’ and ‘magistrate’ interchangeably.
Figure 8.3 shows the responses. Young people discussed a range of what they saw
as being important social problems, which were contributing to their offending in
diverse ways. In all, 10 of those interviewed (55.6%) said that drugs or alcohol
abuse was a key social problem for them in terms of playing a part in offending. In 12
of the interviews (66.7%), accommodation problems were identified as a factor in
their offending. 13 of the young people reported being excluded from mainstream
education at some stage in the semi-structured responses, but only four thought that
this impacted on their offending behaviour, and was a special need at the time of
being placed upon bail support. Other factors mentioned were family problems (four
times) and school bullying (twice), although both of the latter factors were only
mentioned in combination with other factors. The interviewees were then asked to
expand upon their opinions. Each of the above findings will now be illustrated and
expanded upon using the resulting qualitative data.
Seven of the 10 interviewees who mentioned drug or alcohol abuse as being
an important problem in their lives discussed the abuse in the context of other social
problems which they had previously faced. For these young people, such abuse was
both a contributory factor in offending, and the result of earlier difficulties:
7 wasn’t getting on that well with my mum at home, so I liked being with 
my nan and granddad. But then they died, that’s when I started taking 
drugs, that’s how I used to make myself feel better. I was either 
breaking into people’s houses to get stuff to sell so I could get more 
drugs, or doing it after I’d taken the drugs, so I was off it (i.e. 
intoxicated) really.’ (Interview 11, in the community)
The remaining three young people did not mention drug and alcohol problems 
in the context of other problems, but still regarded it as an important factor in their 
offending:
Td done some valium and temazepam, then I wanted more of them, so 
while I was still on them I did the robbery and the rest of it, to get 
money to buy more. I didn’t plan it or nothing, I just did it without 
thinking.’ (Interview 15, in the community)
All of those who mentioned accommodation problems as a factor in their
offending linked such problems in with wider family difficulties which caused
instability in their lives. The young person in Interview 7 had been in a long-term
foster care placement for eight years, but was then moved into local authority
residential accommodation in the Baytown area, prior to the offending which resulting
in his referral onto a bail support package:
7 really hated it there (i.e. in the residential accommodation) and I ran 
away a few times ... other kids there, they tried to run away too, we 
used to go out, smash windows and that, for a laugh . . . I  used to try 
and fight the staff sometimes ‘cos they were always telling me what to 
do, all the time, like.’ (Interview 7, in custody)
For other interviewees, however, the issue was not that they were allocated to
what they saw as unsuitable accommodation, but that they did not have any available
accommodation at all. Interview 16 provided an example of this:
7 didn’t want to stay with my mum and dad anymore, / hated school, so 
I just ran away, lived on the streets. Then I got sick of that, I went to 
Pathway152, told them I was homeless. But they couldn’t really help me 
straight away, said they didn’t have anywhere for me, so I earned on 
being homeless.’ (Interview 16, in custody)
The third factor emerging from the investigation into the context of offending
was that of education and training problems. 10 out of the 18, or 55.6%, mentioned
educational needs in the qualitative discussion of problems contributing to offending:
7 got thrown out of school ‘cos I smoked pot. But I was getting bullied.
I went to another school but I was scared I’d get bullied again so I 
stopped going. I was still smoking so I was just hanging around all day 
. .. I  started stealing stuff to pay for more drugs, couldn’t get money any 
other way. I did go to Leamwise153 a couple of times, but I couldn’t be 
bothered turning up after that.’ (Interview 10, in community)
Educational needs, as with drug and alcohol misuse and accommodation,
! were seen by young people as important in the context of offending (as the quote
152 Pseudonym for a local housing association specialising in finding accommodation for young people 
in Baytown.
153 Pseudonym for a local education and training agency for young people in Baytown.
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from Interview 10, above, shows), especially when interacting with other needs. It is 
interesting, though, that the interviewees did not see education and training needs as 
being as direct an influence on offending as the other factors mentioned above. It 
was discussed more in terms of contributing to offending behaviour indirectly.
Understanding young people’s experiences on the bail support programme: 
activities and conditions of bail support
The interviewees were asked about what they were required to do under the
conditions of bail support, as well as what they were required not to do. They were
also asked how useful or effective they thought these interventions were, in relation
to their needs (as analysed above) and their offending. The results of these
questions are shown in Figures 8.4 and 8.5. All of those interviewed reported having
been (or being) under a curfew, and/or having to report to the police, as imposed by
the bail support package. These were standard conditions included in proposed bail
support packages by the Baytown YOT staff, and were generally included
together154. Most of those interviewed (15, or 83.3%) agreed that the curfew
condition had been helpful in keeping them out of trouble, but 12 of the 15 (80%)
gave qualitative opinions on helpfulness that were ambivalent:
7 was fine about the curfew. The bail hostel was OK anyway, so I 
didn’t mind not going out at night ’ (Interview 1 a, in the community)
7 suppose it was useful, I did stop going out drinking at night for a bit.
But it was more the work I did with the drugs people (i.e. local drugs 
and alcohol agency) that helped me stay out of trouble.’ (Interview 12, 
in the community)
Three interviewees reported having to spend their curfew periods at locations 
which they felt were unsuitable for them (all local guesthouses):
154 As mentioned by them in Chapter Six above.
7 had to stay in this bed and breakfast piace -  I couldn’t stay at home 
and they (i.e. the YOT bail staff) couldn’t find anywhere else.’ (Interview 
6, in custody)
Three interviewees disagreed that the curfew requirement was useful or
effective in keeping them out of trouble. Interviewee 16 was breached twice, in quick
succession, on two separate periods spent on bail support:
7 didn’t care about the curfew. I was supposed to go back to my mum 
and dad’s house, but I never did. I just stayed with my mates until I got 
arrested for breaking the curfew. That was about a week later.’ 
(Interview 16, in custody)
After re-arrest for breach of curfew, this young person was then granted bail 
support for a second time a week later (having been remanded in custody in the 
meantime), but was later breached for a second time, again for breach of curfew. 
This was a case where the curfew (and bail support in general) seemed to have little 
effect on the young person’s behaviour -  but it was more unusual in that a stable 
home address was available for the young person, but was rejected by the young 
person himself.
When discussing the effectiveness of curfews in more detail, young people
reported that curfew conditions were typically monitored by means of spot checks by
YOT staff, conducted by telephone. Sometimes staff visited bail addresses in
person, but this did not happen consistently, as this quote from a young person
interviewed in the community suggests:
7 did get someone to cover for me once, when I was out when I should 
have been in for the curfew. I thought they (i.e. the YOT staff) wouldn’t 
come round, just phone up, so I got my brother to answer the phone for 
me, and I got away with it.’ (Interview 10, in the community)
A second principal condition attached to all of the interviewees’ bail support
packages was that the young person ‘comply with the directions of the Baytown
YOT’. The interviewees were ambivalent about the effects of this condition on their
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needs and offending. This was mainly because most of them (12 in all, or 66.7%)
were unsure about what this condition meant in practice:
‘It meant do what they tell you, so I suppose that’s the curfew, and I 
talked to them a bit, but mainly it was other people (i.e. external 
agencies) I was talking to.’ (Interview 6, in custody)
A young person said that this condition had been helpful to them while on bail
support in only four of the interviews. Generally, in the interviewees’ view, staff took
a reactive approach to bail support intervention. They saw the staff more as
facilitators (i.e. facilitating contact with external agencies), rather than people who
carried out the interventions themselves. There was one exception to this trend,
however. The young person in Interviews 1a and 1b was allocated to a ‘new’
member of the YOT bail team. He was the only interviewee who was allocated to the
‘new’ team in this way. In contrast to the other respondents, he was positive about
intervention from the YOT itself:
7 got on really well with (the ‘new’ team member). She came to see me 
while I was in prison and saw me a lot while I was on bail support. We 
talked about what had happened, any problems I had, what was going 
to happen later on.’ (Interview 1b, in custody)
The third bail support condition discussed in the interviews was that of
accommodation, or more specifically, that the young person had to reside at a
specified place while on bail (mentioned in 13 of the 18 interviews). Only three
interviewees (in four interviews) said that accommodation-related conditions of bail
support had been helpful to them. Those interviewees that mentioned
accommodation issues in the context of what actually happened to them while on bail
support mostly talked about staying with family and friends:
The court and the Youth Offending Team said I had to stay with my 
mum while I was on bail support. That was good ‘cos my family were 
helping me get off the drugs. ’ (Interview 15, in the community)
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Only one interviewee had stayed in specialist bail accommodation for young
people -  and he had not stayed in Baytown:
‘Because of what I’d been charged with, my YOT worker said I’d have 
to go into a proper bail hostel to get out on bail. So I went to a place in 
Steeltown 5 and stayed there, the YOT worker sorted it for me.’ 
(Interview 1b, in custody)
The picture that emerged from the interviews is that there was very little
alternative accommodation for young people on bail in Baytown, if, for whatever
reason, they could not stay at the family home:
The YOT tried the places you go to get your own place for me, when I 
was on bail support, but there wasn’t anywhere for me to stay -  I really 
wanted my own place. I had to stay in a bed and breakfast place in the 
end.’ (Interview 6, in custody)
Some of the interviewees showed the difficulties which could arise when
young people were ordered to reside at home while on bail support because there
was no accommodation alternative, even when staying with the family had been
deemed unsuitable for them in the past:
Td been in care before, like, but I stayed with my mum and dad when I 
was on bail. ’ (Interview 4, in custody)
This young person had severe learning difficulties. Both of his parents also
had learning difficulties, and his father was infirm and seriously ill during the bail
support period. Yet the Baytown YOT and local housing agencies could find
nowhere else for him to go, and were limited to allocating a worker from Social
Services to the case. Interview 11 provided another example of a young person
being sent to live with his family despite previous difficulties:
7 had been living in (local authority accommodation) ‘cos I couldn’t live 
with my mum -  but I had stayed over with her a couple of times while I 
was in the other place.’ (Interview 11, in the community)
155 A town near Baytown, which had a separate youth justice network to that of Baytown, including its 
own YOT.
An activity which was frequently mentioned by the young people (in 14 of the
18 interviews, or 77.8%) was education and training undertaken while on bail
support. The young people identified several sources of education or training in the
Baytown area which had played a part in their bail support packages. All were
agencies and organisations specialising in working with young people, inside and
outside the youth justice process. As with the accommodation agencies mentioned
earlier, therefore, the interviewees (and the YOT) were competing with other young
people not evidently involved in criminal activity for these organisations’ time and
resources. However, on the basis of the data, education and training from these
external agencies played a more significant role in bail support packages than
external accommodation services, as these excerpts illustrate:
‘I’d already left school (i.e. when the period on bail support began) but 
my YOT worker got me some help with careers, that was useful, or I 
think it will be anyway. ’ (Interview 1 b, in custody)
7 wanted to get back into school but it was really hard for me, I ’d been 
away from it for a long time. But Leamwise helped me with reading 
and writing. That helped me more than the other stuff I was doing (on 
bail support).’ (Interview 14, in custody)
In a majority of interviews (11 out of 18, or 61.1%) it was agreed that the
education or training which had been received during the time on bail support had
been useful in terms of preventing future offending. However, not all of the
interviewees saw this type of intervention in such a positive light:
7 went to the mechanics project, they said I’d get a certificate at the 
end, or something to show I’d done the course, but I never got 
anything.’ (Interview 7, in custody)
Despite the mixed attitudes illustrated by the quotes given in this subsection, 
the response to education and training was far more positive, on the basis of the 
evidence, than the response to accommodation services offered as part of bail 
support packages. It is also interesting that young people who were critical of the
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education and training facilities referred more to their own perceived responsibility for 
the failure to make these facilities work than the interviewees who were critical of 
accommodation services. They were more likely to recognise their own limitations in 
terms of education (in terms of failing to turn up for appointments, finding the work 
too hard, or just not being interested) than those who had faced accommodation 
difficulties while on bail support.
The fifth bail support activity discussed by the interviewees was treatment for 
drug and alcohol abuse. 10 interviews (55.6%) reported some element of drug 
and/or alcohol treatment during the time on bail support. This came from two 
separate local agencies who worked with children and adults alike156. Opinions on its 
usefulness, however, were more mixed. Seven interviews (38.9%) reported that drug 
and alcohol treatment-related conditions of bail support had been helpful. Some 
made an effort to engage with treatment, but were not able to avoid further drug or 
alcohol abuse:
7 started to go to Drugwise157 ‘cos I used to lose my temper and then 
kick off on people when I’d taken something. I needed to sort my head 
out . . . I  went three times but then I was drunk the next time I went, so 
they wouldn’t see me.’ (Interview 9, in custody)
‘I’d been with Drugwise before, when I was on a DTO158 ... I wanted to 
stop taking drugs then, and I was alright while I was on the DTO, like ... 
but when it finished I started hanging round with my mates again and 
they were all on drugs so I started again. It was the same when I was 
on bail support ... OK for a bit but my mates started me off again. ’ 
(Interview 13, in custody)
The young person in Interview 3 also admitted to continuing to take drugs 
while on bail support, despite continuing drug treatment, and regular spot checks by 
the YOT staff. Not all of the interviewees had these difficulties with drug and alcohol
156 Although, as noted in Chapter Six above, one of the agencies dealt with most of the young people 
referred while on bail, and this was the only agency which was mentioned by young people in these 
interviews.
157 Pseudonym for a local drug and alcohol agency working with young people in Baytown.
158 I.e. detention and training order.
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treatment on bail support, however. The young person in Interview 12 had a history
of heavy alcohol misuse, which contributed to his convictions for drink-driving and
vehicle theft. Having been remanded to custody at his initial appearance in court for
drink-related offences, he realised that there was a great deal at stake when he was
subsequently granted bail support:
‘Drugwise made me realise I had a problem ... showed me what can 
happen when you drink too much, to you and other people ... they did 
help me, yeah.’ (Interview 12, in the community)
He agreed that the treatment he received had been useful, and this was 
reflected in what happened subsequently in this case. He complied with all of his bail 
support conditions, and, having been at risk of a custodial sentence when he was 
remanded to custody, received a community sentence. Interestingly, he did not see 
the success of his alcohol treatment in isolation from other elements of his bail 
support package:
‘Yeah, that was important because I used to drink and drive and 
everything ... but I did a training course (run by a charity) and that 
helped as well ... ‘cos I hadn’t been in school for ages before that.’ 
(Interview 12, in the community)
Interviewee 12 had not re-offended since his time upon bail support, and 
linked this explicitly to the fact that he had also refrained from taking any drugs since 
that time. These factors helped to explain the fact that he received a community 
sentence159 for what had been several serious offences.
Interviewee 15 was a young person who identified alcohol and drug abuse as 
being a key factor in his offending. The robbery charge for which he had been 
placed upon the bail support scheme had been committed, by his own admission, 
while under the influence of valium and temazepam. In addition, he was already on
159 Namely a combination order, comprising a one year community rehabilitation order and a 60 hour 
community punishment order.
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bail at the time of his arrest, for other offences committed while under the influence of 
drugs:
‘The drugs workers showed me how much I could screw up my life and 
my family’s lives if I didn’t stop taking drugs ... and my mum helped me 
as well ... plus I went on a course and I realised I didn’t have to rob 
people to get money.’ (Interview 15, in the community)
As with Interview 12 above, this young person saw his drug treatment as
being one successful component in an effective bail support package. He perceived
the successful treatment as being effective in the context of family support, which he
received through being able to live at home while on bail support, and useful training.
The young person in Interview 15 was remanded to custody following breach, but did
avoid a custodial sentence -  he was sentenced to a one year community
rehabi itation order, with a curfew requirement.
The sixth and final condition mentioned by interviewees (five times) was that of
staying away from specified persons -  either co-defendants or witnesses. Only one
interviewee reported that this condition was helpful (Interview 7, discussed above
and below), citing the reason that he feared being attacked by his co-defendant.
Understanding young people’s experiences on the bail support programme: 
breach of bail support
As was apparent in the previous section, not all breaches of bail support 
conditicns were detected (as revealed in Interview 3). But breach was still an issue 
for those young people placed upon bail support, as Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show. 11 of 
the interviewees (61.1%) admitted breaches of bail support conditions. Of these, 10 
of the breaches had been detected by the YOT and prosecuted in the youth court160.
160 The eleventh, undetected breach was revealed in Interview 3, and has already been discussed.
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Five interviews reported committing the fundamental breach of committing another 
offemce while on bail support, which was then detected by police and resulted in their 
arrest:
‘It was stupid really; I stayed out past the curfew and got pissed with 
my mates, then I got arrested for being drunk/ (Interview 11, in the 
community)
7 was doing alright on bail, but then my mates talked me into taking 
valium and I stole a car with them. I was so off it I didn’t even 
remember doing it afterwards ... being sent to prison (on remand) 
really upset me, being away from my girlfriend and everything.’ 
(Interview 17, in community)
7 broke into someone’s house with my mate after I’d taken some pills.’ 
(Interview 4, in custody)
The young person from interview 11 was allowed to continue on bail support
despite the new offence of being drunk and incapable. He was sentenced to an 18
month community rehabilitation order, with curfew and tagging requirements, for the
original offence161. As shown above, the young person from Interview 17 was
remanded to custody after being breached for the new offences. He was ultimately
sentenced to a six month detention and training order, for the original and new
offences. The young person in Interview 4 was sentenced to a two year community
rehabilitation order, again with curfew and tagging requirements, after being
remanded to custody for his new offences.
The three young people interviewed here clearly linked their breaches to
alcohol and drug misuse -  although only two of them (Interviews 11 and 17) had
received treatment for substance misuse while on bail support. Three more young
people said that they were breached for failing to keep appointments with one of the
drug and alcohol agencies or education and training agencies working with them:
7 didn’t want to go to Drugwise because I’d taken some valium and I 
knew they’d grass me up anyway ... X 162 tried to get me to go but there
161 He received a one year conditional discharge for the drunkenness offence.
162 A member of the ‘old’ YOT bail team.
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was no point ... it was too much hassle, being sent to prison was easier 
... and I knew I’d get sent down anyway for what I’d done. ’ (Interview 
14, in custody)
The young person in Interview 14 was remanded in custody at his own 
request after breach. He was sentenced to three years’ youth custody for robbery. 
The young person in Interview 9 had been in prison before (on remand and after 
sentence) and made it clear in his interview that the threat of custody was not a 
deterrent for him. He was subsequently sentenced, for various offences, to a six 
month detention and training order, but felt that custody was inevitable in the 
circumstances.
Two other young people -  Interviewees 6 and 7 -  were breached because 
they failed to attend court at the correct time. Interviewee 6 said that the bail support 
programme which he was expected to complete (an ISSP programme) wqs too 
demanding for him, and that he would prefer to be remanded to custody, wbich he 
duly was following breach. He was subsequently sentenced to a six month detention 
and training order. Interview 7’s reasons for not attending court were more complex. 
They centred around frustration that his achievements on bail support had not been 
better recognised by those working with him (see earlier), and the perceived 
inevitability of custody in his situation, but also his fear of meeting his violent co- 
defencant at court. After being remanded, he was later sentenced to five years’ 
youth custody for armed robbery and vehicle theft.
The other factor in breach which was mentioned.in interviews was the failure 
to reside at the prescribed bail address. This was the case in Interview 16, where the 
young person gave a false address to the YOT when he was first granted bail 
support, and following breach, he was then granted bail support for a second time. 
He then went missing from his parents’ home for over two weeks (see earlier), was 
breached.again, and was sentenced to a 50 hour community punishment order on
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his return to court. Two days after sentence he was re-arrested, pleaded guilty and 
was sentenced to another community punishment order, this time of 20 hours’ 
duration. Five days after that he was arrested for a new offence, returned to court, 
and sentenced to a one year detention and training order.
Beyond bail: the impact of bail on sentencing
Figure 8.8 illustrates the responses to a question regarding the impact of bail 
support on subsequent events in interviewees’ lives. A young person agreed that 
being on bail support had had a positive impact on what had happened to them 
subsequently in only five interviews. This was true both in terms of the sentence 
which they had received (14 of the 17 interviewees had been sentenced) and in other 
ways. One of the three young people who were positive about the impact of bail 
support on later events was the young person in Interviews 1a and 1b (see above). 
This was so even though he subsequently received a long-term jail sentence for his 
offence:
‘Yes I think being on bail support made a difference. I know I got sent 
down but I was expecting that. I think I would have gone down for even 
longer if I hadn’t been on bail support. ’ (Interview 1 b, in custody)
This case involved a more serious offence than the other cases in which
young people were placed on bail support163. Before this charge he had only been
arrested once -  this earlier offence resulted in a caution, several years before the
charge. Others placed upon bail support were (as Chapter Four showed) mostly low
or medium gravity offenders, prosecuted for property offences rather than violence
against the person.
163 Murder, subsequently reduced to manslaughter following a guilty plea to the latter charge.
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Another young person to report that he felt bail support had made a positive
difference had subsequently received a community sentence, following an initial
remand to custody and a period spent on bail support:
‘Yeah, I think it might have helped. I’d been in prison before that. I 
didn’t get into trouble while I was on bail support. X  (‘old team’ YOT 
member) told the court I’d done alright. I remember the judge saying 
they’d give me another chance ‘cos of that .’ (Interview 3, in the 
community)
However, these comments should be read in the light of the same young
person’s comments on his experiences of bail support above:
7 did take some drugs while I was on bail, at home, like. But I was 
always in for the curfew, I wasn’t breaking that.’ (Interview 3, in the 
community)
The young person in Interview 2 had over 50 previous convictions when he
was placed upon the bail support scheme. He felt that being on bail support made
little difference to his sentence:
7 didn’t see the point. I was on the curfew but I didn’t do anything 
really. It was better hanging around with my mates, sometimes that 
was in the evenings, so I broke the curfew and got arrested again. I 
wasn’t that bothered, I didn’t mind prison ‘cos I knew people (from 
Baytown) would be there ... they’d already decided to send me back to 
prison when I got charged probably.’ (Interview 2, in custody)
Another young person interviewed spent several months on the bail support
scheme prior to being sentenced to long-term imprisonment for robbery. He also felt
as if being on bail support was a waste of time:
7 knew I was going to go to jail anyway once I pleaded guilty. I thought 
bail support would help but I didn’t get anything out of it, people didn’t 
seem interested. In the end I was too scared to go to court on my own, 
in case I saw (his co-defendant), I tried to get different people (from the 
YOT) to go with me, but no-one would, so I wasn’t there at the right 
time, then the court sent me back to prison. Even though I was on bail 
support for ages and didn’t do anything wrong, one mistake and I was 
back in ja i l ... the court would have sent me down anyway, there wasn’t 
any point ...at least if I’d stayed in prison I would have got time off my 
sentence.’ (Interview 7, in custody)
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This young person was interviewed after he had been sentenced to five years’ 
youth custody, and this probably contributed to his negativity about being on bail 
support. Nonetheless he clearly felt that the bail support scheme had done little or 
nothing to enhance his case in court (see also above). He also raised an important 
point about time spent on remand in custody, and its relationship to final sentence for 
young people -  namely the ‘discount’ given on sentences for time spent on remand 
in custody164.
The interviews revealed that some young people were also aware of this
factor, and the impact it could have on their final sentence:
‘My mate told me he hadn’t asked his solicitor to go for bail because 
he’d get time off his sentence if he stayed in custody (on remand). If 
you’re going to be going to prison anyway, you might as well do some 
of it now and a bit less later, you know what I mean?’ (Interview 2, in 
custody)
This young person was an ‘experienced campaigner’ in the youth justice 
process. Perhaps he would therefore be more likely to understand the ‘time off 
procedure than less persistent offenders -  only two other interviewees (Interviews 5 
and 9i mentioned this ‘mechanism’ in interviews. It was also unclear whether the 
young people were hearing about the rule from other young people in the youth 
justice process, defence solicitors, Crown Prosecution Service lawyers, or YOT staff.
The next section explores further the meanings attached to custody by the 
interviewees.
164 Thisview was substantively accurate, as shown by Home Office guidelines on use of youth custody: 
‘12. Under section 74(5) the court must take time spent on remand in custody into 
account in deciding what overall length of DTO term to impose; time spent on remand in 
cudody is not subsequently offset against the term set by the court...
13. When deciding the term of a DTO, the court is not required to make a precise 
calculation of remand time in custody and deduct that specific period from the term of the 
order. The expectation is that the court will reach an overall judgement about the length of 
the DTO term which it considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case, taking 
account of the time spent in custody on remand. ’ (Home Office 2000)
Cf., hovever, the findings in Chapter 4 above on the statistical relationships in this study 
betweei remands to custody and custodial sentencing.
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Understanding the meanings of custody for young people
Interviewees had previously spent time in custody, or were in custody at the
time of their interview (either on remand or as a sentenced prisoner), in 13 of the 18
interviews (72.2%). Given the discovery that some of those interviewed actually
preferred being in custody to being on bail support, understanding the meanings they
gave to prison and being in prison was a key aim of the interviews. Young people in
11 interviews (61.1%) saw prison in a ‘positive’ light:
7 don’t really mind getting sent to prison for a bit, while the case is 
going through. I’ve seen other lads get upset by it, like, but I don’t think 
it’s that bad.’ (Interview 2, in custody)
It is possible, however, that this young person’s personal experiences of youth
justice single him out as an anomaly. He had had several previous periods in prison
(on remand and after sentence), and was in custody when interviewed. It is possible
that he had become hardened to prison life, or institutionalised. He had, however,
also spent some time on the bail support scheme, and stated that being in prison was
better than being on bail support. When asked why this was, he said that:
‘Sometimes prison’s good forgetting away from what else is happening 
on the outside. You know, you’re not getting on with your family or 
your girlfriend, not sure where you can stay. It’s good being out (in the 
community), but not when you’ve got all that going on as well.’ 
(Interview 2, in custody)
Another interviewee raised a further issue relevant to the way in which young
people saw prison:
‘Prison’s good when you want to get off the drugs for a bit. Yeah, I 
know there’s drugs in prisons sometimes, if you want them, but it’s not 
the same as on the outside. In prison, I haven’t seen as much drugs 
(sic), and if you don’t want them you can stay away from people who’ve 
got them, ‘cos it’s not someone you know most of the time’. (Interview 
5, in custody)
Other sentenced interviewees also seemed sanguine about being in prison:
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‘I’ve been in prison before this. It’s not as bad as people say. I couldn’t 
do what I wanted outside anyway165. ’ (Interview 6, in custody)
‘I’m OK here. Some of my mates are in here anyway. I’m not on my 
own. ’ (Interview 14, in custody)
However, in seven of the interviews, the interviewee saw prison in a very
different way to those quoted above -  as a frightening and dangerous place, one in
which they were not only receiving little or no rehabilitative work, but also ran the risk
of physical and psychological abuse:
7 haven’t been to school for a long time, like. So they do education in 
here, but I don’t go very often, I can’t understand it.’ (Interview 4, in 
custody)
This young person had already been classified as having severe learning 
difficulties, having been raised by parents who themselves had learning difficulties, 
and had indeed not participated in mainstream education since primary school level. 
He added that:
7 do get bullied sometimes in here. Other lads do things, bad things, 
and tell the officers I did it, or try and push me into saying I did it to the 
officer.’ (Interview 4, in prison)
Others who had not been to prison were clearly frightened by the prospect of 
being sent there:
‘When I got arrested, I was already on bail for something else. My 
solicitor and the YOT worker told me I might not get bail. I was really 
scared I’d have to go there, I was scared I’d get bullied if I did. I was 
really happy I got onto bail support, I made sure I did what they told me 
to, so I wouldn’t get sent down.’ (Interview 10, in the community)
7 didn’t want to be away from my mum. I’d never been to prison. No 
way I’d want to get sent there. ’ (Interview 15, in the community)
These two interviewees were the only ones who thought of prison as a
deterrent, but had not yet experienced custody for themselves. The majority of those
expressing negative views on being in custody, therefore, had already spent time in
prison on remand.
165 This is a reference to the antisocial behaviour order and exclusion order he had been on before 
breaching it.
Understanding the meanings of bail and bail support for young people
The meanings which the young people interviewed attached to custody must
be understood in the context of the meanings which they attached to the alternative
to custodial remand -  bail, and the bail support services offered by the Baytown YOT
in particular. Eight interviews (six in prison, and two in the community), or 44.4%,
reported having instructed their solicitors not to make an application for bail:
‘Yeah, I knew X  (YOT member) was OK with offering bail support for 
me in the court, they told me that But I got my solicitor not to ask the 
court for bail, so they had to send me here basically.’ (Interview 6, in 
custody)
This occurrence obviously raises the issue of why these young people did not 
even try to make an application for bail. The young people who had not made an 
application for bail were asked why they had decided to do this. Their replies 
reflected the opinions of prison outlined above -  that it was a useful ‘safety valve’ for 
escaping from other problems in their lives -  but also reflected a negative view of bail 
support itself:
‘What’s the point of having to do all that work when I can just hang 
around in prison? They don’t make you do much in here, most of the 
time.’ (Interview 16, in custody)
‘Being on bail didn’t change anything for me. Once I’d pleaded guilty, 
for what I’d done, it wouldn’t have made any difference. And what I 
had to do didn’t help me. ’ (Interview 7, in custody)
As shown above, however, there were exceptions to this viewpoint. Interviews 
1a and 1b were conducted with a young person who had been charged with a very 
serious offence, for which he was initially remanded to custody. He had been 
charged just before his 17th birthday. When he reached the age of 17, he could no 
longer be remanded in local authority accommodation. Instead he was told that he 
would have to be sent to a YOI (YOI Stonewall). This increased his anxiety:
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‘I’d heard prison was even worse than where I’d already been. It was a 
lot further away from my family and my girlfriend as well. I started 
thinking about hurting myself, maybe even killing myself, just to get out 
of (Interview 1a, in the community)
As this young person had been classified by the Baytown YOT staff as
‘vulnerable’, a second, successful application for bail was made at a later court
appearance. When the first interview with this young person was conducted, the
young person had been living in a bail hostel for several months. As mentioned
earlier, there was no suitable bail accommodation for young people in Baytown itself
at that time. He therefore had to be sent to a hostel in a nearby town, close to where
his victim’s family lived. He was fully aware of the likelihood of custody, given the
offence which he had committed:
7 always knew I’d go to prison, but I still got a lot of help on bail 
support, from my YOT worker. I got to spend more time with my family,
I got help with benefits and stuff. I couldn’t have handled prison then, 
but I felt a lot better about it after I’d been on bail support, ‘cos I knew I 
had support behind me.’ (Interview 1b, in custody)
This young person strongly agreed that bail support was a positive experience 
for him (as described above), despite the fact that he was given a three-year 
custodial sentence. He mentioned both YOT and external agency interventions in 
positive terms.
Following the approach of the previous two qualitative data chapters, the next 
section of the chapter analyses the findings presented, and refers back to the key 
bail process outcomes described and explained in previous chapters.
Discussion and analysis of quantitative and qualitative findings
Discussion and analysis of the findings in this chapter will be organised 
according their relevance to the key outcomes in the Baytown bail process.
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Mostly systematic court decision-making under the terms of the Bail Act, but 
decreasing evidence of systematic decision-making at subsequent court 
appearances
These two key outcomes relate to magistrates’ decision-making in the bail 
process in general. They are discussed together here because the young person’s 
data did little to explain either of these outcomes. The majority of interviewees, 
however, did state that magistrates did not explain clearly how and why bail support 
had been granted in court. It was noted in Chapters Six and Seven that YOT staff 
and magistrates trusted one another’s bail decisions implicitly. In addition, in Chapter 
Seven, magistrates showed that if a YOT worker applied for bail support, there was a 
presumption that the recommendation was justified and accurate. Magistrates also 
showed a widespread lack of understanding of what bail support actually entailed for 
young people in practice, due partly to the rarity of application and referrals in the 
Baytown youth courts.
It could be, therefore, that magistrates’ failure to explain clearly what would 
happen to young people on bail support was a sign that magistrates preferred to 
distance themselves from other agencies in the youth justice process. However, 
there are other possible explanations for this occurrence. One such explanation is a 
lack of effective communication from the YOT staff about the operation of bail 
services in practice. Another, related explanation is the distance maintained by YOT 
staff from the courts, which would make it more difficult for magistrates to obtain bail 
information. In fact, taking the data from Chapters Six and Seven into account, the 
latter explanation fits the data most closely. In the context of the trust between YOT 
bail staff and the Baytown magistrates, and the rarity with which bail staff attended 
court to apply for bail support, the part-time lay magistrates would have found it
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difficult to communicate with staff about bail support and other bail services. In turn, 
this would also have made it hard for magistrates to relay information to young 
people in court.
The lack of communication, and resultant maximisation of YOT remand staff 
discretion over bail information and decisions, is also (as noted in earlier chapters) a 
convincing explanation for the decline in systematic court decision-making at later 
stages of the bail process. The recent emergence of bail information schemes in 
England and Wales was driven by magistrates’ inconsistency in decision-making, 
due to a lack of up-to-date bail information (Morgan and Henderson 1998).
Social significance of remands to custody
The data revealed the meanings which the interviewees attached to prison, 
and to being remanded to custody. The young people showed a wide range of 
opinions on this subject. Around half of them, however, stated that the idea of being 
remanded to custody did not deter or intimidate them. The opinions of those who 
had been to prison and admitting to finding it an unpleasant experience166 should not 
be discounted. Nevertheless, there was evidence that, for some of those 
interviewed, the prospect of being denied bail and remanded to custody did not act 
as any kind of deterrent or disincentive, nor did it hold any particular fears for these 
young people.
These data contrast with those from YOT staff and magistrates in the previous 
two chapters. Both of these groups, on the basis of the research evidence, believed 
that custody acted as a deterrent for young people in Baytown. This assumption 
underpinned local youth justice agency discourse. One example was the YOT staffs
166 Or who had not been so remanded, but had been deterred by the threat of custody.
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policy of not applying for bail support at initial appearances in court, on the ground 
that a short period spent on remand in custody would encourage young people to 
show remorse for their offence, as well as demonstrating suitability for an application 
for bail (or not doing so). Magistrates, similarly, regarded prison as a punishment 
and a deterrent for young people.
The young people for whom remand to the secure estate was preferable to 
release on bail support attached a variety of meanings to prison. These meanings 
ranged from seeing the prison as a detoxification facility, through seeing it as a 
chance to be reunited with peers, to seeing it as a means of escaping social 
problems on the ‘outside’. These findings were accompanied, in the research 
evidence, by data showing that interviewees sometimes asked their solicitors not to 
make an application for bail, so that these young people were effectively remanded 
at their own request. There was also dissatisfaction with the conditions of bail 
support, and pessimism about the difference bail support made in sentencing terms, 
on the part of some of those interviewed.
Taken together, the data provides a possible explanation for the lack of clear 
relationships between remand to custody and other key variables, such as 
persistency and seriousness of offending, in the Baytown bail process, as shown in 
Chapters Four and Five above. Some young people did not instruct their solicitors to 
make an application for bail. This action removed the discretion of YOT staff to 
recommend bail, and the discretion of magistrates to grant it. Such failures to apply 
for bail had the ability to ‘disconnect’ bail decisions from the criteria for denying bail in 
the 1976 Bail Act.
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The rarity of bail support referrals
The data provided several possible interlinked explanations for this outcome. 
The explanations emphasised the key role of young people in instructing their legal 
representatives to make applications for bail, before the YOT workers had the 
opportunity to consider the value of applying for bail support in court.
One explanation was the perceived lack of credibility for bail support among 
those interviewed. Few of the young people believed that the conditions imposed as 
part of their bail support package were effective, in terms of either meeting their 
social needs or of keeping them out of trouble. This lack of credibility was 
compounded by the ambivalent position of custody in young persons’ discourse. 
Some interviewees compared the demands of bail support unfavourably with the 
demands of prison life (see above). Others instructed their solicitors not to make 
applications for bail, not only because of the perceived advantages of prison, but also 
because of their belief that they would be sentenced to custody, and therefore 
wished to do some of their time now rather than doing all of it later. These factors 
were linked with one another to form a negative bail support discourse. This 
discourse then gained strength from the diverse meanings attached to custody by the 
interviewees.
Data not only highlighted the role played by young people in deciding whether 
or not to make an application for bail, but also provided evidence of the importance of 
staff attitudes towards bail support in Baytown. In particular, the positive response to 
bail support, in terms of services provided by YOT staff and external agencies, by 
Interviewee 1 pointed to the role of individual staff discretion in making bail decisions. 
This young person was the only interviewee to be allocated to a member of the ‘new’ 
YOT team (see Chapter Six) while on bail support. Although data derived from the
two interviews conducted with this young person are not representative, it is still 
striking that Interviewee 1 was the only interviewee to make entirely positive 
comments about his experiences on the bail support programme. Others, all of 
whom were allocated to the ‘old’ team members, were positive about some aspects 
of bail support (education and training in particular). However, all of the interviewees 
agreed that being on the programme had not met their social needs in at least one 
respect.
It is therefore unfortunate that this argument could not be tested further by 
gauging the opinions of others who had been allocated to ‘new’ members of the 
team. Nonetheless, given the clear differences in attitudes towards proactive bail 
support between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff (see Chapter Six), the evidence from 
Interviewee 1 provides further support, not only for the existence of wide discretion at 
the micro-level of the bail process, but also for the importance of the way in which 
discretion was used for the effective operation of that process, especially from young 
people’s points of view.
While the data could not provide conclusive support for the evidence of 
contrasts in attitudes towards bail services between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff, they 
| provided evidence for an explanation put forward for the rarity of bail support referrals 
I in Chapter Six. This was that ‘old’ staff members were reactive and cautious in terms 
of advocating bail interventions, and were able to overcome the ‘new’ staffs 
| resistance to these policies through their local contacts and power in Baytown youth 
j  justice. The ‘old team’ senior practitioner allocated bail support cases as they arose,
; and all except Interviewee 1 had been allocated to one of the ‘old’ team members. 
This evidence can be contrasted with the finding, discussed in this chapter, that a 
majority of those interviewed did not believe that bail support had been helpful to
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them, either in the wider context of assisting their social needs, or in the narrower 
context of helping to prevent re-offending.
It is also interesting, in this regard, to re-emphasise that the case which 
produced the most positive young persons’ feedback on the perceived effectiveness 
of bail support work was the only bail support case which was allocated to a ‘new’ 
team member. This was also a case involving a more serious offence than other bail 
support cases. The ‘old’ team members expressed serious doubts over the likely 
success of an application for bail support for Interviewee 1, and over the likelihood of 
bail support making any practical difference to the sentencing outcome of the case. 
Indeed, the sentencing outcome was long-term custody here. Yet the young person 
was still entirely positive about bail support and its effects. This case points to 
another possible explanation for the rarity of bail support referrals -  a failure on the 
part of the ‘old’ YOT staff to understand the wider social significance of bail support 
(and, for that matter, prison) for young people, and a restriction of staff discourse to 
short-term issues, such as sentencing outcome. It is not suggested, in making this 
comment, that these short-term issues should not have been taken seriously by the 
staff -  merely that the whole range of young people’s opinions towards bail and jail 
should have been more fully considered.
Discretion, lack of communication, and the management of conflict out of the process
The use of discretion to manage conflict out of the bail decision-making 
process in Baytown youth justice was illustrated by the data in Chapter Six above. 
Examples of its presence have also been given previously in this analytical section. 
These include the differences in the interviewees’ opinions on the usefulness of 
interventions by ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff members.
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Further evidence can be found when all of the data in this chapter are 
analysed. Young people reported breakdowns in communication between YOT staff 
and external agencies responsible for running services offered as part of bail support 
packages. Interviewees reported activities with drugs and alcohol, education and 
accommodation agencies which YOT staff were not made aware of. These 
breakdowns were both ‘positive’ (failure to communicate drug use in breach of bail 
conditions) and ‘negative’ (failure to communicate a young person’s successes in 
education or training) in the eyes of young people. Both types, however, contributed 
to the lack of bail support’s legitimacy in the eyes of some of those referred onto it.
The importance of communication was intensified by the interviewees’ 
perception of bail support as a package of intervention, rather than as a series of 
separate measures. This perception is reinforced by the variable levels of young
!
people’s satisfaction with different elements of the package, contrasted with the low 
level of satisfaction with ‘bail support’ in general, and the lack of confidence that bail 
support would make a difference to interviewees’ lives in the long-term. This
I suggests that a lack of satisfaction with one element of bail support damaged overall 
satisfaction with the whole package as well. The YOT staff were seen as facilitators 
in the comprising of each package, and so the lack of communication between YOT 
staff and other agencies had wider effects on the legitimacy of bail support in young 
people’s discourse generally. The data in Chapter Six confirmed that YOT staff were 
aware of communication and co-operation problems167, but did not wish to draw 
attention to inter-agency conflict, and thereby risk reducing their own power and 
discretion. The data in this chapter illustrate the effects of this discretion, and the 
ways in which it was exercised, on young people’s ‘bail’ and ‘jail’ discourses.
167 E.g. vagaries in police practice on ‘spot-checking’ observation of bail conditions.
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Conclusions
This chapter has discussed and analysed the views on bail, and remand to 
custody, by young people who were referred onto the Baytown YOT’s bail support 
scheme. It has highlighted the variation in meanings attached to both ‘bail’ and ‘jail’ 
by young people on bail support. While some young people shared the YOT staff’s 
and Baytown magistrates’ view that remand to custody was an effective deterrent, a 
greater number showed a preference for being in custody over having to comply with 
a package of interventions and conditions on bail support.
There was a range of interconnecting reasons behind this finding. The 
negative discourse on bail support was partially explained by legal processes, such 
as the belief in deduction of time spent on remand from custodial sentences. But it 
was also explained by ‘old’ YOT staffs lack of communication with other agencies 
involving in bail support packages, especially regarding young persons’ continuing 
rate of progress on bail support. Further explanation lay in the positive image of 
custody in the minds of many interviewees, in terms of stable accommodation, a 
means of reuniting with friends, or a way of escaping from social pressures on the 
‘outside’, against which the attractions of bail support struggled to compete -  
although given the high rate of long-term social needs reported by interviewees, this 
effect was perhaps to be expected. Staff themselves shared young persons’ view of 
bail support as a short-term ‘sticking plaster’ over longer-term social damage, whose 
effects were necessarily limited.
Nonetheless, staff caution and negativity in exercising discretion over the 
operation of bail services went further than an acknowledgement of the necessarily 
short-term solutions offered to criminogenic needs. Discretion, and the way in which 
it was used, was characterised by breakdowns in inter-agency communication, and
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an unwillingness on the part of the ‘old’ staff to become too involved in bail support 
interventions. While the chapter has highlighted the discretion of young people 
themselves in bail decision-making -  choosing whether or not to make an application 
for bail, for example -  it has also shown that the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of youth justice 
agencies’ discretion in the bail process shaped the active role played by young 
people, and contributed to the rarity of bail support per se, and also, more 
particularly, of its success in the eyes of young people.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusions: towards more effective bail policy and 
practice for young people
Introduction
In the final chapter of the study, the results and analysis of the research will be 
summarised. The chapter will also compare these with the hypotheses put forward 
earlier in the study. In line with the critical realist approach to methodology (see 
Chapter Three), this will involve outlining the mechanisms found to generate the 
structural outcomes of the Baytown youth justice bail process, which were discussed 
and analysed in Chapters Four and Five.
However, as Bhaskar (1989) has pointed out, what separates critical realism 
from other forms of realist social research is its evaluative and normative dimension. 
This chapter will therefore move beyond a straightforward summary of findings. In 
line with the grounded theory approach to exploratory study, as used in conjunction
I
with a critical realist case study model used in this research, the chapter will also 
consider the wider implications of the research findings for the different levels of the 
youth justice bail process, locally (in Baytown) and nationally. The aim here is not 
only to understand bail policy and practice at micro, mezzo and macro levels of that 
process, but also to suggest ways in which policy and practice might be improved in 
the future.
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Outcomes and explanations
The systematic nature of bail decision-making in Baytown
The analysis of the quantitative data in Chapter Four revealed statistically 
significant relationships between bail decision-making outcomes and factors relevant 
to these decisions under the 1976 Bail Act. The available quantitative information 
could not be used to cover all of the grounds for restricting or denying bail, as 
contained in the Act (see also Chapter Three for discussion). Of the three key 
grounds for restricting or denying bail in the Act -  likelihood of re-offending if 
released on bail, likelihood of failing to surrender to bail, and likelihood of interference 
with the course of justice -  only the first two could be examined using the available 
information. Since court records were not accessible for the purposes of the study, it 
was also not possible to determine on which ground or grounds bail was restricted or 
denied.
What was possible to determine, however, was the existence of reasons 
potentially justifying these grounds. These reasons included current bail status (at 
time of arrest), type of offence, seriousness of offence, age, gender, and persistency 
of offending (in terms of re-arrest during the bail period). These factors were 
compared with bail and sentencing outcomes at court. It would have been 
impossible to analyse every possible reason using the data available. It was 
possible, however, to include analysis of key decision-making factors, particularly 
those relating to the offence committed, which have been shown to be key influences 
on bail decision-making in previous research (e.g. Hucklesby 1996, 1997a).
Using the available data, there was some supporting evidence for the 
systematic nature of initial court decisions. Males -  who were more likely to have
committed serious offences -  were also more likely to have their right to bail 
restricted or denied. Offences which posed a threat to the safety of the public (such 
as violence) or a potential threat (vehicle theft) were more likely to have bail restricted 
or denied, and the most serious offences (rated 8) were the most likely to be the 
subject of a remand to custody (although the relationship between age and bail 
decision at this point was unclear, despite the apparently significant relationship 
between them). However, statistical significance was less frequently found for 
relationships between factors and decisions made at subsequent appearances. 
Indeed, the number of significant relationships decreased as the number of changes 
in bail status increased.
There were therefore two linked outcomes from this part of the analysis -  
systematic decision-making at the start of the court bail process, and the apparent 
decrease in systematic decision-making as the bail process continued -  which both 
required explanation through the qualitative data in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. 
The key explanation for these outcomes was the high level of trust between the 
different agencies involved in decision-making. In particular, the data revealed a 
generally mutual trust between the YOT bail staff and the magistrates of the Baytown 
Youth Court, in terms of their respective abilities to make fair and appropriate bail 
decisions, using their own discretion within the framework of legislation and 
guidelines. Both sides tended to blame any shortcomings in bail services locally on 
macro-level failings, such as insufficient funding, rather than on inadequate services 
at the micro-level of the bail process.
However, this trust was a double-edged sword. As the bail process continued, 
and case circumstances changed, both YOT staff and magistrates felt unable to 
respond proactively to opportunities for review of earlier decision-making. The YOT 
staff trusted the magistrates’ initial decisions to such an extent that they rarely saw
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the need to challenge these decisions by offering bail alternatives at later court 
appearances. This was so despite the scope for making two applications for bail in 
each case (even where bail had initially been denied).
The magistrates, on the other hand, felt restricted by initial bail decisions in 
court -  whether these decisions had been made by themselves or by other 
magistrates. They often portrayed themselves in interviews as being bound by the 
advice given to them, by YOT staff and others. They expressed opinions about youth 
justice bail policy, but also claimed not to know enough about what went on locally in 
terms of bail policy and practice to make judgments about the effectiveness of that 
policy and practice. In particular, as so few of them had had any involvement with 
the Baytown YOT’s bail support scheme, most magistrates interviewed had little idea 
about what the scheme involved, or how well it worked in practice.
Similarly, magistrates were happy to endorse YOT staff recommendations 
about restriction and denial of bail in each case. The high level of trust between 
magistrates and other local youth justice agencies, then, ensured that although 
decisions were made effectively in the early stages of the bail process in Baytown, 
the effectiveness of decisions declined as the process continued. This trust, 
particularly shown by magistrates in the ‘old’ Baytown bail team (whom they knew 
well), led to decisions remaining unchallenged and not discussed as the bail process 
continued. It robbed the Baytown bail process of its flexibility and proactive stance. 
This ‘cosiness’ between those who knew one another in the decision-making process 
also belied the lack of communication about local policy and practice between YOT 
staff and others, particularly magistrates.
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The ambiguous social significance of remand to custody in the context of the bail 
process and sentencing
This outcome was related to the one discussed in the previous section. There 
was a statistically significant relationship between remands to custody for initial court 
appearances and custodial sentences, as a denial of bail at this point was more likely 
to lead to a custodial sentence being imposed than to a community sentence. This 
statistical link underlined the importance of bail decision-making to subsequent 
sentencing. However, the links between remand to custody and likelihood of 
custodial sentence weakened as cases progressed through the bail process. This 
showed that discretion in the Baytown bail decision-making process led to more 
inconsistent results at subsequent appearances in court.
Participation observation data derived from the Baytown YOT staffs ‘old’ team 
illustrated their belief that a ‘taste of prison’ on remand (to borrow King and Morgan’s 
(1976) terminology) acted as an effective deterrent for young people. Indeed, this
I
i belief was a cornerstone of their bail policy and practice in general. On the rare 
; occasions when a bail support application was made168, YOT staff preferred to apply 
for bail support at a young person’s subsequent appearance in court. In this way, the 
‘old’ team believed169, young people would be encouraged to show remorse for what 
they had allegedly done.
The ‘old’ team norm of reactive bail services was reinforced by magistrates’ 
actions. As explained above, despite the lack of inter-agency communication and 
knowledge about local bail services, magistrates were mostly content with the
168 And it is important to reiterate at this point that the rarity of referrals onto bail support was not 
attributable to the Baytown courts rejecting YOT staff applications, but rather to Baytown YOT staff 
choosing not to make such applications in the first place.
169 It was the ‘old’ team who were responsible for all but one of the bail support applications made 
during the study period -  see Chapters Six and Eight for details.
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standard of YOT services. On closer examination of the magistrates’ data, however, 
they were really expressing their trust and contentment in the ‘old’ YOT team -  the 
staff they knew and with whom they felt comfortable. The staff of the ‘new’ YOT team 
were not mentioned by magistrates during interviews. Indeed, there was little need 
for magistrates to mention the ‘new’ staff, who had been appointed to the Baytown 
YOT to take responsibility for the expanded, macro-level funded bail support scheme. 
Due to the rarity of bail support referrals, and the power given to the ‘old’ staff by their 
local experience and inter-agency contacts, the ‘new’ staff eventually left the team, 
unable to influence policy and practice with their (proactive) views. In this way, the 
‘familiar faces’ of the Baytown YOT bail process were able to maintain their 
discretion, and the norms of their preferred policy and practice.
Interviews with young people who had been or were on the Baytown YOT’s 
bail support scheme provided further explanations for the ambiguous significance of 
remands to custody. Although some interviewees thought of prison as a deterrent to 
breaching bail conditions, an equal number attached other, very different meanings 
to custody. These alternative meanings included perceptions of prison as a 
detoxification facility, as a means of meeting up with peers, or simply as a means of 
escaping social problems on the ‘outside’. It was also the young persons interviewed 
who revealed that they sometimes instructed their legal representatives not to make 
an application for bail, because prison was seen to be less demanding than
j
community alternatives, such as conditional bail or (particularly) bail support.
Given that some interviews were conducted in prison, allowance must be 
; made for bravado and exaggeration in interviewees’ positive attitudes towards 
custody. Nonetheless, the data revealed a variety of meanings attached to being 
remanded in custody by the young people who had had experienced bail support, 
and there was also evidence that bail was sometimes compared unfavourably with
306
custody by young people. Given that their consent was required for any bail 
application170, the contrast between the meanings attached to custody by young 
people and the meanings attached to it by YOT staff and magistrates aided in 
explaining the inconsistent significance of remands to custody in the Baytown bail 
process. This also reiterated the lack of communication within the process. YOT 
staff and magistrates showed no understanding of the range of meanings attached to 
prison by young people locally. The failure to acknowledge this range of meanings 
restricted the effectiveness of local policy and practice, as well as restricting the 
impact of bail support in particular. The latter issue is discussed in more detail in the 
following section.
The rarity of bail support referrals
A striking feature of the findings in Chapter Four and their discussion in 
Chapter Five was how little the Baytown YOT’s bail support services were used in 
practice No significant relationships could be found in Chapters Four and Five, 
moreover, between persistence or seriousness of offending and referral onto the 
Baytowr bail support scheme. It also became clear that the small number of bail 
support referrals was not due to the courts rejecting the majority of applications for 
bail support by the Baytown YOT staff. Chapters Five and Six showed that it was 
due to the small number of applications for bail support by the staff themselves.
SDme explanations for the rarity (and inconsistency) of bail support referrals 
have already been given in the preceding sections of this chapter. Magistrates, for 
example, were not encouraged to use bail support by regular provision of information 
from YOT staff (see Chapter Seven). They knew very little about bail support locally
170 And for bail support work in particular.
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as a result, and in any case trusted YOT staff decisions -  so that the rarity of YOT 
staff applications for bail support went unchallenged.
Young people, on the other hand, saw bail support as being a demanding (or 
over-demanding) option, which was not necessarily worth being released from 
custody. In interviews young people spoke of the wider social problems which they 
saw as playing a part in their offending, such as exclusion from mainstream 
education without any viable alternative, alcohol and drug abuse, and 
accommodation problems. They highlighted the problem of only receiving help with 
these problems after they had entered the criminal justice process -  the criminalising 
of social policy rather than the socialising of criminal policy (Drakeford and Vanstone 
2000). It was the struggle to adapt to the intensive intervention of bail support -  
moving from too little intervention in their lives to (as they saw it) too much -  which 
was a key factor in their preferences of some interviewees for custody over bail.
However, a third key explanation for the rarity of bail support referrals, and the 
reactive bail strategy employed generally in Baytown, was the use of discretion within 
the Baytown YOT’s bail team. Hucklesby (1996, 1997a, 1997b) has explained the 
role of ‘court culture’ in bail decision-making. In this study, there was clear evidence 
of a comparable ‘YOT culture’, or rather of competing YOT cultures, in the youth 
justice bail decision-making process.
The two ‘old’ team members’ practice norms were reactivity, the ‘protection of 
the public’, and a belief that their expertise and experience placed them in a better 
position than ‘outsiders’ (at every level of the youth justice process) to make 
appropriate risk assessments and other decisions about young people’s bail status. 
These norms had been shaped by the history of bail service provisions for young 
people in the Baytown area before the ‘old’ team members’ arrival on the team. Bail 
support at that time had been badly targeted, contributing to a sharp rise on the
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numbers of young people remanded to custody. This, in turn, led to the ‘old’ team’s 
mistrust of proactive bail services generally. Their mistrust was intensified by what 
they saw as imposition of bail service standards from the ‘macro level’ following the 
1998 Crime and Disorder Act’s introductory of mandatory bail support provision 
across England and Wales. Interestingly, in the context of the previous discussion in 
this chapter, the main stated reason for the suspicion towards macro-level 
intervention171 was the lack of communication between the macro-level and local bail 
workers, who had had previous experience of bail service provision, before the 
imposition of the 1998 legislation and later national standards and guidelines.
The two ‘new’ team members were more proactive in their attitudes towards 
bail service provision for young people. They saw young people as children first and 
offenders second, and were willing to work with ‘outsiders’ (inside and outside the 
YOT) to provide a range of services aimed at supporting (as well as supervising) 
young people on bail. They had none of the ‘old’ team’s negative experiences of bail 
services for young people. Whereas the ‘old’ team’s experience lay almost entirely in 
the area of social work with young people (inside and outside criminal justice), the 
new team’s backgrounds were in probation and the police. Although both of these 
organisations had undergone processes of centralisation and increased macro-level 
control over micro-level practice172, just as the ‘old’ team had one in their role as 
youth justice workers, the ‘new’ team had not been discouraged from exercising 
discretion proactively. It was the experience of misapplied bail services in the 
specific Baytown youth justice context which made the difference between the 
negative norms of the ‘old’ team, and the more positive norms of the ‘new’ team.
171 Apart from the argument that the team members had sufficient expertise and experience to make 
decisions without assistance.
172 See e.g. Raynor (2002) on centralisation in probation, and Reiner (2000) on centralisation in the 
police.
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There were therefore clear differences in the norms of the competing YOT 
cultures. However, during the study period, it was clearly the ‘old’ culture which 
prevailed. It was reinforced by the familiarity of the ‘old’ team to those working 
alongside them in the youth justice bail process. Examples of this familiarity arising 
from the data would be defence solicitors (only two of the many firms in Baytown 
were recommended by the ‘old’ team to young people in the police station), 
magistrates (who only mentioned the ‘old’ team when discussing the operation of the 
bail process locally), and young people on bail (only one of whom mentioned a ‘new’ 
team member in interviews -  since only one bail support case was allocated to a 
‘new’ team member during the study period). All of these groups knew the ‘old’ team, 
and generally trusted the ‘old’ team’s judgment in the Baytown bail process.
In this way, the ‘old’ team’s values (including mistrust of proactive, intensive 
bail services) were reproduced. This trust was evident despite the clear lack of 
communication between the YOT ‘old’ team and other agencies involved in the 
process (see earlier). The lack of communication was as evident within the YOT 
itself as it was outside the team(s). There was no observable conflict between the 
competing cultures, and related issues were rarely, if ever, discussed at team 
meetings. Instead, the ‘new’ team members became increasingly frustrated as their 
concerns were kept off the micro-level policy and practice agenda. Eventually, both 
of the ‘new’ team members left, further strengthening the norms of the ‘old’ YOT 
culture, and relegating services targeted at young people on bail to the margins of 
local practice.
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Re-examining the research hypotheses in the light of the research findings
The research hypotheses set out at the end of Chapter Three above were only 
partially supported. Hypothesis a) claimed that youth justice bail processes in 
England and Wales operate unsystematically. In fact, in the Baytown context, there 
was systematic bail practice. Court bail decisions were made systematically (on the 
basis of the reasons and grounds for denying bail which could be tested) in the early 
stages of the process -  although evidence of the systematic nature of decisions 
decreased as the bail process continued. There was also a high level of inter-agency 
trust locally, which over time had coalesced into a set of norms (Hucklesby 1997b). 
Here, then, there was an ‘anti-system’, based on inter-agency trust without 
communication, and the preservation of the discretion held by local ‘experts’.
Hypothesis b) claimed that macro-level rhetoric in the youth justice bail arena 
did not reflect micro-level policy and practice. This hypothesis was mostly supported 
on the basis of the data, although not entirely. The ‘old’ YOT team displayed 
consistent and extreme hostility towards the structured guidelines and monitoring 
processes ‘imposed’ by the macro-level of the youth justice process after 1998. They 
made any effort to resist the efforts of others (i.e. the ‘new’ team, and the mezzo level 
of the Baytown YOT) to secure greater compliance with national standards on youth 
justice bail and bail support. They were also able to use their local contacts, trust 
and reputation for expertise to exclude challenges to their norms and practice, 
thereby subduing resistance to their culture.
Nonetheless, as Chapter Six showed, the ‘old’ team did not feel able to resist 
macro-level guidelines and accompanying bureaucracy completely. They paid lip
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service to the guidelines173, complying with bureaucracy to what they judged was the 
minimum extent necessary to ‘get away with it’. For example, some forms, such as 
the Bail ASSET form which had to be completed in every case where a bail decision 
had to be made, were partially completed at the time of bail investigation by the 
team, and then returned to (if at all) later when returns or figures had to be supplied 
to the Youth Justice Board. National standards were dealt with in superficial terms in 
YOT paperwork and discussions.
However, the ‘old’ team was able to find justifications, or ‘techniques of 
neutralisation’ (Sykes and Matza 1957) for their reactive, cautious policies in the 
context of the national standards and bureaucracy. They were able to claim, for 
example, that bail support was considered as an option in every case where the 
young person involved was at risk of being denied bail. But, in reality, decisions on 
bail support were made according to the micro-norms of the ‘old’ team’s culture. 
These norms included the ‘history’ and knowledge of the ‘old’ team’s claimed 
decision-making expertise -  such as knowledge of which young people would 
respond to bail support, on the basis of their previous behaviour. Therefore, it would 
be wrong to claim that macro policies and rhetoric had no effect at all on micro-level 
policy. Those policies’ effects were, however, confined to the surface of local policy 
and practice, and had little impact on the substance of day-to-day practice in 
Baytown.
The next section of the chapter attempts to contextualise the study’s findings, 
with the aim of a better theoretical understanding of day-to-day youth justice bail 
policy and practice.
173 E.g. those requiring that bail support be considered as an option in every case where there was a 
risk of bail being denied.
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Making sense of the findings: decision-making, discretion and managing 
conflict out of the ‘system’
Decision-making and the meaning of discretion
The key mechanism for the explanation of the outcomes and hypotheses 
generated by the research, in the context of youth justice in Baytown, was the 
existence and usage of discretion at the local micro-level of the youth justice bail 
process. This section will therefore relate the research findings to other theoretical 
perspectives on organisational decision-making and the use of discretion. The aim 
here is to contextualise the findings, before considering how the youth justice 
process -  at all levels -  could provide more effective bail decision-making for young 
people.
Gelsthorpe and Padfield (2003), in their overview of the issues surrounding
the operation of discretion in criminal justice, define discretion as:
The freedom, power, authority, decision or leeway of an official, 
organisation or individual to decide, discern or determine to make a 
judgment, choice or decision, about alternative courses of action or 
inaction.’ (GeIsthorpe and Padfield 2003: 3)
Clearly discretion involves the power to use decision-making and judgment in 
the exercise of duties within the criminal justice process. Debates in the field of 
political theory about the nature of power aid a better understanding of the nature of 
‘power through discretion’. They emphasise the divergent conceptualisations of 
power which have been put forward by different commentators. Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962, 1970), for example, advocate a multi-tiered approach to researching 
and understanding the nature of power. They argue not only for investigating the
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exercise of power in particular social contexts174, but also for investigating the
‘dynamics of decision-making’:
‘(T)hat is, (the researcher) would examine the extent to which and the 
manner in which the status quo oriented persons and groups influence 
those community values and those political institutions ... which tend to 
limit the scope of actual decision-making to “safe” issues. ’ (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1962: 952)
This approach provides a framework for understanding not only the decision­
making process, but also the non-decision-making process. It shows how powerful 
individuals and agencies can dictate the course of decision-making processes:
‘By this process, the dominant party denies that the particular issue 
raised by the opposition merits serious consideration. The issue is 
considered, the conflict recognised, but only at a superficial level.’ 
(Brogden 1977: 414)
However, others have criticised Bachrach and Baratz’s understanding of
power. Lukes (1974), for example, argues that their theory is too individualist, and
wrongly associates power only with conflict that can be clearly observed:
‘This is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious 
use of power is to prevent such conflict arising in the first place. ’ (Lukes 
1974: 23)
Lukes extends the idea of non-decision-making beyond the concept of the
powerful as gatekeepers to the decision process, to cover the scenario where conflict
is latent and unspecified, but still exists (Brogden 1977):
To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus 
is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by 
definitional fiat.’ (Lukes 1974: 24)
This view is clearly influenced by Marxism, and is concerned with emphasising 
the structural factors which shape the nature and effectiveness of power. As such, 
this view of power as a structural property resource runs the risk of denying individual
174 I.e. the values and rules by which power is exercised, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged 
by this ‘bias’.
314
agency in decision-making. Such a structural approach would contradict a key 
finding of the evidence here -  namely that of the amount of discretion enjoyed by 
individuals in the Baytown youth justice bail process, even at the micro-level.
Both of these approaches have strengths and weaknesses. It is submitted, 
however, that theories of power can and should strike the balance between individual 
agency and structural power175. This involves considering both the macro and micro 
levels of decision-making processes, the structure of social phenomena and the 
meanings and attitudes attached to those living and working within them, as this 
study has done.
A realistic approach to bail services must take into account the fact that a 
great deal of discretion still exists, and must continue to exist, in the criminal justice 
process. Taking this view does not preclude accepting that one part of criminal 
justice necessarily leads into another, such as the way in which the bail process 
leads onto the sentencing stage. It does, however, involve the argument that there is 
not, and arguably cannot be, an overall aim shared by every part of the criminal 
justice process, and therefore that conflict and inconsistency are ‘built-in’ parts of 
criminal justice (Bottomley 1973: 225; Hawkins 2003: 204). The trend towards 
centralisation and managerialism in macro-level youth justice bail policy, and the 
introduction of one over-arching (but vague) statutory aim (the prevention of youth 
offending) for the whole youth justice process in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
should not overlook the continuing presence of wide-ranging discretion at micro-level. 
This study has indicated the presence of such discretion. The next subsection will 
explore the type of power and discretion present in the Baytown youth justice bail 
process, and the way in which discretion was used.
175 Just as realism has attempted to take both social structures and individual decisions into account in 
the field of criminology. See e.g. Young (2004).
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How was discretion used in Baytown?
Although the existence of micro-level discretion in the Baytown process was 
clearly proved, the concept of discretion itself must be now be problematised. The 
literature reveals a variety of types of discretion in the legal context. Galligan (1986), 
for example, identifies three aspects of legal discretion, focusing specifically upon 
judicial decision-making: discretion when the legal rules appear to be unclear or 
incomplete; discretion to change existing legal doctrine; and discretion as to the 
exercise of delegated powers given expressly by statutes or regulation, or by 
accepted doctrines of the common law. Galligan particularly focuses upon the role of 
discretion as a degree of autonomy, given to lower levels of the judicial process by 
higher courts, as to how settled but open-textured standards should be applied in 
particular cases (Galligan 1986: 45; O’Grady 2004). While Galligan is discussing 
common-law judicial discretion here, similar analysis could be applied to the youth 
justice bail context. Chapters Five and Seven illustrated how the flexible ‘standards’ 
of the 1976 Bail Act, in terms of exceptions to the right of bail, allows magistrates to 
take the circumstances of each case -  and non-statutory considerations -  into 
account when making decisions in individual cases.
Schneider (1992: 61-6; summarised in Gelsthorpe and Padfield 2003: 16), by 
contrast, identifies four kinds of discretion in the legal context. These are ‘khadi 
discretion’ (an individual making decisions about other individuals on the basis of 
legal, political and other factors), ‘rule-failure discretion’ (discretionary authority 
activated when cases defy existing classification), ‘rule-building discretion’ (granted 
with the aim of developing better practice through the use of discretion), and ‘rule- 
compromise discretion’ (involving compromise where there is conflict over which 
rules are appropriate). In making these distinctions, Schneider highlights the role
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played by informal (non-legal) as well as formal (legal) factors in exercising discretion 
in practice (see also Hawkins 1992).
In the context of the current study, Government discourse on youth justice has 
anticipated that, where discretion at the micro-level is used, it should be of 
Schneider’s ‘rule-failure’ type (to be used where cases cannot be fitted into 
prescribed decision-making outcome categories) where necessary, but mainly of the 
‘rule-building’ type (to fit in with the Youth Justice Board’s designated role of 
disseminating good local practice). The great increase in macro-level managerialism, 
prescription and monitoring in relation to the micro-level indicates that discretion is 
not part of the Government discourse on youth justice. It does not fit in with ideas of 
efficiency, economy and ‘toughness on crime’, the goals of punitive managerialism 
(Cavadino, Crow and Dignan 1999). This has hidden the continuing key role played 
by discretion in the youth justice bail process.
The study revealed both ‘rule failure’ and ‘rule-building’ varieties of discretion 
in the Baytown courts, within the flexible boundaries of the law on bail, as contained 
in the 1976 Bail Act. In the Baytown YOT, these types of discretion were also used. 
However, ‘old’ team YOT decisions also resembled ‘khadi discretion’ at times. A 
mixture of legal, non-legal and historical factors were applied to each case by the 
‘old’ team in making decisions on whether or not to recommend bail. This mixture 
was then endorsed by the courts in their own bail decisions, because of the high level 
of trust between the courts and the ‘old’ team.
Crucially, however, discretion was used by the YOT (and therefore implicitly by 
the courts as well), not only in making decisions, but also in not making decisions, or 
in excluding discussion of certain issues from the bail decision-making agenda. The 
main mechanism explaining these outcomes was a desire to manage inter-agency 
and inter-individual conflict out of the youth justice process. This reflects the theories
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of Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1970) on the exercise of power in decision-making. 
The management of conflict out of the process was shown particularly in the results 
and discussion in Chapters Six and Seven. The participant observation of YOT staff 
bail practice showed that a key reason for a reactive approach to bail management, 
aside from micro-level management, was resistance against what was seen as 
unjustified macro-level interference in micro-level practice, and unnecessary macro­
level attempts at restriction of micro-level discretion. Even the aim of ‘time and 
money’ efficiency was driven by micro-level needs (lack of time, limited local budgets) 
more than macro-level policy -  it was simply that, on this particular issue, the macro 
and micro level agendas had a common goal.
In fact, through superficially complying with macro level constructs of 
‘efficiency’, micro-level practice, at the YOT and in the courts, was able to maintain 
and even enhance its discretion. Again, the lack of principled youth justice aims, 
beyond ‘preventing offending’, allowed this to happen, and in particular allowed 
punitivism, deterrence and ‘protection of the public’ to be used as valid micro level 
aims -  aims that were in any case in tune with much of the macro-level discourse 
about ‘getting tough’ with young people in the criminal justice process.
Management of conflict out of the process also occurred within the YOT bail 
team itself. Its presence can be seen particularly in the divergent approaches to bail 
intervention taken by the ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the YOT bail team. The 
entrenched decision-making techniques of the ‘old’ team, and their credibility and 
reputation within the Baytown youth justice process, allowed their reactive, non- 
interventionist ideology to prevail over the more proactive approach favoured by the 
’new’ team. This happened to such an extent, and the ‘new’ team became so 
disillusioned and demoralised, that they eventually left the team, therefore further 
reinforcing the ‘old’ team’s power to exercise serial discretion over bail decisions.
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Discretion therefore operated to allow the ‘old’ team to make individualised, ad hoc 
bail decisions, by-passing ‘new’ members of the bail team who had a genuine desire 
to do proactive work with young people on bail, and make a difference to their 
offending patterns and their lives.
The ethnographic work in Chapter Six illustrated the paradox of 
professionalisation in the context of youth justice. Discretion was justified by the ‘old’ 
YOT staff in terms of their own expertise and experience in making bail decisions. 
They legitimated their case-by-case, ad hoc approach by pointing to the 
independence and reliability of their judgment, as well as the trust placed in them by 
other youth justice agencies locally. But such an approach justifies a lack of 
accountability. This, coupled with the stretched mezzo level youth justice structure 
(itself the result of greater macro-level managerialism and bureaucracy), meant less 
of a ‘hands on’ mezzo-level presence at the YOT. Such developments ensured that 
there was little check on the approach taken by the ‘old’ team, even though there 
were problems in the way in which bail services were being targeted, and a lack of 
proactive intervention in general. The ‘old’ team jealously protected their autonomy, 
while simultaneously denying the moves towards managerialism and 
professionalisation driven by changes in policy at the national, macro level.
Magistrates, as shown in Chapter Seven, were also concerned with the 
management of conflict out of the bail process. Likert scales showed a high rate of 
satisfaction with, and trust in, YOT staff decisions. Open-ended interview questions 
revealed more detail about how the magistrates made bail decisions. They talked 
about the need to ‘protect the public’, for example. This aim, although not formally 
expressed in the language of the 1976 Bail Act, could be justified under the vague
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exceptions to bail contained in that Act176. They were excluded from local bail policy, 
however, except in the formal court setting. Few of those interviewed had had any 
experience of local bail sen/ices, or knew exactly what services were available for 
young people in Baytown. This provided mechanisms for the outcome of low bail 
support usage, generated by Chapters Four and Five. Not only did magistrates not 
wish to challenge the earlier decision of YOT staff to reject bail support, but also they 
were not sufficiently involved in the Baytown youth justice bail process to be aware of 
available ways of preventing remands to custody.
The links between micro and macro-levels of bail process and policy must also 
be discussed in the context of the management of conflict out of the process. The 
paradoxical macro-level mixture of greater prescribed control and managerialism and 
the desire to keep policy options open, so as to enable ‘second guessing’ of public 
opinion and continued electoral popularity, led to resentment and resistance through 
apathy in YOT bail practice. Yet conflict was, again, mostly removed from the 
process. The superficial and retrospective micro-level compliance with macro-level 
bureaucracy, guidelines and paperwork has already been discussed in this chapter. 
Such surface-level compliance allowed ideological conflicts to be removed from the 
agenda, while preserving discretion for the micro-level agencies. When micro-level 
conflict was revealed, it normally occurred not with the macro-level itself, but rather 
with intermediate organisations, such as ACORN177.
A crucial aspect of this management of conflict out of the bail process was the 
lack of communication between agencies at the micro-level178, and between different 
levels of the process. This lack of communication not only acted to preserve
176 I.e. either the risk of re-offending if released on bail, the risk of absconding, or the risk of interfering 
with the course of justice if released on bail -  ‘protecting the public’ could fit into any of these criteria.
177 See Chapter Six for discussion of ACORN’s role in the evaluation of the Baytown bail support 
scheme, and the ‘old’ team’s attitudes towards ACORN.
178 E.g. between ‘old’ and ‘new’ YOT members, and between the YOT and local magistrates.
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inconsistency through the use of discretion (as discussed above), but also acted to 
ensure that the views of young people in the bail process went unheard. There was 
a micro-level failure to understand the meanings and attitudes which young people 
attached to bail and custody. These meanings were not congruent with those of YOT 
staff and magistrates. Young people who were interviewed also offered further 
dimensions of the management of conflict, this time between the YOT bail team and 
the external youth justice agencies who shared responsibility for bail support 
services. Data highlighted differences in the use of discretion between the YOT and 
other agencies, but also highlighted that conflicts between them remained largely 
hidden.
Having identified and explained how discretion was used in Baytown, the next 
section moves towards a theoretical model for understanding bail policy and practice, 
in Baytown and elsewhere.
Directions for future research: towards a cultural analysis of bail processes
It would be tempting, given the research findings and analysis generated, to 
view the discretion within the Baytown youth justice bail process as being an 
individualised and undesirable aspect of policy and practice. Such a view would be 
in line with the theoretical standpoint of Davis (1969). Davis, in his analysis of the 
usage of discretion, sees it in terms of individuals making decisions about other 
individuals. He also sees discretion, in the legal process, as being a negative aspect 
of that process -  indeed, as a major source of unfairness and inconsistency within it.
However, as Hawkins (2003: 194) argues, such an individualistic approach to 
research fails to capture the nature of decision-making in criminal justice, which is 
characterised by ‘different officials acting at different times making decisions serially
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in the context of other decisions’. This ‘serial’ view of discretion reflects the reality of
decision-making in criminal justice, in the bail process and beyond.
Applying the model to the context of the current research, the study
(particularly in Chapters Four and Five above) has shown how bail decisions were
passed on from the police, through the YOT, to the courts. However, seeing such
decisions in purely individualistic terms179 would, as Hawkins argues, be a mistake.
As shown in the present study, the influences on criminal justice decision-making are
complex, and operate from every level of that process.
As a result of this holistic view of decision-making, Hawkins recommends an
analytical approach which takes into account the plurality of influences on discretion
(Hawkins 2002). In particular, he argues that in analysing discretion, researchers
need to take into account the surround (broad social environment), field (specific
context of criminal justice) and frame (particular interpretive, decision-shaping
practices) of discretion:
To understand the nature of criminal justice decision-making better, a 
connection needs to be forged between forces in the decision-making 
environment, and the interpretive processes that individuals engage in 
when deciding a particular case.’ (Hawkins 2003: 189)
Hawkins’ view of the influences on discretion shift the focus away from 
individuals and the factors used in their decision-making. Instead, he advocates 
scrutiny of the various individuals and agencies involved in making decisions. More 
importantly, such a view requires study not just of the norms by which decisions are 
made at the individual level, but also of the wider, inter-agency frameworks for 
organising discretionary powers.
This approach reflects the context of youth justice bail decision-making in 
Baytown. Several different youth justice agencies were involved in these decisions -
179 Or, indeed, seeing them as purely structural outcomes of the youth justice process, without any 
individual input.
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the YOT bail team, local police, defence solicitors, the Crown Prosecution Service,
and the courts, as well as other agencies involved with local bail services for young
people. Despite the conflict within the YOT team about the policy and practice of bail
work, it was clear that an established inter-agency ‘frame’ had been established
within the ‘field’ of youth justice bail work in Baytown. As Hawkins notes:
‘Framing is not oniy an interpretive act, a way of making sense for 
decision-making purposes, it is aiso a classificatory act, prompting 
particular decision-making outcomes or forms of action ... (framing) 
reality for the ultimate decision-makers, those who occupy those places 
where authority to decide is formally allocated. Frames penetrate 
records, and given their durability, spread their effects across 
time and different hands.1 (Hawkins 2003: 192, emphasis added)
It is therefore argued that a full understanding of youth justice bail decision­
making -  in Baytown and elsewhere -  requires a focus on local youth justice 
cultures. Hucklesby (1997a, 1997b) has revealed the existence and influence of bail 
decision-making cultures, specifically in the context of the courts, and particular 
benches of magistrates within courts. She also argues in favour of focusing on bail 
decision-making as an administrative, bureaucratic process, conducted in private by 
agencies other than magistrates, according to discretionary and hidden rules:
‘The informal norms of work groups permit predictable routines to 
develop which reduce risk and uncertainty and provide for the efficient 
disposal of cases’ (Hucklesby 1997a: 130-1)
Paterson and Whittaker (1995), analysing bail in the Scottish court process, 
employ a similar model as a means of understanding how bail decisions are made. 
They make the comparison of the traditional model of criminal justice decision­
making, where differences in outcomes can be explained by differences in cases and 
the practices of individual decision makers, and what they call the ‘cultural’ model. 
The latter takes account of three factors. The first is the form of criminal justice 
relationships, established by the institutional structure of the criminal justice process 
and its integral relationships of power and authority. The second is the content of the
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relationships -  how the structure is negotiated by those working within it, i.e. 
recognising the localised context of decisions. The third factor is the focus of the 
relationships: the level and type of local criminal activity and the constituent features 
of the cases -  the incident, the accused, the victim and the evidence -  which are 
being dealt with in the criminal justice process (Paterson and Whittaker 1995: 264-5).
This cultural view emphasises that the courts are just one part (albeit a very 
important part) of bail decision-making. They benefit from authority relations within 
the bail process, and their decision-making process (unlike that of other agencies 
involved in the process) can be heard in public180. But this ‘cultural’ analysis also 
emphasises the importance of understanding other agencies’ decision-making 
processes, although they are less public. Both aspects of research are essential in 
order to understand how bail decision-making cultures develop, using influences from 
the macro, mezzo and micro levels of youth justice, in particular local contexts.
Similarly, both aspects are required to understand how such cultures, once 
established, can be sustained against challenges from different influences in the 
youth justice bail process. The established Baytown bail culture was able to 
withstand pressure to change, originating from macro level centralisation and 
bureaucracy as well as micro-level conflicts over the direction of policy and practice. 
Future research should examine the influences of different agencies upon one 
another’s decision-making within a particular culture. Such research could examine 
the sources of established cultures’ power to exclude critical discussion of their 
norms, drawing upon insights into decision-making originating from outside the 
discipline of criminology181. It would also build upon existing research into the 
intervention of ‘occupational culture’ between macro-level youth justice policy and
180 But this is not always the case: see Hucklesby (1996, 2002: 125).
181 Such as the socio-political and socio-legal work of Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes, and Galligan, 
discussed above.
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micro-level practice (e.g. Eadie and Canton 2002), and the relationship between 
policy and YOT practice under New Labour (e.g. Cross, Evans and Minkes 2003).
A related issue is the lack of consideration given to young people’s attitudes 
towards bail, custody and other aspects of youth justice -  in research as well as 
youth justice policy and practice182. This lack of consideration was just one aspect of 
the wider cultural feature of lack of inter-agency communication. In the Baytown 
context, the views of young people were mostly either misunderstood or simply 
ignored. Changing such attitudes in research and policy would add a vital dimension 
to the understanding of how bail policies transfer into day-to-day practice.
A final advantage of the cultural approach to the specific context of youth 
justice bail decision-making is its ability to complement other recent critical accounts 
of youth justice under New Labour (e.g. Goldson 2000, Pitts 2001, Smith 2003). 
While these accounts have been valuable in their analysis of the limitations of current 
Government youth justice initiatives, they have been primarily concerned with policy 
analysis rather than with youth justice practice ‘on the ground’. This tendency, it is 
argued, has allowed Government publications to dominate the practice-based 
agenda with claims of a smooth, effective and entirely successful transition to multi­
agency, joined-up micro-level youth justice in England and Wales (e.g. Youth Justice 
Board 2000b).
In a youth justice climate which claims to prioritise ‘evidence-based practice’, 
there is a need for more in-depth research into how local contexts explain bail 
decision-making involving young people, rather than research which merely skims 
the surface of the factors driving policy and practice, assuming an unproblematic 
transfer of macro-level aims and policies into micro-level practice. While some
previous research in the area of youth justice practice has provided cautiously
182 But see Lyon, Dennison and Wilson (2000) for an example of research which considers young 
people’s views in detail, in the specific context of their attitudes towards custody.
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optimistic results, in terms of joined-up, positive micro-level youth justice work (e.g. 
Burnett and Appleton 2004183), the current study suggests that such optimism is not 
justified nationwide. In turn, a cautionary approach to the ‘new orthodoxy’ of multi­
agency, coherent youth justice policy and practice requires more case-study 
research in the same vein, examining various local youth justice contexts, so as to 
enable the extent of justifiable optimism to be ascertained.
The study has shown that those who manage the macro-level of youth justice 
bail policy must examine micro-level policy and practice more closely in developing 
their own policy and practice. This may seem a surprising claim, given the recent 
increase in the Home Office’s gathering of data from micro-level bail practitioners. 
However, it is argued that, quantitatively and qualitatively, in principle, policy and 
practice, the Home Office’s approach to the collection and analysis of micro-level bail 
policy and practice is flawed. Quantitatively, the sheer amount of information 
required by the Home Office (e.g. the bail ASSET form) generated resentment and 
resistance at the micro-level. Qualitatively, macro-level research has overlooked the 
non-decision-making dimensions of micro-level policy and practice. Its limitations in 
this respect, as Chapter Three showed, formed the backdrop to this study, which has 
not just mapped out the structure of the bail process in Baytown by discussing and 
analysing its outcomes184, but has also uncovered the mechanisms generating these 
structures in the particular context of Baytown.
The Youth Justice Board should undertake further, similar research to 
understand fully why the funding supplied to Baytown YOT to develop bail support 
services and reduce remands to custody made little practical difference to young 
people. More generally, it could be said that the macro level needs to accept the
183 Although this research amply demonstrates how youth justice practitioners can use their discretion 
to choose between competing macro-level policy strands, in line with local cultures and priorities.
184 Something which Youth Justice Board research has done (e.g. Youth Justice Board 2004), albeit, it 
is argued, not in as much depth as Chapters Four and Five above.
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results of research evidence, even that which is critical of its own policy and practice, 
and adjust that policy and practice accordingly, rather than listening only to evidence 
which is congruent with its own political aims (e.g. Mair and Newburn 2001).
Research should involve greater scrutiny of discretion in the bail process for 
young people. In particular, it needs to acknowledge that discretion is an inevitable 
part of criminal justice decision-making, and cannot be entirely removed by moves 
towards centralisation. There should therefore be a focus upon the positive aspects 
of discretion, and analytical separation of these from the negative aspects, which 
lead to inefficiency and inappropriate outcomes in the bail process. Such an 
approach will inevitably lead to departure from a purely punitive managerialist 
approach to micro-level youth justice. But this may have the beneficial indirect effect 
of restoring a principled core, which prioritises the protection of young people’s rights 
as children in the criminal justice process (Haines and Drakeford 1998), to the 
politics, policy and practice of youth justice in England and Wales. The next 
subsection returns to the opening chapters of this study in reconsidering the role of 
systems management in offering more principled bail policy and practice.
A return to principle -  and systems management? Directions for future policy 
and practice
The Baytown bail process in practice was loosely formed around the idea of 
risk management (Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994). The rhetoric and the stated goals 
from the youth justice agencies was framed in terms of actuarial justice -  protection 
of the public (staff and magistrates), efficiency of service (staff talking about the need 
to reduce costs by reducing remands and money spent on other services), a 
bifurcated approach (staff and magistrates talking about a ‘hardcore’ of young
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offenders who were seen as beyond positive responses to their offending). Such 
rhetoric allowed YOT staff in particular to use the discourse of systems management. 
The actuarial justice model seemed to be what YOT staff and magistrates wished to 
work towards. Yet this aim was belied by the reality of practice, and the development 
of a negative youth justice culture.
In this culture there was ‘unsystematic’ evidence of serial discretion (even at 
the individual level, as seen in the ‘old’ YOT bail team), and only a loose commitment 
to actuarial justice and processing cases as quickly as possible, coupled with a 
desire to manage conflict out of the bail process. The tension between serial 
discretion and actuarial justice and efficiency was resolved by individuals and 
agencies who were well-known to one other, and therefore trusted by one another. 
This allowed key players to make their own non-consensual decisions, by-passing 
the need for consultation, and speeding the process up without necessarily making it 
more substantively efficient.
Such outcomes show the weaknesses of the actuarial justice model, and of 
systems management. They lack a specific theoretical core, a principled approach to 
youth justice, and therefore can be hijacked by those with power over youth justice, 
who wish to impose their own punitive agenda. They also tend to ignore the power of 
individual actors who have agency to resist, tinker with, challenge, misuse, 
guidelines/regulations -  for whatever reason. In recent years power has -  at least 
symbolically -  been transferred to macro level central government, via managerialist 
youth justice policies. The Government wishes to maintain power, but also discretion 
and flexibility over policy, to respond to perceived public demand and promote an 
image of being ‘tough on crime’ where such an image is needed in rhetoric. The fact 
that actuarial justice lacks a theoretical core could be seen at the micro level in its
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permission of unsystematic practices (particularly from YOT staff) in the name of ‘risk 
management’ and ‘protecting the public’ from the ‘hardcore’ of youth offending.
This is not to argue that managerialism, actuarial justice and systems 
management cannot produce positive outcomes for young people and the youth 
justice process alike. The quantitative data in Chapters 4 and 5, for example, 
suggested that young people were more likely to re-offend the longer they spent on 
bail. Therefore the fact that the Baytown courts reduced average lengths of time 
spent on bail by young people locally, in line with managerialist macro-level policy 
(Audit Commission 1996), was beneficial to young people and the process alike.
Neither is it to argue that systems management did not benefit young people 
and youth justice in the 1980s, at a time of punitive Government measures in youth 
justice but a laissez-faire macro approach to micro level practice. But it must be 
recognised that times -  and macro-level youth justice policy -  have changed. Now 
the Government is attempting to centralise control over youth justice policy to a far 
greater extent than it was attempting to do in the 1980s, while simultaneously shifting 
responsibility for policy effectiveness onto local youth justice agencies and individuals 
(Garland 1996). Now there is far greater macro level control over micro level policy, 
through managerialism and its accompanying legislation, national guidelines and 
bureaucracy, together with the same kind of punitive rhetoric as was used by the 
Government when addressing youth crime and justice in the 1980s (Pitts 2001).
In this climate of ‘punitive managerialism’ (Cavadino and Dignan 2002), the 
lack of theoretical thinking behind a systems management approach means that it 
can be pulled in various directions to suit various individuals’ and agencies’ own 
agendas (at local and national level). The approach is appealed to by a macro-level 
structure which attempts to be, and professes to be, more controlling than previously, 
in turn leading to resentment of macro-level policies at the micro-level. But it
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simultaneously allows widespread discretion at micro-level by lacking a guiding set of 
principles, apart from efficiency and ‘preventing youth offending’.
But, as this study has shown, efficiency can and does mean different things to 
different individuals and agencies in the youth justice process. In the 1980s in 
England and Wales, efficiency in youth justice primarily meant diverting young people 
from custody wherever possible at micro-level (Haines and Drakeford 1998). Now, 
although centralising, managerialist policies at macro-level have tried to control 
discretion and monitor practice through increased bureaucracy and detailed national 
standards, they have simultaneously made the youth justice structure more 
amorphous and flexible, by stating that the aim of youth justice in England and Wales 
is merely to ‘prevent youth offending’. Underneath all of the managerialism and 
attempts at state control is a theoretical vacuum. In the current politics of criminal 
justice, the climate of ‘populist punitivism’ (Bottoms 1995), the need to look tough on 
crime, and the project of moral and social discipline (Pitts 2001) prevail in 
Government discourse on youth justice, as well as punitive managerialism (Cavadino 
and Dignan 2002).
A principled, theoretical approach must be re-injected into youth justice to 
avoid further injustice to young people, by means of disproportionate or inappropriate 
punishment, excessive and harmful youth justice agency discretion, unnecessary 
restrictions on the right to bail, and failure to provide youth justice interventions based 
on young people’s criminogenic needs and rights to bail. It is submitted that the 
‘children first’ approach, advocated by Haines and Drakeford (1998), is an effective 
means of filling this theoretical gap, while retaining the advantages of the systems 
management approach. Lack of space precludes detailed discussion of the children 
first approach here. However, its advantages include a built-in capacity to protect 
children’s human rights, targeted interventions and systematic consideration of key
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decision-making points in the criminal justice process, and a focus on society’s 
responsibilities towards disadvantaged children, outside criminal justice as well as 
inside it.
Youth justice (and criminal justice generally) needs to recover moral integrity
within practice (Rutherford 1993) by drawing upon a combination of theoretical
perspectives, which King (1981) suggests is the key both to understanding and
improving criminal justice policy and practice. The ‘children first’ approach is
inherently pluralist, drawing upon (targeted) rehabilitation, managerialism (in terms of
diversion as well as saving time) and just deserts (due process) perspectives, among
others. In taking this approach, however, systems management must guard against
the temptation to see youth justice as being entirely ‘systematic’. On the basis of the
evidence in this study, it is better viewed as a series of interdependent but semi-
autonomous organisations, linked (but not in a linear, direct way) at both national and
local levels. Such a view does not preclude a systems management approach to
criminal justice, but has the advantage of acknowledging the inevitability of discretion
within the ‘system’:
‘Perhaps the most fundamental sense in which criminal justice 
agencies are linked together at the tactical level lies in the process of 
discretionary decision-making by which cases are adjudicated and 
transferred from one agency to another ... (t)his process is rather like 
an assembly line in which each agency’s workload is essentially 
controlled by the actions of the previous agency. In most instances the 
decision of the transmitting agency is largely discretionary, but the 
receiving agency generally has little or no say in the decisions made. ’ 
(Feeney 1985: 10)
It is also clear that a systems management approach can -  and must -  
accommodate the need for clear and effective communications between the 
individuals and agencies which make up youth justice. This need has been reflected 
in the research, not just between individuals and agencies at the same level of the 
process (e.g. YOT staff and young people), but also between different levels of the
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process (e.g. the stretched communications between the micro and mezzo level YOT
staff, identified in Chapter Six). Again, though, writers on systems management have
accepted the requirement of better communication:
‘The criminal justice system can only work effectively if it has sufficient 
communication between its sub-systems ... (t)he structure of 
information flows, the methods of information handling, and the 
techniques of reducing the information to manageable levels are all of 
prime importance.’ (Pullinger 1985: 26)
It is therefore submitted that the systems management approach to analysing 
youth justice can provide a response to the limitations of policy and practice identified 
in this study. However, such an approach requires better communication, particularly 
between governmental and local levels of the youth justice process. It also requires 
the governmental level to develop ‘evidence-based practice’ which takes into account 
all reliable research evidence available, and not just the evidence which reflects its 
own political priorities (Tonry 2004).
Conclusions
Detailed conclusions would largely repeat the previous discussion in this 
chapter. However, despite the limited impact of proactive bail services in Baytown, 
some optimism for the future is justified. The recently introduced Bail Intensive 
Supervision and Surveillance Scheme, organised and run by a specialist team of 
YOT staff in Baytown, could not be included in the research -  but early indications 
are that it has been used both more effectively and more proactively than the 
previous bail support scheme (see Appendix H for more detailed discussion). The 
study indicates that, despite the increasing managerialism and control over local bail 
policy and practice from central Government level, micro-level practitioners can make 
a difference to the implementation of macro-level policy -  for better or worse. And
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ruegative youth justice cultures, which damage both the effectiveness and the 
legitimacy of the youth justice bail process, can be overcome.
But the message for the macro-level is that such cultures must be better 
uinderstood; the micro-level in general must be listened to; and the views of young 
people on youth justice must be taken seriously, in order to make progress in terms 
oif policy and practice. Without the right kind of Government monitoring of bail policy 
aind practice -  the kind which prioritises two-way communication, recognises young 
pteople as key players in the decision-making process, and is willing to accept 
evidence which the Government does not want to hear -  wrong turns will continue to 
toe made. All of the agencies involved in the youth justice bail process must take 
responsibility for developing better practice, and for restoring principles to the 
pirocess. Even though New Labour’s post-ideological approach may prove a major 
barrier to progress, it remains true that the local level of youth justice can, and 
should, take the initiative in moving forward.
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Appendix A 
Systems management analysis flowchart of the Baytown 
youth justice bail process and its participating agencies
The following is a flowchart showing the basic operation of the Baytown youth 
justice bail process, and the agencies participating in it. Arrows on the flowchart 
show the order in which decisions are made as cases progress through the process. 
Rectangular boxes show the different stages in the process, and ovals show the 
stages at which agencies have decision-making input. As described in Chapter Two, 
this flowchart was devised as an aid to constructing the study’s methodology. It 
therefore shows how the process was designed to work in theory, rather than how it 
actually worked in practice.
Due to space limitations, the flowchart is divided up into three parts across the 
following three pages. The first part deals with the pre-court bail process; the second 
part deals with the initial court appearance and bail decision; and the third and final 
part deals with subsequent court appearances and bail decisions.
334
# RS' ^  
O  -o
LIBRARY
Illustration A -  systems management analysis flowchart of the Baytown youth 
justice bail process and its participating agencies
DEFENCE
SOLICITOR
ARREST
POLICE
STATION
NFA4 POLICE BAIL DECISION2 1st OFFENCE & GUILTY PLEA?
« -------------------- i k
CHARGED 
& BAILED 
TO COURT
POLICE 
BAIL, WITH 
OR
WITHOUT
CONDITIONS
GROUNDS
FOR
DENYING 
BAIL MET?3
t
CHARGED? YES NO
YES NO
3Z
NFA
CRITERIA FOR 
REFUSING 
TRANSFER TO 
LAAMET5?
NO YES
PREVIOUS 
WARNING 
MORE THAN 2 
YEARS AGO?
WARNING
CRITERIA
MET?
YES
~T~
YES NO
CHARGE
APPROPRIATE?
NO
I
CHARGE
YES NO
FINAL WARNING & 
REFERRAL TO YOT
YES NO CHARGE
CHARGE & 
DETENTION BY 
POLICE OVERNIGHT -  
COURT APPEARANCE 
NEXT DAY6
FINAL WARNING 
& REFERRALTO 
YOT8
BAIL SUPPORT
INITIAL APPEARANCE IN COURT
GUILTY PLEA & PROPOSAL OF 
MOVE TO SENTENCE ACCEPTABLE 
TO COURT?
YOT
(ASSET)
YOT (BAIL 
ASSET)
REPRIMAND
ASSESSMENT
YOT (BAIL TEAM/COURT OFFICER)1
DEFENCE SOLICITOR
NO
MOVE TO FINAL 
SENTENCE OUTCOME 
-  NO BAIL PERIOD
COURT BAIL DECISION 
(s e e  top o f next page)
335
COURT BAIL DECISION
HAS CPS OPPOSED BAIL?
YES
HAS DEFENCE APPLIED FOR BAIL?
31
NO YES
APPLICATION 
ACCEPTED BY COURT?
NO
31
COURT ACCEPTS CPS 
RECOMMENDATION?
NO
3 ~
YES
NO YES
BAIL DENIED11 r
BAIL GRANTED
AGE OF DEFENDANT (in years)
10-11 12-14 15-16
FEMALE MALE
CRITERIA FOR 
REMAND TO 
SECURE 
ACCOMMODATION 
SATISFIED?12
CRITERIA FOR REMAND 
TO SECURE 
ACCOMMODATION OR 
CUSTODY 
SATISFIED?13
YES NO YES
UNCONDITIONAL BAIL, 
CONDITIONAL BAIL OR 
BAIL SUPPORT
BREACH 
OF BAIL?YOT & POLICE
YES
1r
COURT ATTENDANCE?
YES NO
ALTERNATIVE
PROPOSED?LOCAL YOT 
WORKER
AUTHALTERNATIVE
PROPOSED?
EXTERNAL
AGENCIES
PROPOSAL
ACCEPTED? COURT SATISFIED 
OF NEED TO 
PROTECT PUBLIC?
PROPOSAL
ACCEPTED?
COURT SATISFIED 
OF NEED TO  
PROTECT PUBLIC?
IS DEFENDANT 
VULNERABLE?
IS SECURE 
PLACE 
AVAILABLE?
YOT/CARERS
YOT VISITS
RLA SECURE REMAND REMAND TO CUSTODY
336
DEFENCE
SOLICITOR
YOT (BAIL 
TEAM/ 
COURT 
OFFICER)
SUBSEQUENT COURT APPEARANCES
CHANGE OF CASE CIRCUMSTANCES, BASED 
ON UPDATED BAIL INFORMATION, WHICH 
JUSTIFIES A CHANGE IN BAIL STATUS?
YES NO
YOT (PRE 
SENTENCE 
REPORT IF 
REQUIRED)
DEFENCE
SOLICITOR
NEW BAIL STATUS BAIL STATUS
(see options for CONTINUES
granting or denying AS BEFORE
bail for different age
& gender groups on
previous page)
FINAL CASE OUTCOME
Notes on flowchart
1. Throughout the flowchart the abbreviation ‘AAs’ denotes ‘appropriate adults’. The 
role of the appropriate adult during a young person’s questioning at a police 
station is set out in the Codes of Practice of the 1984 Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act. The Codes deem all young persons aged 17 or under to be 
‘vulnerable’ on the grounds of their age and understanding. Therefore interviews 
at police stations with young people must include the presence of an ‘appropriate 
adult’, defined as either a parent, guardian or social worker, or in the absence of 
any of these another responsible adult who is not a police officer or an employee, 
or a solicitor attending to offer legal advice. The role of AAs is a vital one and 
must involve intervening to protect basic principles (such as the young person’s 
rights and civil liberties, his or her physical and emotional welfare, and due 
process, such as the prohibition of the use of statement-questions by the police 
during questioning). The role of AA can be and is sometimes fulfilled by 
volunteers rather than YOT members. In either situation the process is the same: 
the custody officer at the police station deems that an AA is needed in a particular 
case. Then the custody officer rings the local YOT. If necessary the YOT 
ascertains which area service office needs to be faxed (e.g. the learning 
difficulties team or mental health services). The relevant team is then contacted, 
and the volunteer who is on duty is notified to be prepared to act in the case. If 
the volunteer is to act, a time is arranged for him or her to arrive at the same time 
as the young person’s defence solicitor. As mentioned above, whilst at the police 
station, if the volunteer has any concerns about the way in which the young 
person is being questioned by police, he or she can liaise with the relevant duty 
officer at the police station for advice. At the conclusion of questioning, the 
volunteer has to fax an AA monitoring sheet to the relevant service office (if
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necessary) and to the YOT. In cases where the client is bailed to return back to 
the police station, the YOT logs the date of return, so that a volunteer can act in 
the same capacity on the second occasion.
2. Since the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, the police now have the 
power to remand young people on conditional police bail (section 27 of the 1994 
Act). The police now have the same bail powers as the courts in this regard, 
except that the police may not order a young person to live in a bail hostel, to live 
in local authority accommodation, or to undergo medical tests. Section 26 of the 
1994 Act removes the presumption of bail in cases where a defendant is charged 
with an indictable or ‘either-way’ offence which was allegedly committed while on 
bail. The 1994 Act also introduces automatic refusal of bail in ‘serious’ cases, 
such as homicide and rape.
3. As stated above in note 2, the police have basically the same powers of denial of 
bail as the courts, subject to the exceptions that are again stated above at note 2. 
Generally speaking, the custody officer at the police station has the responsibility 
of deciding upon what action to take where he or she believes that bail may not 
be granted to a young person. The grounds for that decision must be one of the 
four set out in section 38(1 )(a) of the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(hereafter ‘PACE’). These are: 1) that the young person’s name or address 
cannot be ascertained, or those given are believed to be false; 2) that a young 
person has to be detained for their own protection or in his or her own interests; 3) 
the belief that the young person will not answer bail, or might interfere with the 
administration of justice or the investigation of an offence if not detained; 4) 
section 28 of the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act amends the previous 
fourth criterion so that the police are now able to refuse bail whenever, in their 
view, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the young person would
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commit an offence while on bail. If one or more of these criteria is satisfied, 
section 36(6) of PACE states that subject to the exceptions set out at note 4 
below, the arrested young person must then be moved to local authority 
accommodation.
4. Throughout the flowchart the abbreviation ‘NFA’ denotes ‘no further action 
(against the young person)’.
5. The abbreviation ‘LAA’ here denotes ‘local authority accommodation’. The major 
exception to the rule requiring transfer of arrested young people to local authority 
accommodation is that 17-year-olds cannot be transferred in this way. Aside from 
this there are two other exceptions: when it is ‘impracticable’ to arrange a move 
(rather than merely inconvenient), and when, in the case of any young person 
aged between 12 and 16, the custody officer at the police station believes that 
other accommodation ‘would not be adequate to protect the public from serious 
harm from him or her’. ‘Serious harm’ is defined in the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, 
in relation to sexual or violent offences, as ‘death or serious injury, whether 
physical or psychological, occasioned by further offences committed by him or 
her’. Where this criterion is satisfied, the young person is held overnight in police 
cells to appear in court the next day. This represents a loophole in the 
‘impracticable’ rule.
6. As mentioned in note 5 above, as 17-year-olds who are arrested cannot be 
transferred to local authority accommodation from the police station, where one or 
more of the above criteria for denying bail is satisfied the only option is to detain 
them overnight at the police station for an appearance in court the following day.
7. The abbreviation ‘RLA’, here and elsewhere on the flowchart, denotes ‘remand to 
local authority accommodation’.
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8. The reprimand and warning system was introduced to replace the process of 
informal cautioning of young people in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. The 
flowchart itself is designed to show the reprimand and warning system as set out 
in section 65 of the 1998 Act (i.e. how many reprimands and warnings each 
young person may receive, and in what circumstances). Section 66 of the 1998 
Act deals with the referral to a YOT in the case of a warning. It states that where 
possible the YOT will provide the offender with a rehabilitative programme aimed 
at preventing further offending. This section also states that unless there are 
exceptional circumstances relating to the offender or the offence, the courts can 
no longer sentence an offender to a conditional discharge for a crime committed 
within two years of receiving a warning.
9. The YOT Bail ASSET form, which National Standards issued to bail workers by 
the Youth Justice Board (2001) state must be used to assess the suitability of all 
defendants for bail intervention at this point in the process, includes such 
assessment criteria as previous offending history, previous known reactions to 
bail and supervision, gravity of offence, verified address, nature of family support, 
drug & alcohol-related offending, welfare issues and suicide risk if the defendant 
was remanded in custody.
10. The abbreviation ‘YOT’ is used here and throughout the flowchart to denote 
‘Youth Offending Team’.
11. Once in court the decision whether or not to grant bail to a young person is 
governed by the 1976 Bail Act. The criteria that have to be satisfied before bail 
can be denied for imprisonable offences are set out in the 1976 Act. These are: 
that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if released on bail, the 
defendant would fail to appear for trial, would commit an offence while on bail, or 
would obstruct the course of justice; that the court thinks it necessary for the
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defendant’s own protection; that there has been insufficient time to enable the 
court to obtain enough information to reach a decision; and that the defendant 
has previously failed to answer bail. For non-imprisonable offences, the only 
criteria for refusing bail is that the defendant has previously breached bail, and 
the court thinks that this would be likely to happen again if the defendant was 
released (Jones 2003: 401). In addition, as mentioned above in relation to police 
bail, conditions can be imposed on bail. The 1976 Act also requires that bail 
decisions are recorded, and that grounds and reasons for refusing bail are given 
to the defendant.
12. Court-ordered remands to secure accommodation were introduced by sections 97 
and 98 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, amending section 23 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1969. Under the 1998 Act the criteria for this type of 
remand are as follows: that the young person is charged with, or has been 
convicted of, a violent or sexual offence, or of an offence punishable in the case 
of an adult with imprisonment for a term of 14 years or more; or that the young 
person has a recent history of absconding while remanded to local authority 
accommodation, and is charged or has been convicted of an imprisonable offence 
alleged or found to have been committed while he or she has been so remanded. 
In either case the court be of an opinion that only remanding the young person to 
local authority secure accommodation would be adequate to protect the public 
from serious harm from them.
13. Where the court is unwilling to consider bail or remand to local authority 
accommodation, then male offenders aged 15 or over can be sent either to a 
remand centre or to a young offender’s institution. These are intended, in theory, 
to be transitional arrangements pending the availability of sufficient local 
authority-provided secure accommodation, at which point the court will be able to
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impose a condition that a young person is kept in such secure accommodation. 
The 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act extended this power to include all 
those aged 12 or over. Apart from the age and gender tests, a further five criteria 
must be satisfied before a custodial remand can be made. These are as follows: 
the court must first consult a probation officer or social worker; the young person 
must be given the opportunity to be legally represented; a remand to custody 
must be the only means by which the court can be satisfied that the public can be 
protected from serious harm done by the young person; the individual must have 
been charged or convicted of a violent or sexual offence, or an offence 
punishable by at least a 14-year jail term in the case of an adult; or (as an 
alternative to the previous criterion) a remand to custody can be considered 
where the young person in question has a recent history of absconding while 
remanded in local authority accommodation, and has been charged or convicted 
of an offence while so remanded.
14. The abbreviation ‘local auth.’ here denotes ‘local authority’.
15. Consultation with drug or alcohol agencies, or mental health workers, could take 
place at this stage where earlier assessment of the young person had indicated 
that this was appropriate. The young person might then be referred to one of 
these agencies with a view to being remanded with them and provided with a 
remand bed by the agency involved, if it was thought appropriate that that agency 
should work with the young person as a condition of remand.
16. Remand foster carers are classed as local authority accommodation. If they are 
available they therefore provide a extra accommodation option for young people 
remanded in this way, where the young person returning to live at home is not a 
viable option (returning to live at home can also be classed as a remand to local 
authority accommodation).
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17. Following a remand to custody, a YOT worker is also responsible for completing a 
post-court report, which is then forwarded to the custodial institution in which the 
young person is being held (Youth Justice Board 2001).
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Appendix B 
Classification of offences in quantitative data, by offence 
type and offence gravity
Appendix B consists of two parts. The first part lists the categories into which 
the offences recorded in Chapter Four above were compiled. Offences are listed in 
alphabetical order in each category. The second part lists recorded offences 
according to the category of seriousness under which each offence type was 
classified. Offences are listed in alphabetical order within each offence seriousness 
category. As noted in Chapter Four, eight categories of offence seriousness were 
used, with category 1 being the least serious and category 8 the most serious. Both 
scales were derived from the Baytown YOT’s information database, from which 
information forming the basis of the quantitative data in Chapter Four was gathered.
It should be noted that, in both of the lists below, only offences which were 
recorded at least once during the study period are included. This includes offences 
and charges which were later reduced to lesser offences.
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Contents of offence categories for offences recorded in quantitative data
MOTORING OFFENCES
Careless driving 
Dangerous driving 
Driving while disqualified 
Driving while intoxicated 
Driving without a licence 
Driving without insurance 
General road traffic offence
VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PERSON & SEXUAL OFFENCES
Abduction or kidnap 
Aggravated common assault
Assault causing grievous bodily harm -  wounding with intent (s. 18 Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861)
Assault causing grievous bodily harm -  wounding (s.20 Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861)
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861)
Assault on a police officer
Assault with intent to resist arrest
Attempted assault occasioning actual bodily harm
Common assault
Incest
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Indecent assault
Making written or verbal threats to kill
Manslaughter
Murder
Racially aggravated common assault 
Rape
Sexual assault
THEFT
Aggravated domestic burglary
Aggravated non-domestic burglary
Attempted deception
Attempted theft
Deception
Domestic burglary
Going equipped for burglary
Going equipped for theft
Handling stolen goods
Making off without payment
Non-domestic burglary
Robbery
Theft
347
VEHICLE THEFT
Aggravated being carried in the course of a TDA or TWOC 
Being carried in the course of a TDA or TWOC 
Interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle 
Taking a vehicle without owner’s consent (TWOC)
Taking and driving away a vehicle (TDA)
Theft of a motorcycle
DRUGS OFFENCES
Possession of a class A drug
Possession of a class A drug with intent to supply
Possession of a class B drug
Possession of a class B drug with intent to supply
Possession of a class C drug
Possession of a class C drug with intent to supply
Supply of a class A drug
Supply of a class B drug
Supply of a class C drug
PUBLIC ORDER OFFENCES
Affray
Being drunk and incapable
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Breach of the peace
Causing fear/provocation of unlawful violence (Public Order Act 1986 s.4)
Causing harassment, alarm or distress with intent (Public Order Act 1986 s.4a) 
Obstructing police
Racially aggravated causing of fear/provocation of unlawful violence (Public Order 
Act 1986 s.4 as amended by Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.31(a))
Racially aggravated causing of harassment, alarm or distress with intent (Public 
Order Act 1986 s.4a as amended by Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.31(b))
Racially aggravated causing of threatening or insulting words or behaviour (Public 
Order Act 1986 s.5 as amended by Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.31(c))
Threatening or insulting words or behaviour (Public Order Act 1986 s.5)
ARSON AND CRIMINAL DAMAGE OFFENCES
Arson
Arson with intent to endanger life 
Criminal damage
Racially aggravated criminal damage
OTHER
Breach of bail 
Breach of court order
Causing death or injury through dangerous dogs 
Cruelty to animals
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Failure to surrender to court
Having an article with a blade or point in a public place
Hoax or malicious phone call
Interfering with or intimidating witness
Non-payment of fine or compensation order
Perverting the course of justice
Possession of an offensive weapon
Trespassing on a railway
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Gravity scores for offences recorded in quantitative data
GRAVITY SCORE ONE
Breach of bail 
Breach of court order 
Driving without a licence 
Failure to surrender to court 
General road traffic offence
GRAVITY SCORE TWO
Attempted deception 
Attempted theft 
Being drunk and incapable 
Breach of the peace
Non-payment of fine or compensation order 
Trespassing on a railway
GRAVITY SCORE THREE
Being carried in the course of a TDA or TWOC
Careless driving
Common assault
Criminal damage
Deception
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Going equipped for theft
Handling stolen goods
Interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle
Making off without payment
Obstructing police
Possession of a class B drug
Possession of a class C drug
Theft
GRAVITY SCORE FOUR
Aggravated common assault
Attempted assault occasioning actual bodily harm
Causing fear/provocation of unlawful violence (Public Order Act 1986 s.4)
Causing harassment, alarm or distress with intent (Public Order Act 1986 s.4a)
Cruelty to animals
Driving while disqualified
Driving without insurance
Going equipped for burglary
Having an article with a blade or point in a public place
Hoax or malicious phone call
Non-domestic burglary
Possession of an offensive weapon
Racially aggravated common assault
Racially aggravated criminal damage
Threatening or insulting words or behaviour (Public Order Act 1986 s.5)
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GRAVITY SCORE FIVE
Aggravated being carried in the course of a TDA or TWOC 
Aggravated non-domestic burglary
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861) 
Causing death or injury through dangerous dogs 
Dangerous driving
Interfering with or intimidating witness
Perverting the course of justice
Possession of a class A drug
Possession of a class B drug with intent to supply
Possession of a class C drug with intent to supply
Racially aggravated causing of fear/provocation of unlawful violence (Public Order 
Act 1986 s.4 as amended by Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.31(a))
Racially aggravated causing of harassment, alarm or distress with intent (Public
Order Act 1986 s.4a as amended by Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.31(b))
Racially aggravated causing of threatening or insulting words or behaviour (Public 
Order Act 1986 s.5 as amended by Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.31(c))
Taking a vehicle without owner’s consent (TWOC)
Taking and driving away a vehicle (TDA)
Theft of a motorcycle
GRAVITY SCORE SIX
Affray
Assault on a police officer
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Assault with intent to resist arrest 
Domestic burglary
Possession of a class A drug with intent to supply
Robbery
Sexual assault
Supply of a class B drug
Supply of a class C drug
GRAVITY SCORE SEVEN
Abduction or kidnap 
Aggravated domestic burglary 
Arson
Assault causing grievous bodily harm -  wounding (s.20 Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861)
Driving while intoxicated 
Supply of a class A drug
GRAVITY SCORE EIGHT
Arson with intent to endanger life
Assault causing grievous bodily harm -  wounding with intent (s. 18 Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861)
Incest
Making written or verbal threats to kill 
Manslaughter
354
Murder
Rape
Appendix C 
Tables of data reported on in Chapters Four and Five
Appendix C includes the full tables of data, the results of which were reported 
on in Chapter Four of the study above. All discussion of individual tables in Chapter 
Four correspond with and refer to the listing of tables in Appendix C. It should also 
be noted that the analysis of the data contained in Chapter Five also refers to the 
tables in this Appendix.
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Appendix D
Schedule for interviews with Baytown youth court
magistrates
MAGISTRATES’ QUESTIONNAIRE
•  Thank you for agreeing to take part in the research. Can I take this 
opportunity to assure you that all the information that you give me 
during this interview will remain completely anonymous. No records 
will be kept with your name on them, and all quotes used in the final 
written research report will be anonymised.
• On a scale of 1 to 5, to what extent would you agree with the following 
statements about your experiences of the Swansea Bail Support 
Scheme? Please choose the number that best fits the level of your 
agreement with the statements. The higher the number, the higher 
the level of agreement is that has been expressed by you.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
400
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BAIL SUPPORT W ORK AND THE 
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY
1. The bail support scheme for young people is an integrated part of 
the local youth justice process.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
2. The majority of young people who come before Swansea Youth 
Court and are bailed are not suitable for placement on the bail 
support scheme, because they do not need the intensive 
conditions that come with bail support work to help them comply 
with the conditions of bail.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
r ( 
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3. The bail support project is an effective project in targeting the 
criteria regarding exceptions to bail as set out in the 1976 Bail Act, 
and therefore in increasing the chances of bail.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
QUALITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT BAIL SERVICES
4. When you first sat in the Youth Court, the Youth Offending Team  
took steps to fully inform you about the way in which local bail 
services worked.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
402
5. Currently, the Youth Offending Team continues to keep you 
updated with the way in which bail services are being used -  rates 
of usage, programme components available, and so on.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
6. The presentation and operation of the programme in court by YOT  
workers is helpful, well prepared and comprehensive.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
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7. The courts trust the recommendations made by the YOT workers 
as regards the most appropriate bail outcome for each young 
person.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
RELEVANCE OF BAIL SERVICES TO LOCAL YOUTH JUSTICE AIMS
8. The existence of the bail support scheme can make the difference 
between remanding a young person to custody and allowing him or 
her to remain in the community.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
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9. The bail support scheme is always put before the court and 
considered as an option in cases where a young person is in 
danger of being denied bail.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
10. Bail support is an essential part of the bail services offered by 
the YOT.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answer:
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OBSTACLES TO BETTER PERFORMANCE
Using a similar scale of 1 to 5 to the one used above, to what extent 
would you agree that the following factors affect the performance of the 
Swansea YOT bail services generally, and the bail support scheme for 
young people in particular?
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
11. A lack of financial resources?
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
12. A lack of staffing resources?
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
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13. The transfer of all young people from this area who are bailed 
in custody away from the local prison?
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
14. Overcrowding in the youth justice secure estate generally? 
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
15. The needs of young people on bail?
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
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16. Protection of the public from offending by young people on 
bail?
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
17. The needs of the victims of youth crime?
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
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18. The need for efficiency in the court process, in terms of 
reducing the time it takes for each case to pass through the youth 
justice system, from first appearance in court to final sentencing 
outcome?
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
19. The nature and extent of recorded youth crime locally? 
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY: 1 2 3 4 5
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME PARTICULARLY: 1 2 3 4 5
Please give reasons for your answers
409
IMPROVEMENTS
20. Can you think of any ways in which the YO T’s bail services, 
and the bail support scheme in particular, could be improved? If 
you can think of ways in which the service might be improved in 
each aspect, please give details:
BAIL SERVICES GENERALLY?
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME IN PARTICULAR?
410
21. Are there any other comments you would like to make about 
the issues covered in this interview?
• Thank you for taking part in the research. Can I emphasise once 
again that the information you have provided will be anonymised in all 
written records and reports.
411
Appendix E 
Figures illustrating the responses to the quantitative Likert 
scale questions asked as part of the magistrates’ interview 
schedule
The bar charts in Appendix E show the full range of responses to the 
quantitative Likert scale questions asked as part of the magistrates’ interview 
schedule. The quantitative data reported on in Chapter Seven above draws on the 
results illustrated here. All references to individual figures in Chapter Seven apply to 
the charts included in this appendix.
Fig. 7.1 -  ‘bail support is an integrated part of the local youth justice process’
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Fig. 7.2 -  ‘the majority of young people in Baytown are not suitable for
bail support work’
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Fig. 7.3 -  ‘the Baytown bail support scheme is effective in targeting the 
criteria for denying bail contained in the 1976 Bail Act’
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Fig. 7.4 -  ‘magistrates were well-informed about bail services when they first
sat in the Baytown youth court’
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Fig. 7.5 -  ‘magistrates are still well-informed about bail services
currently’
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
strongly
disagree
disagree neutral agree strongiy agree
416
Fig. 7.6 -  ‘YOT presentation of bail information in court is helpful, well-
prepared and comprehensive’
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Fig. 7.7 -  ‘Baytown magistrates trust bail recommendations made by
YOT staff’
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Fig. 7.8 -  ‘bail support can make the difference between bail and remand to
custody’
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Fig. 7.9 -  ‘bail support is always put before the court as an option where 
a young person is at risk of being denied bail’
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Fig. 7.10 -  ‘bail support is an essential part of the bail services offered by
the Baytown YOT’
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Fig. 7.11a -  Mack of financial resources is an obstacle to bail services
generally’
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Fig. 7 .1 1 b -  ‘lack of financial resources is an obstacle to bail support work in
particular’
10 -
8 —
6 -
4  —
2 -
strongly agreedisagree neutral agree
423
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Fig. 7.12a -  Mack of staffing resources is an obstacle to bail services generally’
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Fig. 7.12b -  ‘lack of staffing resources is an obstacle to bail support work in
particular’
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Fig. 7.13a -  ‘the transfer of young people who have been remanded to custody 
away from HMP Baytown is an obstacle to bail services generally’
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Fig. 7.13b -  ‘the transfer of young people who have been remanded to 
custody away from HMP Baytown is an obstacle to bail support work in
particular'
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Fig. 7.14a -  ‘overcrowding in the youth justice secure estate is an 
obstacle to bail services generally’
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Fig. 7.14b -  ‘overcrowding in the youth justice secure estate is an obstacle to
bail support work in particular’
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Fig. 7.15a -  ‘meeting the needs of young people on bail is a key part of
bail services generally’
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Fig. 7.15b -  ‘meeting the needs of young people on bail is a key part of 
bail support work in particular’
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Fig. 7.16a -  ‘protection of the public is a key part of bail services
generally’
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Fig. 7.16b -  ‘protection of the public is a key part of bail support work in
particular’
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Fig. 7.17a -  ‘meeting the needs of victims of crime is a key part of bail services
generally’
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Fig. 7.17b -  ‘meeting the needs of victims of crime is a key part of bail support
work in particular’
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Fig. 7.18a -  ‘improving time efficiency is a key part of bail services generally’
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Fig. 7.18b -  ‘improving time efficiency is a key part of bail support work in
particular’
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Fig. 7.19a -  ‘the nature and extent of recorded youth crime in Baytown plays a
key part in directing bail services generally’
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Fig. 7.19b -  ‘the nature and extent of recorded youth crime in Baytown
plays a key part in directing bail support work in particular’
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Appendix F
Schedule for interviews with young people
YOUNG PERSONS1 QUESTIONNAIRE  
INTRODUCTION
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. None of the 
information that you give me will have your name on it if it is used in the 
research report, so no-one will be able to tell what you have said.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. How old are you? ____________ years (_______ when on bail
support)
2. What were you doing before you went onto the bail support project 
(e.g. school, work, training, etc.)?
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W HAT HAPPENED IN COURT, BEFORE YOU W ENT ONTO THE BAIL 
SUPPORT SCHEME
3. Had you heard about the project before you were referred onto it, for 
example did you know about the leaflets about the project available in 
the court?
[ i Yes iz z i  No
4. Did you go onto the project the first time you appeared in court?
tzm Yes i □ No
5. Before you actually started on the project, how did you feel about 
going onto it?
6. Did you plead guilty or show you were sorry for committing the 
offence before you were placed on the bail support scheme? 
a  yes c = i No
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7. On a scale of 1 to 5, how much do you agree with this statement? 
My bail support application was well presented in court by the YOT or 
solicitor.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5
Why did you give this answer?
YOUR NEEDS AND PROBLEMS
8. What needs and problems would you say are important in your life? 
Do you think they have played a part in you committing crime? Why 
did you give these answers?
442
INFORMATION ABOUT W ORK YOU HAVE DONE AS PART OF THE  
BAIL SUPPORT SCHEME
9. Which of these things did you have to do as part of your bail support 
package? Did you think doing these things was useful, and why?
a ) 1=1 A curfew, or reporting at a police station (if you had to go to the 
police, how often did you have to go?)
Was it useful? 
Why?
□ Yes i—i No
b) □  Complying with what the Youth Offending Team told you to do?
Was it useful? □ Yes nil No
Why?
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c) n  Having to live in one particular place while you were on bail
support? 
Was it useful? □ Yes CD No
Why?
d) 1=1 Training or education? 
Was it useful? n  
Why?
Yes □ No
e) n  Drug or alcohol treatment (if so, who did you do this with?)
Was it useful? □ Yes □ No
Why?
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f) n  Not speaking to or meeting up with certain people? 
Was it useful? □  Yes □  No
Why?
g) n  Anything else? If so, what?
Was it useful? □  Yes □  No
Why?
10. Did you breach the bail support package?
□  Yes □  No
If you did, what did you do to breach the bail support package?
445
AFTER BAIL SUPPORT
11. Did you think that being on bail support made a positive difference 
to what happened to you afterwards (including the sentence you got)? 
□  Yes □  No
Why?
12. Are you in prison now, or have you been in prison before? 
n  Yes □  No
13. In general, what does being on bail or bail support mean to you?
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14. In general, what does prison and being in prison mean to you?
15. Is there anything else you would like to say about the questions 
I’ve asked you?
Thank you again for agreeing to let me interview you. Can I just remind 
you that your name will not appear on any of the information that you 
have given me which is used in the final written report of the research, so 
nobody will be able to tell what you have said, or even that you have 
taken part in the research.
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Appendix G
Figures illustrating the responses to the quantitative Likert 
scale questions asked as part of the young people’s 
interview schedule
Appendix G includes the full responses to the quantitative Likert scale 
questions asked as part of the young person’s interview schedule. The data from 
these questions is reported on and discussed in Chapter Eight above, and references 
to individual figures in Chapter Eight refer to and correspond with the figures included 
in this appendix.
Fig. 8.1 -  ‘did you plead guilty or show you were sorry for committing the 
offence before you were placed on the bail support scheme?’
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Fig. 8.2 -  ‘my bail support application was well presented in court by the
YOT or solicitor’
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Fig. 8.3 -  social needs identified as reasons for offending190
2 -
drug and/or 
alcohol abuse
accommodation exclusion from 
education
family problems school bullying
190 In Figure 8.3, the responses for family problems and school bullying as needs which were factors in 
offending were the result of the ‘other’ option on the questionnaire, i.e. after the interviewees had been 
asked about the specified options, they were also asked if there were any other social needs 
contributing to their offending which had not yet been mentioned.
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Fig. 8.4 -  conditions of bail support imposed
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Fig. 8.5 -  number of interviews reporting usefulness of conditions 
imposed, in terms of helping to prevent future re-offending
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Fig. 8.6 -  incidence of breach of bail support conditions
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Fig. 8.7 -  whether breach of bail support package was a new criminal 
offence (from total number of breaches)
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Fig. 8.8 -  whether interviewees felt that being on bail support had had a 
positive impact on what happened afterwards (including sentencing)
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Appendix H
Issues affecting Baytown youth justice bail services 
following the introduction of Intensive Supervision and 
Surveillance Programmes (ISSP) for young people on bail
The Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme (hereafter ISSP) was 
introduced in the Baytown YOT towards the end of the study period for this thesis 
(2001-2002). Funding from the Youth Justice Board was received in late 2001, and 
the ISSP team was in place by the end of the study period. Bail ISSP had the 
potential to change the face of bail services in Baytown, in the sense that the criteria 
for referring young people onto bail support changed. Evaluation of bail ISSP in 
Baytown was beyond the scope of the thesis, since detailed analysis of the new 
scheme would have reduced the scope of the analysis into existing bail services 
which has comprised the subject matter of the thesis. Undertaking in-depth 
evaluation of a tangibly different project would also have disrupted the overall 
integrity of the thesis. As an alternative, this appendix gives a brief overview of the 
key issues affecting the Baytown youth justice bail process following the introduction 
of ISSP, as well as background information on the aims and objectives of the new 
ISSP project.
Specific criteria for referral onto the ISSP scheme were introduced when the 
scheme was implemented in Baytown. If these criteria were met in any particular 
young person’s case, then referral to ISSP was automatic, whether the young person 
was on bail or had been sentenced. The criteria for referral to the ISSP were:
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• The young person had to have been charged with at least four offences in the 
twelve months previous to the date on which he or she was charged with the 
current offence.
• All of these charges had to have ‘stuck’ (i.e. if any were discontinued at any time, 
then they did not count towards the target of four or more).
• The young person had to have received at least one previous supervision 
sentence.
This meant that whenever a young person on bail met these criteria, the ISSP 
team offered a bail support package. Therefore they assumed responsibility for 
monitoring bail support work in these cases, taking over from the ‘old’ YOT bail team. 
The young people who were referred onto ISSP while on bail gained access to an 
extended range of activities that were set up as part of ISSP. These young people 
were also to be monitored by the police, following an agreement by local police to do 
this work. This arrangement was in contrast to the vague arrangements for the 
monitoring of bail conditions that existed between the ‘old’ bail team and the Baytown 
police (see Chapter Six above).
The ISSP scheme claimed to be aiming to tackle the problems which hindered 
the bail support service for young people in Baytown previously. One of the main 
obstacles for bail support services in the area, as the thesis showed (particularly in 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight above), was the lack of suitable accommodation for 
young people who might be eligible for bail support. On several occasions during the 
study period, a young person met the locally defined criteria for bail support eligibility, 
but had no bail address (frequently because the young person in question had left 
the family home and had no suitable alternative accommodation while on bail), and 
as a result was denied bail. The ISSP scheme aimed to remedy this problem by
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‘ring-fencing’ a number of beds at a local site run by Futurebuild191, near to the centre 
of Baytown. This had the advantage of being close to the Baytown Youth Court, 
reducing transportation problems as well as increasing locally available bail 
accommodation. Both of these factors had an impact on bail support services 
previously. The nearest available bail hostel was in Steeltown (see above, Chapter 
Eight), since Futurebuild would not previously accept young people on bail support. 
The ISSP team aimed to make dedicated bail support beds available at the Baytown 
Futurebuild site, but this was still under discussion when the study period ended.
The ISSP team also set up a range of other activities, which all of those young 
people referred to the ISSP scheme, whether as part of their sentence or as part of a 
bail support package, were able to use. These included a music course, teaching 
young people about music and allowing them access to musical instruments and a 
recording studio; anger management classes, which were already in place as a 
resource at the Baytown YOT192; mentoring, accessing volunteers through the local 
agency which had previous provided the ‘old’ Baytown bail team with volunteers for 
appropriate adult work193; and courses in motor mechanics, among other things.
Some pilot work was carried out before the priorities of the ISSP bail support 
service could be set. In particular, the co-ordinator of the ISSP team wished to 
secure particular information before piloting began. This information centred around 
the following:
•  Previous rates of remand to custody for young people in Baytown, and the cross- 
referencing of previous remands to custody to ascertain their eligibility for ISSP 
on the date on which they were remanded;
191 A pseudonym given to a charitable organisation working with young people and the homeless.
192 Access was provided via the community psychiatric nurse on the Baytown YOT staff, who ran them 
from a gymnasium which he owned in Baytown.
193 But see Chapter Six for the problems arising from this arrangement in practice.
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• The rate of remands to custody at Saturday courts194;
•  The rate of young people from Baytown being remanded to custody at courts 
outside Baytown -  the issues here being that the Baytown bail team were either 
not informed that the young person was appearing and risked being remanded to 
custody, or that the bail team found out about the case but could not travel to 
represent the young person when he or she was appearing in court, and present 
a bail support package to the court;
•  The rate at which young people from Baytown had been remanded to custody (at 
least partly) on grounds supported by the reason that they had no available bail 
address.
It seemed probable that the implementation of the ISSP scheme and its 
application to young people who were persistent, but not necessarily serious 
offenders (since the criterion for acceptance onto the ISSP scheme for those on bail 
was persistent offending) would increase the number of young people being referred 
onto the bail support scheme in the Baytown YOT area. It was interesting to note 
that for the first time since the Baytown YOT bail support scheme received funding to 
extend its development to all young people between 10 and 17 years old (in 
September 1999), clearly defined referral criteria had been applied to at least part of 
its operation. The introduction of bail ISSP also meant that for the first time since the 
start of the study period, there were extra, dedicated staff who would only be working 
with young people on a bail support package. These staff remained separate, 
however, from the ‘old’ bail team, whose functions regarding ‘the trawl’, remand in 
custody visits, appropriate adult work and so on were scheduled to remain the same 
following the introduction of ISSP.
194 At which, as noted above in Chapter Six, YOT bail staff did not offer bail interventions.
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Also for the first time, extra resources were dedicated specifically, not directly 
for bail support work as such, but for some young people who will be allowed onto 
the bail support scheme through their eligibility for ISSP. Such a development 
contrasted sharply with the attitudes of the ‘old’ bail team towards dedicated bail 
support workers (see Chapter Six above). The resources to allow young people to 
undertake a course in music theory and production, for example, had never been 
accessed before. It is interesting to note, however, that the local resources 
employed by the ISSP team were for the most part accessible previously (for 
example, courses in motor mechanics), but were not used by the ‘old’ team.
Given these preliminary issues, the impact of the new staff who would be 
working specifically with young people on bail support was likely to be considerable, 
especially in terms of their differences in attitude towards bail support work. Those 
on the ‘old’ team consistently argued that bail support is a service designed only for a 
fairly specific minority of young people, usually (in practice) those who have 
committed a relatively serious offence without any history of serious or persistent re­
offending (see in particular Chapter Six above). However, as noted in Chapter Six 
above, staffing levels on the bail team were halved during the study period. The two 
‘new’ members of the team, who were employed (originally) to deal with the extended 
bail support service, left the bail team within two years of their appointment.
The ‘old’ team’s cautious, negative attitudes towards bail intervention therefore 
endured, despite the Home Office decision to stop sending young people remanded 
in custody to HMP Baytown and to start sending them, along with all other young 
people from South Wales who were remanded in custody, to YOI Stonewall (see 
Chapters Six and Eight above). Under the old process, the close proximity of the 
YOT offices to HMP Baytown, and the close links and protocol formed between the 
staff of the two organisations, meant that it was easy for the Baytown YOT bail team
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to visit those remanded in custody, and assess their vulnerability and possible 
suitability for bail support work. However, once the new procedure came into effect, 
the previous response to it remained, managed as it was by staff who historically 
were very suspicious of proactive bail intervention.
It may be that the remand to custody was not taken as seriously by the bail 
team when the young people were being remanded to custody locally, within easy 
reach of the YOT and their families, and that this may have contributed to their 
attitude that bail support should only be used ‘in exceptional circumstances’ (see 
Chapter Six in particular). The introduction of dedicated bail support staff, who were 
outside the direct control of the ‘old’ team in terms of the work that they undertook, 
and the referrals to bail support that they made, aimed to change the quantity and 
quality of bail support work done with young people in Baytown. Moreover, given the 
resources allocated to the new ISSP service (in terms of finance, staff and facilities), 
this aim was likely to come to fruition.
As a rough measure of the impact of ISSP, basic follow-up enquiries after the 
end of the study period (in August 2003) revealed that there had been a total of 33 
remands to custody in the Baytown area over the previous year. While it was not 
possible to compare these data directly with that obtained during the study period (for 
example, the 2002-3 figures given above do not take into account the frequency, 
nature and seriousness of offending), Tables 4.12, 4.21 and 4.25 in Appendix C 
above (reported on in Chapter Four) show that there were a total of 287 remands to 
custody recorded during the three-year study period. Therefore, during the study 
period, there were an average of 95.7 remands to custody per year. While it must be 
re-emphasised at this point that the 2002-3 figures do not control for offending 
patterns in any way, the total of 33 remands to custody over this period was 
noticeably lower than the study period average. There is clearly, therefore, scope for
461
follow-up research which compares the operation of, and local attitudes towards, 
ISSP bail services in Baytown with the data on the previous services which has been 
gathered and analysed in this thesis.
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